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THE PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY

OF

PIETRO POMPONAZZI
THE PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY
OF
PIETRO POMPONAZZI

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PREFACE

THE following essay on the philosophy of Pietro Pomponazzi—or Petrus Pomponatius—was originally written by its author as a thesis for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts in the University of Cambridge. He did not publish it, because he intended it to form part of a more general and complete account of the movement of opinion to which Pomponazzi's writings contributed—an account in which more positive results would have supplemented the negative phase which dominates Pomponazzi's thought. His too early death prevented the execution of this project; and now, after consultation with those well able to advise, the present volume is published. It need hardly be said that it is a purely historical study of a phase and stage of opinion remote from that of its author.

The first three chapters were regarded by him rather as an introductory restatement of results obtained and accredited by other scholars than as a direct or original research. The remaining chapters embody the fruits of a direct examination of the writings of Pomponazzi.
The editors are responsible for the division into chapters, for the translations in the text, and for such alterations and amendments as fell to be made in preparing and publishing the manuscript.

C. D.
R. P. H.

June 1910.
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INTRODUCTORY NOTE

PIETRO POMPONAZZI is a unique figure in the history of the last phase of scholasticism.

Born at Mantua in 1462, he studied philosophy and medicine in Padua, and taught first there and afterwards at Ferrara and Bologna. At Bologna he died in 1524. His life was wholly that of a student; and his disinterested pursuit of truth subjected him to constant censure and even to persecution.

His singularity consists in the fact that, while he lived in the very heart of the Renaissance period, and while his work forms an integral part of the intellectual change which the revival of learning produced, he is himself apparently uninfluenced by the spiritual circumstances of his time. He is unaffected by the new discovery of Plato which inspires Plethon and Ficino, and Pico della Mirandola. The repudiation of Aristotle as a pagan Oriental finds no echo in his thought. He is not led away from the subtleties of scholastic theology by the enlarging influence of classical learning which withholds Erasmus, his contemporary, from doctrinal controversy. He is not confronted with the fresh spiritual realities which in the same years possess the mind of Savonarola. He becomes neither scholar nor saint, but remains an Aristotelian student in the direct line of the scholastic tradition, occupied with the problems of the schoolmen and inheriting their instrument of thought—the Aristotelian logic.

In others we perceive scholasticism and the old intellectual world undergoing change from without, through the intrusion of new interests or the discovery of new realms of knowledge. In
Pomponazzi we see a different spectacle. We see scholasticism, unmixed with streams from any source except its own, undergoing inward changes not less complete and not less significant than those which, in other minds, are brought upon it from elsewhere.

To the contemporaries of Pomponazzi, the main interest of his writings was in his conclusions—in his refusal to accept the reasoning either of the argument for individual immortality which St Thomas drew from Aristotle, or of the more subtle construction put by Averroes upon the Master, to prove for humanity in the abstract an immortality denied to individual men.

But to us the transient phase of a perennial problem—the dead controversy and all its vanished presuppositions—the denial by thought of that which is yet yielded to faith—these are less interesting than the emergence in Pomponazzi of a new comprehension and use of Aristotelian philosophy. The vital fact is not that he refuses the conclusions of St Thomas and the Arabians, but that he changes their methods, and reverts to simpler and clearer ways of thinking which he finds for himself in Aristotle.

This is really the end of scholasticism. Pomponazzi, the last of the schoolmen, is, in a sense, the first of the Aristotelians.

C. D.

R. P. H.
CHAPTER I

ARISTOTLE IN THE EARLY MIDDLE AGES

Mediaeval thought is not easy to understand, either in its strength or in its weakness. In its earlier stages especially it eludes our comprehension, and baffles every effort of a modern mind to grasp its presuppositions or follow its processes with anything like sympathy or intelligence. Perhaps we shall best be enabled to comprehend it by approaching it, not at its obscure beginnings, but backwards from its end; and by observing the fabric in its dissolution. It is not unreasonable to expect that a great deal may be learned about the scholastic period by taking our stand with those who stood upon its nearer verge. They may reveal to us whatever was true and valuable in mediaeval ideas by expressing them in language that is closer to our own. We shall also be helped to unravel the fallacies of a scholasticism which still clings at many points to popular thought, by the experience of those who were undergoing a personal emancipation from its grosser errors.

In Pomponazzi we have precisely that admixture of the old and the new which from this point of view it is interesting to study. In various parts of his works we are able to perceive the dawn of ideas and methods of thought which have since prevailed. On one page he is occupied with questions and controversies whose interest has long ago perished and whose presuppositions have disappeared with the change of the standpoint of thought; on the next, he employs and even expounds positive and empirical methods of reasoning which are the permanent foundation of science. And, once again, in the application even of true methods, he is misled by meagre or
erroneous information, and remains the victim of innumerable superstitions. Pomponazzi may be called one of the earliest of the moderns; but it is even more instructive to observe that he was one of the last of the schoolmen.

Pomponazzi is especially memorable as one of the first to receive Aristotle's doctrine of the Soul in its simplicity, and to escape from the monstrous shadows of Averroism. For *a priori* speculations as to the nature of intelligence and of spiritual substances, speculations which had attained to mythological dimensions, he substituted an attempt, imperfect yet genuine, at direct observation and analysis of the character of intelligence in man.

The change which he made is not sufficiently accounted for by the influence upon him of the Greek commentators on Aristotle, since in his conception of human intelligence Pomponazzi rose almost as far above Alexander as above Averroes; and it is on this account completely misleading to represent the controversy which divided the Italian universities in the 16th century, simply as a dispute between the followers of Averroes and those of Alexander of Aphrodisias in the interpretation of Aristotle. We shall see upon closer examination that this account of the matter is altogether too simple. Meanwhile two observations may be made. On the one hand, many or most of those who invoked the authority of Averroes had introduced a garbled Averroism which really travestied the doctrine of the Arabian and turned it upside down. Not only did they employ his dogma of an eternal Intelligence of collective humanity to support individual immortality, which Averroes probably did not profess to hold, and at any rate could not hold consistently; but, in order to do this, they had abandoned the

1 As is done, for example, by J. A. Symonds, *Renaissance in Italy*, Vol. v. p. 472: "There were two ways of regarding Aristotle's doctrine of the active intellect. The one was to view the Nous as a development from the soul, which in its turn should be conceived as a development from the senses. The other was to recognise it as separate from the soul and imported from without.... The latter found able expression at the hands of his Arabic commentator Averroes. The former was maintained by the fullest and latest of the Greek Peripatetics, Alexander of Aphrodisias." (It is difficult to see in what sense Alexander can be called the latest of the Greek Peripatetics; but to ascribe to him the view, that the Nous is not imported from without, is to affirm the exact opposite of the truth.)
most characteristic tenet of Averroism, namely that individual men do not naturally possess true reason, but receive it by "union" with the common Intelligence. On the other hand Pomponazzi was not merely a follower of Alexander. While largely influenced by Alexander, he presented that commentator's doctrine of the soul with a difference of which he may himself have been more or less unconscious, but which is of material consequence to the comparison of ancient and modern thought. Pomponazzi's doctrine of man's participation in intelligence is something quite different from Alexander's doctrine of Divine "assistance"—of the νοῦς ποιητικὸς in a theological sense, acting from without upon the human soul: Pomponazzi is less dualistic and theological, more positive and humanistic than Alexander. And corresponding to this difference, there is a different conception of the soul; since to Alexander no more than to Averroes did the human soul naturally or in itself possess true intelligence.

The psychology of Pomponazzi, accordingly, had in reality a deeper root than his reading of Alexander, since in an essential point he refused Alexander's guidance and indeed on that issue diverged alike from Alexander and from Averroes in a manner which is of the greatest interest to those who seek to trace the growth and origin of modern modes of thought. The truth is that Pomponazzi, largely neglecting baseless speculations, concerned himself with intelligence as it exists in man. Abandoning the search after "separate substances," at least so far as man is concerned, he examined intelligence as it is actually manifested in human nature. It was in virtue of this method of positive analysis that he approximated so closely to the original doctrine of Aristotle. Following Alexander, he held that such an analysis discovered no soul existing in separation from the body; but then he did not, like Alexander, distinguish true intelligence from the soul of man as something above it, and only visiting it from without; on the contrary, he held that the "intellectual soul" of man was possessed of true intelligence.

This way of approaching the issues concerning intelligence and the soul seems, when compared with mediaeval modes of thought, to indicate a new standpoint and a new mental attitude.
In reality it was an old standpoint that had been recovered again—the original standpoint of Aristotle.

It is true that Pomponazzi still speaks of the soul’s “participation” in intelligence, and so far uses the language of dualism which was the legacy of the Middle Ages. It is true also that he adopts, though only after a conventional and perfunctory manner, in relation to a mythical world of superior Intelligences, the notion of intelligence as “separate substance” independent of body and matter. But these are not the elements in Pomponazzi’s mind which are of most interest to the historian tracing in him the onward movement of thought. They are part of the furniture of his mind, not without historical significance; but it is not in these traditional features of his belief, but in more personal mental activities exercised apart from them and in spite of them, that we find the spirit of the time expressed, and that immanent logic at work, to trace which is to write the history of philosophy. It is in the spirit of Aristotle that Pomponazzi considers human intelligence, which is the real subject of his interest and of his personal contribution to thought. He finds by a positive analysis that the soul of man is possessed of intelligence; and the soul is known to us in body, is never manifested to us except in body, and is indeed but the highest aspect and true being of that body. There is, he contends, no evidence of any “separate” existence of the soul. We have no knowledge of any other mode of being for a soul, which thus, and only thus, presents itself to us.

Now, whatever we are to think of the conclusions at which Pomponazzi arrived as to the constitution of the human being, and as to the worth, significance, and prospect of human life, this is the only scientific method of approaching the study of man.

Every mediaeval and every later Alexandrian interpretation of Aristotle had been coloured by Neo-Platonism. The idea of the individual soul as a substance, separate and self-existent, which prevailed with practical uniformity in the orthodox schools from patristic down to modern times, can be traced historically through the theology of Augustine back to the influence of the
Alexandrian thinkers who first expressed Platonic conceptions in the forms of the Aristotelian logic. So also with that separation of intelligence from the soul, which is so characteristic of the Arabians, and which gave rise to the fantastic speculations as to the real nature of human intelligence conceived as substantially separate from the soul of man, and to the interminable, because fictitious, question about the soul’s participation in intelligence. This false abstraction was likewise derived from the Neo-Platonic metaphysics of those early discussions in which Arab Peripateticism took its rise. And certainly, among the commentators on Aristotle, Alexander of Aphrodisias was no exception to this rule: although a predecessor of Neo-Platonism in the official sense, he interpreted Aristotle in accordance with the postulates of a metaphysical dualism.

It cannot of course be said that the original doctrine of Aristotle about the intellectual soul of man (ψυχὴ νοητικὴ) is free from obscurity or even from ambiguity. The contradictions, at least in appearance, of that doctrine have been abundantly illustrated by Zeller¹ and others. The soul of man is the “form” of his body; that is the standpoint from which Aristotle’s investigation of human nature starts; and within the conception thus determined the whole enquiry moves. Soul and body are one as the wax and the form into which it is impressed are one; the body is what it is only in virtue of the soul, as an eye is an eye only in virtue of the power of seeing, and an axe is an axe only in virtue of its power of cutting: the eye is “the pupil and the vision.” But then Reason (νόης), which is the faculty of the soul as intellectual (νοητική), is spoken of as something essentially separate from the body. It does not first come into existence when it “enters into” the body; nor does it perish with the body; although of its previous or subsequent existence we, whose thought is conditioned by sense and sensuous representation, can form no idea. Yet is reason as in man not to be identified with a Divine or extramundane Reason; it is a true part of the human soul. Again, there seems to be a contradiction between the conceptions of “active” and “passive” reason; and although the process described as “passive reason”

—the operation of thought upon the data of sense—is psychologically verifiable, and it was important that it should thus be signalised, it is not easy to reconcile the actual facts of that process with the definition given of thought under the name of "active reason." Finally, there is on this view of reason no ground for the determination of personality. Personal identity cannot be supposed to be determined by the lower faculties of the soul; but reason as defined is essentially impersonal, its imperishability, for instance, by no means implying personal immortality\(^1\).

When Aristotle comes to the most difficult point, the transition namely from particular data of sense to the unity of a "thought," he introduces a principle of thought to explain the change; thought, he simply says, brings the universal conception from its potentiality (in "sense" and "imagination") to actuality. Psychologically, of course, this is no explanation. It does not explain for example why thought emerges in human experience only gradually, and at a certain stage.

Such was the deficiency of Aristotle's attempt at a psychological account of human thought as thought. The distinction and proper correlation of a metaphysical and a psychological or historical view of thought, were achievements not to be expected of ancient philosophy\(^2\). At the same time, even if he could not properly account for reason in the soul of man, or say why in him reason has just this history, Aristotle preferred to leave this difficulty standing, rather than, with Democritus and

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\(^1\) Cf. Zeller, op. cit. ii. pp. 125 ff. Siebeck (Geschichte der Psychologie, i. 2, pp. 122, 126) describes this ambiguity in Aristotle's doctrine of the Nous as the intrusion of a metaphysical conception into his psychological account of human nature. This point (Siebeck remarks) was early brought to light by the question of Theophrastus:—"Why then is thought not present in its full activity in the child?" A principle of thought entering in "from without"—why should it not shew itself at once? Why should such a faculty of thought be delayed by any conditions, why should it be subject to any necessity of growth and development at all? Aristotle was doubtless perfectly conscious that he did not offer any explanation of the emergence of the various powers of the soul. He did not suggest any derivation, for example, from one another or from any source, of the vegetative and sensitive powers of the soul, any more than of its thinking power. It would probably have seemed sufficient, for him, to refer to the macrocosmic organism, and in particular to the place Thought was believed to hold there.

\(^2\) Siebeck, op. cit., i. 2, p. 127.
Epicurus, to underestimate the rational factor in human life. He determined fully to recognise the peculiar character of thought as such in the soul of man.

The achievement of Aristotle with reference to the soul of man may be summed up in three particulars.

(a) In advance on Plato he substituted science—a method of empirical observation and genetic biological analysis—for mythology in psychology.

(b) He recognised at the same time the true nature of thought and of thought as it exists in man.

In his view of reason Aristotle remained an idealist. His failure to balance his doctrine of universal and timeless reason with any deduction of personality has already been referred to.

(c) He attributes the power of thought, so understood, to the essential nature of man. The νοῦς πνευματικός is a part of the soul—of that soul which is the "form of the body" of man. It is neither a separate substance existing outside of the man as man, nor an emanation or communication of a superior spiritual being not himself. It is εν τῷ ψυχῇ. The distinction between active and potential reason is a distinction within the soul itself. Reason is a part of the soul (μοριον τῆς ψυχῆς): it is said to be a higher aspect or kind of the soul—ψυχῆς γένος ἐτερον (which does not in reality mean another soul): and this although in another point of view it is χωριστός. Whether the

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1 Siebeck, op. cit. i. 2, p. 123.
4 "Hatte doch Aristoteles selbst im Grunde der Sache nicht auf der naturalistischen sondern auf der platonischen Seite gestanden. Wenn er namentlich in seiner Psychologie sich als Empiriker zeigte, so war dies bei ihm mehr durch das Interesse an wissenschaftlicher Methode und sorgfältiger Beobachtung bedingt, und er selbst hatte gerade an der bedeutungsvollsten Stelle jener Untersuchungen, in der Lehre von der Vernunft, durch das Abbrechen der naturalistischen Entwicklungsreihe die Schranke des Naturalismus deutlich hervortreten lassen." Siebeck, op. cit. i. 2, p. 298.
apparent contradiction in these terms is really a contradiction, and whether in ascribing reason to the soul of man Aristotle passed beyond the scope of his original enquiry into man as a natural being, is the question to which all philosophy seeks an answer. It may be repeated again that Aristotle’s affirmation of reason in man was to a large extent a dogmatic affirma-

Aristotle, however, cannot at any rate be held responsible for the notion of the soul as a “separate substance” or for the separation of “intelligence” from the soul, although both these corruptions of his doctrine soon sprang up within his school, and both may partly be attributed to the dogmatic introduction of a timeless principle of reason into the nature of man, and to the abrupt juxtaposition of intelligence beside the lower powers of the soul. On the one hand the soul being identified with reason might be separated from the physical nature of man; or, on the other hand, if the soul were still regarded as the form of body, “reason” might be distinguished from the “soul”: and as a matter of fact the doctrine of Aristotle came to be perverted in both of these directions by those who considered themselves his followers. Under various influences the idea took shape of the soul, the organ of intelligence, as a separate substance metaphysically distinguished from the body; and this conception prevailed largely throughout the Middle Ages, even when combined with a nominal adherence to the Aristotelian formula that soul is the “form” of body. In other minds the Aristotelian language about νοῦς, reinforced by more or less of Platonic

1 Cf. Siebeck, op. cit. 1. 2, pp. 122, 123: “Da er die untern Seelenvermögen nur empirisch beschreibt und von nirgends her ableitet, so bleibt die Notwendigkeit unerklärt, derzufolge der Geist als seine anthropologische Unterlage und Bedingung seines bewussten Wirkens sich gerade diese Stufen des Seelenlebens in diesem bestimmten Verhältnisse zu einander geschaffen hat. Hierbei mag dem Philosophen immerhin die Anerkennung dafür unversagt bleiben, dass er sich lieber dazu entschloss, diese Schwierigkeit, deren er sich voll und ganz bewusst ist, bestehen zu lassen, als die Thatsache der Eigenartigkeit des denkenden Factors, wie Demokrit und Epikur thaten, zu unterschätzen.”

influence, suggested a metaphysical separation of intelligence and the natural soul. A tendency to this mode of dualism shewed itself very early among would-be interpreters of Aristotle; it was essentially characteristic of Alexander of Aphrodisias; and it reached its full development in the speculations of the Arabians. To Alexander the Intelligence productive of true knowledge in the human soul might be the Divine Reason, to Averroes an intermediate intellectual Power; both alike, while holding with more or less comprehension and consistency that "soul" was the "form of body," denied to soul as such the natural possession of "intelligence."

The earliest disciples of Aristotle began, like him, with man as a physical being; but they failed to follow him further, and, missing the impulse which urged their master to unify the life of man and to attribute to the soul which was all the while the "form of the body" the possession of reason (ψυχή νοητική), they relapsed into a practical materialism. Even they however could not ignore the νοῦς χωριστός of the master's system, though they relegated it as far as possible to a higher sphere and denied its part in the actual life of the soul of man. Stoic influences doubtless co-operated in this early materialistic tendency.

With the reaction against such an interpretation of Aristotle began the development of the two dualistic theories that have been referred to—the theory of the separateness from the body of the soul in its higher functions, and the theory of the separation of intelligence from the soul. Yet each of these attempts to escape from materialism was also a natural outgrowth from what had gone before; for the doctrine of an "assisting" Intelligence, in the simple form in which it was held by thinkers like Alexander, was only a more consistent application of the dualistic scheme which lay behind the naturalism of the earliest Peripatetics; and, on the other hand, the corporeal notion of

1 Cf. Ravaisson, Métaphysique d'Aristote, II. pp. 50, 51: "Dans Théophraste, dans ses contemporains Cléarque, Aristoxène, et Dicésarque, dans Straton, une double tendance se manifeste de plus en plus, d'une part à délaisser dans sa solitude le principe hyperphysique de l'acte et de la pensée pure, unique objet de la philosophie première ; de l'autre, dans la physique, à unir intimement la pensée, l'âme, la forme intelligible avec le mouvement, la matière, la puissance."
soul current in the Stoic schools was a large factor in the conception of the soul as a "spiritual" substance.

The physical and quasi-physical theories of the Stoics, and of those who mingled Stoicism with the doctrines of Aristotle, helped the formation of the "substantial" notion of the soul.

The conception was widely current and popularly influential which regarded soul as one form or manifestation of "spirit" (πνεῦμα)—body being another. This was in intention an effort to distinguish soul from body, while at the same time accounting for the connection between the two. The use thus made of the conception of πνεῦμα might be traced back to its remote origin in the primitive notion of a peculiar power residing in air, wind, and breath, and exercised both in the universe generally and in the body of man. This primitive idea underwent an interesting theological development in Hebrew thought; among the Greeks it played a great part in physiological theory. Hence the universal rôle in the mechanics of life assigned by early medicine to breath, which was in the body as it were the organising power. Aristotle himself gives this place to πνεῦμα in the mechanism of the body, connecting it especially with vital heat: it was used by him, and still more by his successors, as a convenient explanation of unknown physiological processes (such, for example, as the functions of the nerves or the arteries). There had also been an early idea of a connection between πνεῦμα and soul as mind, and early theories of air or breath connecting soul and body.

But it was in the Stoic philosophy of nature that the idea of πνεῦμα reached its fullest development, as an explanation of vital and psychical phenomena. In working out their half materialistic and half mystical pantheism, the Stoics made large use of the primitive notion of a universal fire-force and of the later medical theories of πνεῦμα. They avoided the materialism into which a section of the Peripatetic school fell: soul, they said, could not be simply a product of body. Yet as compared with the idealism of Aristotle's doctrine—that body found in its

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1 Siebeck, op. cit. 1. 2, pp. 140, 141.
psychical (and intellectual) aspect its true being and meaning—the πνεύμα of the Stoics was essentially a physical principle, although it was intended to be something more, and, as the common source of body and soul, to combine in its potentialities the qualities of both.

"Spirit" then originally entered into psychology in a theory of the nature of the soul. It was not first introduced as a faculty or part of the soul, but by way of explaining its substantial nature. It may be said that to ancient thought ψυχή was the fact to be explained—organised matter, that is, and life, and the thinking being; and πνεύμα represented a theory of that fact. Originally, it stood for a physical explanation; and it was by a curious course of changes in language and thought that the "spiritual" came at last to mean precisely that which is not physical, which is purely immaterial.

This conception of "spirit," devised to form a common basis for soul and body, sprang from a sense of an antithesis between the two. From Aristotle's standpoint it was unnecessary to seek this basis of union, since in concrete reality soul and body were already one as form and matter. But the "pneumatic" theory proposed to harmonise them in a common derivation from a single universal force—which should be at once, as it were, matter attenuated to the point of immateriality and soul on a physical basis. Really, the separation supposed was not overcome by this means; soul and body remained two different manifestations of the original principles. Accordingly, as has been suggested above, the πνεύμα doctrine effectually prepared the way for the dualistic notion of body and soul as separate substances. On the other hand, the explanation given was in reality a physical one, and soul was reduced to terms of body. A dualistic account of soul and body cannot in fact be consistently maintained; soul and body are actually united; and if the true nature of their union be not discerned by a philosophical criticism like Aristotle's of the two ideas in correlation, one will always be merged theoretically in the other. The "spiritual" or "pneumatic" theory really merged soul in body.

It was, however, through various refinements that the original "pneumatic" theory of the soul passed into the doctrine of the
"separate spiritual substance." A combination of influences, proceeding from very different sources, led to the gradual sublimation of the πνεύμα ψυχικόν into something essentially immaterial.

There began, for example, very early, by reaction against the materialistic aspect of Stoicism, that reversion to Platonic modes of thought which eventually culminated in Neo-Platonism. A revived recollection of the Aristotelian doctrine of νοῦς χορηγός operated in the same direction, especially when Aristotle’s language was interpreted in a Platonic sense.

To this was added the influence of the Hebrew conception of “Spirit” when Hebrew thought, mainly through the Jewish and subsequently the Christian writers of Alexandria, found its way into the main stream of Western philosophy. Originally, no doubt, the conception of Ruach corresponded closely with that of πνεύμα in the primitive stage of Greek thought. But as it presents itself within the historical period, the Hebrew doctrine has a distinctive stamp upon it. It is probable that from very early times, in accordance with the Hebrew’s conception of the relation between God and Nature, the breath was to him something dynamic, separate from the matter into which it was breathed. It was of course derived from God. There remained, indeed, a marked physical colouring in the conception of this derivation: first, in so far as Spirit was represented mythologically as a substance intermediate between God and the world, and, as it were, hyper-physical; and secondly, in the imaginations that were formed of the manner of its emergence from the Divine Being. Over against this, however, was a strongly ethical delineation of the Spirit’s fruits and operation, and in general of the nature of God and man, especially in the New Testament. The ethical emphasis of Hebrew and Christian anthropology wrought powerfully towards the metaphysical conception of the “spirit” of man.

1 The whole Biblical doctrine of “Spirit,” and especially that of the New Testament, is more theological and ethical than psychological. St Paul’s doctrine of πνεύμα, in so far as it is a new doctrine, is theological and ethical. St Paul and other New Testament writers employ the language of the psychology accepted in their day, as indeed they could not but do; and in that language we may trace the survival of many Hebrew and Greek and indeed primitive ideas. (See Siebeck,
Speaking generally, theological ideas reacted on psychology. In the system of the Stoics, \( \pi\nu\varepsilon\iota\mu\alpha \) had constituted the substance not only of the world, physical and psychical, but of God as well; for indeed the two were in substance indistinguishable. Consequently, when a reviving Platonism and a Christian theology conceived in the Platonic spirit substituted for this idea of God that of a Being separated from matter, the new idea of God came to be read into the meaning of \( \pi\nu\varepsilon\iota\mu\alpha \), and affected directly the conception of the nature of the soul as \( \pi\nu\varepsilon\mu\alpha\tau\iota\kappa\iota \).

Thus we see the physical giving place to the immaterial signification of the words "spirit" and "spiritual."

The ideas of Philo represent a well-marked stage in this development. Subject as he was to all of the various influences which have just been enumerated, he combined all the main ideas of antiquity upon the subjects of the Universal Spirit and the soul of man in a syncretism which, while possessing the least possible positive value, is nevertheless of extraordinary historical interest. The Jewish Alexandrian philosophy may be said in a word to have combined the Greek with the Hebrew.

*op. cit. 1, 2, pp. 156, 157.*) But in so far as in his declarations about \( \pi\nu\varepsilon\iota\mu\alpha \) St Paul develops a specific doctrine, it is a doctrine of man's relation to God—of the relation to God, in particular, as the creative and indwelling Spirit, of those new and distinctive ethical experiences which he has as a Christian. Of physical effects of the Divine \( \pi\nu\varepsilon\iota\mu\alpha \) he traces none. Nay, further, it is the very point of all his assertions about the life of the \( \pi\nu\varepsilon\iota\mu\alpha \) in man that it has no relation at all to either \( \psi\upsilon\chi\theta \) or \( \nu\omicron\omicron\upsilon\sigma \). His \( \pi\nu\varepsilon\iota\mu\alpha \), then, is a religious dogma; it is his expression for a reference to God of the higher religious life of man. Whether St Paul in this theology altogether escaped the physical associations of the word \( \pi\nu\varepsilon\iota\mu\alpha \) is a question of great historical interest; it is certain that those who followed him in the doctrine of the Divine co-operation, and of grace, did not succeed in eliminating from it the physical element. (Cf. Hampden, *Bampton Lectures*, pp. 231, 235.) In St Paul's case it is to be observed that the union of man with God is not described in physical terms: it is "by faith"; its effects also, the "fruits of the Spirit," are ethical in their character. In conclusion it may be said that the New Testament doctrine of \( \pi\nu\varepsilon\iota\mu\alpha \) had not much to do with the subsequent development of ideas about the soul of man, except in so far as these were influenced by theology. Indirectly, it will be gathered from the text that theological influence played a considerable part—the ethical deepening, for example, produced by Christianity, and the new value set upon the individual soul, accentuating the problem presented by man's complex nature and requiring an analysis which should do justice to its higher elements; the Neo-Platonic theology, again, of the early Church corroborating the dogma of a "substantial" soul; or, once more, physical conceptions of grace or of the Divine Being, falling in with the physical aspect which those "spiritual" substances always retained.
idea of spirit, and to have found in both at once the Platonic and the Aristotelian reason (νοῦς). Philo adopts both the physical and the incorporeal conception of spirit (πνεῦμα), just as he seeks to combine in his own thought the λόγος of the Stoics and of Plato: πνεῦμα, in grosser or in finer form, is the nature of man as a living soul. The soul (ψυχή) Philo derives, following Aristotle on his naturalistic side, from the seed, but from a "pneumatic" element there. Again the νοῦς is implanted from without, and is not a part of the soul, having its υψιλα in the Divine Nature; but it also is πνεῦμα in the finest form. This πνεῦμα Philo now attempts to explain in Stoic fashion as matter refined to the point of immateriality, and again treats as essentially immaterial. He attempts to mediate between the two notions by means of such conceptions as those of invisibility and infinite extensibility. But the truth is that Philo represents the stage of transition between the Stoic idea of the materiality of the substance of the soul and the Platonic idea of its immateriality.

The Divine Logos, for example, of which the νοῦς is an image, is immaterial and transcendent. The νοῦς itself (which is πνεῦμα in its finest form) he speaks of in opposition to matter as incorporeal, but in comparison with Divine spirituality as "ethereal"—that is something intermediate between the material and the immaterial.¹

Philo's position at all events illustrates the development of the conception of a substance of the soul as separate from body. It is true that it is the νοῦς, which is not part of the soul, that attains or approaches most nearly to the attribute of immateriality; and that Philo, in whom we find everything of this sort, illustrates also that other corruption of Aristotle which metaphysically distinguishes soul from reason. But it is also evident that in Philo we make the transition to a Platonic or hyper-physical determination of the soul, with the final sublimation or rarefaction of πνεῦμα, of which ψυχή is a mode. The conception which begins to shew itself in Philo is at least something perfectly different from the πνεῦμα ψυχικόν of writers of

¹ Siebeck considers (op. cit. 1. 2, p. 155) that, in advance upon the Stoics, Philo regarded the πνεῦμα as essentially immaterial.
the school of Galen. If πνεῦμα was still in a theoretical sense physical, the features of materiality had altogether disappeared from it: it had the attributes of immateriality.

It only needed the outbreak of Neo-Platonism to complete the process. Plotinus, with both subtlety and justice, argued against the possibility of explaining either life or thought by means of a physical ("pneumatic") principle. He held himself bound indeed, in refusing a physical account of soul, to reject Aristotle’s doctrine that soul is the form of body. Certainly this was the exact opposite of the hypothesis of a separate physical substance; and it especially forbade a description of that substance in physical terms—of soul in terms of soul-less matter. The Neo-Platonist, however, turned the logical distinction between soul as such, and soul-less matter, into a metaphysical hypostasis of the informing soul. He changed a logical into an ontological question; and whereas in concrete reality soul and body are one being, he made an affirmation in the field of actual reality of that which could never possibly be verified as a fact—of the soul existing in abstract separation from the body.

Later Neo-Platonists declined into metaphysical and mythological speculations. The soul being abstractly conceived as independent of body, intermediate beings were invented to

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1 The following summary of his arguments is given by Siebeck: (1) Matter and body being essentially in flux require for any unity or intelligible form in them a unifying principle which cannot be material: (2) Every body has a definite way of working; "soul" can work equally in opposite effects: (3) The quality of soul is independent of quantity, e.g. in the living seed: (4) The distinction, comparison, and unification involved in perception imply an independent principle: (5) This principle cannot be corporeal; for if corporeal it would have parts, and then either the different parts of the thing perceived would impress the parts of the perceiving thing and the former would never be perceived as a whole; or, if perceived as a whole by each part of the perceiving soul, the thing perceived would give rise to as many perceptions, of itself as a whole, as the soul had parts: (6) If memory consisted only of the repetition of an impression on a corporeal substance, it could never come to pass; for the second impression would never be, physically, the same as the first: (7) Consciousness is a psychical fact with no physical concomitant: (8) The unquantified can be conceived by us: (9) If soul, itself physical, ran "through" body as was alleged, its evident separateness would be quite unaccounted for; besides that the whole idea of one physical substance penetrating another is unthinkable: (10) The ethical categories are inapplicable to soul in a merely "pneumatic" sense, and ethical qualities have no physiological analogue. *Op. cit.* 1. 4, pp. 316—318.
connect the two—for example, a “pneumatic” or ethereal body, or a material as well as an immaterial “part” of the soul. Similarly, the νοῦς πνευτικὸς being separated from the individual soul, intermediate beings were ranged between the two.

Neo-Platonism appeared as a reaction against the πνεῦμα theory; and Plotinus even declares that the relation of individual souls to the universal soul is not to be expressed in physical terms as a division and a relation of parts to a whole, but in logical terms as a relation of species and genus: so that the whole World-Soul is in every individual, and in all multiplication remains itself. Nevertheless there remained a largely physical element in the conception of souls as separate spiritual substances, which Neo-Platonism did so much to foster.

This was in itself inevitable; for the very antithesis of soul and body implies a fundamentally physical conception of the former; to conceive of the two as entities, distinct yet related, is to imply some community of nature between them and to put them in some sense upon a level. To speak of the soul as “separate” from the body is to use a mechanical category; to call it a “substance” is to employ physical associations. As a matter of history, the conception of the soul as a separate substance, although finally shaped under Platonic influence, was also largely suggested by that physical account of the soul as a mode of πνεῦμα, whose history we have been occupied in tracing.

A dualism which was a fundamental departure from the Aristotelian standpoint had originally suggested the πνεῦμα speculation; and that dualism continued to characterise the resultant doctrine of the nature of the soul. The duality of soul and body was only more definitely affirmed by Neo-Platonism. And finally, the view that the denial of the concrete unity of soul and body involves the merging of one in the nature of the other is vindicated in the fact that the idea of soul as a separate substance was a really mechanical and physical conception of it.

This idea, however, dominated the orthodox schools in the Middle Ages. Among the early Christian fathers we find the
πνεῦμα theory much in evidence, with the customary confusion of the physical and metaphysical meanings of the term; and writers like Lactantius and Tertullian definitely adopt the notion of the soul as refined matter, its rational part being the most refined of all. Augustine remained the ruling authority on the nature of the soul; and Augustine, while avoiding mythological extremes, was essentially a Neo-Platonist in this part of his doctrine. He follows the arguments of Plotinus for the immateriality of the soul; although still accepting the "pneumatic" physiology, and with it the belief in a refined physical medium through which soul acts on body. In itself, the soul is to him a single substance, with powers or faculties. He does not separate soul and reason. The soul as attached to body has sensitive and vegetative powers; as superior to body it exercises reason. How soul is united to body, it is impossible to explain: it is God's appointment. There is no fresh reference on Augustine's part to the original doctrine of Aristotle.

The emphasis laid by Christian belief upon the ethical side of life, and its estimate of the value of the individual soul, brought into view higher aspects of human nature of which a complete philosophy of man must take account. These interests naturally at that time led Christian thinkers to an alliance with Platonism, and generally, in the neglect of the true Aristotelian distinctions, tended towards dualism and an abstract isolation of the moral and reasonable soul. A great variety of influences also, of which Platonism was only one, betrayed the Church into the error of an ethical contrast between spirit and matter; and this again suggested a mutual independence of the two as substantial existences. The ethical value of matter in the development of spirit had not yet come into view for any one, although it might be unconsciously implied in the primitive spirit and characteristic genius of Christianity. Meanwhile, a common suspicion of matter formed a link between the Church and Platonism.

The earlier scholastic psychology was largely traditional, and inherited through Augustine a strong Platonic or Neo-Platonic cast. It is affirmed by Siebeck that in spite of the lapse of nearly a thousand years the development of thirteenth century
from patristic psychology is almost continuous, as if there had been no break\(^1\); and this was mainly due to the influence of Augustine\(^2\).

Throughout the earlier Middle Ages, Aristotle was known only in some of his logical writings. His name occurs in lists of the masters of the sciences, simply as that of the authoritative writer on dialectic\(^3\). It is after the thirteenth century that he is "Princeps philosophorum\(^4\)." The use, therefore, which was made of Aristotle in the earlier Middle Ages was chiefly formal. The question so persistently discussed, on the basis of a passage of Porphyry, about the real nature of "universals" no doubt involved far-reaching logical and ontological issues. But the prevalence of a crude "realism," and the strong influence of certain Neo-Platonic writers, such as the Pseudo-Dionysius, confined the influence of Aristotelian method to narrow limits. In psychological thought, as in theology, the Platonising tendency prevailed; and the forms of the Aristotelian logic were employed in the expression of a system whose conceptions were essentially Platonic or Neo-Platonic. No better illustra-

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1 Siebeck, *op. cit.* t. 2, 401, 402.

2 Jourdain, *Recherches sur les traductions Latines d'Aristote*, Paris, 1843, p. 212 fixes on 1220 or 1225 as the date at which a general knowledge of the works of Aristotle began to be diffused in the West. The books prohibited to the University of Paris in 1209 and 1215 under the name of Aristotle he considers to have been Arabian commentaries or possibly even apocryphal works like the *De Causis*. The original account of the transaction of 1209 speaks only of books on natural philosophy, and commentaries ("nec libri Aristotelis de naturali philosophia, nec commenta, legantur Parisiis publice vel secreto"); Roger Bacon in referring to the controversy speaks rather of expositions by Avicenna and Averroes than of original works of Aristotle; and we know that there was in existence an abridgement of the *Physics* of Arabian or Jewish origin (Jourdain, *op. cit.* p. 194), and the fact that the works in question were condemned expressly as the source of the heresies of Almaric and David of Dinant, both suggests that they were not original Aristotelian writings and illustrates the ignorance of Aristotle's real teaching which prevailed at that time (Jourdain, *op. cit.* pp. 187—199, 210—212).

3 Jourdain, *op. cit.* p. 28.

4 Hauréau (*De la philosophie scolastique*, 1. pp. 86—98: cf. Rousselot, *Études sur la philosophie dans le moyen âge*, t. pp. 31, 32; Jourdain, *op. cit.* chap. 1) mentions as the only sources of the knowledge of Aristotle before the twelfth century the *Isagoge* of Porphyry, in Boethius's commentary on it; the translation by Boethius with commentary of the *Peri Hermeneias*; and at a later date the same writer's translation with commentary of the *Categories*. These writings were the only genuine representations of Aristotle to the mediaeval mind until the translation of the Arabians began to be known in the eleventh and especially in the twelfth century.
ton of this could be taken than the scholastic conceptions of the soul; for even after the language of Aristotle about the soul had been recovered, it was understood in a Platonic sense. Like their Alexandrian predecessors, the schoolmen professed to be, and supposed themselves to be, Peripatetics; while they were only cutting into Aristotelian shapes a Platonic fabric of thought.

To this must be added the positive misrepresentations of Aristotle which prevailed before the thirteenth century. We need not perhaps attach much importance to the fact that the principal source of the earliest knowledge of Aristotle was a Neo-Platonist like Porphyry, since Porphyry's Platonism was never suspected by those who received at his hands the problem of universals; but we can hardly forget that Boethius had set before himself the object of reconciling Plato and Aristotle; and the fact is never to be lost sight of that the anonymous De Causis ascribed by Albert to a Jewish author—a compilation from late Greek and Arab sources, with a Neo-Platonic character so marked that St Thomas pronounced it to be extracted from Proclus—was long and generally ascribed to Aristotle. The identification with the name of Aristotle of the emanationist pantheism of Almaric and David of Dinant—which Rousselot, following Albert, traces to Arabian influences, and Jourdain in particular derives from the De Causis and the Fons Vitae of Avicebron—also illustrates the obscuring of the real Aristotle.

The confusion as to Aristotle's true doctrines did not of course pass away even after his writings had been fully translated and circulated. Another illustration will shew the persistency of the misunderstanding which had attributed to Aristotle the De Causis and the doctrines of Master David.

1 The parallel has been drawn by Schultze (Philosophie der Renaissance, p. 10). "Wie Proklos den gesammelten Inhalt des Neuplatonismus, so hat auch die Scholastik den der Kirchenlehre systematisch zu ordnen, und gerade wie Proklos sieht deshalb auch sie aus formalen Gründen sich genötigt, den Aristoteles wieder zu Rathe zu ziehen. Das Interesse an Aristoteles ist logischer Natur."


3 See Jourdain, op. cit. p. 196; Rousselot, op. cit. II. pp. 130—140; Hauréau, op. cit. I. pp. 382 ff.

4 Jourdain says, "Rien ne prouve mieux la connaissance imparfaite qu'on avait d'Aristote, que le don qu'on lui faisait de semblables doctrines." Op. cit. p. 196.
The apocryphal Theologia Aristotelis, although plainly a late Alexandrian composition and reflecting faithfully the doctrines of Plotinus, had been translated and circulated by the Arabian Peripatetics as a work of Aristotle. A reference to it by St Thomas shews that it had also gained acceptance in the West. As he remarks that it had not yet been translated into Latin (whether it were the original Greek, now lost, or an Arabic or Hebrew version that he had seen), it is not to be taken in evidence of the earlier Platonising interpretation of Aristotle in the European schools. But perhaps even more worthy of attention as illustrating a misapprehension of Aristotle's real meaning, prolonged over centuries, is the fact that such a writing should have passed for Aristotle's, not only in the time of Aquinas but even till the sixteenth century, when it was translated and presented to Leo X as a genuine work of Aristotle.

In so far as the question of universals was really a question between Plato and Aristotle (although the schoolmen themselves were very far from recognising that such was the issue), it may be said to have been decided by Abelard for Aristotle. But amid all the discussions about Ideas, the question of the soul

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1 De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas (St Thomas, Opera, 1593, Vol. xvii. f. 99 d 1): “Hujusmodi autem quaestiones certissime colligi potest Aristotelem solvisse in his libris, quos patet eum scripsisse de substantialis separatis...quos etiam libros vidimus numero 14, licet nondum translatos in lingua nostra.” The books of the Latin version of Theologia Aristotelis number fourteen.

2 See Munk, Mélanges de Philosophie juive et arabe, pp. 281—259; Ravaission, Métaphysique d'Aristote, ii. pp. 543—555.

The relation of these facts to the development of the mediaeval doctrine of the soul may be most simply illustrated by a couple of quotations from the Theologia Aristotelis upon that subject, which I borrow from the two authorities above referred to, namely Munk and Ravaission respectively. The following words declare for the existence of separate or immaterial substances: “Rationes, quod omnes substantiae sita primam consequent ex materia et forma quodque animus non intelligat nisi materialia, sunt falsae; siquidem plurimae substantiae sunt abstractae a materia, quorum numerum nos etiam prius in metaphysicis probavimus, uli etiam collegimus quod hujusmodi substantiae existunt perpetuae et incorruptibles, quum sint immateriales.” (Theol. Arist. vers. lat. lib. xiil. cap. 7, f. 66 b; Munk, op. cit. p. 252, note 3.) Secondly, this notion of a “substantial form”—form without matter—is applied to the soul: the soul of man is such a “separable” form, self-substantive, and existing in permanent independence of the body: “Quare essentia animae procul dubio restat superstes, corrupto corpore.” (Theol. Arist. lib. iii. cap. 7; Ravaission, op. cit. ii. p. 544). The difference between this conception and that of Aristotle is apparent.
ARISTOTLE IN THE EARLY MIDDLE AGES

had never been raised in a manner resembling that of Aristotle; and the great Dominican schoolmen, who were the most sober "conceptualists," and in many points understood Aristotle well, retained with reference to the soul the views which they had inherited from the Platonising fathers and which had had their birth in Alexandria. It cannot be denied, besides, that the long predominance, in the schools, of "realism" with regard to Ideas had created an intellectual atmosphere favourable to abstract spiritualism in psychology, and to the development of such an hypostasised abstraction as the "separable form," the "separate spiritual substance."

Accordingly the recovery in the thirteenth century of the true Aristotle did not alter rapidly the received ideas about the soul\(^1\); though a gradual infiltration can be traced of the Aristotelian idea of the soul into the thought of the thirteenth century scholastics. William of Auvergne draws the connection of soul and body closer than his predecessors, in so far as he makes the body a real part of man as a rational being; at the same time he refuses the Peripatetic doctrine of Avicebron with reference to form and matter, assigning to the soul, as immaterial, an independent and substantial existence. The localising of the soul (in the heart) is the stamp of this dualistic conception. Still, a transition is begun. Alfred had still earlier perhaps given a quasi vitalist account of the influence of soul, and described both soul and body as being what they are only in their conjunction; while still soul had a mode of being—indeterminate, however—previous to and apart from its embodiment; and, correlative, had its special organ in the body—the heart, from which all

\(^1\) Europe received the complete Aristotle almost simultaneously from two different quarters. On the one hand, the Arabian translations and commentaries began to be diffused by their Jewish and Spanish translators and expositors in the twelfth, and still more largely in the thirteenth century. On the other hand, the fall of Constantinople and the ransacking of the treasures of the East were soon followed by the circulation and translation of the original Greek texts.

The long process that followed is thus summed up by Siebeck (Gesch. d. Psych. \(1^1\) 2, p. 426): "Der Uebergang von dem mehr platonischen zu dem entschieden peripatetischen Standpunkte lässt sich bei Wilhelm von Auvergne (1449) deutlich beobachten. Die aristotelische Auffassung von der Seele als Lebenskraft vermischt sich hier (wie übrigens auch bei späteren Aristotelikern) mit der platonischen von dem Leibe als dem Werkzeuge der Seele."
bodily motion, set up by the immaterial soul, proceeded by the agency of the pneuma. Finally Alexander of Hales (ob. 1245) brings us in sight of the doctrine established in the schools by Albert and Thomas. Alexander calls soul the "form of body"; but on the one hand the body has its lower or natural form as well, so that it is not the soul that makes the body what it is; and on the other hand, while there are actions of the "whole man" there are also activities which belong to the intellectual soul as such, and are not in the body. If the soul has no longer a specific organ, this is indeed partly because it is in a sense the "form" of the whole body, but partly also because it is essentially separate from all that is corporeal. The dualism of the conception appears in Alexander's occupying himself with intermediate degrees of fineness (moisture, breath, and so on) between matter and soul; this is not a tendency to materialise the soul, but the very contrary. Soul as such is abstractly conceived as incorporeal.

Albert and Thomas were in some respects more faithful to the letter of Aristotle; but in substance their famous doctrine is a development of these ideas, and presents the same combination of Aristotelian formulas with the traditional "spiritualistic" psychology. Meanwhile another influence had been at work—the influence of the Arabians.

Here we must go back to trace the history of that other perversion of Aristotelian doctrine, specified a few pages back, according to which intelligence in man is something metaphysically distinct from soul. Men were confronted by the difficulty of accounting for reason in the physical being man, and of relating the natural and the spiritual aspects of the human being; and while some were led into the supposition of soul as a substantial entity separate from the body, others retained the word 'soul' to describe (in its higher aspect) the physical being, but denied to that soul and that being the possession of intelligence: intelligence they regarded as a separate entity, "assisting" the physical and psychical man or even in a sense inhabiting in him, yet separate from him in the ground of its existence. This mode of conceiving man's

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composite being might justly claim to follow, more faithfully than the other, Aristotle's doctrine of the soul; while, if not true to his real intention to ascribe reason as such to man as a natural being, it plainly was not without support from some of his language about νοῦς χαριστός.

It lies wholly beyond the design of this sketch in outline to trace the various and innumerable influences from both Greek and Oriental systems of thought which helped to inspire this particular form of dualism, or to describe the differences in detail of the countless shapes in which it embodied itself. We have already noticed that the earliest followers of Aristotle, who carried the empirical side of his thought almost to the point of materialism (defining the soul as a "movement" or as a "harmony" of physical elements) left a place still in their system for a transcendent and creative Reason; and that precisely in proportion as they diminished its part in the actual psychology of man they relegated it to a higher sphere. But the most instructive early example of this tendency to a dualistic theory of human reason within the Peripatetic school is presented by Alexander of Aphrodisias.

Alexander, who represents an intelligent and conscious reaction of Peripatetic principles against the grossness and confusion of Stoicism, handled firmly the physical and quasi-physical theories of the soul. He exposed the impossibility of one physical substance being really interpenetrated by another, as involving the inconceivable supposition of two bodies occupying the same space. A "mixture," he argued, means one of two things; either that the elements mingled, preserving their own nature, exist side by side; or that the elements cease to exist as they were, and in their mixture become something different from either. Neither of these modes of co-existence is appropriate to body and soul; for the soul does not exist alongside and outside of the body, seeing it is the body that is animated, and the whole body; while on the other hand body and soul both evidently retain their characteristic qualities—the co-existence of the two being

1 The following observations on Alexander of Aphrodisias are based mainly on the account given of him, with illustrative extracts, by Nourrisson (Alexandre d'Aphrodisias, Paris, 1870) and Ravaisson (Métaphysique d'Aristote, 11. pp. 295—319).
the very problem before us. The Stoics had sought to escape this dilemma by imagining an inconceivable and impossible sort of "mixture," according to which the two elements retained their distinctive qualities, yet interpenetrated or suffused one another in a physical manner. Alexander pressed home the contradictions of this whole mode of conception, and called for the entire abandonment of all physical notions of soul and all mechanical explanations of its union with body in favour of the true Aristotelian conception of form and matter. He states that conception accurately; the body, he says, would not be the body apart from the soul; the body is not mere matter; it is matter in this "form" of animation. It follows from this conception that the soul is not separable from the body except in thought, and Alexander believed that the soul came into existence and perished with the body.

When, however, he comes to the subject of Reason, Alexander shows signs of the influences that had been at work since Aristotle's day. The soul in its highest form, the soul of man, exercises the function of rational thought. But instead of simply attributing this rational activity to man as man (as Aristotle had done, however dogmatically), Alexander ascribes it to influence from without and to the agency of a higher power. The νοῦς πνευμάτος he attributes to the Divine Being; ὁ θεὸς νοῦς he calls it, and in its relation to us compares it to light. To the human soul he allows only the potentiality of rational thought—ὁ ὦλικός νοῦς; but this ὦλικός νοῦς is, strictly, but the capability of thought, a mere disposition or potentiality (ἐπιτηθειότης); actually it is nothing.

Simultaneously with this cardinal modification of Aristotle's notion of man we have to notice in Alexander a

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4 See Nourrisson, op. cit. pp. 87—101; Ravaissin, op. cit. 11. p. 302.
lowering of the doctrine of the soul. Those who had preceded him—Theophrastus, Dicaearchus, Strato—had more and more tended to regard the soul as a result, rather than as the informing principle, of the bodily organisation. Although rising nearer to Aristotle's original conception, Alexander was infected by this tendency; it is illustrated by his calling the soul, in language unknown to Aristotle and foreign to his mind, a "power" (δύναμις) of the body.¹

These two features of Alexander's interpretation of Aristotle are of the greatest interest in view of the developments that followed, especially in the Arabian schools. On the one hand, while following the essential Peripatetic doctrine of soul and body, he somewhat disturbs the balance of it, leaning to the materialistic side. On the other hand he adopts the dualistic and theological interpretation of Aristotle's ambiguous language about the νοῦς. Two tendencies thus appear which were destined to react upon each other. In proportion as a lower view was taken of the soul of man as it actually is, and as it reveals itself to psychological analysis, it became the more necessary to introduce from without the principle which should explain the rational element in human nature; while conversely, as in course of time the supra-human and extra-psychical principle came to bulk more largely in men's minds, and at the same time to acquire, through various speculations about its nature, a seeming authenticity, the natural soul grew less, and an ever widening gulf was set between the "soul" as such and "intelligence" in the proper meaning of the name.

Meanwhile it is important to record the dualism of Alexander's theory of human mental action. The human soul in itself possessed for him only a capacity or disposition for rational thought, while the Divine Reason brought the "assistance" necessary to its real exercise. But the "participation" of the human soul in superior reason was but a passing relation².

The analogy between the active reason of the Aristotelians

¹ "D'un mot entièrement étranger au langage et contraire à la philosophie d'Aristote, il l'appelle fréquemment une puissance du corps." Ravaisson, op. cit. p. 301.

² ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ (scilicet ὁ ὑλικὸς νοῦς) σῶν τῇ ψυχῇ, ὃς ἔστι δύναμις, φθειρομένη φθέιρεται. Alex. Aphrod. op. cit. p. 90.
and the Stoic World-Soul is superficially evident, although the difference between the two is as profound as the difference between the two philosophies. The doctrine of an "assisting" Reason presents itself also in one form or another in almost all the Alexandrian systems. We have observed that Philo, in his comprehensive syncretism, even while he was sublimating the soul as πνεῦμα into pure immateriality, had drawn the distinction which was implied in declaring that νοῦς (which also was πνεῦμα at the highest grade of refinement) was not a part of the soul. Later the Neo-Platonists regarded all the exercise of reason in human souls as the operation of the one Divine Reason, acting through the intermediary agency of the World-Soul.

This marked the introduction of an element which was not present to the minds of men of Alexander's school. To Alexander the "assisting" Intelligence was the Divine Intelligence simpliciter (ὁ θείος νοῦς). Plotinus imagined the Divine Reason as an intermediate Being, from whom reason proceeded, first to the World-Soul, and secondly, through its mediation, to individual human souls. This prepares us for what we shall find among the Arabians.

1 "Die Erkenntniss der Ideen von der überirdischen Vernunft her ist der Einzelseele auch erst durch die jener näherstehende Weltseele vermittelt, so dass, wie die Einselseele sich zur Weltseele, so die in jeder Seele enthaltene einzelne Vernunftkraft sich zu der gemeinsamen und einen überweltlichen Vernunft verhält und durch sie bedingt ist." (Siebeck, op. cit. i. 2, p. 315.) Similarly in the Neo-Platonic writings current among the Arabians. See Munk, Mélanges, pp. 247, 250.
CHAPTER II

THE ARABIANS AND ST THOMAS

The powerful influence of the Arab philosophers upon the Western schools from the thirteenth to the fifteenth century makes it highly important to trace the sources of their doctrines, and especially to investigate the character of their interpretation of Aristotle. The rise of the Mohammedan so-called "Peripatetic" school in Bagdad and Damascus, Africa, and Spain, between the tenth and twelfth centuries may be rightly described by Renan as an incident in the history of Oriental thought; but

1 Averroës et l’averroïsme, 3rd ed. pp. 89—91: "On ne doit pas d’ailleurs se faire illusion sur l’importance qu’ont eu chez les Arabes les hommes spécialement appelés philosophes. La philosophie n’a été qu’un épisode dans l’histoire de l’esprit arabe. Le véritable mouvement philosophique de l’islamisme doit se chercher dans les sectes théologiques...Or les musulmans n’ont jamais donné à cet ordre de discussions le nom de philosophie (filsafet). Ce nom ne désigne pas chez eux la recherche de la vérité en général, mais une secte, une école particulière, la philosophie grecque et ceux qui l’étudient....Ce qu’on appelle philosophie arabe n’est qu’une section assez restreinte du mouvement philosophique dans l’islamisme, à tel point que les musulmans eux-mêmes en ignoraient presque l’existence....Disons plutôt que ce n’est que par une très-décevante équivoque, que l’on applique le nom de philosophie arabe à un ensemble de travaux entrepris par réaction contre l’arabisme, dans les parties de l’empire musulman les plus éloignées de la péninsule, Samarkand, Bokhara, Cordoue, Maroc. Cette philosophie est écrite en arabe, parce que cette idiomé était devenue la langue savante et sacrée de tous les pays musulmans; voilà tout. Le véritable génie arabe, caractérisé par la poésie des Kasidas et l’éloquence du Coran, était absolument antipathique à la philosophie grecque. Rennemés, comme tous les peuples sémitiques, dans le cercle étroit du lyrisme et du prophétisme, les habitants de la péninsule arabique n’ont jamais eu la moindre idée de ce qui peut s’appeler science ou rationalisme. C’est lorsque l’esprit persan, représenté par la dynastie des Abbassides, l’emporte sur l’esprit arabe, que la philosophie grecque pénètre dans l’islam....Les origines de la philosophie arabe se rattachent ainsi à une opposition contre l’islam, et voilà pourquoi la philosophie est toujours restée chez les musulmans une intrusion étrangère, un essai avorté et sans conséquence pour l’éducation intellectuelle des peuples de l’Orient."
it became also a factor of the first consequence in the development of the European mind.

It is not to be supposed however that the translation into Latin of the Aristotelian writings of the Arabians and of their versions of the master constituted a genuine introduction of the Western mind to the original philosophy of Aristotle. The Arabians had from the first, in their reading of Aristotle, been subject to strong influences proceeding from Alexandria, and had besides given to Alexandrian Peripateticism a further bent characteristic of themselves. The peculiar direction of their thought may be traced back to the time when a Platonic interpretation was put upon Aristotle's doctrine of the νοος by Alexander, or when that doctrine was associated with a Neo-Platonic hypostasis by Plotinus, and when each combined with those foreign elements an Aristotelian logic and (up to a certain point) an Aristotelian doctrine of the soul.

The acquaintance of the Mohammedans with Greek philosophy dates from their contact with Persian culture under the Abbasides from the eighth to the tenth centuries. The ruling family, who had long been exiled in Persia, and their famous Persian ministers, the Barmecides, looked with favour upon foreign learning. Almansour, Haroun-al-Raschid, and Mahmound are all mentioned by various authorities as having fostered not only Greek but Persian and Indian philosophy. The translation of Aristotle into Arabic soon began; and the

1 Jourdain (Recherches, pp. 214—216) considers the influence of the Arabians to be at least co-ordinate in importance with the fall of Constantinople, so far as the philosophical treasures of antiquity are concerned, and their effect upon the modern world.

2 "On peut dire," says Renan, in summing up the evidence on this point, "que l'origine de la philosophie arabe, aussi bien que de la scolastique, doit être cherchée dans le mouvement qui porte la seconde génération de l'école d'Alexandrie vers le péripatétisme....C'est sur ce prolongement péripatétique de l'école d'Alexandrie qu'il faut chercher le point de jonction de la philosophie arabe avec la philosophie grecque." (Op. cit. pp. 92, 93.) Accordingly, and since it was characteristic of the Arabian school that the main features of its doctrine remained unchanged throughout its history, Munk remarks of Averroes, its last and most truly representative master: "Comme les autres philosophes arabes, Ibn-Roschd a vu les doctrines d'Aristote par le prisme des commentateurs néoplatoniens." Mélanges, p. 441.

3 See Munk, op. cit. p. 312; Jourdain, op. cit. p. 81; Renan, op. cit. p. 91.
chief agents in the work were Nestorian Christians, many of whom the caliphs had about their court as mathematicians and astronomers. Their translations were in some cases—though by no means in all—made from Syriac versions; such translations seem also sometimes to have been revised, not much later, from the Greek originals; and those who have seen the translations in the Arabic pronounce them much more correct than the garbled translations into Latin through a Hebrew intermediary which afterwards were current as the Arabian versions of Aristotle. Very many of such translations were made in the ninth century, their authors being always of Persian origin and generally Nestorians in religion.

It is equally to our present purpose to notice that the labours of the Persian translators included the Alexandrian commentators on Aristotle—Porphyry, Alexander, Themistius, John Philoponus.

Munk asked the question why the Arabians should have preferred Aristotle to Plato, and supposed an affinity between the former and the Arab mind; but the truth is, as Renan has pointed out, that they had no choice. Nominally, although not in its true spirit, the Peripatetic mode of thought had been adopted by the schools of Alexandria; while, on the other hand, the suggestion of an affinity between the Arabians and Aristotle rather loses its point when we observe how far from the original meaning of Aristotle was the system which they received in his name. The logic of Aristotle doubtless had a value to the Persians, in relation to their scientific and practical interest in nature; but in the so-called Aristotelianism of that late day there were also other elements claiming kinship with an altogether different side of the Eastern mind—namely, with its mysticism. It was, however, nominally Aristotelianism that the

1 "On traduisit d'abord des ouvrages de mathématiques, de médecine et d'astronomie, puis on en vint aux traités de Logique et de Métaphysique. Aristote ne put être oublié, car depuis longtemps les nestoriens s'étaient rendu ses écrits familiers, et y puisaient des armes pour combattre les décisions des conciles d'Éphèse et de Chalcédoine." Jourdain, op. cit. p. 85.
2 Munk, op. cit. pp. 312, 313.
3 Renan, op. cit. p. 93. "Les Arabes ont accepté la culture grecque telle qu'elle leur est arrivée."
PIETRO POMPONAZZI

Persians received, as at that time the dominant philosophy of the Greek schools.

The influence of the Alexandrian commentators in general and of Neo-Platonists in particular upon the Arabian Peripatetic school can be traced from the beginning to the end of its history. From first to last it was concerned with the problem of "union" or "conjunction" with the "active intellect"; and from first to last "active intelligence" was conceived as a separate and intermediary real Being.

It is true that there were not found among the Arabians any professed followers of Plato on the one hand or of Plotinus or Proclus on the other. Indeed the works of Plotinus were never translated for them, and his very name seems to have been unknown\(^1\), or was even possibly confounded with that of Plato\(^2\). But Munk has established the existence of a large body of pseudonymous writings, attributed to various ancient philosophers, but of a uniformly Neo-Platonic cast, which circulated among the Arabians in the early days of Greek influence. These compositions, of which the *Theologia Aristotelis* was only one, have been traced by him generally to an Alexandrian origin, and were in truth simply Neo-Platonic compilations. They bore the names of Empedocles, Pythagoras, Plato and Aristotle; but Munk has abundantly proved the Neo-Platonic affinities of these apocryphal writings, including the *Theologia Aristotelis*. It is true that they were superseded in the esteem of the learned East by the more genuine Aristotelianism of Alfarabi and Avicenna; but it is still remarkable that a book of the character of the *Theologia Aristotelis* should so long have passed for a work of Aristotle; and the persistency of the influence of pure Neo-Platonism in the Arab schools is also vividly brought to light in the instance of the Jew Avicebron (*flor.* 1054), who was professedly a Peripatetic, and whose *Fons Vitae* exercised a powerful influence on thirteenth century scholasticism, but whose doctrines are substantially those of Proclus\(^3\).

These facts prepare us to find that even the Peripateticism

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1 Munk, op. cit. p. 240.
of the leading Arab masters, while more faithful to the letter of Aristotle, contained elements foreign to his system and breathed a spirit very different from his.

Renan is doubtless right also in discovering in the genius of the Arabian philosophy the influence of Oriental mysticism, and especially of Persian Sufism, which readily combined with the influences of Alexandria to determine the doctrine of *Unio*.

It has frequently been remarked that the Arabian philosophy, throughout the three centuries of its history, remained substantially consistent with itself, and presents on the whole a singular uniformity of outline. All its representatives are at one in considering the human act of thought in the light of union or conjunction with a superior Intelligence (*intellectus agens*). It is not possible here to compare the successive modifications which this general idea received among them, or the scheme of mental discipline by which they sought to guide the soul into union with intelligence—for example, in Ibn-Badja's (Avempace) *Discipline of a Solitary*, or the *Philosophus autodidactus* of Ibn-Tofail (Abubacer). It is sufficient to say that in general they conceived *Unio* to be effected by the proper exercise of intelligence in man, and through study, education, and speculative science rather than through mystic ecstasy. Consequently the notion of complete absorption, which was the crown of their system as of every dualistic theory of human reason, had with them a peculiar shade of meaning.

The one-ness of all true intelligence had become the commonplace of the later Greek schools, and was certainly a fixed point with the Arabians. In the earliest of their writers of whose

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1 "On ne peut douter que le soufisme, qu'on le tienne pour originaire de la Perse ou de l'Inde, n'ait eu sa part dans la formation des théories de l'union avec l'intellect actif et de l'absorption finale." Renan, *op. cit.* p. 94.

2 The only exception is Gazali's curious reaction, and sceptical confounding of reason in the interests of mysticism. Averroes, who stands as the chief representative of Arab thought, really only summed up, and passed on to the Western world, with doubtless some individual modifications, the system which had been handed down by his predecessors. Cf. Renan, *op. cit.* p. 2, "le Boëce de la philosophie arabe"; p. 88, "resté seul en vue comme représentant de la philosophie arabe, Ibn-Roschd eut la fortune des derniers venus."

3 For example, in Plotinus: "Dabei soll aber die Vernunft in allen Seelen als dem Wesen und der Substanz nach eine betrachtet werden, die sich nicht in den
views we have any certain knowledge, Alfarabi (ob. 950), the active intelligence occupies the same place as in all later developments of the school; and he approaches the further deduction from the unity of intelligence, which was afterwards drawn by Avempace and Averroes, namely the unity of intellectual souls. Avicenna (980—1037), on many points the most sober Aristotelian of them all, yet held most definitely the view of νοῦς ποιητικός characteristic of his school; and while he made the concession to orthodoxy—how far in good faith is perhaps doubtful—that the human soul was an individual substance, and immortal, this did not of course affect the unity of intelligence or reason which was distinguished from the soul; in all exercise of intelligence the soul depended upon an assistance from, a union with, intelligence as outside and above itself. Avempace, a Spanish Arab-philosopher of the early twelfth century (ob. 1138), taught the doctrine of the unity of intellectual souls usually associated with the name of Averroes.

Several of the Arab philosophers wrote treatises expressly "On the possibility of union" between the soul and intelligence.

The universal Intelligence acting in human thought was, to the Arabians, one of a hierarchy of intermediate beings, between God and the world of matter. We have already seen how the Neo-Platonists, distinguishing after their manner the Divine Reason from the Divine Being, differed from Alexander in conceiving of the "universal" assisting Reason as an intermediate being; and the Arabians developed this conception further, in connection with their doctrine of the Intelligences of the

Körpern spaltet, in derselben Weise, wie trotz der Individualisierung die Allseele in den vielen doch eine Substanz bildet, ähnlich wie die Wissenschaft trotz ihrer Spaltung in eine Vielheit von Sätzen doch in jedem derselben als die eine und einheitliche vorhanden sein soll." (Siebeck, Gesch. d. Psych. 1. 2, p. 316.)

1 Munk, Mélanges, p. 345.
3 Munk, op. cit. pp. 364, 365; Siebeck, op. cit. 1. 2, p. 437.
4 Munk, op. cit. p. 387.
5 For example, Avempace (Munk, in Dict. des Sc. Phil. III. p. 154) and Averroes (Renan, Averroës, p. 67: "Qualiter intellectus materialis conjungatur intelligentiae abstractae"). Cf. Avicenna (Munk, Mélanges, p. 365); Avicebron, Fons Vitae, III. (Munk, op. cit. p. 26).
In their hands the passage about the stars, in the Twelfth Book (A) of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, had grown into an elaborate cosmology. They invented reasons to prove that each of the celestial spheres (that is, the spheres of the seven planets, the sphere of the fixed stars, and the circumambient sphere) was the seat of a particular Intelligence; their circular motion, it was said, implied directing intelligence, and purposive will, while the differences among them revealed a separate agent in each, distinct from the one First Mover, the Supreme Intelligence; and this First Intelligence was himself distinguished from God. The last of these "separate Intelligences," that namely which presided over the sphere next to us, the sphere of the moon, was usually identified with the *intellectus agens* operative in human thought.

Thus originated the perplexing terminology of the schools with reference to the various *intellectus*. Alexander had distinguished three uses of the word *νοῦς*; *νοῦς οὐκός* or potential reason; *νοῦς ποιητικός* which was not a power of our soul at all; and *νοῦς καθέξιον* or *ἐπικτήτος* which was thought exercised by us through the assistance of *νοῦς ποιητικός*. The Latin equivalents of the names, by which the Arabians represented these distinctions, were (1) *intellectus materialis* (*hylicus*) or *passivus*; (2) *intellectus agens*, *activus*, or *actualis*; and (3) *intellectus in actu* or *habitualis*. Two remarks should be added. First, intelligence in exercise in the human mind (*habitualis, in actu*) is frequently referred to as *intellectus agens*; and this is in strict accordance with the theory of the real agency in human thought and the unity of intelligence. Secondly, the Arabians introduced a further distinction: when thought in man (*in actu*) attains its perfection it becomes *acquisitus* or *adeptus*; and the words reflect perfectly the governing conception of the nature of knowledge in the human soul, as the soul's participation in, possession of,

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1 "Dans la théorie des Intelligences séparées, telle qu'elle est présentée par les philosophes arabes, on reconnaît un mélange des théories aristotéliciennes sur le mouvement des sphères célestes et de la doctrine néoplatonicienne de l'émanation et des hypostases." Munk, *op. cit.* p. 331.

2 Renan, *op. cit.* p. 118.

3 Nourrisson, *Alex. d' Aphrod.* p. 87.
and possession by, a metaphysical principle of reason outside of itself.

The distinction of "intelligence" from the "soul," and the conception of an "action" by intelligence on the soul, thus dominated this whole school of speculation; and these thoughts were brought to their clearest expression, and carried out to their logical issue, by Averroes. His famous doctrine was the final denial of intelligence to man as an individual, and the absolute metaphysical separation of reason from the natural soul.

The formula in which the view of Averroes was expressed by himself, and discussed by the succeeding age, was that of "the unity of the passive intellect"; and this meant the denial of any exercise of intelligence in the individual human being which was not the work of the common Intelligence.

Averroes defined his own position, as eventually determined by him, in a criticism on the one hand of Alexander, and on the other of more orthodox commentators like Theophrastus and Themistius. It was the well-known doctrine of Alexander that the potential or passive intellect alone belonged to human nature, the active or actual intelligence being Divine, and outside of the soul of man. The abstract distinction made by Aristotle between potential and actual intelligence, although expressly said by him to be a distinction within the soul of man, was used by Alexander to express a metaphysical distinction between the human soul and the Divine Intelligence. He conceived of the process of thought, and supposed Aristotle to have conceived of it, as the action of Divine Intelligence operating in the non-rational human soul. Consequently there was in man as man only a disposition for, or capability of, intelligence; the bringing of that potentiality to realisation was the work of Divine Intelligence; and real Intelligence there was none, save and until the active Intelligence, not a power of human nature, operated on that nature from without. Averroes accepts this doctrine very much in its original sense. His mediaeval predecessors

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2 Cf. Dante, _Purg. xxv._, referring to Averroes, "The soul disjoined from passive intellect."
had corrupted it: after their manner of translating logical terms into metaphysical entities, they had made the “potential intellect” a real existence, just as “active intellect” was another. But this was not the original meaning of Alexander; and Averroes apprehended the difference.

The commentators who followed more closely Aristotle’s original meaning, attributing active and actualised intelligence to each man as a thinking being, claimed that a capability of reason in man implied a reasonable nature in him. They pointed out that a capability or disposition must be the capability or disposition of some subject; but obviously the lower or non-rational faculties of the soul, or the soul as possessed of those faculties, cannot be the subject of a capability of rational thought; therefore reason itself—“active intelligence”—must be the subject of that capability in each man. Averroes accepts this argument also, but he accepts it in a sense of his own; for him the required “subject” of the potential thought in each soul is not the soul itself but a common thinking principle (his intellectus agens)\(^1\).

In this way Averroes goes back to what he recognises as the original meaning of Alexander, namely that the intellectual power does not belong to the nature of man at all. For a “mere disposition” is in itself equal to nothing; and the “potential intellect” is of itself nothing real, being a mere abstraction.

He admits the force of the contention that a capability for rational thought means a rational subject of that capability, and therefore cannot be attributed to the soul in so far as it is non-rational. In particular he lays stress on thought’s consciousness of itself; the apprehension of the objects of knowledge might be regarded as a faculty to apprehend them, in the sense of

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\(^1\) Renan, *Averroès*, pp. 133 ff., followed by Nourrisson, *Alex. d’Aphrod.* pp. 112, 113. Renan, noticing Averroes’ use of the argument for a subjectum, assumed that he rejected the doctrines of Alexander. In fact, he did the very contrary. And Munk is able to quote his formal retraction of opinions, previously expressed, and final assertion that the passive intelligence is pure potentiality (*op. cit.* p. 442); and to supply us with translations from the (unpublished) Arabic version of the “medium” commentary on the *De Anima* which are at present the most authentic account of Averroes’ attitude towards this fundamental question of his philosophy (pp. 445–9).
a mere potentiality of knowledge; that which is conscious
of the apprehending power as well as, and in distinction from,
the objects must itself be more than a mere capability; it is
a subject.

But what is that subject? Not, he says, the individual soul
as such, in any sense. He denies the inference of the com-
mentators, that there is a principle of rational thought in the
individual. No, he says—and undoubtedly he can claim the
authority of Alexander—the subject of all rational thought is
intellectus agens.

Alexander was the real father of the Arab notion of a
separate Intelligence. And now, in a stricter interpretation of
Alexander, Averroes can carry the doctrine of “separation”
a stage further. He has grasped the purely logical and abstract
character of Aristotle’s distinction; “passive intellect,” he says, in
itself is no real thing. Therefore, he concludes, the individual
soul, in this mere potentiality, possesses, in the way of intelligence,
nothing; intelligence cannot be attributed to the soul in any
sense, or to any part of it, as its subjectum.

The extreme absurdity of this conclusion was disguised by
the Averroist from himself through the attribution to the natural
soul of man of various mental powers to which a “rational”
character was not allowed—imagination, memory, vis cogitativa—
of all, in a word, that came short of the power of forming a pure
abstract notion. Such was the psychology of the schools. But
it is to be remembered that when intellectus was denied to the
soul as such, the soul was understood to be deprived of every-
thing that characteristically distinguishes man from the brutes.

On the hypothesis that intellectual agency resides outside of

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1 One of the passages quoted by Munk makes this clear. His further examina-
tion of the words of Aristotle, he says, has convinced him that the potential intellect
cannot be anything actual—cannot be a substance with attributes, a thing in ac-
tuality, one particular “form among others.” Munk is surely wrong in translating
“l’intellect hylique, considéré comme une substance recevant une faculté, ne saurait
être une chose en acte, etc.” The words surely mean rather: “The
potential intellect cannot possibly be the substance endowed with (lit. receiving)
attributes, in which consists (lit. is) a thing in perfect actualisation—that is to say a
man, man must eventually be deprived of every shred of reason. To this conclusion Averroes was forced, when he recognised the logical nature of the distinction of actual and potential thought. What was this intellectus passivus? It was no longer a semi-rational attribute allowed to man; it was in reality nothing. When the thinking principle came into “conjunction” with the soul as potentially disposed to thought, in that conjunction lay “potential intellect.” In so far as separate, intelligence was active; in that conjunction, passive. For Averroes, active and passive intelligence were one and identical; as active, intelligence created intelligible forms; as passive, it received them.

Averroes’ doctrine, then, of the unity of “passive intelligence” was the logical completion of the idea of an external and “assisting” reason. Such was his use of Alexander’s doctrine; and such was his application of the argument for a subjectum. The subject of the activity of thought, he said, is the thinking principle and not the individual.

This doctrine presents two aspects. On one side it was the extreme development of the dualistic view of human nature—of anima and intellectus, of man as a natural being and as possessed of reason—whose history we have been tracing. In another aspect, it was the last step towards the abolition of that dualism.

Certainly Averroes absolutely distinguished Reason from the soul, as the metaphysical principle from the natural being. He denied the possession of reason to the individual soul—save as joined to the metaphysical entity, “intelligence.” And he emphasised his intention of doing so by laying it down that the conjunction of the real or “active intelligence” with the capability or potentiality of intelligence in the individual was only per accidens. Lest it should be supposed that reason was in any sense the attribute of the individual soul as such, he made it clear that the relation of the soul to reason was neither essential nor permanent. The orthodox commentators might believe in a multiplicity of rational souls, holding as they did that a rational principle in each individual was the subject

1 Munk, op. cit. p. 448.
of rational thought in him. To Alexander individual souls were many, but did not participate in true and eternal Reason. Averroes followed Alexander with respect to the soul; and his doctrine of conjunction implied no individual reason or individual immortality; for man as man, human intelligence as human intelligence, was no spiritual being; but a spiritual being (*intellectus activus*) was joined to man—and that not in a necessary unity, but in a casual and external and temporary conjunction (*per accidens*).

This analysis of human thought and human nature, which not only erects the thinking principle in man into a separate entity, but absolutely distinguishes it from the individual soul in which it is manifested, and of whose phenomena it was originally intended as the explanation, might well seem the very extravagance of metaphysical abstraction. Yet this extreme development prepared for a transition to an exactly opposite mode of thought, and marked the conclusion of the dualism of which it was the final expression.

In words, Averroes affirmed that universal reason was the only reason, denying to the natural being—man—any share therein, and assigning all the operation of thought in man to a superhuman principle of thought. In effect, this amounted to the identification of all actual human thought with reason as such. For there could be, on these terms, no operation of thought in man which was not Reason in the full sense of the word.

Thus, in its extreme development, dualism had destroyed itself. Logically it had already passed away; and even practically, it had prepared the way for its own abolition. So soon as a fresh mind should take up the problem, Averroes' separation of intelligence and the soul would drop out of sight, while his identification of human thought with universal reason would stand, and find acceptance.

This is what happened in Pomponazzi. Approaching the problem of human nature from an empirical standpoint, he easily dismissed Averroes' metaphysical distinction of intelligence from the individual soul, with its corollary of the unity of individual minds; but he made full use of Averroes'
the doctrine of human thought as rational—identifying it with the original doctrine of Aristotle.

In a real sense Averroes had returned to Aristotle. He had denied the fiction of an *intellectus passivus* really existing over against *intellectus activus*; and if his object in doing so had been only more absolutely to separate between reason and the individual soul, yet none the less the effect of his identification of active and passive intellect was to assign to reason the operation of thought in the individual soul. For him, indeed, reason, even while in “conjunction” with the individual soul, acted in entire independence of it so far as the metaphysical substratum of the being of each was concerned. For Pomponazzi, beginning anew with a positive analysis, and pursuing the simple Aristotelian conception of the soul—animal or intellectual—as the “form” of body, Averroes’ doctrine meant the identity of *intellectus* in *anima intellectiva* with *intellectus* as such. We shall find Pomponazzi using the very language of Averroes, but with this changed application, and in support of a philosophy far removed from Averroism!¹

The truth is that, with a change of method, the centre of gravity in the system of thought came to be shifted. The theme of Averroes was intelligence (*intellectus separatus*) as a metaphysical principle in a certain relation to the soul: that of Pomponazzi was the concrete process of thought (*anima intellectiva*).

Pomponazzi returned to the spirit and method of Aristotle, in that he pursued, not abstract speculations as to the nature of intelligence, but a positive analysis of the living and thinking

¹ *De Imm.* x. p. 80: “*Ipsum intelligere quodam modo est in materia sed satis accidentaliter, quoniam intellectui qua intellectus est accidit esse in materia.*” IX. p. 66: “*Intellectus etiam qua intellectus nullo modo est actus corpus organici...at intellectus humanus qua humanus est actus corporis organici ut objecti, et sic non separatur, non autem ut subjecti et sic separatur.*” IX. p. 59: “*qua intellectus est non dependet a materia neque a quantitate; quod si humanus intellectus ab ea dependet, hoc est ut sensui conjunctus est, quare accidit sibi qua intellectus est a materia et quantitate dependere.*” But intelligence, even in the higher sense thus distinguished, in which it does not inhere in matter but has its *subjectum in itself* (“*ipsum intelligere esse in ipso intellectu*”) is definitely attributed to the *human soul*; “*Dicitur vere secundum essentiam ipsum intelligere esse in ipso intellectu, juxta illud 3 De Anima, anima est locus specierum. non tota sed intellectus.*” X. p. 79.
soul, and, in the result, attributed reason to the *anima intellectiva*, to man as man. The summary of his conclusions is that "Soul is the place of forms, not as a whole but as intellect!"

Still even when attributing intelligence thus to the soul of man, in a theory that might be said to run directly counter to the fundamental doctrine of Averroes if it did not move on a different plane, he employed the language and the logic of the Averroist school. Thus he defined the quality of thought, as in the soul of man, by saying that it does not depend on matter as its *subjectum*; he adopted the argument of Averroes and his predecessors, that thought as such cannot inhere in matter, or in the non-rational powers of the soul. This illustrates the ultimate result of Averroes' extreme dualism. His criticism of human rational thought was intended to remove reason altogether out of the field of human nature into the metaphysical region. But since after all it was actually human thought to which his argument referred, dualism in him over-reached itself; and Pomponazzi, adopting Averroes' estimate of human thought, found "active intelligence" in the soul of man.

It only remains to mark the influence of the Arabian interpretation of Aristotle upon the orthodox Western schools.

By the time of Averroes the scene of chief intellectual activity among the Mohammedans had been removed to Spain—a change of great moment to the history of European thought. The intellectual movement which took place in the East under the Abbasides early penetrated to the Arabs and Moors of Spain, where learning was fostered and free thought allowed by enlightened caliphs of the Ommiade dynasty. Frequent communication was maintained with the East; and, just as the Christian mediaeval doctors itinerated among the European schools, so the Arabs passed from East to West and West to East, and the Spanish Mussulman earned his degree as a sage

1 See note 1, p. 41.
2 *Apol.* 1, 3, f. 59 b: "Non dependere a materia tanquam de subjecto; immediatum enim subjectum intellectonis et volitionis sunt intellectus et voluntas, quae non sunt organicae." Or the same thought was turned to Pomponazzi's purpose in another form of expression: "Etsi (intellectus) est in quantitate, tamen quantitas non est principium illius operationis." *De Imm.* x. p. 78.
and teacher by visits to Egypt, Damascus and Bagdad. In the eleventh century Arab learning began to pass from Spain to Europe.

Toleration in Moorish Spain, under the Ommiades, had been almost complete. The Jews had long found in Spain "a second fatherland"; and the Christian subjects of the Moors, tolerated in their own religion, profited by the learning and civilisation of their conquerors. Jews, Christians, and Moors, meanwhile, maintained friendly relations with the towns of Southern France, and occasionally emigrated thither; and the Jewish schools of that region of Europe played a great part in introducing to Christendom the learning of the East. Simultaneously many wandering Arab scholars found their way into Europe from Sicily and the other Mediterranean islands; the Norman counts of Sicily were known to patronise them. Thus it came to pass that, at the very time when the Spanish-Arabian philosophers were beginning to experience the violence of the theological fanaticism which eventually brought their labours to an untimely end, their works and those of their predecessors were being translated into Hebrew and into Latin. The earliest translations date from the eleventh and twelfth centuries, and were at first mainly confined to medical and mathematical writings. But during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries there were in circulation many translations of the writings of Arabian philosophers and of parts of their versions of Aristotle, translations executed in some cases by Jews, in some cases by Christian ecclesiastics. As time went on, these translations did much to enlarge the schoolmen's acquaintance with Aristotle. But meanwhile the history of Arab Peripateticism was drawing to a close. The rule of the Ommiades was over; and as early as 1013 the usurper Almansour found it politic to yield to popular religious prejudice against the philosophers. The extreme obscurantism of the theological sect called Ascharites had already prevailed in the East and was soon to be victorious in Spain as well. When the Almohades first came to the throne (1150), a lull in the persecution of

1 Jourdain, Recherches, p. 89.
2 Jourdain, op. cit. p. 92.
3 See Munk, Mélanges, pp. 320—326.
rational thought permitted the appearance of the brightest ornaments of the Spanish schools—Avempace, Abubacer, Avenzoar, and Averroes; but Averroes himself experienced the fickleness of the third Almohade ruler, Yakoub Almansour (1184); and after him Mohammedanism relapsed into darkness, and a suggestive and hopeful movement of thought came to an abrupt conclusion just when it had reached an intensely interesting point in its development. The further history of the Arabian philosophy is to be sought in the Jewish and Christian schools.

The Christian schoolmen readily acknowledged their debt to the Arabians; and Avicenna and Averroes especially were held in the highest esteem among them. Averroes was "the Commentator" par excellence; and he who came afterwards to be regarded as the very father of infidelity, and whom the painters used to paint in the lowest pit of hell, was seen by Dante among the noble heathen in the Elysian fields—

"great spirits, by whose sight
I am exalted in my own esteem."  
(Inferno, iv.)

In this estimate Dante followed his master, St Thomas.

The great Dominicans, however, occupied themselves in confuting the Arabian doctrine of intelligence. Without an attempt to reproduce their argument, some illustrations of it may be given which will at the same time shew the reflection, in their own conceptions of the soul, of the doctrine which they disputed. St Thomas's treatise, De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas¹, may be taken as a compendious summary of the reasonings of Albert, Thomas, and their followers upon this subject. Here the doctrine of Averroes, of the unity of the "passive" or "potential" intellect, is distinctly understood to be a separation between "intelligence" and "the soul"; and St Thomas meets this conception in limine by insisting that intelligence as in man is the very fact to be explained². Consequently his criticism of Averroes' hypothesis of an independent

¹ St Thomas, Opera, 1593, Vol. xvii.
² "Intellucum non esse animam quae est nostri corporis forma, neque partem ipsius, sed aliquid secundum substantiam separatum." St Thomas, op. cit. f. 102 c G.
³ "Nunquam enim de intellectu quaereremus, nisi intelligeremus: nec cum quærímus de intellectu, de alio principio quaerímus, quam de eo quo nos intelligimus." Op. cit. f. 101 a E.
intellectual principle which thinks in our thinking\(^1\) is that this is irrelevant as an account of human knowledge. A scientific account of man must explain man as he is, that is, as a thinking being. To deny the possession of intelligence to the nature of man is to abandon the attempt at a scientific account of the man as he is; and Averroes, by introducing a metaphysical principle, outside the nature of man, to explain thought in man, passed beyond the bounds of scientia naturalis\(^2\). Further, the action of the supposed intellectual principle is no explanation of the actual exercise of intelligence by any particular man. The individual's sense-presentations were supposed to be presented to the common Intelligence; and the "union" of the individual with intelligence was illustrated by the relation of an object (say a man) reflected in a mirror to the reflection there\(^3\); but it was easy for St Thomas to reply that although a man be in a sense "united" with his reflection in a mirror, you do not therefore attribute to the man the property of the mirror, namely to reflect. Neither, in like manner, on the theory of "union" with intelligence, is intelligence attributable to the individual whose sense-experiences are the contents of thought\(^4\); yet actually the thought in question is that man's thought. Once more, to say that the sense-experiences of a certain man are apprehended in thought, is not to say that that man thinks. A wall is seen, but it does not see; the animal possessing the power of vision sees the wall. But the relation (copulatio, unio) of the individual man whose sense-data are received in thought to the supposed thinking power is exactly that of the wall whose visible qualities, size, colour, and so forth are seen, to the visual power that sees. So again, it is not the man that thinks\(^5\). Thus

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2. "Manifestum est autem quod terminus considerationis naturalis est intellectus; secundum autem dictum Averrois intellectus non continuatur homini secundum suam generationem, sed secundum operationem sensus." *Op. cit. f. 101 b C.*
3. "Sicut speculatum continuatur homini cujus species resultat in speculo."
5. "Manifestum est enim quod per speciem intelligibilem aliquid intelligitur, sed per potentiam intellectivam aliquid intelligit; sicut etiam per speciem sensibilibem aliquid sentitur, per potentiam autem sensitivam aliquid sentit: unde paries, in quo est color, cujus species sensibilis in actu est, in visu videtur, non videt; animal autem habens potentiam visivam in qua est talis species, videt. Talis autem est praedicta..."
St Thomas exposes the dualism of the Averroist theory, and its real irrelevance to the problem of intelligence in man.

On the contrary, he insists that intelligence in man must be taken as it really is in man—that is, as constituting the true nature of his soul. Even if we suppose that an external power or principle does act in producing human intelligence, it holds true equally that that which is in the human soul, and belongs to it characteristically—making it what it is—is intelligence. Whatever we may think of the ultimate nature of intelligence or the ultimate relations and metaphysical basis of intelligence in man, the presence of intelligence in man, and in the human soul as such, is a psychological fact.

The denial of intelligence to the soul of man had involved Averroes in the affirmation of the unity of intelligence, in that absolute sense expressed by his formula of the “unity of potential intelligence.” St Thomas, who attributes intelligence to individual souls, combats this position. He does so mainly by displaying its logical consequences, and the absurd extreme to copulatio intellectus possibilis ad hominem, in quo sunt phantasmata, quorum species sunt in intellectu possibili, qualis est copulatio parietis, in quo est color, ad visum, in quo est species sui coloris. Sicut igitur paries non videt, sed videtur eius color, ita sequeretur quod homo non intelligeret, sed quod eius phantasmata intelligerentur ab intellectu possibili. Impossibile est ergo salvare quod hic homo intelligat, secundum positionem Averroys. Op. cit. f. 101 b e, c f.


3 St Thomas’s meaning may be illustrated by the following sentence from the Summa (quoted by Rousselot, XI. p. 252): “Intellectus nostrer possibilis reducitur de potentia ad actum per aliquod ens actu, id est per intellectum agentem qui est virtus quaedam animae nostrae, ut dictum est: non autem per aliquem intellectum separatum, sicut per causam proximam; sed forte sicut per causam remotam.” And so he concludes in the passage under examination—“Dato ergo quod sit alicuius intellectus separatus movens Sortem, tamen oportet quod ille intellectus possibilis de quo Aristoteles loquitur sit in anima Sortis, sicut et sensus qui est in potentia ad omnia sensibilis, quo Sortes sentit.” Op. cit. f. 102 a a.
which it leads. Clearly distinguishing the Platonic, the Aristotelian, and the Averroist theories, he reminds us that, while the first laid down the unity of active intelligence, only the last supposed that unity of potential intelligence or denied a multiplicity of intellectual souls. Employing a figure, he says: the Platonists hold one sun but many eyes; the Aristotelians, many lights and many eyes; the Averroists, one sun, one visual power. Now certainly many agents can employ the same instrument, and remain many. But if the instrument (the "eye" as he calls it, following his illustration) be that which constitutes the nature of the agent, then "one instrument" implies "one agent." But intelligence is that which makes man what he is—an intelligent soul; therefore the Averroist doctrine of the unity of intellectual powers leads to the intolerable extreme of identifying all mankind and contradicting the multiplicity of human personalities.

The act of knowledge by which two men apprehend the same object at the same time is one and the same. For, so far as "intellectual" action is concerned, nothing belongs to the individual; and the fact that the sense-presentations involved differ for different individuals, as Averroes allowed, does not affect the identity of the act of knowledge; since, for Averroes, thought and sense are wholly separate.

St Thomas adds that this doctrine is inconsistent with individual freedom and responsibility, and logically destructive of morality.

\[1\] "Si oculus esset principale in homine, qui uteretur omnibus potentiis animae et partibus corporis quasi instrumentis, multi habentes unum oculum essent unus videns." ST Thomas, op. cit. f. 102 d 6, G.

\[2\] "Manifestum est autem quod intellectus est id quod est principale in homine, et quod utitur omnibus potentiis animae et membris corporis tanguam organis: propter hoc Aristoteles subtiliter dixit, quod homo est intellectus maxime. Si igitur sit unus intellectus omnium, ex necessitate sequitur quod sit unus intelligens, et per consequens unus volens, etc." Op. cit. f. 102 d 6.

\[3\] "Si intellectus sit unus omnium, sequitur quod omnium hominum idem intelligentium eodem tempore sit una actio intellectualis tantum, et praecipue cum nihil eorum, secundum quae ponuntur homines differre ab invicem, in operatione intellectuali diversificetur." Op. cit. f. 102 d 1.

\[4\] "Phantasmata enim preambula sunt actioni intellectus, sicut colores actioni visus: unde per eorum diversitatem non diversificatur actio intellectus....Sed in duobus qui idem scint et intelligent ipsa operatio intellectualis per diversitatem phantasma tum nullatenus diversificari potest." Op. cit. f. 102 d 5.
It is easy for him to shew that to deny potential intellect to the individual and assign it to the race is in effect to contradict Aristotle's conception of potential intellect as a *tabula rasa*; for an *intellectus possibilis* that is *common* has been *intellectus in actu* from all eternity\(^1\), and thus "potential intellect" is deprived of all its meaning as a term in Aristotle's analysis of knowledge.

Finally he returns to the point that those activities of a so-called separate intelligence, having no relation to the sense-presentations in our (sensitive) souls to which they are supposed to bring the unity of thought, are irrelevant as an explanation of intelligence *in us* and have no relation to our experience\(^2\).

St Thomas's own view, which he holds to be also that of Aristotle, is that not only is the soul capable of true thought ("possessed of potential intellect"), but active intellect is a power of the soul—of the soul which is the "form" of the body. The intellect is not, indeed, according to him, related to the body precisely as are the inferior powers of the soul; but intelligence is an attribute of the soul; and the soul is the form of the body. Such is the formula of St Thomas\(^3\).

It is the great merit of Albert and St Thomas in relation to the questions about human reason and the human soul that they followed a psychological instead of a speculative and metaphysical mode of thought. We have already seen how the Aristotelian doctrine of soul and body as correlative aspects of one being had begun to make its way into the Christian schools, although in a confused and corrupted form. Simultaneously the schoolmen made acquaintance with a speculative system which had widely diverged from the primitive Peripatetic

\(^1\) "Per phantasmata nullius species intelligibiles sunt acquisitae intellectu possibili, sed sunt species intelligibiles intellectus possibiliis aeternae." St Thomas, *op. cit.* f. 103 a 2.


\(^3\) "Sic igitur per ea quae ex verbis Aristotelis accipere possumus usuque hue manifestum est quod ipse voluit intellectum esse partem animae, quae est actus corporis physici." (Op. cit. f. 98 c 9, H.) "Non solum Latini...sed et Graeci et Arabes hoc senserunt quod intellectus sit pars, vel potentia sive virtus animae quae est corporis forma...Intellectus est potentia animae quae est corporis forma, licet ipsa potentia quae est intellectus non sit alicujus organi actus, quia nihil ipsius operationi communicat corporalis operatio." (f. 101 a 3, D.) "Oportet igitur ipsum intellectum uniri corpori ut formam, non quidem ita quod ipsa intellectiva potentia sit alicujus organi actus, sed quia est virtus animae, quae est actus corporis physici organici." (f. 102 b A.) Cf. *Summa*, Qu. 84, Art. 2.
standpoint, in the Arab commentaries, which were constantly in their hands. It was the Aristotelian psychology, in so far as they understood it—and not, it must be confessed, without the admixture of a traditional and Neo-Platonic "spiritualism"—that they employed against the metaphysical dualism of the Arabians.

We have just seen how St Thomas, by changing the venue of the discussion, and assuming the empirical and psychological point of view, swept away the speculative structure of Averroism.

The Dominicans of the thirteenth century followed Aristotle in considering the whole being of man as a unity. *Corpus animatum* was to them one concrete being, in which form and matter were mutually correlative. Analysing, with Aristotle, the human soul they found it to be at once "vegetative," "sensitive," and "intellectual"; but while these three powers (*virtutes*) were distinguishable in it, it remained for them one soul. It is true, however, that they did not carry out this method of thought with complete consistency; and, in attributing it to them, reservation must be made of their conception of the relation of *virtus intellectiva* to the body.¹

The metaphysical dualism of the Arabians was further superseded by a positive analysis of the various phases of human experience and a discovery of rational elements throughout it. Instead of abruptly distinguishing thought from sense-presentation, Albert and St Thomas traced the action of intelligence through all the activities of the mind in graduated stages—which to them, characteristically, were stages of more and more complete abstraction. Thus "common sense" brought the data of sense to a first unity of presentation; next, imagination wrought upon sense-presentations; a preliminary act of generalisation followed,

¹ Rousselot, *Études*, ii. p. 203: "En général, toute cette psychologie qu'Albert-le-Grand emprunte à Aristote, et surtout à ses commentateurs arabes, est beaucoup plus viciée dans la forme que pour le fond; elle a du moins le mérite d'indiquer une étude complète de l'homme, de l'observer dans son physique comme dans tous les autres rapports, non seulement comme un être doué d'intelligence et d'activité, mais comme un être qui croît, qui se nourrit, qui se meurt et se rattache ainsi à la série des êtres qui lui sont inférieurs; ce point de vue large et rationel, si différent de la psychologie spiritualiste introduite depuis, est remarquable dans les théologiens du moyen âge, en cela bien plus fidèles aux grandes traditions de la science que les hommes qui ont renversé la scolastique."
known as *cogitatio* or *comprehensio*, which was a comparison and a recognition of similarity (*simile*) without the formation of a logical notion (*universale*); finally, general notions were formed in an ascending scale of abstractness, up to pure “forms,” *intellecta speculata*.

It was mainly, then, by a psychological method of enquiry in the Aristotelian sense that the school of St Thomas reached their own doctrine of intelligence and of the intellectual soul in man. What, finally, was this doctrine?

In terms, the Dominicans adopted the Aristotelian formula, that the soul is the reality or essential being of body (*forma corporis*). And, up to a certain point, the Aristotelian conception was firmly grasped and cordially endorsed; the body could not be without the soul, nor the soul—in so far as it is the form of the body—apart from the body.

But this was not the whole of their doctrine. The soul was *more* than the form of the body. Or it was a “form” in an altogether singular and unique sense—in short, a “separate” form. Here evidently was a conception foreign to the spirit of Aristotle, and arrived at by some method other than that of empirical analysis.

In similar terms Albert had taught that intelligence was essentially constitutive of the soul; the soul again was the

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1 Cf. Siebeck, *Gesch. d. Psych.* 1, 2, pp. 441, 442.
2 This did not, of course, mean the method of introspection. Introspection was not altogether neglected by the Peripatetic and mediaeval psychologists. But it was not sufficiently employed by them; nor had its nature and use been defined by analysis. It is perhaps one of the merits of their psychology that it did not make introspection the exclusive instrument of psychological enquiry.
3 “Nulla pars corporis potest diffiniri sine parte aliqua animae, et recedente anima nec oculus nec caro dicitur nisi aequivoce.” (St Thomas, *op. cit.* f. 102 a 1)
   And again—“Forma corporis non potest esse sine corpore.” *Op. cit.* f. 99 b D.
4 It was as possessed of intelligence that soul was to St Thomas something more than the form of body. *Anima* was *forma corporis*, but not *qua intellectiva*. On the contrary, intelligence was a power (*virtus*) of the soul (which was the form of body), but itself in no sense a power of body. This was the distinction; “Non enim dicimus animam humanam esse formam corporis secundum intellectivam potentiam” (*op. cit.* f. 102 b D); “Oportet ipsum (intellectum) uniri corpori ut formam, non quidem ita quod ipsa intellectiva potentia sit aliquid organis actus, sed quia est virtus animae, quae est actus corporis physici organicī” (*op. cit.* f. 102 b A); “Ultima formarum, quae est anima humana, habet virtutem totali r supergregidentem materiam corporalem, scilicet intellectum. Sic ergo intellectus separatus est, quia non est virtus in corpore, sed est virtus in anima: anima autem est actus corporis.” *Op. cit.* f. 99 a E.
form of the body, but a “form” having a separate existence from that body; consequently, intelligence might be and was entirely independent of the body.

In this metaphysical realisation of the νοῦς χωριστός we may with some confidence trace the influence of the Arabian dualism. The Dominican school had defended against the Arabians the rational nature of the soul of man. The principle of thought, they had said, must not be so separated from the nature of the human individual that man, as man, should cease to be regarded as a thinking being. Intelligence (intellectus agens) was to them a “part” of the soul. But still they stopped short of attributing reason to man regarded as a natural being. The soul, so far as possessed of reason (qua intellectiva or secundum potentiam intellectivam), was no longer the “form of body.” Now Aristotle never ceases to regard the soul as the form of body. This interpretation, therefore, of his description of intelligence as “separate,” namely, that the intellectual soul is not the form of body, was contrary both to the letter and to the spirit of Aristotle. It was contrary to his spirit and intention, which was to attribute to man as naturally existing and as empirically observable the possession of rational thought. But it was also contrary to his language, for he plainly calls the soul, as intellectual (ψυχὴ νοητική), the form and realisation of body. The express intention of St Thomas was to separate intelligence from the body (“Sic ergo intellectus separatus est”). And his conception of the separateness of intelligence was still, like that of the Arabians, although in a different form, the conception of a real metaphysical separateness—of a substantial something, existing separate from the body. For the Arabians, this substantial existence had been a cosmical being or principle—intellectus agens; for St Thomas, it was the individual soul, as a substance possessing intellectus agens. The “separation” was in each case a real metaphysical separation. We see, then, that he did not mean exactly what Aristotle meant, in arguing against Averroes that intelligence is the “proper nature of man.”

1 See Siebeck, Gesch. d. Psych. 1. 2, p. 442.
2 “Propria autem operatio hominis, in quantum est homo, est intelligere. Per hoc enim differt ab allis animalibus, et immo in hac operatione Aristoteles felicitatem
If St Thomas's conception of a "separate" intellectual soul shewed the influence of the metaphysical dualism of the Arabians, his descriptions of the nature of the soul as a "separable form" recall another set of ideas—namely those which had been traditional in the schools from Neo-Platonic times and which were focussed in the notion of "spiritual substances." The origin of this conception has already been traced, and in particular its physical associations. Its prevalence throughout the Middle Ages has been indicated, for instance, in the *Theologia Aristotelis*. We have also seen the attempts that were made, even after the true Aristotelian doctrine of soul and body had begun to be known, to combine with it the notion of the independent and substantial soul. The soul, it was said, while the form of body, has also a mode of being, and specific activities, apart from body; the body again, while informed by the soul, has also its own "lower form" as well, and consequent separate existence. Finally Albert had regarded the soul as a substantial being separate from the body.

This combination of the essentially Platonic doctrine of the separate soul, in the Neo-Platonic shape of a "spiritual substance," with the Aristotelian thought of the soul as form of body, is represented in St Thomas's conception of a "separable form" as applied to the intellectual soul of man.


2 St Thomas distinguishes two kinds of "forms." (a) "Formae...quae nul lam operationem habent sine conjunctione suae materiae, ipsae non operantur, sed compositum est, quod operatur per formam. Unde hujusmodi formae ipsae quidem propre loquendo non sunt, sed eis aliquid est." (β) "Forma... quae habet operationem secundum aliquid sui potentiam, vel virtutem absque communicacione suae materiae, ipsa est quae habet esse; nec est per esse compositi tantum, sicut aliae formae, sed magis compositum est per esse ejus: et ideo destructo compósito destruitur illa forma quae est esse compositi; non autem oportet quod desstruatn ad compositi destructionem illa forma per cuius esse est compositum, et non ipsa per esse compositi." *Op. cit.* f. 99 c 1 K, d f.

Now the first (a) is "form" in Aristotle's sense—in the sense in which "soul is the form of body." And St Thomas rightly says that forms in that sense "are not" ("non sunt, sed eis aliquid est"); for "form" without matter is an abstraction, and as an abstraction does not really exist.
St Thomas expressly admits that this is a metaphysical view of man's being\(^1\); and this separate substantial existence is, to his mind, the postulate of man's possession of intelligence ("major est dignitas hujus formae quam capacitas materiae"). He assumes an antagonism between matter and thought. Man's soul could not possess the power of thought if it were the form of body.\(^2\) Therefore it must be a self-subsistent, "separate" spiritual being.

Now in all this there is a fundamental departure from Aristotle, who had made no such assumption as is here contained; and there is also an abandonment of Aristotle's empirical method of enquiry about the soul.\(^3\) It was Pomponazzi, taking up again in earnest Aristotle's thought of *anima intellectiva* as still *forma corporis*, who first called St Thomas's conclusions in question.

Two aspects of St Thomas's doctrine in which Pomponazzi felt a special interest may be noted. His conception of self-subsistent forms afforded a ready escape from the ambiguity and obscurity in which Aristotle had left the question of the immortality of the soul. It is true that that question was not settled, even if it were determined that soul was more than the form

As to the "form" (\(\beta\)), "quae habet esse," and which exists "destructo composito," this is a platonising *hypothesis*. If there could be evidence for the existence of such a "spiritual substance," it would in any case be incorrect to call it in Aristotelian language a "form."

\(^1\) "Physicus considerat formam in quantum est in materia....Naturalis in tantum considerat formam, in quantum est in materia....Forma ergo hominis est in materia, et est separata. In materia quidem secundum esse quod dat corpori;...separata antem secundum virtutem, quae est propria homini, scilicet secundum intellectum." *Op. cit.* f. 99 b v c.

\(^2\) "Si essentia animae humanae sic esset forma materiae, quod non per esse suum esset, sed per esse compositi sicut est de aliis formis." *Op. cit.* f. 102 b e.

of a perishable body; for after all, the soul was in this life dependent for knowledge upon its corporeal instrument, and especially upon the presentation of the data of sense in imagination; and, besides, the individual soul only came into existence with the formation of the body. The further theory was therefore devised that the soul formed a "habit" of existence, during its embodied life, which persisted after its separation from the body. It was also easy, if not satisfactory, to imagine the possibility of some entirely different mode in which the soul should acquire knowledge after separation from the body.  

This illustrates St Thomas's general conception of the relation of the soul to the body. We must remember that he nominally adhered to the formula—"Soul the form of body." Accordingly, he conceded that "for its perfection" soul should be in union with body. But relation to a body was not essential to the intellectual soul; and St Thomas therefore expressed the relation of the soul, as intellectual, to body by the notion of aptitudo; it is capable of relation to body, and tends (so to speak) towards that relation; but it exists in its essential nature, even while that capability is not realised. It was not difficult for Pomponazzi to shew the difference between this idea and a definition of the soul by its relation to body as actus corporis.

Pomponazzi followed St Thomas in dismissing the theory of a unity of souls in the unity of intelligence, while maintaining the latter in a sense which neither of them analysed. In calling the soul the form of body he again had the great authority with him; and, once more, even to St Thomas, the soul which was forma corporis was the "intellectual soul," since the soul—vegetative, sensitive, intellectual—was one. But Pomponazzi made soul the form of body qua intellectiva; and in this he left St Thomas and returned to Aristotle. At the least, if a taint

1 Levi-ben-Gerson proposed to reconcile the Aristotelian doctrine of knowledge through the senses with the immortality of the soul by the supposition that knowledge and all growth are entirely stationary after death. (Cf. Franck, Journal des Savants, March, 1869.)

2 "Concedimus quod anima humana a corpore separata non habet ultimam perfectionem suae naturae." St Thomas, op. cit. f. 104 b D.

3 "Non est animae humanae finis movere corpus, sed intelligere." Ibid.
of Averroism still clung to him, and the suspicion of an external union between intelligence and man, he denied the separate substantial existence of *anima qua intellectiva*.

There is a passage in the *De unitate intellectus* which exactly presents the point of departure for the discussions of Pomponazzi.

St Thomas is contending that the act of intelligence is not the act of the composite being man, but the act of the soul—of the soul, that is, in its separation as *intellectiva* from the body; and he says: "Thought is said to be the act of the composite being, not *per se* but *per accidens*, namely, in so far as its object, which is an image, is in an organ of the body, not because the act is performed by means of an organ of the body!"

Now in the first place we shall find Pomponazzi agreeing with St Thomas that intelligence, as such, is somehow independent of matter. We shall find him also saying, as we have already seen: "Intellectui qua intellectus est accidit esse in materia," etc. We shall find him asserting "intellectum non dependere a corpore tanquam de subjecto"; but "secundum essentiam ipsum intelligere esse in ipso intellectu."

On the other hand, St Thomas and Pomponazzi agree in accepting the Aristotelian doctrine that the objects of human knowledge are derived from sense through the medium of imagination. On every page of Pomponazzi we shall read "intellectum humanum dependere a corpore tanquam de objecto," "intelligere non esse sine phantasia."

Both also recognise the peculiar quality of thought as such, and its transcendence of all material limitations. Both express this in terms coloured by Averroism; and, with the whole Middle Ages, hold that the exercise of thought comes near to its perfection in proportion as it dispenses with a physical organ, and abstracts from all material contents.

But Pomponazzi and St Thomas differ in their conclusion as to the nature of the human soul. St Thomas argues that the soul must have some mode of being in which it has no essential connection with matter—that, even while embodied, and de-

1 "Intelligere dicitur esse actus conjuncti non per se, sed per accidens, in quantum scilicet ejus objectum, quod est phantasma, est in organo corporali, non quod iste actus per organum corporale exerceatur." *Op. cit.* f. 99 d g.
dependent upon sense and imagination, it must be a separate intellectual substance as well. Pomponazzi says: "The human soul must have one and only one mode of being; it is as it is determined to be." Like Aristotle, he attributes timeless intelligence to the soul which is the form of body. He might have quoted St Thomas's own words; for his is only a further application of the same positive and empirical method of analysis which St Thomas employed with effect against Averroes: "We should never investigate the nature of the intellect if we had not the power of thought; and when we investigate the nature of the intellect, what we investigate is simply the principle by which we think." We know no other soul, he says in effect, than that which we know as embodied and, while embodied, as possessed of thought. We know no other human intelligence than that which depends de objecto on the data and the avenues of sense.

While denying that the soul now has more than one mode of being, Pomponazzi saw no reason to suppose that it should or could ever have any other. St Thomas had said: "But if any one enquire further, if the intellect cannot act without an image, how then will it operate as an intelligence, after the soul has been separated from the body, the objector should understand that the solution of that question does not belong to the physicist"; and these words contain the germ of Pomponazzi's argument against the immortality of the soul. The difficulty which really appeared formidable to him was the difficulty of conceiving the possibility that a soul, which was defined to be, and was only known as forma corporis, should exist in a disembodied state. That such a conclusion was on grounds of reason unprovable, and unthinkable, was all he ever expressly affirmed; although his reservation of other grounds on which it might be established was probably not meant in such good faith as that of St Thomas here.


2 "Si quis autem quaerat ulterius, si intellectus sine phantasmate non intelligit, quomodo ergo habebit operationem intellectualen, postquam fuerit anima corpore separata, scire debet qui haec objicit quod istam quaestionem solvere non pertinet ad naturalen." Op. cit. f. 99 d H.
CHAPTER III

POMPONAZZI AS AN ARISTOTELIAN

It would not be difficult to trace the historical connection between Pomponazzi at the beginning of the sixteenth century and the great schoolmen of the thirteenth and Arabians of the twelfth centuries. The enduring influence of St Thomas, not only through his supreme authority in the great Dominican schools, but indirectly over all European thought during several generations, needs no illustration. Meanwhile, and in Northern Italy especially, the doctrines of Averroes were much in vogue during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries; and in particular the points at issue between him and St Thomas were perpetually under discussion.

The school of Padua "prolonged the Middle Ages." And the name of Padua, at this period, stands for the whole of north-eastern Italy. Padua, Bologna, Ferrara, Venice, were at this time in the closest academic literary relationship to one another; they had for two hundred years a common intellectual life, and one bearing a very distinctive stamp1.

Cousin long ago called for a history of the school of Padua; but it has not yet been written. On the philosophical side, it would be a history of the discussion of the problems raised by Averroism.

1 "Les universités de Padoue et de Bologne n'en font réellement qu'une, au moins pour l'enseignement philosophique et médical. C'étaient les mêmes professeurs qui, presque tous les ans, émigraient de l'une à l'autre pour obtenir une augmentation de salaire. Padoue, d'un autre côté, n'est que le quartier latin de Venise; tout ce qui s'enseignait à Padoue s'imprimait à Venise. Il est donc bien entendu que sous le nom d'école de Padoue on comprend ici tout le développement philosophique du nord-est de l'Italie." Renan, Averroès, p. 325.
Averroes entered Italy, as he entered Europe generally, through his medical writings; and it was through the Italian physicians that his name came to be identified with infidelity and materialism. But his philosophical works also were early known in Italy, and were quoted (1303) by Pietro d' Abano. Philosophy, indeed, was closely connected in the Italian universities with medical and physical studies; teachers of philosophy used to graduate in medicine; and Pomponazzi all his life taught both "natural" and "moral" philosophy.

From the first half of the fourteenth century onwards, we find a number of professed Averroists in Northern Italy, many of whom, however, toned down the distinctive features of the Averroist doctrine. It is a Frenchman, John of Jandun (Gandavensis: flor. 1330), who has perhaps the best claim to be called the father of Italian "orthodox" Averroism. Although himself engaged as a teacher in Paris, he was in close communication with the Italian Averroists, and corresponded with Marsilius of Padua; and certainly his writings exercised a great influence on the subsequent development of the school. While calling himself an Averroist, he declined to believe in the unity of human intelligence, denying the distinction of the intellectual from the sensitive soul, and thus, in direct contradiction of Averroes, making an intellectual soul the form of human nature. John, however, openly confessed that in this respect he departed from the teaching of the master, whereas later clerical writers tried to make out that Averroes himself was orthodox upon the point.

Some of the Italian Averroists of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries were ecclesiastically orthodox, following in the footsteps of John of Jandun; others were not. Of the former, the most influential was Gaetano of Tiene (1387—1465), whose

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1 Renan, op. cit. pp. 326, 327.
2 Fiorentino, Pomponazzi, p. 10.
3 Fiorentino, op. cit. p. 27.
4 Renan, op. cit. p. 339.
5 Pomponazzi often refers to him in his Commentary on Aristotle's De Anima.
6 Werner, Scholastik des späteren Mittelalters, IV. Pt 1, p. 141; Renan, op. cit. p. 341.
7 Werner, op. cit. IV. Pt 1, p. 143.
library is at St Mark's. He also rejected the heretical consequences of Peripateticism; but he was a professed Averroist, claiming to represent the true Averroes and to defend him against heretical misinterpretation. Thus in order to establish intellectus agens as of the true nature of the human being, he denied the doctrine of sensus agens by which popular Averroism sought to make good the distinction of the sensitive from the intellectual soul. This he declared, and probably with truth, to be no part of the original scheme of Averroes; he rejected, as Pomponazzi also did, a compromise\(^1\) suggested by John of Jandun, and came to the same conclusion which Pomponazzi afterwards adopted. Apart, however, from the particular question of sensus agens, there can be no doubt that Gaetano fatally compromised Averroes' doctrine of soul and intelligence\(^3\).

Paul of Venice (ob. 1429), though an ecclesiastic, had boldly accepted the whole doctrine of Averroes. Werner\(^4\) lays it down as a general rule that the clerical Averroists remained orthodox, while it was otherwise among the laity. To this rule, however, there were evidently exceptions. Paul describes the "intellectual soul" as the lowest of the spherical Intelligences, appropriated to the human race; whereas the natural soul of man, which he denominates by an unusual and highly suggestive term, anima spiritiva (πνευματική), is the same as in any other animal, of natural origin and subject to corruption\(^5\). We perceive that Pomponazzi did not need to go very far back to find in his own country Averroism in its purest form\(^5\); and the comparison of his notion of anima intellectiva with the doctrine of Paul will shew the difference in fundamental principle between his denial of the immortality of the soul and that of the ordinary Averroist.

The so-called Averroists of Pomponazzi's own time in Italy were much less consistent than Paul of Venice. They either ultimately withdrew their Averroist opinions, or altered Averroism

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1 Comm. de An. f. 86 r.
2 Werner, op. cit. iv. Pt i, p. 143; Renan, op. cit. p. 349.
3 Werner, op. cit. iv. Pt i, p. 142.
4 Renan, op. cit. p. 345.
5 Pomponazzi cites Paulus Venetus more than once in his Commentary on the De Anima.
beyond recognition. Vernias, and, after him, his pupil, Niphus, took the former course. Vernias (flor. 1480), who was the immediate predecessor of Pomponazzi in Padua, had at first expounded the doctrine of Averroes in all its extent, but afterwards yielded to ecclesiastical influence, and wrote in defence of the plurality and immortality of souls\(^1\). Niphus (1473—1546), Pomponazzi's chief antagonist, appears to have been a discreet time-server. In his first published work he maintained with Averroes that, besides the heavenly Intelligences and a single human Intelligence, there exist no spiritual beings\(^3\). But his strictures upon the anti-Averroist arguments of Albert and St Thomas brought him into trouble\(^2\); and he subsequently fell back upon a modified and orthodox Averroism. He denied that Averroes had taught, as his enemies made out, and as John of Jandun had admitted, that intelligence was only \(\textit{forma assistens}\) in man. At the same time, he knew his Averroes well; he prepared a standard edition of his works, and owed his own reputation chiefly to his commentaries on the Arabian; and he could not credit Averroes with the opinion ascribed to him by Gaetano of Tiene, Achillini, and the orthodox Averroists generally, but really adopted by John in correction of Averroes—namely, that \(\textit{intellectus}\) was in man as \(\textit{forma substantialis}\). He took refuge from this perplexity in the possibly disingenuous suggestion that Averroes did not declare himself clearly on the point, and attributed the confusion to his possessing only imperfect translations of Aristotle\(^4\). Niphus was employed by the Pope to answer Pomponazzi; and his attack, which followed no consistent line of reasoning, but utilised indiscriminately Averroist, Platonic, or Thomist arguments, drew from Pomponazzi his \textit{Defensorium}\(^5\). Niphus was a frivolous and probably insincere writer.

Achillini in Pomponazzi's day, and Zimara (flor. 1530) immediately after, maintained the effort to use the language of Averroes while explaining away his meaning, and put an

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\(^1\) See references in Nourrisson, \textit{Alexandre d'Aphrod.} p. 142, n. 3; p. 143, n. 1.
\(^3\) Renan, \textit{op. cit.} p. 367.
\(^4\) Werner, \textit{op. cit.} iv. Pt i, pp. 147, 148.
interpretation upon his doctrine of intelligence consistent with the presence of a spiritual element in human nature. These were the "Averroists" who defended the immortality of the soul. Zimara aimed not at refuting Averroes, but at relieving him of the charge of heresy.¹

With the advance of the Classical Renaissance, and the study of the Greek text of Aristotle, Averroism was gradually discredited. An echo of the doctrine may be heard here or there². But the school of interpreters of whom Zabarella is the chief representative (ob. 1589), while students of Averroes as a commentator, returned in essentials to the original doctrine of Aristotle.

Meanwhile Pomponazzi had broken fresh ground. He had gone back to Aristotle; and the master's profound and simple doctrine of man began once more to exercise its native force upon philosophy. Aristotle's conception of soul and body may be said to have been a perennial fountain of vivifying influence in human thought. Every time that men have caught sight of his meaning, even in partial glimpses, it has been the occasion of a new departure; it has acted as an impulse and a corrective, stimulating and clarifying speculation.

Partly as reflecting Aristotle, partly from their own freshness and simplicity, the ideas of Pomponazzi had a great effect in their day. Averroism had greatly decayed; it had lost its character and become a medley of inconsistent opinions, combined by a shallow verbal logic over whose ambiguous and undefined terms the professional disputers held futile argument. Pomponazzi went behind most of their controversies in returning to the text of Aristotle. His startling, but plain and consecutive, statements cleared the situation; while the human interest of his conclusion, and the constant references to life, history, and conduct, by which he illustrated and defended it, came like a refreshing breath of air into the stifling class-rooms of the professors.

A reaction against Averroism was, in any case, at that time,  

¹ An account of this eviscerated Averroism will be found in Werner, op. cit. iv. Pt 1, p. 150, and Renan, op. cit. p. 375.  
² e.g. Magister Calaber. See Renan, op. cit. pp. 405, 406.
a thing to be expected. Its formulae had doubtless grown weary-
some. The Thomists had never ceased to keep alive a vigorous
opposition. And finally it became impossible, with a better
knowledge of Aristotle and some acquaintance with the views
of his earlier interpreters, to accept Averroism as the natural
sense of Aristotle's language.

The appearance of Pomponazzi meant a reaction against
Averroism, and a reaction at the same time against the or-
thodox doctrine of spiritual substances. History has associated
Pomponazzi's new departure with the name of Alexander of
Aphrodisias; and the controversies in which he was the leading
figure have been represented as a conflict between Averroism
and Alexandrism. But it would be easy to exaggerate the influence
of Alexander upon Pomponazzi. Indeed, it is difficult to deter-
mine how far he was familiar with the writings of Alexander
at all. He was no doubt fully acquainted with that writer’s
general position, and with the outline of his arguments; a few
leading names and characteristic reasonings were the common
stock of the scholastic debates; and the disputants borrowed
their materials of this sort from one another for purposes of
comment and criticism. But just as Pomponazzi seems to
depend for his knowledge of Plato upon Aristotle's criticisms,
so, in some at least of his references to Alexander, he is evi-
dently quoting at second-hand. Still there can be no question
that, to a large extent, he either borrowed from Alexander
(whether directly or through his various sources of information)
or welcomed his interpretations as coinciding with his own; and
it is certain that he made large use of his name. There were,
no doubt, in a certain sense and at a certain point, an Averroist
and an Alexandrist faction in the school of Padua. Genuine
Averroism still had its advocates. And if the new interpretation

1 It is true that Pomponazzi was no Greek scholar himself; but in his own day
and university, Leonieus Thomaeus was expounding Aristotle and the Greek com-
mentators from the original texts.

2 E.g. Comm. de An. f. 24 r: "Plato, ut bene recitat Aristoteles decimo libro
Metaphysicorum."

3 E.g. De Iinm. p. 68: "Alexandri responsionem quam ibi refert Commentator
ex relatione Themistii"; p. 128, "Alexander Aphrodisens, ut refert D. Thomas...
dixit."
of Aristotle must have, according to the scholastic fashion, its representative authority, no fitter name could be found than Alexander's. "Pour couvrir cette tendance nouvelle, un nouveau nom était nécessaire: on trouva celui d'Alexandre d'Aphrodisias." But we must not allow this theoretically clear issue to blind us to the divisions of opinion which actually took place; and we need not forget, in relating Pomponazzi either to Averroes or Alexander, the close metaphysical affinity between those two which has already been noticed. In point of fact Pomponazzi was no more an "Alexandrist," in regard to an "assisting Intelligence," than he was an "Averroist." Still less were Niphus and Achillini consistent "Averroists," since they abandoned the doctrines of the unity of souls and of collective immortality.

Instead of two parties, then, there were four at least; while various intermediate positions were also occupied with more or less definiteness and more or less consistency. There were the Averroists proper. Then there were various attempts to reconcile the "separateness" of intelligence with an individual anima intellectiva, some of which were barely distinguishable from Averroism. There was the orthodox doctrine of spiritual substances, supported by the large and influential school of Thomists. There were "Alexandrists"—those who accepted in a thoroughgoing way Aristotle's doctrine of forma corporis but took little heed, be it observed, of Alexander's theological conception of νοῦς πνευματικός; and of these Pomponazzi is the best known representative, unsparing in his rejection of "separable forms" (spiritual substances), while yet, in his notion of intelligence, retaining a dash of Averroism. There were others who were certainly not "Alexandrists," who indeed claimed either in some or all of their views to interpret the true mind of Averroes, and who yet opposed as decidedly as the "Alexandrists" the popular tenets of Averroism. They denied the common Intelligence with its so-called "collective" immortality. Unlike the "Alexandrists" however—for these were the "orthodox" Averroists—they maintained the immortality of the individual, while some of them made an altogether inadmissible use of Averroes's own doctrine in support of this belief.

1 Renan, op. cit. p. 354.
Another way in which it has been sought to define Pomponazzi’s position has been to say that, as a follower of the Greek commentators, he was an opponent on the one side of Averroes and on the other of St Thomas; and it is true that in developing his own doctrine, he criticises both of those authorities, each on one particular point. He attacks in Averroes the theory of the oneness of anima intellectiva; and in St Thomas the notion of the soul as a “separable form,” and as immortal. But Pomponazzi could not fail to inherit the Averroist tradition; and we trace it in his conception of intelligence inhering in itself, timeless and incorporeal, as its subjectum; while in one place we shall find him labouring to prove that his own doctrine of anima intellectiva as forma corporis was not foreign to the true intention of Averroes. On the other hand, so far from being simply an “opponent of St Thomas,” there is no writer by whom he is more largely influenced, or from whom he borrows so much; he takes over St Thomas’s criticisms of Averroes wholesale; from St Thomas he learns his conceptualism, his doctrine of knowledge, his idea of truth; and it is not unlikely that he learned more in the interpretation of Aristotle from St Thomas than from Alexander.

The truth is that in Pomponazzi three streams met—the Dominican scholastic Peripateticism, the Arabian Peripateticism, and the stream from the Aristotelian fountain-head, a little troubled, and coming partly by way of Alexander. In his understanding of Aristotle he took the help of all the commentators, and was influenced by them all. He is perhaps more profoundly affected by Averroes’s doctrine of intelligence than by St Thomas’s doctrine of the soul; for he has nothing whatever to say of “spiritual substances.” Yet even his use of Averroist language proves to be rather conventional than indicative of real agreement. The philosophical phraseology of the time had become completely coloured by the Averroist notion of “separate intelligence.” Pomponazzi not only uses this language to express his own meaning, but makes a vigorous attempt to impose that meaning on Averroes.

1 Fiorentino, Pomponazzi, cap. 4.
2 Comm. de An. ff. 140, 141.
3 Comm. de An. ff. 174, 175.
4 Comm. de An. ff. 140, 141.
What was important in Pomponazzi was his return to Aristotle, and to the simplicity of the early interpretations of him. No doubt there was something in the Greek commentaries that suited the spirit of the time and met its need. Whatever the influence of Alexander over Pomponazzi may have amounted to, his doctrine on its psychological side fell in with the movement and direction of Pomponazzi's mind.

It may be true that Alexander had given a dualistic, theological interpretation to Aristotle; and that Averroes, while differing from Alexander on one point, merely developed and perpetuated his doctrine in its essential character. On the other hand, apart from his doctrine of 

It is not historically correct to say absolutely that Averroes was the heir of the dualistic and supra-naturalistic element in Aristotle, and Alexander of his empirical spirit and method. Alexander had his θείος νοῦς; Averroes found a place for the doctrine of \textit{anima forma corporis}. Still, speaking broadly, the general distinction of spirit and emphasis, in the two systems, may be made. The centre of gravity in Alexander's Aristotelianism was his psychology, his natural history of man; the centre of gravity in Averroism was the separateness of intelligence. Fiorentino aptly points out that, if the latter had a natural affinity for the mediaeval mind, the former was equally congenial to the Renaissance. The fact that Pomponazzi and the Renaissance Aristotelians generally ignored or overlooked the theological aspect of Alexander's doctrine precisely illustrates their attitude towards him, and the point at which his writings appealed to them.

It will not be doubted that, in adopting the psychological teaching of Alexander, Pomponazzi did return to the true

\footnote{Nourrirson, \textit{Alex. d'Aphrod.} p. 110: "Ce fut Averroès qui, en contredisant nommément Alexandre d'Aphrodias, contribua le plus à fonder ou à propager son autorité."}

\footnote{As Fiorentino does (\textit{Pomponazzi}, pp. 108, 123).}

\footnote{\textit{Op. cit.} pp. 123, 124.}
Aristotle. With Pomponazzi, accordingly, we reach the last chapter in the chequered history of Aristotle in the Middle Ages. The work of Pomponazzi was an episode in the final phase.

With regard to the place of reason in the soul, Pomponazzi clearly recognises that there are two possible interpretations of Aristotle—one which separates, the other which unitēs, reason and the soul; and he admits an appearance in Aristotle of self-contradiction. He claims for his own doctrine, which allows the absolute (χωριστός) and timeless character of reason and yet attributes the possession of it to the natural soul of man, that it reconciles the seeming inconsistency and accords with the true teaching of Aristotle.

The part of Pomponazzi's doctrine which made most stir in his life-time, and has attracted most attention since, is of course his inference, from the denial of a separate spiritual substance in the soul, that the soul is not immortal. Supposing the soul to have no separate existence apart from the body, there is no reason, Pomponazzi argued, to hold that it survives the

1 "Aristotile, è vero, conteneva entrambi cotesti avviamenti, lo spirito come sviluppo della natura, e lo spirito come fuori della natura; ma tra cotesti niuna dubita che la vera e seconda novità di Aristotile era nel primo; e chi il secundo era una reliquia della filosofia passata, un retaggio del misticismo platonico." Fiorentino, Pomponazzi, p. 108.

2 "Celui qui le concile de Paris avait proscrire en 1209, et Gregoire IX en 1231, que plus tard on avait voulu mettre au nombre des saints du calendrier, allait tomber enfin sous la fausse réputation qu'on lui avait faite, tandis que ses écrits aidaient à la réaction qui approchait, en conduisant à la pratique de la vraie méthode." (Rousselot, Études, i, p. 23, cf. 111, pp. 8–11; Jourdain, Recherches, pp. 20–24; Hauréau, De la Phil. Scot. pp. 1–12; Schultz, Philos. der Renais., pp. 12–16.)

3 "Ex quibus omnibus patere potest, quod multa quae dicuntur ab Aristotelis de intellectu videatur se invicem oppugnare cum minime oppugnent: dicit enim quandoque quod est materialis et mixtus seu non separabilis, quandoque vero quod est immaterialis et separabilis. In definitione namque dicitur quod est actus corporis organici, quandoque vero dicitur quod nullius corporis est actus, haec vero pugniantia videntur: quare in diversis tramis diversi declinaverunt, et aliqui existimant Aristotelem seipsum non intelleixisse: verum omnia jam aperta sunt ex praedictis, neque ullia est contrarietas; intellectus enim absolute et qua intellectus est omnino immixtus et separatus est, at humanus utrumque retinet, nam separatrum a corpore ut subjecto, non separatrum vero ut objecto; intellectus etiam qua intellectus nullo modo est actus corporis organici, quoniam intelligentiae non indigent organo ad intelligendum, sed tantum ad movendum: at intellectus humanus, qua humanus, est actus corporis organici ut object et sic non separatrum; non autem ut subjecti, et sic separatrum, quare nullum repugnans." De Imm. IX. p. 66.
body. The only evidence, he urged, which could justify a belief in its continued incorporeal existence would be evidence of its having now some mode of existence independent of its connection with the body. But there is no such evidence. On the contrary, the soul has only one mode of existence; and this is, that while possessed of intelligence (which in itself is incorporeal) it possesses it in a manner implying dependence on the body. The human soul exercises reason always and only in dependence on sense and imagination. The evidence, then, is wanting. An incorporeal existence is impossible for such a soul as this. If it could exist incorporeally it would be something different from what it is. In the absence of evidence of the sort required, it is arbitrary and gratuitous to assert that in the future the soul will be capable of, and will enjoy, an entirely different mode of being.

Such was the substance of Pomponazzi's argument. Curiously enough, three years before his book *De Immortalitate* was published, that is in 1513, the Pope sent out a bull against Averroism as denying the immortality of the soul. Pomponazzi and the unbelieving Averroists, however, had reached the same conclusion upon different grounds. The Averroists denied immortality to the individual soul because it did not possess the attribute of intelligence. Pomponazzi only denied the possibility of the soul's exercising intelligence independently of corporeal embodiment and sense-experience. The philosophical difference had one odd result. Within six years of the decree of the Lateran Council condemning Averroism the strange anomaly was witnessed of the appearance of Niphus and Achillini to defend the immortality of the soul in the name of Averroism. We have seen that there were "Averroists" ready to employ Averroes's doctrine of the eternal common Intelligence in support of the immortality of individual souls. But Niphus and Achillini did not hesitate to combine with an abundant use of Averroist phraseology about "eternal intelligence" the ecclesiastical formula of separate intellectual substances or souls.

Pomponazzi did not much concern himself with the orthodox

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Averroists. In writing the *De Immortalititate* he did not think it worth while to notice their theories. He knew what Averroism was, and devoted some attention to it. But the corrupt Averroism of the ecclesiastical schools, which was, as Renan says, the official philosophy of Italy in the sixteenth century, he seldom noticed even in his lectures: and he does not name it in the *De Immortalititate*. Eventually the attacks of Niphus stung him into a somewhat contemptuous answer (the *Defensorium*); or prudence required him to defend himself. He treated Thomist orthodoxy with much more respect, devoting to it the bulk of his original volume and addressing an early and respectful reply to the sincere and earnest Thomist criticisms of his friend and pupil Contarini.

Pomponazzi's book was received with a storm of indignant criticism. Attempts were made to move the Pope against him; and Leo commissioned Niphus to prepare a reply. In the same year in which this appeared (1518) a papal brief also was issued against Pomponazzi. Cardinal Bembo, who is said to have agreed with Pomponazzi, protected him; and the Pope, it may be believed, was in no way disposed to go to extremes.

It is not necessary to enter into the details of Pomponazzi's personal history. The best account of these will be found in the work of Fiorentino. The only complete list of his works

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1 Paul of Venice has already been mentioned. The fact is also worth noticing in this connection—besides being an interesting historic link with the people and the schools that had first introduced Averroes to Christendom—that there lived in Padua, when Pomponazzi was a young man, a learned Jew named Elias del Medigo, who taught in the university the doctrines of Averroism, doubtless in their purest form. See Renan, *Averroës*, p. 197.

2 In the *Apologia*.


4 "Ce n'est pas que, pour sauver les apparences, on ne se montrait sévère par moments. On condamnait Pomponat, et sous main on l'appuyait. On payait Niphus pour le réfléter, et on encourageait Pomponat à répondre à Niphus. Que pouvait-on attendre de sérieux d'une bulle contre-signée Bembo, et ordonnant de croire à l'immortalité?... (Léon) prenait trop d'intérêt au débat pour songer à brûler les combatants." Renan, *Averroës*, pp. 363, 366.

5 *Pietro Pomponazzi: Studi Storici su la Scuola Bolognese e Padovana*. Firenze, 1868.
is that given by Prof. Ferri\(^1\) in his Introduction to the Commentary on Aristotle's *De Anima*. Pomponazzi wrote a number of treatises on physical subjects, there enumerated. His works upon the soul were long supposed to be three in number—the *De Immortalitate Animae* (Bologna, 1516) and the two books in defence of the same, first against Contarini (*Apologia*, 1518), secondly against Niphus and others (*Defensorium*, 1519). His most elaborate philosophical and psychological work remained undiscovered until 1876, and is still practically unknown. It is his Commentary on the *De Anima* of Aristotle.

A seventeenth century writer professed to have seen a work by Pomponazzi on the *De Anima* in a private library in Padua. Only in 1876, however, Prof. Ferri of Rome presented to the Accademia dei Lincei an account of two different manuscripts of this work—an incomplete copy in a Florentine, and a complete one in a Roman library. Prof. Ferri caused a large part of the work to be transcribed, and printed it with a valuable introduction in the *Atti della Reale Accademia dei Lincei* for 1876 (Vol. III. Series ii.). It was subsequently published in a separate form.

The Commentary is expressly described as having been given in the course of public teaching, and, in the form in which we have it, was probably compiled by a pupil. Allowances being made for possible inaccuracies in detail, the authenticity of the text is unquestionable, being established both by circumstantial evidence, and still more certainly by its absolute agreement with the well-known opinions and language of Pomponazzi. It consists of three parts, representing evidently three separate courses of lectures, and embracing to some extent the same subjects. The topics include all the questions about knowledge, and about the nature and faculties of the soul, then discussed in the schools. One of the sections (the second) bears the date 1520, five years before his death. It thus appears that here we possess at once the fullest, and the latest and most mature, expression of Pomponazzi's views on the subjects which had always occupied him.

This work of Pomponazzi undoubtedly deserves somewhat

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fuller examination than it has yet received. It does not appear to have been considered in any of even the more recent accounts of Renaissance Aristotelianism, or of Pomponazzi himself. Prof. Ferri published his extracts from the Commentary in 1876. Noack's Dictionary of 1878 in a full article on Pomponatius did not mention it. J. A. Symonds in 1881, and Weber and Höfding in their recent Histories of Philosophy, selected Pomponazzi as the representative Aristotelian and psychologist of the Renaissance, and gave detailed accounts of him and his writings; yet none of them appears to have been aware of the publication or existence of this, his principal work. Weber's American translator has heard of Prof. Ferri's publication and gives its title—La Psicologia di Pietro Pomponazzi—as an addendum to a bibliographical note; but manifestly without any suspicion of its real contents. Speaking generally this Commentary may be said to take up, usually in a more systematic manner, and in the most general terms, all the questions raised by the De Immortalitate and many others as well.

The works De Fato, Libero Arbitrio, Praedestinatione et Providentia Dei and De Naturalium Effectuum Causis, sive de Incantationibus, are dated by Ferri 1520—the year in which they were written. The latter seems to have been published for the first time at Basel in 1556; the former at the same place in 1567. They are not included in the standard edition of Pomponazzi's collected works, published at Venice in the year of his death 1525.

A treatise Dubitationes in quartum Meteorologicorum Aristotelis librum was also printed for the first time subsequently to the issue of that edition—at Venice in 1563.

The collected edition of 1525 contains three physical treatises, the three companion pieces on the soul, and the last work written by Pomponazzi—De Nutritione et Augmentatione.

2 For example, the question of an embodied intelligence ("anima intellectiva de corpore dependens") is treated in the most general form on ff. 126 to 130; and the argument with respect to immortality is set out on both sides in order, resuming the discussions of the De Immortalitate on ff. 130—150, 250, 251, 253, 254.
There has been no later collection of his works; and consequently no complete edition is in existence. The *De Immortalitate*, which was by far the most popular of his writings, and has been called "il più bel libro fra i filosofi del Risorgimento," was frequently reprinted during the sixteenth century, and was also edited at Tübingen in 1791 by Bardili.

The accounts given of Pomponazzi in the Histories of Philosophy have all a strong family likeness; from Brücker downwards, through Tennemann, Ritter, to more modern writers, the same material is employed and the same general view taken. The only works giving evidence of a fresh and thorough study are those of Fiorentino and Ferri already referred to, of which the second is much the better.

But Pomponazzi had a reputation in his own day, and has exercised an influence quite out of proportion to this negligent estimate of his significance.

He was a persistent and vigorous thinker. His whole circle of ideas was governed by one or two leading principles. The denial of immortality would not of itself have been sufficient to bring so much attention upon his book; there were many then in Italy who denied immortality; but the position of Pomponazzi seemed so strong, and was so eagerly assailed, because of what lay behind it. The impossibility of a soul without a body was by him stringently connected, first, with a clear consistent view of the nature of the soul; secondly, with a theory of knowledge which was steadily making way as the true doctrine of Aristotle and had been accepted by St Thomas himself—the theory, namely, that all human knowledge is acquired through the bodily faculties of sense and imagination; and, thirdly, with a plausible theory of morals. Materialism had usually been associated with moral laxity. But Pomponazzi faced boldly the ethical consequences of his position and laid down a moral doctrine compatible, as he held, with his philosophical conclusion, which was not only lofty and consistent with the dignity of human nature, but had the great further advantage of being simple and intelligible. He claimed that mortality rather than immortality harmonised with the

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proper view of human destiny; that the belief in the soul's mortality, rather than the notion of future recompense, opened the way and gave the opportunity to the highest and purest goodness and virtue.

It was not, then, altogether without reason that he had in his day so great a name. His influence was the less enduring as the Reformation carried the stream of independent thought away from Italy. That he continued, however, to be read and regarded as an authority upon the subject of the soul may be inferred from a reference to him by Kenelm Digby in his *Treatise of Man's Soul* (1644), which shews not only a knowledge, such as might be gathered from hearsay, of his main conclusion, but a precise acquaintance with the grounds on which he had reasoned: "But unawares I have engulphed myselfe into a sea of contradiction, from no mean adversaries: for Alexander Aphrodiseus, Pomponatius, and the learnedest of the Peripatetike schoole, will all of them rise up in maine opposition against this doctrine of mine: shewing how in the body all our soul's knowledge is made by the working of our fancies; and that there is no act of our souls without speculation of fantasmes residing in our memory: therefore, seeing that when our body is gone, all those little bodies of fantasmes are gone with it; what signe is there, that any operation can remaine? And hence they inferre, that seeing every substance hath its Being for its operations sake, and by consequence were vaine and superfluous in the world, if it could not enjoy and exercise its operation; there is no necessity or end, why the soule of a man should survive his body: and consequently, there is no reason to imagine other, than that it perisheth when the man dyeth. This is the substance of their argument."

The terms will also be remembered in which Descartes, in the Epistle prefatory to his *Meditations*, refers to the denials of the immortality of the soul. His particular mention of the Decree of the Lateran Council (1513) suggests that he had the Paduan school in his mind; and the suggestion is corroborated by an allusion to the opposition of reason and faith, of which Pomponazzi in particular had made so much in this connection;

"Pour ce qui regarde l'Ame, quoy que plusieurs ayent creu qu'il n'est pas aysé d'en connoistre la nature, et que quelques-uns ayent meme osé dire que les raisons humaines nous persuadoient qu'elle mouroit avec le corps, et qu'il n'y avoit que la seule Foy qui nous enseignast le contraire," etc.

To us however Pomponazzi will remain chiefly interesting for an early criticism of the Averroist and Thomist systems and as an illustration of the force and vitality of the philosophy of Aristotle.
CHAPTER IV

POMPONAZZI'S PSYCHOLOGY

The great question with which Pomponazzi concerned himself was the question of the soul's relation to reason or intelligence. This was the question of his time. *Anima* and *Intellectus* were then the watchwords of the schools; their relation, or the nature of *anima intellectiva*, was the point round which discussion moved and on which was invoked the authority of Averroes, Alexander, or St Thomas. When the audiences in the Italian class-rooms called out "Quid de anima?" this was the subject which they desired to hear treated.\(^1\)

The prevailing tendency was towards a metaphysical dualism of "Soul" and "Reason." Averroism had its professed adherents; but the spirit of Averroism had also deeply penetrated the orthodox schools. Even among those who rejected the Averroist doctrine of a common Intelligence, the "separateness" of intelligence in some sense or other was a fixed presupposition, a dogma that found expression in the character attributed to superior Intelligences, angelic or astral, and which led to the separation of the intellectual from the natural soul of man, or of the soul *qua intellectiva* from the body. The doctrine of Averroes continued to be seriously discussed, even if it was rarely held in its primitive simplicity; and men's minds were haunted by the phantom of an impersonal Intelligence of humanity.

Pomponazzi was not occupied at all with physical speculations about the nature of the soul, such as have been agitated before and since his day. He neither introduced irrelevant physical enquiries as to the substance of the mind nor sought the "seat of the soul" in the body. The reason is not that he was superior to many of the superstitions of his age, but that he was preoccupied with the question about intelligence and the soul. Body and Soul were the simple terms of his thought of man; and Thought and Matter for him the poles of metaphysical speculation.

In the enquiry as to the nature of the human soul, and the character of intelligence as in man, Pomponazzi substituted for the method of abstract speculation a method of positive analysis. The Arabians, going by what they conceived to be the necessary nature of Reason, postulated a "separate" rational principle (their intellectus agens). St Thomas was led partly by a similar a priori conception of the nature of a thinking principle and partly by a theological and ethical interest in the immortality of the soul to affirm the existence of "separate" spiritual substances. Pomponazzi, instead of pursuing a priori speculations as to what the nature of an intellectual principle must be, proposed simply to determine our conception of human intelligence by the actual character of intelligence as exhibited by man.

St Thomas had recalled Averroes to the real problem of intelligence as actually exercised by man the individual, and shewn the irrelevancy to that problem of his theory of intellectual action in a separate principle. Pomponazzi deals in the same way with St Thomas's own postulate of a separate intellectual principle in the individual; he asks for evidence ("naturale signum") of its existence, and contrasts the hypothesis with the fact that in man, as he actually is, intelligence is always exercised in dependence on a bodily organisation.

He presses constantly against both Averroes and St Thomas, and against every theory of a separate intellectual soul in man, the Aristotelian definition of soul as the form of body¹; and his

¹ Comm. de An., ff. 251—253; and passim.
assent to Aristotle's formula is more than a mere verbal agreement. He occupies Aristotle's standpoint of empirical observation, and pursues his method of a positive analysis of the facts before him. Doing so, he finds, as Aristotle did, that the soul of man—yes, and his "intellectual" soul—exists in body. It is known only there. We know nothing of it except in that relation. So far as known to us it has no other mode of existence. What is before us is corpus animatum.

Accordingly we find him arguing, whether against the superior Intelligence of Averroism, the single anima intellectiva operating in human intelligence—or against the "separate" anima intellectiva of St Thomas, which is not (qua intellectiva) the actuality of body (actus corporis) at all—that human intelligence exists as we actually discover it to be, and can have only one mode of existence under the same conditions and at the same time; and requiring for those other supposed modes of existence, postulated by the one doctrine or the other, some evidence (naturale signum) upon which they can be accepted as real. Thus when the Averroists, in order to bring their hypothesis of anima intellectiva into relation to human knowledge, have explained that intelligence had one operation secundum se, and another quoad nos—the former in metaphysical separation from, the other in dependence upon, the body—Pomponazzi replies: "It seems absurd to say that the intellectual soul, which is numerically a single faculty, has two distinct modes of intellection—one that depends on body and also one that is independent of it—for thus it seems to have two beings....In the soul two forms of intellection are supposed to be united, one of which depends on the body, while the other is entirely unrelated to it, which seems at variance with reason, since of one and the same thing with reference to a single operation there seems to be only one mode of operation."

But it is no better he says with the Thomist distinction of anima intellectiva qua intellectiva and

1 "Ridiculum videtur dicere animam intellectivam quae est una potentia numero duos habere modos intelligendi, scilicet et dependentem et independentem a corpore; sic enim duo esse videtur habere....In anima autem ponuntur intellectiones quarum una dependet a corpore, altera vero est simpliciter absoluta, quod non videtur consonum rationi, cum unius operationis respectu unius et eiusdem non videatur esse nisi unus modus operandi." De Imm. iv. p. 16.
qua actus corporis; and, frequently, in the De Immortalitate he reiterates that human intelligence has and can have only one mode of being: "Unius rei est tantum unus modus operandi essentialis."

I call attention to this mode of argument; for such a method of enquiry is the basis of a science of human nature, and, if consistently followed, will lead to a coherent conception of that nature as a single reality.

It is true that in the expression of his result Pomponazzi did not get beyond the word "participation"—the participation of the human intellectual soul in intelligence as such—and the distinction of intellectus qua intellectus from intellectus qua humanus. In so far as this language represented a dualistic mode of thought he failed to give perfect expression to the unity of human nature. But the conception of the unity of human nature in reality was the practical result of his enquiry, as it was the natural result of the method which he followed.

Indeed, the distinction he draws between intellectus qua intellectus or intellectus separatus and intellectus humanus is precisely (apart from the dogma of the "separate" superior Intelligences) Aristotle's distinction of separate reason and rational soul. What underlies it is the distinction between a metaphysical and a psychological view of reason, which neither Aristotle nor his mediaeval disciple had clearly drawn. But they had both a sufficient inkling of it to hold, even if in a somewhat dogmatic way, that the possession of reason which in itself is timeless and absolute does not destroy the psychological unity of human nature as existing in time and in concrete reality.

Participatio is a term that betrays the spurious metaphysics of the Arabians—which had turned the distinction between a metaphysical and a psychological view of reason into an ontological distinction between a thinking principle and the soul. But Pomponazzi did not mean by it what Averroes had meant. Practically, he regarded human nature as Aristotle did. And at the least it may be said that his philosophy was an attempt to

1 "Si anima intellectiva, quatenus intellectiva est, non est actus (scil. corporis), ideo, quatenus intellectiva sit, non erit anima." Comm. de An. l. 252 r.
discard metaphysical presuppositions and to base a doctrine of human nature on the hypothesis of its unity and the observation of its phenomena; while, once more, whatever we may think of his analysis and construction of human nature, we may recognise the substitution of an empirical for a speculative, and a positive for a dogmatic method.

I have said that Pomponazzi's method is best illustrated by his criticisms of the accepted philosophies of his time. He is essentially a critic and a dialectician, and both expounds and develops his own views by means of the examination of received opinions. We are justified in ascribing to him such a method as has been indicated when we find him applying the same canons of credibility, and addressing the same criticisms, to theories so diverse from one another in their conclusions (while similar in their speculative method) as the Averroist, the Platonic, and the orthodox spiritualistic doctrines of the soul.

He divides the possible theories of human nature into six, differentiated by their view of the "mortal" and "immortal" nature of man. By "mortal" and "immortal" he means the same as if he had said "material" and "intellectual"; for intelligence is in its essential nature timeless, and not subject to change or decay, while the body evidently decays and dies. That man's nature possesses these two aspects he considers beyond question: as in the body, or, if you will, using the body as an instrument, man is at least in one sense mortal; as exercising intelligence he partakes of that which is immaterial and imperishable. Now, it may be said either that there are here two separate beings or that one being combines two aspects.

If the physical and the intellectual elements in man be two different beings, then either (1) there are as many physical beings and as many spiritual beings as there are individual men (the Platonic doctrine of the soul); or (2) the physical body is multiplied and the intellectual element is one in all men (the

1 De Imm. cap. 11.  
Averroist doctrine of the common Intelligence); or (3) the intellectual beings are many and the physical body one. The third supposition is dismissed, as never having been put forward by any one and as absurd in itself. The Platonic and Averroist theories are left.

The other alternative was that the human being is one nature with two aspects. Here Pomponazzi distinguishes his own view from that of St Thomas. Either (4) man is an intellectual—spiritual and immortal—being in an absolute sense, with an accidental and temporary relation to the body (simpliciter immortalis, et secundum quid mortalis); or (5) the relation to the body is of his essential nature and his participation in timeless and imperishable reason is only such as is consistent with that relation (simpliciter mortalis, secundum quid immortalis). We need not be too much deterred by the barbarism of secundum quid mortalis and immortalis—as if there could be shades and degrees of mortality and immortality. These words are Pomponazzi’s compendious formula for the material and perishable on the one hand, the “intellectual” and imperishable on the other. And the question, as between him and St Thomas, is the simple and not irrelevant one—whether on the one hand the relation to the body is essential to the existence of the soul (which St Thomas denied), or, on the other, the possession of timeless reason is compatible with a genuinely and essentially physical mode of existence (as Pomponazzi affirmed).

To complete his scheme Pomponazzi adds the possibility (6) that the human being is in an equal sense spiritual and material. Logically this possibility is exhausted in the alternatives already stated. As Pomponazzi says, in his scholastic way, “Nothing can be constituted equally of two contraries; one must always be the dominant factor.” This notion also, like (3), is a “man of straw.”

1 "Quoniam inimaginabile est unam rem corpoream esse in tot distinctis loco et subjecto, et maxime si est corruptibilis." De Imm. III. p. 9.
Four theories then are left clearly distinguishable. In criti-
cising them Pomponazzi maintains the Aristotelian standpoint,
comparing each with the observed facts of human physical life,
and guided by the formula "soul is the form of body" (anima
forma corporis).

In the doctrine of Averroes there were two main points—
first, that the intellectual principle was something separate from
the soul of man; second, that it was one in all men.

With regard to the second point, Pomponazzi professes that
he has nothing to add to the arguments of St Thomas, which he
commends in terms of the highest praise. It is evident, indeed,
that this part of the doctrine of Averroes had begun to lose all
credit, in presence of a more accurate knowledge of Aristotle.
In the Commentary on the De Anima Pomponazzi shews that
he fully understands whither the Averroist conception tends and
that the anima intellectiva, which is supposed to be one in all
men, is that which makes each man what he is, so that there is
no escape from the monstrous consequences drawn by St Thomas.
But he no longer feels it necessary to argue the point; and
occupies himself by preference with an attempt to bring out the
more reasonable side of Averroes's doctrine implied in his con-
cession of a vis cogitativa to the individual soul. In the
chapter of the De Immortalitate devoted to Averroism he is
content with a summary assertion that the notion of union with
a superhuman intellectual principle as the end of man is an
arbitrary invention ("figmentum in se") morally impracticable
("sic finis hominis irritus est") and contrary to Aristotle. He
hazards the opinion, which perhaps was not far from the mark,
that the belief in the unity of intellectual souls in Averroes's
sense had never really been more than an academic theory.

He was much more concerned about the question of the
"separateness" of the intellectual principle. Through various

1 De Imm. IV. p. 11.
2 "Dat esse." Comm. de An. f. 135 r.
4 "Imo existimo quod tanta fatuitas fuerit nedum credita, verum excogitata." De Imm. IV. p. 11.
modifications, and particularly through the orthodox theory of the soul, this part of Averroism was living still in many minds. It is obvious that in his examination of it Pomponazzi was preparing the way for his attack upon the "separate forms" of St Thomas.

Before quoting, therefore, his apt criticism of the Averroist "separate intelligence," we notice the general principles which he lays down at the beginning of the *De Immortalitate*, and applies consistently throughout all his discussions of these subjects.

The question is whether an intellectual principle can exist, in the case of man, in such self-subsistence and separation from the body as to be independent of the body, and to continue to exist when the body is no longer there. Pomponazzi proposes to answer this question by an examination of the actual nature of intelligence in man—the actual facts regarding human knowledge. And he recalls the canon of Aristotle, which was also universally accepted in the schools, that all human knowledge, as such, requires the presentation in imagination of the data of sense\(^1\). This psychological necessity was the nerve of Pomponazzi's thinking and the basis of his argument about the soul\(^2\). He inferred from it that it was impossible for the intellectual principle *in man* to exist in any absolute separation from the body.

The argument is developed in logical form in the *De Immortalitate*\(^3\). To establish the separability of human intelligence from the body, says Pomponazzi, it is necessary to find it independent of the body both in its own essential nature as intelligence (*tanquam de subjecto*) and in its reception of the objects of knowledge (*tanquam de objecto*). Now independent in the latter sense human intelligence can never be, according to the obvious fact and the canon of Aristotle. As Pomponazzi puts it, *two* conditions have to be established before the "separate" existence of the soul can be held as proved; it must

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1 "Intelligere aut esse phantasiam aut non esse sine phantasia." *De Imm.* IV. p. 12.
3 *De Imm.* cap. IV.
be independent of body in both the senses named above. If it fail in either, the proof has fallen. If the corporeal embodiment be necessary either on the one ground or on the other, we have no right to speak of a disembodied human intelligence. The statement of the case against "separability" takes the form of a disjunctive proposition, and can only be met by a conjunctive affirmation against both clauses.

It is not sufficient to argue from the independence of intelligence in itself (tanquam de subjecto). All Averroists argued, and Pomponazzi himself held, that the only subjectum of thought is thought; but independence in this sense, he contended, was not equivalent to absolute independence of the body; for dependence de subjecto was not the only way in which intelligence might be dependent on the body. Human intelligence in its intrinsic and essential nature acts and exists only in its reception of the objects of knowledge, and in respect of this (tanquam de objecto) it is dependent on body.

It might be thought that Aristotle made the intellectual soul immaterial in an unqualified sense ( simpliciter) when he ascribed to it the reception of all material forms. But still the question remains, after what manner does human intelligence receive knowledge? And even to intelligence in man Aristotle attributed a passive attitude ("intellectus possibilis est virtus passiva"); he likens it to sense in the mode of its operation ("intelligere est sicut sentire"); and it depends for its operation, and actual existence, on the senses and material things ("intellectus movetur a corpore...suum motivum est phantasma"). All this, says Pomponazzi, looks rather in the direction of

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1 "Disjunctivaque affirmativa contradictat copulativae affirmativae factae de partibus oppositis. Si igitur ad inseparabilitatem sufficit alternative vel esse in organo tanquam in subjecto vel ab ipso dependere tanquam ab objecto, igitur ad separabilitatem conjunctim requiritur, neque dependere ab organo tanquam a subjecto, neque tanquam ab objecto." De Imm. iv. p. 17.


materiality than of immateriality. These are the thoughts which Pomponazzi develops with every variety of application, throughout his writings.

Meanwhile he is specially concerned with the Averroists and their theory of intellectus separatus. How, he asks, is that theory brought into relation with the actual fact of intellectual action in individuals? How, in particular, if the intellectual soul be a being metaphysically distinct from the sensitive individual soul, can the action of the intellectual soul be conditioned as all human thought is by sense-apprehension?

The most plausible answer of the Averroists was that the intellectual soul had a twofold mode of existence—secundum se, and quoad nos. The argument against total separateness from body was allowed to hold good so far as the intellectual principle is "in man"; while "in itself" it was not subject to Aristotle's rule. The same idea is referred to in the Commentary on the De Anima, where after a contemptuous reference to the self-styled Averroists of his own day, who escaped the difficulty by abandoning the doctrine of their master altogether, Pomponazzi goes on: "Therefore others give a different account more in accordance with the intention of the Commentator: namely, that the intellectual soul has two modes of intellection, one in relation to us, that is, for us only, and that, in this aspect, it cannot think without the mediation of an organ, and therefore that, in this aspect, the intellectual soul is the actuality of body." This theory was supported by the

1 De Iium. iv. p. 18.
3 "Surrexit quaedam nova secta de novo incipientium philosophari dicentium, ad mentem Averrois, quod anima intellectiva, in intelligendo, semper eget organo, non tanquam subjecto, sed ut objecto, et ita anima intellectiva est actus corporis. De hoc nihil vel parum dixi in mea quaestione, quia non credebam aliquem esse ita fatuum, qui hoc dicaret." Comm. de An. f. 252 v, 253 r.
4 "Ideo aliter dicunt alii et magis ad mentem Commentatoris, quod anima intellectiva habet duas intellectiones, unam in ordine ad nos, scilicet quoad nos; et, ut sic, non potest intelligere nisi mediante organo, et ideo, ut sic, anima intellectiva est actus corporis." Comm. de An. f. 253 r.
supposed analogy of the spheric Intelligences, which (it was said) may be considered in two ways, in relation to their spheres, or in se; and are really separate from, and independent of, their spheres. So, by analogy, might the "common Intelligence" of men be considered—"uno modo ut est infima intelligentiarum," and also "alio modo in ordine ad suam sphaeram." In the second aspect the human intelligence was the subject of scientia naturalis; in the former it was "the business of the metaphysician." The canon of Aristotle held good for intelligence quoad nos, but not simpliciter.

The original vice of Averroism

"Che per sua dottrina fe' disgiunto
Dall'anima il possibile intelletto" was dualism; and, in a speculative system, the metaphysical dualism which is caused by a false abstraction is always a flaw which runs from top to bottom. The separation of reason from the natural soul was repeated in a division within human nature between intellect and sense; and when the separated intellectual principle was required to account for the actual facts of intelligence (from which it had originally been inferred !) it could only do so on the hypothesis of its having a twofold existence and twofold operation.

Pomponazzi had already signalised Averroism as a dualistic theory; and now he treats as arbitrary and unfounded this supplementary hypothesis of a double mode of being for the intellectual principle.

He brings the theory at once to the bar of the Aristotelian definition: "Soul is the actuality of a natural organic body, etc. Therefore intellectual soul is the actuality of a natural organic body." With regard to the analogy of the spheres, he insists that the whole point lies in the difference between human intelligence and the superior Intelligences (in which he himself

1 De Imm. IV. p. 14.
2 Dante, Purgatorio xxv.
of course believes). Aristotle, he says, did not discuss the human soul with the spherical Intelligences in the *Metaphysics*, but made it expressly a matter of "natural science." And while the higher Intelligences (as was believed) required body only for motion, being independent of sense and "separate" in thought, this was precisely not the case with man.

Thus Pomponazzi appeals to facts and to the actual nature of human intelligence, which is only known to us as in a soul which is *forma corporis*. Finally, he condemns the unreasonable-ness of supposing two modes of being for that which is only known and only knowable in one. It may be possible to conceive beings who in one operation (motion) require bodies, in another (thought) do not. But in the case of man it is that very operation which is in question, namely thought, in which according to all our knowledge and observation of man he does require the body. Such is Pomponazzi's argument.

Since already in answer to Averroes he had devoted more time to the "separability" of the intellectual soul than to its unity, he passes rapidly over the second dualistic theory of human nature, which he associates with the name of Plato, and which differs from the former only in assigning a separate intellectual soul to each individual man. Such a conception, however, which he represents by the formula "Man is soul that uses a body," he declares to be completely opposed to the Aristotelian doctrine of *forma corporis*. He criticises it as destroying the unity of human nature, which after all is the datum in these questions; "Soul and body would have no greater unity than the oxen and the plough." Putting the same thing in Aristotelian language, he points out that two independent entities, such as body and soul were by this theory supposed to be, do not make one composite being in the true

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1 *De Imm.* iv. p. 15.
2 See note 1, p. 76.
3 "Intellectivum realiter distinguitur a sensitivo...verum...secundum numerum sensitivorum ponit numeram intellectivorum." *Op. cit.* v. p. 27.
sense of the word. Herein, he says, is the difference between the theory that relates soul and body to each other as correlative form and matter, and that which relates them externally as motor and motum.

He carries this criticism a stage further by shewing the absolute necessity in common sense and experience for finding some relation between the soul as intellectual and the soul as sensitive. I who feel am the same as I who think; I feel pain, say, and devise a remedy. (This is borrowed from St Thomas.) On the theory of a separate self-subsisting intellectual soul, we cannot, in short, construe human nature as a unity. Aristotle's distinction between the sensitive and intellectual souls was not this distinction of two separate real entities; he spoke of one soul in different aspects or functions.

The orthodox scholastic or Thomist doctrine, while really regarding the soul as a "spiritual substance," professed to differ from "Platonism," as it understood Platonism, in that it claimed at the same time to maintain the unity of body and soul. To describe it roughly—it may be said to have taught that the soul was both a separate substance and the "form of the body."

Pomponazzi disputed this claim by shewing the inconsistency of such a position. It was the point of his criticism of St Thomas, that this combination of ideas ascribed to the soul—to the same being and at the same time—two different modes of operation and of existence; the one verifiable by empirical observation and the analysis of human nature, the other arbitrarily invented on speculative grounds.

Pomponazzi's philosophical writings are one prolonged criticism of the Thomist doctrine. It may be said never to be out of his sight for a moment. But without giving a complete account of his argument against St Thomas, an attempt may be made to distinguish its chief points.

St Thomas's doctrine of the soul consisted of two parts. In the first place, it was an account of the present relation of the

1 Cf. Comm. de An. f. 254; De Imm. cap. vi.
soul to the body—as at once constituting the existence of the body, organised and animated, and itself, in so far as *anima intellectiva*, still independent of the body. In the second place, he rested on this state of matters the inference of the possibility of the soul’s continued existence after the body has ceased to be.

The various arguments of Pomponazzi against the Thomist conception of soul and body may be analysed and arranged somewhat as follows. First (*a*) he shewed it to be inconsistent with the definition of the soul; which meant really, inconsistent with all our attainable verifiable knowledge of the soul. Secondly (*b*) he pointed out that there was no more reason to detach “intellectual soul” from the body and remove it from the category of *forma corporis*, than there was in the case of (say) the sensitive soul; seeing that intelligence as human is essentially dependent on a corporeal organisation. Next he argued that the suggested notion of the substance of the soul as a “separable form” was (*c*) inconceivable in itself; and (*d*) incompatible with the unity of the human being. Finally he insisted (*e*) that the “separate” subsistence of the soul, whether in its present connection with the body, or, in a future state, altogether without the body, really implied that the same being should have two different natures, two opposite modes of existence.

(*a*) The mixed notion of the Thomists was undoubtedly different from the conception represented by the Aristotelian definition of the soul; but they themselves did not admit that it was so. The definition was their own accepted standard for all theorising about the soul; and Pomponazzi’s point against them was that, if the human soul as endowed with the power of thought (*anima qua intellectiva*) was no longer to be thought of in conformity with the definition, it should no longer be denominated a “soul” at all. Now the schoolmen appreciated the natural or biological doctrine of Aristotle about the soul, and the positive and empirical method by which it was reached. It was therefore a valid argument against them that, in such a metaphysical notion of the rational soul of man as they had framed, they had set the rational soul beyond the scope of
Aristotle's thought and beyond the reach of his analytical method.  

(b) Further, on positive grounds, the intellectual soul of man was not to be removed from the scope of the definition, since intelligence as it is in man acts by no means in independence of the body, but, on the contrary, always and only in the body. Accordingly, when in the De Immortalitate Pomponazzi comes to deal with the Thomist notion of the "separable" intellectual principle, he repeats and applies the identical arguments which he had employed against the Averroist conception of it.

Such an intelligence as man's is, depending for all its operation on sense and sensuous imagination, and thus united in the most inseparable way with those psychical powers which are admittedly bound up in the body, does not by its nature require a separate and peculiar mode of being. It is not necessary, the argument is, to deny to the soul of man as possessed of rational thought, the name of forma corporis, since all human rational thought is exercised in dependence on the body (if not tanquam de subiecto, yet tanquam de objecto).

At the place in the De Immortalitate where he presses the point that embodiment is of the very nature of intelligence as known in man, and also in the corresponding passage of the Commentary on the De Anima, Pomponazzi examines

1 "Dicit ergo Thomas in prima parte, in Quaestionibus Disputatis, et in multis alis locis ubi pertractat hanc materiam semper dat hanc responsonem, dicendo quod intellectus noster, quantum est de ratione sui et ratione potentiarum intellectivarum, sic non est actus corporis, sed ratione sensitivarum sic est actus corporis. Quando ergo dicitur 'intellectus nullius corporis est actus,' intelligitur de intellectu ratione potentiarum intellectivarum. Sed contra hanc ratiocinationem arguo sic; quia si anima intellectiva, quatenus intellectiva est, non est actus, ideo quatenus intellectiva est, non erit anima: quod est contra Aristotelem ponentem illam esse definitionem communem omni animae, imo secundum Thomam, dictam univoce de omnibus animabus." Comm. de An. ff. 251 v., 252 r.

2 See op. cit. cap. VIII.; Comm. de Anima, f. 137, and passim.

3 "Ergo si anima est actus corporis organici quantum ad sensationem, hoc est pro sua intellectione; ergo in omni suo intelligere indiget phantasia. Sed si sic est, ipsa est materialis; ergo anima intellectiva est materialis." De Imm. VIII. p. 40.
a logical quibble by which it was sought to avoid his conclusion. Soul, it was said, might have a capability to be the form of body (aptitude), and might be defined by that capability, though the possibility was not realised; just as "lightness," for example, is defined as the capability of moving upward, while yet the light object may not always so move. In replying that a mere unrealised possibility would not suffice for a definition—for then a thing might really possess none of the qualities by which it was defined—Pomponazzi brings out clearly his point that the definition of soul by its relation to body must be taken seriously as the very description of its actual nature. It is, he says, a definition, in the sense that the quality which it attributes to the soul is that in virtue of which the soul is what it is. If the soul were supposed not to be in relation to body, it would not be known at all as we know it; it would not be what we find it to be. The soul *is* in relation to body. This belongs to the definition of "the soul." And a thing cannot be only potentially that which it is determined to be.

(c) Again, Pomponazzi effectively criticises St Thomas's perversion of the Aristotelian notion of form, in his doctrine of "separate" or "substantial" forms. While allowing that the soul, as "naturally" considered, is one aspect of a composite being in the Aristotelian sense, characterised by "form and matter," St Thomas pronounced the soul as rational or possessed of intelligence (qua intellectiva) to be a form in an altogether different sense. Forms which have no separate subsistence, and no operation except as conjoined with matter in a compositum, strictly speaking do not exist; but something exists in virtue of them. It is otherwise with "separable" forms; they are self-subsistent ("sunt per esse suum").

Pomponazzi altogether refuses to recognise this as a development of the Aristotelian conception. He denies the name of "forms" to these "essences"; and refuses to allow that if they were what they were supposed to be—self-existing substances—

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2 See loc. cit.; and, almost in the same words, Comm. de An. f. 253 v.

3 "Proprie loquendo non sunt, sed eis aliquid est." St Thomas, De unitate intellectus, f. 99 c 1.
they could in any sense be the “forms” of material bodies as well. For a form in the latter sense, which is Aristotle’s sense—actus materiae—is not “an existent” (quod est), but (as St Thomas himself knew well) that “in virtue of which something exists” (quo aliquid est). This then is Pomponazzi’s criticism. “It is necessary that a form of this kind should be a ‚this’ and subsist through itself; how then could it happen that it should be the actuality and completion of what is material, since such a thing, namely the actuality of what is material, is not an existent, but that in virtue of which something exists?" Similarly in the Commentary he clearly apprehends, and applies to the same effect, Aristotle’s distinction of form and substance. “The peculiarity of a substance is not to exist as dependent: the soul is dependent: therefore etc. The peculiarity of a substance is to subsist per se and to be the ground of attributes: but the soul does not subsist per se and is not the ground of attributes: therefore etc.”

Whatever therefore may be said of these self-subsistent rational souls (essentiae per se stantes), they are not “forms” in the Aristotelian sense. St Thomas no doubt would say that the soul has a unique mode of existence and that when it is called a “form” the word is used in a peculiar sense. But this Pomponazzi justly characterises as arbitrary; and he pronounces it unsatisfactory, in an attempt to explain the mode of existence of the soul, to introduce the supposition of a unique and peculiar mode of existence: this seems to be dogmatic and to bring suspicion upon the whole hypothesis of substantial souls. Pomponazzi expresses surprise that St Thomas did not declare for Platonism outright: Platonism is at least consistent, and certainly preferable to this attempt to join with the doctrine of Aristotle a conception wholly foreign to it.

1 “Oportet talem essentiam esse hoc aliquid et per se stans; quomodo igitur fieri poterit ut sit actus et perfectio materiae, cum tale, scilicet actus materiae, sit non quod est, sed quo aliquid est?” De Imm. viii. p. 46.
2 “Proprium est substantiae in subjecto non esse; anima est in subjecto: ergo.... Proprium est substantiae per se stare et accidentibus substare; sed anima non per se stat, nec accidentibus substat: ergo.” Comm. de An. f. 48v.
3 “Quod si dicitur hoc esse peculiare animae intellectivae; hoc est valde suspicium, et voluntarie dictum.” De Imm. viii. p. 46.
4 “Quare sapienter mihi visus est Plato dicere ponens animam immortalem, quod
Pomponazzi professes himself entirely unable to understand the mode of being which it was thus proposed to assign to the “substantial” souls; a being composed of matter and form he understood, and a form *quo aliiquid est*, but not this essence which was both a form and a substance, or was neither.

(d) But if the “separate” soul be thus something quite different from the “form” of Aristotle’s doctrine of soul and body, all the ancient difficulties as to the relation of the two return. Body as a self-subsisting substance, soul as a self-subsisting substance—how are they related? We are reduced to the Platonic dualism: we have lost the only clue to the interpretation of human nature as a unity. Pomponazzi reproduces in his Commentary the dialectic in which Alexander of Aphrodisias had refuted the Stoical conception of the soul as a substance, and by which he had shewn the inconceivability of two substantial beings interpenetrating one another, and the impossibility of relating soul and body on any other terms than those of form and matter. In another place he brings home to the Thomists, on their master’s own principles, that this last is the only way in which the relation can be conceived.

(e) But his most frequent criticism of St Thomas’s doctrine was that it assigned to the soul of man *two modes of being*. On the one hand, the soul was to have that mode of being which is described in the Aristotelian definition, and verified by all that we can have in the way of observation and experience, in which it is not properly an existence (*quod est*) but *forma qua aliiquid*.

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1 “*Esse quoque difficilis de esse compositi quod ponitur distinctum ab esse animae, quodnam est illud esse, et quodnam corrupitur; de quo etsi ipsi multa dicant, fateor me eorum verba tenere, sed non sensum.*” *Op. cit. viii. p. 46.

2 *Comm. de An. f. 134, 135.*

3 “*Sumo essentiam animae intellecivae in homine; tunc ipsa est substantia, vel ergo forma, vel materia, vel compositum. Non compositum, quia sic non esset pars hominis; nec materia ut omnes concedunt; ergo forma et non nisi corporis; ideo intellectiva, quatenus talis, non est forma nisi corporis. Item ipse dicit quod intel lectiva est actu pars essentialis ipsius hominis; ideo oportet, quod cum ex ipsa et corpore fecit (fiat) unum per se, quod ipsa sit actus et corpus potentia; alter non fieret unum per se.*” *Op. cit. f. 252 r.*
est (aliquid in this case being corpus animatum), and in which it is of course inseparable from a body. On the other hand it was to exist as a separate substance—itself presumably constituted of “form and matter”—already independent of the body, and in a future state actually to be detached from it. Now to assign thus to any object of knowledge two inconsistent and irreconcilable, yet, by the hypothesis, simultaneous modes of existence, appeared to Pomponazzi strictly unreasonable. The nature of anything is only to be known as it shews itself to be. We must take the soul and the nature of human intelligence as they are given to us in actual experience; and so they are described in the definition. To ascribe any other nature to the soul on a speculative ground is dogmatic and arbitrary. If therefore we abandon Aristotle’s definition we are plunged in hopeless confusion; if we leave the ground of actual experience, we can have no sure knowledge about the soul at all.

It was the same consideration which made the orthodox idea of the condition of the individual soul in the future state so inconceivable to Pomponazzi. It was in the future state that the “separate” subsistence of the soul was to be fully realised. For St Thomas and his followers perceived the difficulty of maintaining its separateness in any absolute sense so far as the present life was concerned. It is true that a certain theoretical independence of the body even in the present life was entirely necessary for their theory, and was the ultimate foundation of the belief in a disembodied existence hereafter. But actually, in the present, they admitted, the soul is not separate from the body. It comes into existence along with the body (although, as they held, by an act of special creation): it continues to be attached to the body; and the exercise of even its highest or

1 "Tamque diversi modi operandi, scilicet per phantasma et sine phantasmate, videntur arguere diversitatem essentiae." De Imm. viii. pp. 42, 43. Cf. ix. p. 71: "Neque plures modi cognosciendi ab Aristotele in aliquo loco sunt reperti, neque consonat rationi."—ix. p. 56: "Neque apud Aristotelem fingendum est quod iste modus intelligendi intellectus humani sit ei accidentalis, scilicet moveri ab objecto et non indigere subjecto, tum quia unus rei est tantum unus modus operandi essentialis."

intellectual powers is conditioned by the body and bodily functions, just as the senses, the imagination, etc., were allowed to be. Accordingly in the argument for immortality a new element was introduced. The soul, it was suggested, during its existence in attachment to the body acquires a “habit” of existence in virtue of which it continues to exist after the bond that united it to the body is dissolved. A figure employed by the Thomists to illustrate this idea was that of water frozen in a bottle, which, the bottle being broken, retains the shape into which it has been congealed.¹

By this supplementary explanation they escaped some of the difficulties of their theory of the “separate” anima intellectiva; and they were able to assent to the definition of Aristotle and to his doctrine of knowledge as true for the present state of the soul².

This was, as Pomponazzi says, their last resort (“ultima ratiocinatio”); but in spite of this explanation he still urged his objections. In the first place, the theory still depended on a separate subsistence of the intellectual soul in the present life. Metaphysically, and as it were de jure, the soul was independent, and the Thomists clearly affirmed it to be so. And Pomponazzi pressed the demand for evidence of such a mode of existence, and insisted on its logical inconsistency with the conception of soul as forma corporis, and the impossibility of reconciling it with all the actual and verifiable experience in which we know the soul.

In the second place, taking the Thomist theory on its own terms, as referring the fully separate and independent condition of the soul to its disembodied state after death, he still questioned their right to ascribe to the same being two entirely opposite modes of existence, or to the same name two different meanings. For what, he asked, is the change that is supposed to pass upon

¹ Fiorentino, Pomponazzi, p. 236.
² "Illa (scil. ‘anima non est sine phantasia’) secundum Thomam est vera in hoc statu, non autem in alio in quo nostrum intelligere est sine phantasia." Comm. de An. f. 250 v. "Expresse vult (Philosophus) quod intelligere animae nostrae ortum habeat a sensu. Ad hoc credo quod Thomas diceret, et est ultima ratiocinatio quam possit dare, quod verum est quod intellectus eget corpore pro sua operatione, sed non semper, sed pro statu isto; pro alio vero non." Op. cil. f. 252 v.
the human intelligence when, from a condition in which it is
known solely as the "form" of body, and finds exercise only in
virtue of sensuous experience, it enters a condition in which it
is disembodied, and the old avenues of knowledge are wholly
removed? It is nothing less than a change of nature. "For to
say, as those who wish to do who affirm that the human soul is
immortal in the full sense, that the intellect itself has two
modes of cognition, one entirely without the use of images, the
other accompanied by them, is to transmute human nature into
divine....Thus the human soul would be made divine, since it
would assume the mode of activity that belongs to Divine
beings, and thus we should commit ourselves to the legends of
Ovid, namely to the view that one nature can be transmuted
into another."

What is implied is an essential alteration. The thing we
call human intelligence will no longer be the same; for its
operations will be different: and a thing is what its essential
operations are. There will be a different mode of intelligence;
for the body and the senses are essential to human intelligence
as it is here, to human intelligence as Aristotle described it and
as we know it to be. There will be a different mode of being.

It is then expressly on these grounds that Pomponazzi rests
his denial of immortality, namely, that the soul cannot now have
simultaneously two incompatible modes of existence, and that it
is equally impossible to imagine it existing hereafter in a form
wholly different from all that we now know it to be. Accordingly,
speaking of his doctrine of mortality, he says "The whole root
of this theory is based on the ground that the human intellect
has only one mode of intellectus." And whatever on rational
or moral grounds may be expected in the future for conscious-
ness as individually personified, Pomponazzi made it clear that

1 "Dicere enim ut volunt affirmantes intellectum humanum esse absolute im-
mortalem, ipsum intellectum duos habere modos cognoscendi, scilicet sine phantasmate
omnino, et alium cum phantasmate, est transmutare naturam humanam in divinam....
Sic anima humana simpliciter effeceret divina, cum modum operandi Divinorum
sumeret, et sic poneremus fabulas Ovidii, scilicet naturam in alteram naturam trans-
mutari." De Imm. i. x. pp. 71, 72; cf. p. 56.


3 "Tota radix hujus positionis inmittitur ei fundamento, scilicet quod intellectus
a doctrine of immortality cannot safely rest upon the theory of self-existing spiritual substances. The leap from the "soul" of experience (forma corporis) to the "disembodied spirit" of theological speculation is beyond the power of reason. Pomponazzi therefore states his conclusion: "Wherefore since all these statements seem irrational and contrary to Aristotle, it seems more rational to suppose that the human soul, being the highest and most complete of material forms, is really that by means of which a substantial existence exists and in no sense itself a substantial existence; so that it really is a form which begins to exist and ceases to exist at the same time as the body, and which on no terms can operate or exist apart from it, and has only one mode of existing or operating."

In such arguments, then, Pomponazzi's method is to depend on experience. If we are not to hold human intelligence to be as it is actually determined, all certainty is taken from us. He asks for evidence before we can believe in any other mode of being. "If this method be rejected, there is no way of proving specific difference between things." "By no evidence of experience is it possible to be convinced that the human intellect has any other mode of intellection, as we see by trial, since we always need an image." He firmly holds to it that the mode of human existence which we know is its essential mode. Other modes of existence there may be. The animals have a different being from man's: the higher Intelligences another being still: but man is man. One nature is not changed into another.

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1 "Quapropter cum haec omnia irrationabilia et ab Aristotele aliena esse videantur, ideo rationabilis videtur quod anima humana cum sit suprema et perfectissima materialium formarum, vere est quo aliquid est hoc aliquid, et nullo modo ipsa vere est hoc aliquid, quare vere est forma simul incipiens et desinens esse cum corpore, neque aliquo pacto potest operari vel esse sine eo, unumque tantum modum essendi vel operandi habet." Op. cit. IX. pp. 62, 63.


4 "Neque apud Aristotelem fingendum est quod iste modus intelligendi intellectus humani sit ei accidentalis, scilicet moveri ab objecto et non indigere subjecto; tum quia unus rei est tantum unus modus operandi essentialis; tum quia sicut modus sensitivus nunquam transmutatur in modum intelligentiae vel intellectus humani, ne-
Repeatedly he insists upon this point, that to allow the existence of the soul as a separate substantial being, whether now in temporary conjunction with the body, or in an imagined future self-subistence, is to assign to man a nature other than his own, other than that which essentially distinguishes him and makes him what he is. It is to confound things that differ, to transform the human into the Divine.

The whole mode of thought, he concludes, which is represented by the notion of "separate soul," is not that of empirical analysis and observation, but that of a priori speculation. And this is true both of the Averroist and of St Thomas's form of the doctrine. The common intellectual principle, the spiritual substances, are affirmed not on scientific but on metaphysical and theological grounds.

que modus intelligentiae in modum humili vel sensitivi, ita pariter modus humanus intelligendi non videtur posse transmutari in modum intelligentiae, quod esset si intelligeret absque indigentia corporis ut subjecti et objecti; hoc etiam firmatur, quia sic natura transmutaretur in alteram naturam, cum operationes essentiales transmutarentur. Amplius per nullum naturale signum cognoscit potest intellectum humanum habere alium modum intelligendi ut experimento comprehendimus, quoniam semper indigemus phantasmate: Quare concluditur quod hic modus intelligendi per phantasma est essentiales homini." Op. cit. ix. p. 56.

1 "Tamque diversi modi operandi, scilicet per phantasma et sine phantasmate, videntur arguere diversitatem essentiae." De Imm. VIII. p. 43. Pomponazzi quotes with approval the saying of Averroes, "Quod si qui essent homines qui non eodem modo cognoscerent sicut nos, non essent ejusdem generis nobiscum." Op. cit. VIII. P. 43.

2 "Anima nostra in aliqua operatione per se non egeret materia et sic quantum ad istam operationem qua, secundum Averroem, intelligit semper, vel secundum Thomam, pro alio statu, non consideraretur (a physico) sed a metaphysico, ex quo non eget corpore in ista operatione, et sic dictum Aristotelis in secundo (primo?) de anima plus non esset verum quia consideratio naturalis stat usque ad animam." Comm. de An. f. 251 r.

A concise summary of Pomponazzi's criticism of Averroes and St Thomas is found in the Commentary on the De Anima, ff. 250 to 254, where he states in clear terms the result he has arrived at. The soul is not "separate" from the body here, and there is "no reason" ("non est ratio") to suppose it will so exist hereafter.

"Concerning the intellectual soul I hold in accordance with Aristotle that it essentially depends on body, both for its existence and for its intelllection, and can neither exist without body nor operate without a corporeal organ. There is no reason to suppose that we think after death (through a corporeal organ), but there is reason for supposing that in this world we do think through a corporeal organ in respect of the object...our soul—in so far as it is a concrete intellectual soul—uses in intellelection a corporeal organ, and is not altogether independent of a corporeal organ. Yet it does not altogether and in every way need a corporeal organ, since it does not
need it as the ground of its existence....In its operation it does not need a body in this way, but in reference to the object of thought it does, because whatever is thought by our mind is thought by means of something corporeal."

"De intellectiva (scil. anima) autem dico quod, secundum Aristotelem, essentialiter et in essendo et in intelligendo dependet a corpore, neque potest esse sine corpore, neque intelligere sine organo corporeo; quod enim post mortem intelligamus non est ratio, sed in hoc mundo quod intelligamus per organum corporeum tanquam per objectum est ratio....Anima autem nostra secundum quod est intellectiva realis (utitur) in intelligendo organo corporeo, nec ex toto absolvitur ab organo corporeo; nec enim ex toto et omni modo in intelligendo eget organo corporeo, quia non eget eo ut subjecto....In ista sua operatione non eget corpore ut subjecto sed bene ut objecto, quia quidquid intelligatur ab anima nostra intelligitur per aliquid corporeum." Comm. de An. ff. 253 v, 254 r.
CHAPTER V

THE SOUL

It has by this time appeared that the doctrine of the mortality of the human soul, by which the name of Pomponazzi is best known, was but a consequence of his general view of the soul’s nature. The question of the mortality or immortality of the soul was the question whether the soul were separable or inseparable from the body, whether, that is, it were in its nature “material” or “immaterial.” In all Pomponazzi’s discussions, these three questions were treated as convertible: they were the same question in different forms. It was upon this question that he took up that curious and interesting middle position, that the soul is “material and immaterial”—that conception of “mind in matter” which is the characteristic feature of his philosophy. Meanwhile the arguments on which he most relies to prove the mortality of the soul, although he avails himself also of various ethical and cosmological considerations, are arguments drawn from the nature of intelligence as in man.

His conception of the problem of immortality found expression, accordingly, in words like these: “Pomponazzi enquires whether the soul be mortal or no; and it must first be asked whether it be material; for if it be material, it is mortal; if it be immaterial, it is immortal.”

1 Cf. De Imm. cc. viii. and ix.; Comm. de An. ff. 130, 131, 137; Apologia, Lib. i. cap. iii.
2 "Quaerit Pomponatius utrum anima sit mortalis, vel non; et primum quaedem est utrum sit materialis; si enim est materialis est mortalis, si est immaterialis est immortalis." Comm. de An. f. 130 l.
Holding firmly to his idea that the human soul has and can have but one mode of existence, that human intelligence has not and never can have any other than one way of knowing, he enquires what this nature is, and this mode of operation; proposing so to determine whether a disembodied and post-mundane existence be compatible with the nature of the soul.

He does not find this question determined by any organic unity of body and mind, any subsistence of mind in body, which should make mind a merely physical or material product. On the contrary he holds that in its highest, its truly characteristic functions, mind does not employ any specific physical organ at all1.

But two opposite aspects of mental action equally impressed Pomponazzi; and the fact of their combination was the problem which he set himself to solve. He found the characteristic quality of thought as such, and thus of human thought, to be the possibility of abstraction from all particulars, in independence of every limitation of hic et nunc and with absolute transcendence of all material conditions. On the other hand, following Aristotle, he noticed the dependence of thought on its object, the acquisition of all knowledge through sense-experience, and the apprehension of the universal, by us, only in the particular instance2.

The customary arguments for the "immateriality" of intelligence were three in number: (a) the power to receive the "forms" of material things, implying indifference to those or to any particular forms3; (b) the power to think in universals4 and

1 *De Imm.* x. p. 80. "Intellectui, qua intellectus est, accedit esse in materia, non tamen in aliqua parte ponitur corporis ipsum intelligere, sed in toto categori-matici sumpto; non enim in aliqua parte, quoniam sic esset organisus intellectus, et vel non omnia cognoscere, vel si omnia cognosceret ut cogitativa, tantum singulariter et non universaliter cognosceret...Quamquam autem sic totum corpus ponatur instrumentum intellectus, quasi ut subjectum, non tamen est vere ut subjectum, quoniam intelligere non recipitur in eo modo corporali."

2 "This he designated the mind's dependence on the body "tanquam de objecto."

3 "Anima est receptiva omnium formarum materialium...Recipiens debet esse de-mudatum a natura rei receptae." *De Imm.* vii. p. 32. Cf. x. p. 78; *Comm. de An.* f. 130; *Apol.* i. ii. 56 b; iii. 57 c.

4 "Si intelligit omnia necesse est immixtum esse." (*Comm. de An.* f. 130 v.) "Cum ipse intellectus sit in hac quantitate, quomodo igitur species in eo recepta poterit universaliter repraesentare?" *De Imm.* x. p. 78.
contemplate abstractions of which the senses have no cognisance, such, for example, as the mathematical point or line, the indivisible, the infinite, or immaterial beings such as God and the higher Intelligences; and (c) the mind's power of reflection upon itself.

Pomponazzi admits the force of all these considerations, but not, in its full scope, the inference that was drawn from them. Admitting that the human soul is possessed of intelligence, and of intelligence exercising these "higher" functions just specified, which belong to it as intelligence—he yet could not forget that as a matter of fact human intelligence is known to us only as residing in the body; that its whole known history is a corporeal history, and its only observed exercise takes place under corporeal conditions—at least in so far as all the objects of human thought, the materials on which human intelligence is exercised, are drawn from a material world ("dependere tanquam de objecto"). To affirm any other mode of existence for the human soul, or for intelligence as in man, was not only to go beyond the warrant of experience; it was to contradict all that we know of the soul, and every idea of human nature with which experience supplies us.

Pomponazzi accordingly set himself to discover and to express a conception of the human soul, and of intelligence or reason as in man (anima intellectiva), which should embrace these seemingly contrary aspects of it. He conceived himself to have arrived at it in the formula: Anima humana de immaterialitate participat. Or rather, this was one of the many ways in which he sought to express the idea of an intelligence, material, in a sense, in its origin, material certainly in the mode of its existence, yet possessed of the essential attributes of intelligence and therefore in another sense immaterial: an intelligence, whose existence before or survival after its embodiment in matter was inconceivable, and so far as reason shows, impossible, yet exercising functions which could by no means be ascribed to matter. Two points may be regarded as fixed in Pomponazzi's

1 Comm. de An. f. 130 v.
2 Op. cit. f. 130 v.; cf. De Imm. x. p. 82; Apol. 1. ii. f. 56 b; iii. ff. 58, 59.
3 Comm. de An. f. 130 v.; De Imm. x. p. 76; Apol. 1. iii. 59 d.
theory of the soul. One is, that there is and can be no evidence for any existence of the soul as disembodied, for any exercise of human intelligence except with reference, direct or indirect, to a material subject-matter (objectum as he calls it). The other certain thing is that human intelligence is itself, for Pomponazzi, always something immaterial; nothing could be further from the mark than to call him, as he has been called, a materialist.

The position of Pomponazzi may be defined, in a preliminary way, in the terms of his own thought, by saying that he denied the "separability" of soul from body without denying its "immateriality." The current formula was that "inseparability" meant materiality and corruptibility; while immateriality implied "separability" and potential immortality. Pomponazzi holding the inseparability of the soul from the body (namely, tanquam de objecto) and denying in consequence the soul's immortality, yet regarded the soul—qua intellectiva—as immaterial.

To return then to the accepted proofs of the immateriality of intelligence we have to note Pomponazzi's attitude towards them in view of his peculiar conception of human intelligence. As I have already said, he admits in a general way their validity. But he seeks to define or limit, in the interest of his own theory, the inference to be drawn from them. He does not allow that they imply, in the case of human intelligence, absolute "immateriality" in the sense of the soul's entire independence of matter or its possible separation from the body; and seeks to find room within their scope for his own conception of a relative independence and a soul immaterial yet not separable. Accepting the received marks of an "immaterial" intelligence he seeks so to interpret them—at least in the manner and degree in which they characterise human intelligence—as to permit and even justify his view of the soul as de immaterialitate, or de immortalitate, participans.

Thus with reference to the argument from the soul's reception, in cognition, of material forms, he points out that if in one part of it the soul thus "receives" matter in knowledge, in other aspects of its nature it is not capable of any such action¹; and

¹ "Ipsa materialiter operatur ut vegetativa, non omnes formas recipit ut sensitiva." De Imm. viii. p. 36.
thus far may with equal reason be concluded to be material or immaterial. He also argues that the conjunction of intelligence with matter does not forbid its exercising this power of cognition, and that it is not necessary that soul should be absolutely independent of matter in order to apprehend matter 1.

He clears up the point by reference to an analogy which had been drawn in favour of absolute immateriality, from the case of sensation. The organ of sense, it had been said, must itself be clear of the particular sensible property which it is to apprehend; thus, if various colours are to be perceived, the eye must be in a neutral condition in relation to all colour. Pomponazzi pointed out in reply that the sense organ has nevertheless other physical properties, and is itself physical 2. So, on this analogy, the mind may apprehend material things in knowledge and yet itself be in a real way dependent upon matter 3.

In the Apologia Pomponazzi quotes the case of sense-perception as that of an admittedly physical power which nevertheless “receives” material objects in cognition. Wherefore, he says, it cannot be maintained that cognition of material things implies an organ independent of matter 4.

1 De Imm. cap. x.
2 “Materiale universaliter non impeditur per coexistentiam alterius materialis a cognitione; sic enim visus non cognosceret colores, cum visui sint conjunctae primeae qualitates; sed bene per coexistentiam aliius illorum quorum ipse est perceptivus impeditur; per rubedinem enim impeditur a cognitione aliorum colorum quorum et rubedinis est perceptivus.” Op. cit. x. p. 77.
3 “Si intellectus esset pura forma materialis, cum omnium formarum materialium est perceptivus, impeditur ab earum cognitione: at ipsum esse immateriali probatum est, licet non simpliciter inmaterialis sit; quapropter per coexistentiam formarum materialium non impeditur.” The result of this discussion is a clear distinction between knowledge and the conditions of knowledge, between the physical aspect of the act of knowledge and its cognitive value, in the case both of sense-perception and of knowledge generally. “Revera intellectus humanus non potest intelligere nisi in materia sint quale et quantum sensibile, cum non possit operari nisi ipse sit, ipseque esse non potest nisi cum dispositione convenienti; non tamen sequitur quod per tales dispositiones intelligat, imo ut satis liquet non sequitur in sensu; nam virtus visiva non videt nisi oculus sit calidus, non tamen per caliditatem vel aliquam aliam qualitatem realem videt, sed per speciem visibiledem.” Op. cit. x. p. 77. Cf. Comm. de An. ff. 126—9.
4 “Primum autem quod aducebatur erat, quoniam ex eo quod humanus animus omnia materialia intelligit inferebatur ipsum esse omnino immaterialem. Ad quod imprimitis dicimus non esse verum materiam, qualitercumque acceptam, materialium cognitionem impedire. Etenim unusquisque sensus exterior...sua objecta, quae mate-
But he does not take up a merely defensive attitude on this point, or rest satisfied with maintaining, negatively, that his view of the mind is consistent with the possibility of knowledge—that knowledge is *not impossible* to an essentially embodied intelligence. He claims expressly that since human knowledge is by presentation of sensible objects, it is only as the mind is related to matter *tantum de objecto* that knowledge takes place at all.

So, too, in considering the second supposed note of immateriality, the mind’s *power of abstraction*, and of forming *general conceptions*, he insists upon the distinction that general conceptions, as entertained by *human* intelligence, are mediated through a knowledge of particulars—that is, ultimately through sense-perception. For the human mind, Pomponazzi uniformly maintains, general conceptions are formed by an induction from particulars and the universal considered as realised in particulars. And thus cognition through sense, and the *embodiment* of intelligence, are not only consistent with the fact of human intelligence, but are inseparable characteristics of thought as it exists in man.

1 "Anima humana sic potens recipere omnes species formarum materialium duas habet conditiones: unam scilicet quod secundum se est immaterialis et non indigens organo tanquam subjecto pro quanto recipit et intelligit illa, quod nos concedimus: verum alteram habet quoniam formas illas non recipit nisi mota e phantasmatibus sicut plane ibi docet Aristoteles, quare indiget organo tanquam objecto." *De Imm.* X. p. 75.

2 "En quae sunt in intelligentiis (scil. superioribus) sunt simpliciter actu intellecta, et penitus a materia denudata; quae autem sunt in sensu sunt mere intellecta in potentia; quae vero sunt in intellectu humano medio modo se habent, quoniam species primo universaliter repraesentat, secundario vero ut in supposito, quando-quidem ex toto absolvit non potest a materia, cum intellectus pro quacunque sui cognitione moveatur ab objecto et in singulari speculetur universale, sicut dictum est." *(De Imm.* X. p. 78.) "Per intellectum in naturam elephasit ascendimus universaliter quae neque est signati individui neque particularis cognitioni...sed quamquam ita sit hoc tamen fieri nequit absque adninculo sensuum, quum sine phantasmate hoc fieri non potest, velut in nobis experiri possimus. Semper etem in quacunque nostra intellecctione, quantumcunque abstracta sit, aliquid corporeum ante intellectum ponimus: Quare nos immaterialia materialiter, intemporaliter temporaliter cognoscinus, e contrario modo intelligentiis se habentibus," etc. *(Apol. i. iii. f. 59 a.) "Cum dicitur
Pomponazzi's view is that man's power of universal thought is in this respect deficient, and that human thought falls short of the ideal of thought as such. Fiorentino considers that he was hampered by the Aristotelian doctrine of imagination, while denying himself the resources of the Nous by means of which Aristotle escaped into the region of absolute thought; and that he really failed to allow to the human mind the possession of universal conceptions. But the truth rather seems to be that while, in his investigation of human knowledge, Pomponazzi approximated to a truer view of the nature of thought, he was still haunted by the mediaeval idea of absolute thought which made it consist in pure abstraction, and placed the "universal" in antagonism with the "particular." He did attribute to human intelligence universal thought in the only real meaning of the term—removing, in the human instance, the opposition of universal and particular, of thought and sense. While this is our chief interest in his speculative position, we need not overlook the survival in him of an older mode of thought; and his ascription to the Divine and to the superior Intelligences of an extravast universalia, dicit Alexander quod cognoscit universale comparando unam rem alteri; sed non fit hoc per virtutem immaterialem, sed materialem." Comm. de An. f. 137 v. Cf. ff. 151—155.

1 Cf. the allusions to superior intelligence in the passages quoted in the last note; see especially Apol. i. iii. f. 59 a: "...é contrario modo intelligentiis se habentibus, nam materiaia immaterialiter et temporaliter intemporali cognoscunt...Quare ipsae solea sincerum universale cognoscent, et sine allicjus sensus vel corporis adminiculo; quam et ipsae soleae vere et proprie sunt immateriales." Cf. De Imm. xiii. p. 90: "Participat (animus humanus) de proprietatibus immortalitatis, cum universale cognoscat, tametsi ejusmodi cognitio valde tenuis et obscura est."

Of God and of the infinite, in particular, says Pomponazzi, we have only vague and inadequate conceptions. "Cum dicis quod Deum intelligit, dicit (Alexander) quod Deum anima non cognoscit nisi caecutiendo, ex eo quod non intelligit nisi per phantasmata; et hoc non arguit eam esse immaterialem, imo opponitur ex eo quod non bene cognoscit. Et similiter dico quod non intelligit infinitum nisi caecutiendo et confuso." "Dico," concludes Pomponazzi in the same passage, "quod intellectus indiget abstractione, sed non omnino, quia per phantasmata intelligit; imo arguit nostram sentientiam quod, cum per phantasmata intelligat, partim sit abstractus et partim non, non ex toto." Comm. de An. f. 137 v.

2 "Et si fa forte dei detti di Aristotile, che sensa l'intelletto passivo non si può pensare, che il conoscere non è sensa fantasmi; ma Aristotile seppe disvilupparsi da questo legame, a contemplare l'universale col Noo speculativo. Il Pomponazzi, volendo schivare ogni incongruenza, restrinse soverchiamente l'importanza e l'attività dell'intelletto umano." Fiorentino, Pomponazzi, p. 203.
apprehension of universals apart from any process of experience, and of universals in pure abstraction, need no more surprise us than his belief in the mythological “Intelligences” themselves. The fact to be observed, as suggestive of the immanent movement of his thought, is his relegating such imagined modes of reason to a transcendent realm, and, as the result of his analysis of human experience and human modes of knowledge, attributing to reason in this sublunary sphere an altogether opposite character.

While holding thus that intelligence, as human, derives all knowledge and all the materials for general conceptions from the data of sense through imagination, he does not consider that an intelligence so placed is either incapable of abstract thought, or itself material.

In the first place he does not allow that the capacity for abstract thought implies absolute immateriality, or that the sort of “dependence” on the body in which he defines the soul of man to stand is inconsistent with its possession of the power of thought.

His general position in this respect is brought into view by an argumentum ad hominem which he employs in the Apologia, in support of his idea of an intelligence “immersed” in matter. A common feature in the mediaeval psychology of knowledge was the vis cogitativa, whose function was an act of generalisation which did not amount to pure abstraction, and was therefore not assigned to intellectus as such, but which mediated between the data of sense presented in imagination and the proper act of thought. Now this power of cogitare was classed among the potencies of the animal soul, and allowed to reside in matter. Yet it was a power of receiving in knowledge the forms of things; the drawing of inference came within its scope; it was, in a sense, a power of thought. If “thought” then, in this sense, is not incompatible with a physical origin and a physical

1 See De Imm. ix. pp. 58 ff., x. pp. 78 ff.
2 "Ponti (Averroes) cogitativam exspoliare substantias ab omni sensibili communi et proprio; quare et sine quantitate cognoscit eas; idemque Thomas et Aegidius Romanus in quampluribus locis affirmant; dicuntque ipsam cogitativam discurrere, quam appellant ipsum rationem particularem." Apol. 1. iii. f. 59 c.
basis, why should absolute immateriality be predicated even of the highest exercise of thought possible to man?  

On this analogy, and on general grounds, he does not see why the power of thought should not be actually physical in its natural source and organ even as cogitativa was supposed to be. So far from the capacity of abstraction implying total independence of matter, he does not see that it must necessarily exclude the physical nature of the thinking power; although for his own part he is not disposed to adopt that hypothesis.  

For the power of thought is not, he ultimately decides, itself to be regarded as a product and quality of matter. The characteristic distinction drawn by him is that, "as human," intelligence is inseparably connected with matter (per quandam concomitantiam), but that this connection does not affect its proper nature as intelligence. What he denies is that thought

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1 "Advertendum autem est humanum animum rationabiliter ponere potentialias non affixas organo, et ipsum existentem materialem; nam ex communi omnium consenso cogitativa cognoscit omnia materialia, syllogizat et particulariter, quam est in confinio intellectus, et participat de intellectu; quid igitur vetat et humanum intellectum...paululum plus elevari quam cogitativa, sic quod et universaliter cognoscit et syllogizat, non excedendo tamen limites materiae, quam semper a phantasmate dependet, cum continuo et tempore? Nam rationalis dicitur et non vere intelligens. Quare cum discursu cognoscit et temporaliter; si namque ab hujusmodi liberaretur non amplius rationalis esset, et sic natura sua periret....Cagogitativa virtus extensa est, quam omnes affirmant ipsam esse virtutem sensitivam; ipsaque potest sequestrare substantialia a quantitate, quamvis sit in quantitate. Quid igitur obstat et ipsum intellectum existentem materialem et extensum, secundum quendam altiorem gradum quam sit cogitativa ipsa, infra tamen limites materiae, et universaliter cognoscere et universaliter syllogizare; non discedendo tamen penitus a materia quum in omni tali cognitione dependet a phantasmate? Puto itaque quod qui tenet cogitativam esse talem ut diximus, multum probabiliter habet tenere et de intellectu."  

After stating the theory of the Arabians of the manner in which the (inmaterial) "intellectus agens" acted on the (physical) "virtus imaginativa" to produce "cogitative," he explains that something of the same sort is his idea of intelligence in man: "Sicut enim apud dictos cogitativa etsi sit extensa non tamen afficiatur ad extensione, sic et apud nos intellectus; vero non absolute ut materialis est sed quatenus de immaterialitate participat et ab intellectu agente illustratur." *Apol. i. iii. f. 59 c, d. Cf. Comm. de An. f. 128.*

2 "Sic itaque existimo quod sive intellectus ponatur indivisibilis, sive extensus, nihil cogit ipsum esse simpliciter immateriale; verum mihi magis placet ipsum ponere inextensum." *Apol. i. iii. f. 59 d.*

3 "Intellectus humanus est in materia quasi per quandam concomitantiam; et ipsum intelligere quodam modo est in materia sed satis accidentaliter; quoniam intellectui, qua intellectus est, accidit esse in materia." *De Imm. x. pp. 79, 80.*
is material in the sense that it can be quantitatively regarded; since it cannot be so regarded it is not "material." So far, then, he admits the argument that the power of abstraction cannot be attributed to matter. He does so, because he distinguishes between matter and thought as such. He draws the distinction—which was by far the best legacy left by Averroism to after generations—between the physical conditions and the essential nature of human thought, between the physical conditions of human thought and the nature of thought as thought. While intelligence, he thus distinguishes, exists in man only as embodied, intelligence as such is by no means of the nature of body.2

The precise deductions thus drawn by Pomponazzi from the power of abstract thought as possessed by the mind of man are summarised in the following passage from the Apologia. After explaining the manner in which the human mind knows universals, he continues—"Since our knowledge of the universal is as I have described, it is worth while to see how that can take place suitably to the nature of the soul. I would say therefore: Since every soul—or at least every complete soul—is indivisible in respect of its essence (I mean 'indivisible' not in the sense in which a point in a line is indivisible but in virtue of being the negation of the category of quantity, as we say a sound is indivisible), such indivisibility belongs most appropriately to the human soul, which is nearest to the Intelligences, and exists as

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1 "Non esse in organo, sive subjective eo non indigere, est vel non esse in corpore vel in eo non esse modo quantitativo; unde dicitur intellectum non indigere corpore ut subjecto in sui intellectione, non quia intellectio nullo modo sit in corpore ...sed pro tanto intellectio dicitur non esse in organo et in corpore, quoniam modo quantitativo et corporali non est in eo." De Imm. ix. p. 58.

2 "Si dicitur, cum ipse intellectus sit in hac quantitate, quomodo igitur species in eo recepta poterit universaliter repraesentare? Cui dicitur hoc nihil prohibere; primo quia accidit sibi qua intellectus est ut sit in quantitate; secundo quoniam etsi est in quantitate tamen quantitas non est principium illius operationis, neque in eo opere ea per se utitur." De Imm. x. p. 78. Cf. Apol. i. iii. 59 b. Again: "Intellectus humanus non potest intelligere nisi in materia sint quale et quantum sensible, cum non possit operari nisi ipse sit, ipseque esse non potest nisi cum dispositione convenienti; non tamen sequitur quod per tales dispositiones intelligat, inuo ut satis liquet non sequitur in sensu; nam virtus visiva non videt nisi oculus sit calidus, non tamen per caliditatem vel aliquam aliam qualitatem realem videt, sed per speciem visibilem." De Imm. x. p. 77.
intermediate between material and immaterial beings. Hence, by reason of its homogeneity with material beings, though in respect of its substance it is itself indivisible, nevertheless it has all those extended and organic faculties that subserve the percipient and vegetative soul. But in so far as the human soul itself participates in immateriality, and is in the neighbourhood of immaterial beings and coterminous with them, it has intellect and will, which are faculties that do not imply extension. Wherefore the form received in it is received as unextended; \textit{whence it comes to pass that such a form represents its object universally}. But since this form both in coming into existence and in continuing to exist depends on an image which is extended and determinate, it does not represent the universal in complete purity, but only points out the universal in the individual!"

Towards the argument for the soul's absolute independence of matter derived from the capacity of self-knowledge, Pomponazzi adopts an exactly similar attitude. The human mind, he says, does not possess such a self-knowledge as he imagines to belong to superior intelligences and to be the ideal or perfect self-knowledge—namely a direct or intuitive consciousness of self. Human self-consciousness, he remarks, is essentially mediated through some particular experience; self-knowledge

\[1\] "Cum itaque nostra cognitio de universali talis sit qualem diximus, operae pretium est videre quam convenienter istud fiat. Dicam igitur; Cum omnis anima saltem perfecta indivisibilis sit secundum essentiam (dico autem indivisibile non veluti punctum in linea, verum secundum privationem generis quantitatis, qualiter sonum dicimus esse indivisibilem), talis indivisibilitas maximae convenit animae humanae, quae est propinquissima intelligentiis, mediaque existit inter materialia et immaterialia. Unde [not 'universal' as Ferri has transcribed the contraction \textit{un}, Introd. p. 72] ratione unigeneitatis cum materialibus tametsi ipsa secundum substantiam indivisibilis est, habet tamen omnes illas vires extensas et organicas quae sensitivae et vegetativae deserviunt; at qua ipsa humana anima de immaterialitate participat, estque in con- vicinio sive confino immaterialium, habet intellectum et voluntatem quae sunt vires non extensae. Quare species in ea recepta inextense recipitur; unde fit ut talis species universaliter repraesentet. At cum dixta species et in fieri et in conservari dependet a phantasmate quod extensum et signatum est; idcirco non sincere omnimo universale repraesentat, sed universale in singulari demonstrat." \textit{Apol.} i. iii. f. 59 a.

Cf. \textit{Comm. de Anima}, f. 137 v.: "...quod cum per phantasmata intelligat, partim sit abstractus et partim non: non ex tota...Non omnimo modo abstrahitur a corpore, quia eget eo ut phantasmate; et argumentum non concludit nisi quod secundum eam partes per quas anima intelligit non sit materialis, sed a materia abstracta, non tota anima."
always takes place, in us, on the occasion of some other specific act of knowledge, and the human mind only knows itself in knowing something else. The self-consciousness which was supposed to imply independence of matter was really an "absolute" self-consciousness, self-moving to the knowledge of itself. And Pomponazzi had not much difficulty in shewing that this was not the nature of self-consciousness in man, though (as he still conceded) it might well be its character in higher beings.

Once more, also in the Apologia, Pomponazzi argues from the analogy of the admittedly physical powers of human or animal nature, inferring that a knowledge of self, at least in the degree and manner in which it exists in man, does not imply "separability" from matter. Thus he ascribes to the senses a perception of their own operations and traces a rudimentary form of self-consciousness in the lower animals.

Thus by a criticism of the received marks of "immateriality" and a comparison of them with the facts of human nature as he saw it, Pomponazzi defended his conclusion that the soul is partly material and partly immaterial, simpliciter materialis and immaterialis secundum quid; or, as he otherwise expresses it, de immaterialitate participat.

On this conclusion as to the soul's nature, rigorously maintained, and coupled with a refusal to entertain any hypothesis of the soul's changing, under other conditions, what he conceives to be its fundamental nature, Pomponazzi bases his denial of immortality. It is indeed a little disconcerting to find him embodying his doctrine on that subject in the strange formula

1 "Licet non cognoscat se per speciem propriam sed aliorum...secundum tamen illud esse potest quoquo modo supra seipsum reflectere et cognoscere actus suos, licet non primo et ita perfecte sicut intelligentiae." De Imm. X. p. 76. Cf. Apol. I. iii. f. 59 d, 60 a: "Intellectus intelligendo alia se intelligit," etc.

2 "In eis (rationalibus, i.e. hominibus) idem non est primo movens et primum motum, veluti est in intelligentiis, unde in eis non est perfectus circulus." Apol. I. iii. f. 60 a.

3 "Sensum sentire se sentire....Quis autem ambiget sensum esse virtutem organicam?" Op. cit. 1. iii. f. 59 d.

that the soul is *simpliciter mortalis et immortalis secundum quid* (as against the opposite doctrine of *simpliciter immortalis et mortalis secundum quid*), since the question of the soul’s existence seems to admit only of the alternative answers—Yes and No; and the phrase *de immortalitate participat* seems merely unintelligible. But we have to remember once more how the question of the immortality and the immateriality of the soul were for Pomponazzi bound together. *De immortalitate participat* is what he means; and he frequently expresses himself in this more accurate form of words\(^1\). He does not hesitate to draw the inference of the soul’s mortality—so far that is as reason and philosophy carry him, and with all due reserve. Since the soul is “partly” material, and at the same time is one and indivisible, its perishability is for Pomponazzi an inevitable inference. Partly immaterial, doubtless, the soul is also; but immaterial absolutely, or “separable,” it certainly is not.

On a review of Pomponazzi’s reasonings we find that three considerations principally impressed him. The first was the patent fact of the *embodiment* of human intelligence. The soul of man, in the Aristotelian meaning of the term, was in some at least of its operations plainly physical (*anima vegetativa, sensitiva*). Even as intellectual (*anima intellectiva*), therefore, since the soul is one, it had its corporeal aspect\(^2\); and thought

\(^1\) E.g. *Apol.* i. iii. f. 59 a.

\(^2\) See *Comm. de An.* ff. 253 v., 254 r.: “(Intellucus) quatenus intellectus non eget corpore...Anima autem nostra secundum quod est intellectiva realis (utitur) in intelligendo organo corporeo...nec ex toto et omni modo in intelligendo eget organo corporeo quia non eget eo ut subjecto....Anima autem nutritiva secundum quod realiter eadem est cum vegetativa et sensitiva et sic in suis operationibus, quae sunt pertinentes ad vegetationem et sensationem, indiget corpore ut subjecto, quia omnes tales operationes sunt cum conditionibus materiae, quae sunt hic et nunc; ideo in talibus operationibus anima intellectiva, quatenus sensitiva aut vegetativa, indiget corpore ut subjecto; modo cum operatio eiusdem animae intellectivae, quatenus intellectiva est, quae est intelligere, fiat sine conditionibus materiae, quae sunt hic et nunc; ideo in ista sua operatione non eget corpore ut subjecto, sed bene ut objecto, quia quidquid intelligatur ab anima nostra intelligitur per aliquid corporeum.” Cf. *De Nutritione*, i. xxiii. f. 130 b: “Quamquam id quod est anima intellectiva sit extensum—est enim sensitivum et nutritivum ut supponimus, quae sunt extensa—ut tamen intelligit et recipit species intelligibiles non utitur corpore, neque ut sic afficiur quantitate....Nam intellectus qua intelligit est immaterialis ad modum expressum; cum quo tamen stat quod et sit materialis.”
in man, although not corporeal in its nature, acted only on occasion of physical impressions, and in permanent connection with, if not in dependence on, a bodily organisation.

These facts, taken in connection with the admittedly incorporeal nature of intelligence and the consequent incorporeal aspect of anima intellectiva, presented a problem. And early in the De Immortalitate, weighing against one another the considerations that suggested the corporeity and mortality or the immateriality and immortality of the soul, Pomponazzi treated the question provisionally as dubious or at least unconcluded. Subsequently however, and in his writings generally, he defined the human soul as both material and immaterial; although being one, and in one aspect material, it is therefore mortal, and its participation in immateriality does not guarantee its actual immortality.

A "part" of the soul might indeed be in a certain sense immaterial, for this was Pomponazzi's belief about the anima intellectiva. While the human intelligence derived all its knowledge through the bodily organisation, it was not a product of the organisation, did not depend on it for its existence. Thus so far as thought qua thought was concerned, the bodily organisation was the condition, and not the cause either of its existence or of its operation.

1 "Ex eo namque quod talis essentia formas omnes materiales recipit, quia recepta in ea sunt actu intellecta; quod non utitur organo corporeo; quod aeternitatem et superna affectat; ideo concludebatur quod ipsa sit immortalis. Sed pariter cum ipsa materialiter operatur ut vegetativa, non omnes formas recipit ut sensitiva, et eadem organo corporeo utitur, temporalia et caduca affectat; probabtur quod ipsa vere et simpliciter sit mortalis, verum ex ea parte qua intelligit secundum quid erit immortalis, tum quia intellectus non conjunctus materiae est incorruptibilis, sed materiae conjunctus est corruptibilis, tum quia in tali opere non fungitur instrumento corporali, sicut etiam ipse (Thomas) dicit quod taliter est per accidens et secundum quid materiales; non enim major ratio de uno quam de altero videtur." De Imm. VIII. p. 36.

2 De Imm. cap. IX. and passim. Comm. de An. f. 137 v.

3 "Ex ea parte qua intelligit, secundum quid erit immortalis." De Imm. VIII. p. 56. "Secundum eas partes per quas anima intelligit, non est materialis." Comm. de An. f. 137 v. "Intellactus...qua intellectus est, non dependet a materia, neque a quantitate." De Imm. VIII. p. 59.

4 "Mihi magis placet ipsum (scil., intellig. hum.) ponere inextensum." Apol. I. iii. f. 59 d. See De Imm. cap. x.

5 "Intellactus humanus...esse non potest nisi cum dispositione convenienti, non tamen sequitur quod per tales dispositiones intelligat." De Imm. X. p. 77.
But again the soul was “partly material,” and human intelligence (anima intellectiva) so far dependent on matter as to be inseparable from it. How this should be, must depend upon the nature of matter and of intelligence respectively.

The second fact on which the mind of Pomponazzi dwelt was the character of intelligence as human.

The intermediate position occupied by man in the universe, between purely spiritual beings on the one hand and material or merely animal existences on the other, was a leading idea with Pomponazzi as with so many of his predecessors. It finds expression on almost every page of his writings. His mind dwelt upon it so habitually that it moulded his thoughts on every subject. But especially did it determine his doctrine of human nature, which was perhaps the most thorough-going and logical application made by any of the mediaeval thinkers of the theory of a hierarchy of beings and the intermediate nature of man.

Intelligence, as has been said, was for Pomponazzi the “immaterial part” of the human soul. But this superior part of man was itself of an intermediate nature and grade. For the intermediate nature of man did not mean, for Pomponazzi, simply a nature compounded of both body and soul; the idea, in his mind, referred to an intermediate position occupied by man’s soul (the “form” of his existence) among the hierarchy of beings.

Now Pomponazzi’s conception of human intelligence, of the degree and manner in which the higher power of thought existed in man, was affected in two respects by his idea of man as an intermediate being; or, alternatively, it may be said that his general idea of man was corroborated by his conception of human intelligence. The dogma of man’s intermediate place in nature is reflected in a twofold modification of the theory of human intelligence; its influence acted in two opposite directions to produce the same effect. On the one hand we find

1 “Partim abstractus et partim non, non ex toto.” Comm. de An. f. 137 v.
2 “Visa itaque multipliici ancipitique hominis natura, non ea quidem quae ex compositione materiae et formae resultat, sed ea quae ex parte ipsius formae seu animae,” etc. De Imm. II. p. 7.
Pomponazzi lessening the distance between man and the lower orders of being, and on the other hand emphasising the distinction between mind in man and a supposed absolute Intelligence. We have already seen 'that Pomponazzi laboured to trace analogies between thought and the lower powers of the soul. He sought to find parallels to what were supposed to be the unique and peculiar operations of the intellectual power, in the senses or in other supposed powers of the mind that were admitted to have a physical basis and origin. He aimed at diminishing the distance between attributes which were supposed to be the distinguishing property of man, alone among all mundane existences, and those capacities which were ascribed to his physical nature or allowed to be shared in, to a greater or less degree, by lower animals. The express design of Pomponazzi was of course to shew that the intermediate nature of man meant an inseparable relation in him between body and soul, and thus his mortality. Apart from that particular deduction from the premises, these psychological comparisons of Pomponazzi have a twofold interest. In the first place they mark the tendency of his mind towards a more scientific psychology based on a prevailing sense of the unity of mental life. Secondly we see here a real attempt to relate man to nature and especially to forms of life below him in the scale of being, and thus witness an early beginning of the comparative and historical method through which alone a science of human nature is possible, and by which an intelligible account of man and of reason is substituted for dogmatic conceptions alike of body and of soul.

We have also to note on the other hand the contrast which Pomponazzi drew, and which was never absent from his mind, between the mode of intelligence observed in man and that which was supposed to characterise a superior order of thinking beings. The human mind was constantly regarded by him in the light of a comparison with those Intelligences which filled so large a place in the world of mediaeval thought, and which, although they were by no means a primary interest to Pomponazzi, yet occupied always the background of his theory. In them, and in the Deity, the perfection of intelligence was supposed
to be realised. Space and time were in their thought absolutely transcended and all things considered in pure and abstract generality. Their general conceptions also were not formed by induction from concrete and particular reality, but by a direct intuition addressed to the universal as such, and as opposed to the particular. I do not enter upon the discussion of the value of such an ideal of thought—implying as it does that things considered as in space and time are not considered truly, and by a logical fiction distinguishing the universal from the particular as a real object of thought. But it is evident that such an ideal has little bearing on the actual process of human knowledge, and involves the condemnation of all that presents itself as truth to the human mind. Pomponazzi has at least the credit of perceiving this clearly; and it was significant of his position as a pioneer of a naturalistic view of man and a humanistic view of reason that he drew the distinction between thought in man and that ideal of absolute thought which tradition had handed down to him. He deferred to that ideal: it had a real place in his belief. Yet at the same time he felt its irrelevancy to the problem of thought which actually presented itself to him in man. And even if (as may be admitted) his doctrine of the Intelligences was more than a merely perfunctory homage to received beliefs in theology and cosmology, it remains true that the chief energies of his mind were given to the new questions about human thought which were opening up before him, and to the analysis of the real process of experience.

Accordingly he defines intelligence in man by contrast with the supposed perfect Intelligences.1

The third consideration by which Pomponazzi's mind was governed was the idea of intelligence or thought as something sui generis. The relation of thought to its object in the act of

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1 See Apol. i. iii. f. 59 a. Cf. f. 59 c: "Intellectum humanum...paullulum plus elevari quam cogitativa, sic quod et universaliter cognoscit et syllogizat, non excedendo tamen limites materiae, quoq semper a phantasmate dependet, cum continuo et tempore. Nam rationalis dicitur, et non vere intelligens. Quare cum discursu cognoscit et temporaliter"; and De Imm. xii. p. 90: "Non enim vere (anima) appellatur intellectualis sed rationalis; intellectus enim simplici intuitu omnia intuitur; at ratiocinatio discursu, compositione, et cum tempore, quae omnia attestantur super imperfectione et materialitate ejus."
knowledge was clearly distinguished by him, as indeed by mediaeval thinkers generally, from any physical relation whatever.

For the maintenance of this distinction, the Middle Ages were largely indebted to Averroes. The Averroist metaphysics was in many respects a hindrance to mental progress; but it was a powerful barrier against materialism, and was largely instrumental in protecting from it mediaeval philosophy, and perhaps, indirectly, modern philosophy as well.

Pomponazzi also attributed thought as such, in its essential and peculiar nature, to the soul of man. In this he went against Averroism, at least in the letter, although even in distinguishing so absolutely as he did, in a metaphysical sense, between the soul of man and the intellectual principle, Averroes came near to abolishing his own distinction; since just in so doing he ipso facto attributed every actual exercise of reason in man to intelligence in the proper sense of the word; and thus the metaphysical dualism, at its extreme, wrought its own destruction. So soon as a thinker appeared, like Pomponazzi, starting from an empirical and psychological rather than a metaphysical point of view, a transition was rapidly accomplished; and Averroism was one of the principal influences which led Pomponazzi at once to apprehend the essential nature of thought and to recognise the activity of thought in the mental processes of man.

The language which Pomponazzi uses in constantly speaking of the subjectum of human thought shews the influence of Averroist discussions upon his mind. The question of the nature of human thought, as it presented itself to him, was the question of what should be considered to be the subjectum or metaphysical substrate of intelligence in man; and his characteristic position was that, while the human mind depends on matter and on a corporeal instrument for the objects of its thought, it does not depend on matter subjective. Now the precise meaning of this distinction is not, as has usually been supposed, that the higher or rational powers of man act in independence of a corporeal organ. In a sense, Pomponazzi holds they do so; in

1 See Comm. de An. ff. 126—129.
another sense they use the body, the "whole body," as an instrument. But what Pomponazzi denies is that matter is the \textit{subjectum} of mind, that mind subsists in matter\textsuperscript{1}.

Intelligence is, in its nature, independent of matter. Its independence, according to Pomponazzi, is perfectly realised only in the higher Intelligences. But in the case of human intelligence also the independence of thought is to be maintained \textit{quatenus ad subjectum}; or, as he also expresses it, human intelligence is independent of matter \textit{qua intellectus}, though not \textit{qua humanus}\textsuperscript{2}. Thought in man has the quality of thought as such, and stands above the category of quantity and physical categories generally. This idea of human reason distinguishes the doctrine of Pomponazzi absolutely from materialism. It is expressed in an important paragraph:—“Not to be in an organ or not to need it as a substrate of existence, means either not to be in body, or not to be in it in a quantitative way. Hence we say that intellect does not need body as a substrate, in its intellect of itself, not because intellect is in no sense in body...but that in so far as it is called 'intellection' it is not in

\textsuperscript{1} "Quamquam...totum corpus ponatur instrumentum intellectus quasi ut subjectum, non tamen vere est ut subjectum, quoniam intelligere non recipitur in eo modo corporali." \textit{De Imm.} x. p. 80. (See the whole passage in note 2, p. 135.)

\textsuperscript{2} See \textit{Apol.} i. iii. f. 59 b: "Ex his autem patere potest qualiter intellectus nullius corporis est actus. Illud enim universaliter verum est de quocunque intellectu, sed non eodem modo; quem et intellectus dicitur fere equivoce de diis et nobis; intellectus enim deorum, qui vere intelliget, est penitus nullius corporis actus est, quum in intelligendo non indiget corpore velut subjecto vel veluti objecto. Quare simpliciter et vere illud dictum verificaret de diis, et de intellectu secundum se, quoniam intellectus qua intellectus non indiget corpore. At noster intellectus, ut visus est, quamvis non indiget corpore ut subjecto, indiget tamen ut objecto. Quare non ex toto noster intellectus nullius est corporis actus. Unde propositio assumpta, si referatur ad humanum intellectum, restringenda est quantum ad subjectum, et non quantum ad objectum....Exponi etiam potest, et melius, veluti dictum est, quod humanus intellectus nullius corporis est actus, qua scilicet intellectus est, licet non qua humanus.” In another place (\textit{De Nutritione}, i. xxiii. f. 130 b) he clearly states that the \textit{subjectum} of thought as \textit{human} is intelligence—intelligence as timeless and unquantified; it is this, he says, which Aristotle had in view when he spoke of intelligence coming from without. “Dicimus Aristotelem per ea verba voluisse ostendere gradum intellectivum in hominibus convenire cum separatis a materia quantum ad aliaquas conditiones: utpote quod non indiget materia vel organo ut subjecto; quare quasi extrinsecus venire videtur, et quoniam sic operando non continetur neque quanto neque tempore; ut sic videtur esse aeternus, quanquam re vera non sit aeternus,” etc. \textit{Cf. De Imm.} passim.
an organ and in body, since it is not in that in a quantitative and corporeal way. Wherefore the intellect can have itself as its object, can reason, and have universal conceptions, which faculties that use material organs and are extended cannot do. All this arises from the essential nature of intellect, since in so far as it is intellect it does not depend on matter or on quantity, because if the human intellect is said to depend on it, this is true in so far as it is conjoined with sense, so that it is an accident to it qua intellect to depend on matter and quantity. Whence also its operation is not more separate from matter than its essential nature, for unless intellect had an element which in virtue of itself could exist apart from matter, the operation itself could not take place except in a quantitative and corporeal way. But although the human intellect, as has been held, does not in its operation of thinking employ quantity, nevertheless since it is conjoined with sense, it cannot be separated altogether from matter and quantity."

The *subjectum*, in short, of the operations of intelligence, is intelligence itself. This is the metaphysical meaning of Pomponazzi’s denial of mind’s dependence on body *tanquam de subjecto*

1 "Non esse in organo, sive subjective eo non indigere, est vel non esse in corpore, vel in eo non esse modo quantitativo; unde dicitur intellectum non indigere corpore ut subjecto in sui intellectione, non quia intellectum nullo modo sit in corpore... sed pro tanto intellectio dicitur non esse in organo et in corpore, quoniam modo quantitativo et corporali non est in eo; quaprotpter potest intellectus reflectere supra seipsum, discurre, et universaliter comprehendere, quod virtutes organicae et extensae minime facere quent; hoc autem totum provenit ex essentia intellectus, quoniam qua intellectus est non dependet a materia, neque a quantitate, quod si humanus intellectus ab ea dependet, hoc est ut sensui conjunctus est, quare accidenti sibi qua intellectus est a materia et quantity dependere; unde et eius operatio non est magis abstracta quam essentia, nisi enim intellectus haberet quod ex se posset esse sine materia, intellectio ipsa non posset exerceri nisi modo quantitativo et corporali. At quamvis intellectus humanus, ut habitum est, intelligendo non fungatur quantitate; attamen quoniam sensui conjunctus est, ex toto a materia et quantitate absolvit non potest." *(De Imm. IX. p. 58.)* Again he says, "Intellectus humanus est in materia quasi per quendam concomitantiam et ipsum intelligere quodam modo est in materia sed satis accidentaliter, quoniam intellectui, qua intellectus est, accidit esse in materia." *(Op. cit. x. p. 79.)* The distinction of thought from matter is for Pomponazzi axiomatic.

2 "Vere secundum essentiam ipsum intelligere esse in ipso intellectu juxta illud 3 de anima, 'anima est locus specierum, non tota sed intellectus'." *(De Imm. x. p. 79.)* "Immediatum enim subjectum intellectus et volitionis sunt intellectus et voluntas, quae non sunt organicae potentialia...quoniam omne organicum est quan-
The strength of this position is in its signalising the peculiar nature of intelligence. Its weakness is the metaphysical conception of thought as *subjectum*—a mechanical category from which it would be impossible to deduce personality. Still, in a sense, under the guidance of Averroes, an attempt is here made to formulate the problem which Aristotle had ignored—the metaphysical question of the nature of thought and its relation to the individual human soul, to which Aristotle had attributed its possession.

Pomponazzi, meanwhile, following Aristotle, also attributed thought in that true and immaterial sense to the individual soul of man.

The mind of man, while in a sense it is in body, is not so in a physical sense. To deny that mind subsists physically in matter (*de subjecto*) does not necessarily mean to separate mind from matter. Mind would be said to be independent of matter (*intellectum non indigere corpore ut subjecto*), if it were not "in matter" at all: it is so, however, also if it be not in matter in a physical or quantitative sense. *Non esse in organo, sive subjective eo non indigere may, says Pomponazzi, have either of these meanings; and while he does not hold the existence of human intelligence apart from body, he yet is not shut up to its physical subsistence in body*.

This is further expressed in his ascribing to the human mind, in its rational or intellectual aspect, "indivisibility," which he explains to mean its exemption from the category of quantum...ipsae vero solae sunt indivisibiles. Et secundum istum modum verificatur illud Aristotelis 3 de anima, scil. 'anima est locus specierum, non tota sed intellectus?'." *Apol. i. iii. f. 59 b.*

"Non esse in organo, sive subjective eo non indigere, est vel non esse in corpore vel in eo non esse modo quantitativo: unde dicitur intellectum (scil. humanum) non indigere corpore ut subjecto—non quia intellectio nullo modo fit in corpore—sed pro tanto intellectio dicitur non esse in organo et in corpore, quoniam modo quantitativo et corporali non est in eo." (De Imm. ix. p. 58.) Cf. *Apol. i. iii. f. 59 b.;* "Dicimus...humanam intellectionem non esse in corpore, non quoniam non sit in materia; quandoquidem hoc fieri inimaginabile est, cum enim anima sit in materia imposibile est quin et accidentus ejus non sit in materia...sed pro tanto dicitur intellectionem non esse in corpore, quem ipsa non dicitur esse in materia modo quantitativo, sed inextense; et utullo pacto in organo recipitur, veluti sensatio et omnis operatio vegetativa."
tity. Thus his conclusion with regard to man is:—"The human intellect cannot think unless a qualified and a quantified sensible object exist in matter, since it cannot operate unless it itself exists, and it itself cannot exist without an appropriate modification (of body): nevertheless it does not follow that it thinks by means of these modifications. . . . Although its existence implies quantity, yet quantity is not the ground of its operation."

On the one hand, that is to say, Pomponazzi affirms the embodiment of human intelligence, on the other the difference between thought and all that is physical. All the operations of the human mind, he constantly maintains, take place through the apprehension of physical objects by the bodily senses; and he never appears concerned to establish an activity of human thought, even in its highest functions of self-consciousness or the apprehension of universal ideas, that is unaccompanied by bodily organisation. But thought cannot be physical in its nature: the subjectum of intelligence cannot be the body or matter in any form.

Accepting the antiquated form of expression, we may take this as an affirmation that thought is sui generis. And it is interesting to note that, instead of endeavouring to find specific operations of thought independent of a physical concomitant, Pomponazzi rests upon the distinction of the physical and the intellectual. He is not concerned with a question of fact, but with the nature of intelligence.

1 "Dico autem indivisible non veluti punctum in linea verum secundum privationem generis ejus." Apol. i. iii. f. 59 a.

These views are maintained by Pomponazzi with substantial uniformity in all his writings. Fiorentino (Pomponazzi, pp. 173—175) laboured to shew that Pomponazzi's standpoint changed with the advance of his thought, and that he moved gradually towards a professed materialism. Prof. Ferri has abundantly shewn that the facts do not bear out this theory. In the De Immortalitate it is unflinchingly maintained that the soul is inseparable from the body; in the De Nutritione it is equally made plain that intelligence is to be considered as "immaterial" in its nature ("Intellectus qua intelligit est immaterialis ad modum expressum"). See De Nutr. i. xxiii. f. 130 b.

2 "Intellectus humanus non potest intelligere, nisi in materia sunt quale et quantum sensibile, cum non operari potest nisi ipse sit, ipseque esse non potest nisi cum dispositione convenienti: non tamen sequitur quod per tales dispositiones intelligat... Etsi est (intellectus) in quantitate, tamen quantitas non est principium illius operationis." De Imm. x. pp. 77, 78.

3 "Quanquam totum corpus ponatur instrumentum...non tamen vere est ut subjectum." De Imm. x. p. 80.
CHAPTER VI
INTELLIGENCE

We are now in a position to understand what Pomponazzi meant by the "participation" of the human soul in intelligence.

His conclusions may be summarised under three heads, as follows:— (1) Relation of Soul and Reason (anima and intellectus); (2) General conception of Human Nature; (3) Connection of Mind and Body.

(1) Relation of Soul and Reason.

In attributing Reason to the soul of man Pomponazzi followed Aristotle. The rationalistic side of Aristotle's doctrine, we have seen, was well to the front in the Middle Ages. The orthodox schools emphasised it to the prejudice of his naturalistic doctrine of the soul. And Averroes, while not assigning the possession of reason, in a metaphysical sense, to the natural soul, nevertheless maintained the rational character of human mental life. Pomponazzi in this respect fully profited by the mediaeval tradition.¹

Two criticisms are commonly made upon the doctrine of νοῦς in Aristotle. One refers to the absence of a metaphysical analysis of the nature of reason; the other to the lack of a psychological derivation of rational thought in man—reason as a cosmological or ontological principle being introduced, it is

¹ Cf. "Dicimus Aristotelem...voluisse ostendere gradum intellectivum in hominibus convenire cum separatis a materia, quantum ad aliquas conditiones; utpote quod non indiget materia vel organo ut subjecto" etc. (De Nutr. 1. xxiii. f. 130 b.) "Quamquam...corpus ponatur instrumentum intellectus quasi ut subjectum, non tamen vere est ut subjectum." (De Imm. x. p. 80.) "Secundum essentiam ipsum intelligere esse in ipso intellectu." Op. cit. x. p. 79.
said, with some violence into the account of the psychical process. The result of the former defect is traced in the metaphysical dualism of the later Peripatetics; and of the latter, in a corresponding psychological dualism, which isolates "reason" in the sense of the power of abstract thought, and fails to recognise its derivation from "lower" powers and its organic connection with them in the unity of mental life. Both these complaints against the Aristotelian doctrine are indicated when it is said that he did not distinguish between a metaphysical and a psychological view of reason.

It may be asked then, first, whether Pomponazzi correctly apprehended the meaning of Aristotle, and, further, whether he is to be credited with any advance upon Aristotle in either or both of the aspects of his doctrine which have been mentioned.

These questions can perhaps best be answered, and answered together, by a comparison of Pomponazzi with the Averroist and the ecclesiastical interpretation of Aristotle. It will be generally agreed that, in rejecting the superhuman intellectual principle of Averroes, and what may fairly be called the extra-physical intellectual principle (anima intellectiva) of St Thomas, represented as a "separate form" or spiritual substance, Pomponazzi came nearer to the original doctrine of Aristotle than either of those thinkers. He attributed reason to the human soul as such, and to that soul as embodied, or in its observed character of forma corporis; and in these respects returned to the original standpoint and belief of Aristotle.

Was, then, the affirmation of reason in the natural soul of man as dogmatic as the same affirmation had been in the case of Aristotle? Perhaps not quite. The reference of the actual reason in man to reason regarded as a subjectum shews that Pomponazzi felt at least the need for some further explanation. This conception, gained from Averroism, was in no sense itself a metaphysical explanation of reason; but it may be said to have expressed the need for a true metaphysic as distinct from those spurious ontological constructions, which Pomponazzi partly rejected (in the case, that is, of man) and partly permitted to remain.

In the same way, we cannot indeed say that Pomponazzi's
distinction of *intellectus qua humanus* and *intellectus qua intellectus* is a distinction between a psychological and a metaphysical view of reason. A conscious and intentional distinction of that sort it certainly is not. Still we note with interest the words in which he develops the Aristotelian suggestion of a *νοῦς χωριστὸς*. On the one hand, intelligence as in man is in an indissoluble relationship with a material body; on the other, it is “immaterial” in the sense of being timeless and unquantified: “Though that which is an intellectual soul is extended...nevertheless *qua* thinking and receiving intelligible forms it does not use body, and in thus operating it is not affected with quantity.” Again he says: “Since every soul—at least every complete soul—is indivisible in its essential nature (I mean indivisible...in the sense of exemption from the category of quantity),” etc. And again, “It is an accident of intellect *qua intellect* to be in matter,” and, “Intellect does not need matter or an organ as its substrate: wherefore it seems to come, as it were, from without, and since in so operating it is not limited or in time, in this reference it seems to be eternal”.

Actually, he says, it is not eternal (“*quanquam re vera non sit aeternus*”). But it thus appears as Pomponazzi’s view of the soul of man, that as possessed of intelligence (“*qua intelligit,* “*qua intellectus est*”) its being is constituted by eternal, timeless Reason. This is his alternative to the Averroist theory of its being acted upon by a thinking principle outside itself, or to the orthodox hypothesis of a thinking substance apart from, and independent of, the body.

It is still in vague and uncertain terms that Pomponazzi attributes reason to the soul of man. This is undoubtedly owing to the dualistic tendency to confine the name of reason to pure abstract thought, and to the vain imagination of a direct

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1 “*Quamquam id quod est anima intellectiva sit extensum...ut tamen intelligit et recipit species intelligibiles non utitur corpore neque ut sic afficitur quantitate.*”

“*Cum omnis anima saltem perfecta indivisibilis sit secundum essentiam (dico autem indivisibile...secundum privationem generis quantitatis),*” etc. “Intellectui *qua intellectus est accidit esse in materia.*” “(Intellectus) non indiget materia vel organo ut subjecto; quare quasi extrinsecus venire videtur et quoniam sic operando non continetur neque quanto neque tempore, ut sic videtur esse aeternus.” *De Nutr.* III. xxiii. f. 130 b; *Apol.* I. iii. f. 59 a; *De Imm.* x. p. 80; *De Nutr.*, ibidem.
intuition of universal truths without particular experiences. So long as this was the ideal of rational thought, it formed an additional barrier to the attribution of reason to man. It was the recollection of the superior Intelligences, in whom reason wrought without discursus, and without sensuous experience, that forbade Pomponazzi to follow the natural tendency of all his thought and to attribute intellectus in the proper sense to man. It was by this idea of the nature of intelligence that he was obliged to use ambiguous and unmeaning qualifications like per accidens and per quandam concomitantiam in assigning intelligence to an embodied and a sensuous "soul."

Yet in his psychology Pomponazzi is not without attempts to overcome the dualism of sense and reason, reason and the "lower faculties," and in this respect, once more, to advance upon the doctrine of his master. The schoolmen had already done something in this direction, seeking, in opposition to Averroism, to bridge the imagined gulf between reason and the natural soul of man. Pomponazzi in a striking passage of the Commentary on the De Anima\(^1\) endeavours at once to shew that Averroism had not been so unreasonable upon the point as was supposed and to develop his own conception of the soul of man as a unity. He recalls on the one hand Averroes' doctrine that the intellectual soul makes man what he is (an illustration of the fact that in Averroes dualism had over-reached itself and was felt by Pomponazzi to have done so); on the other hand, the concession to the natural soul of virtus cogitativa. Cogitativa was assigned to the power of sense, or of the lower and natural soul, and represented the highest aspect of psychical life short of true thought or reason itself. And on his own account Pomponazzi suggests that cogitativa and intellectus are really not the disparate and twofold natures they were supposed to be, but different stages in the development or in the perfection of man as a rational being\(^2\).

\(^1\) Ff. 141, 142.

\(^2\) "Ideo dico quod ex anima intellectiva et corpore informato per cogitativam fit per se unum, quia cogitativa non est hominis essentia per se compless, sed adhuc corpus tale est in potentia ad intellectum; et si dicitur 'impossibile est idem habere duo esse,' dico quod est verum de duobus esse ultimatis, et aequa perfectis." "Alias ego dixi quod anima intellectiva realiter est idem quod sensitiva." Comm. de An. ff. 142 r., 141 v. Cf. Apol. i. iii. f. 58 d.
(2) General conception of Human Nature.

Reference has already been made to the ruling position occupied in Pomponazzi's system of thought by the conception of an order and hierarchy of beings in nature. The corollary of this general doctrine was the intermediate place and character of man.

There were, according to this scheme, three orders of beings—the immaterial and the imperishable, including the Deity and (in their essential nature and true being) the spherical Intelligences; at the other extreme, material and mortal, all sublunary beings with the exception of man; intermediate between the two, and sharing the attributes of both, the composite nature of man.

Pomponazzi combined, however, with the threefold division of existence the more general conception of a universal hierarchy in being. Between the three outstanding points of the one scheme came the innumerable gradations of the other. The one was, as it were, imposed upon the other. So between Deity at the one extreme and man the intermediary—and again between man and the lowest point of being which was "formless matter"—intervened an indefinite variety of beings in a (theoretically) completely graduated scale. Thus the Intelligences, while all alike belonging to the superior order, were relatively subordinate to the Divine intelligence, besides having a gradation among themselves. Man, next, was essentially the possessor of diverse powers, graduated in excellence, and in their approximation to the immaterial and enduring. Among lower creatures finally we find Pomponazzi signalising those which are transitional and intermediate in their character, such as the sponge, which is intermediate between the plant and the animal, or the ape, which bridges the gulf between man and brute; or dis-

1 "Recte autem et ordinate sic processit natura." (De Imm. ix. p. 60.) "Ut decor et naturae ordo servetur." (Apol. I. iii. f. 59 a.) "Natura gradatim procedit." (De Imm. ix. p. 64.)

2 "Sunt enim quaedam animalia media inter plantas et animalia, ut spungiae marinae, quae habent de natura plantarum; quae sunt affixae terrae, habent etiam de natura animalis pro quanto sentiunt. Similiter inter animalia est simia, de qua est dubium an sit homo an animal brutum; et ita anima intellectiva est media inter aeterna et non aeterna." Comm. de An. f. 111.
tistinguishing, among the lower animals, some which lead a merely sensuous life, with almost no power of reasoning, from others which rival man in mechanical skill and even in the civil virtues.  

Belonging to the three orders of being, there were three sorts of “souls.” For the superior Intelligences were also to be regarded as in a sense the informing souls of the spheres to which they belonged. Only the difference between them and the human soul was that the act of intelligence in them did not depend in any way upon the physical spheres to which they were related only as the motor is to that which is moved; knowledge in them was a direct intuition and contemplation of abstract and immaterial objects; whereas the soul of man is dependent for the exercise of intelligence upon matter tanquam de objecto, and the sensitive soul, or the soul of the lower animal, resides in matter tanquam de subjecto as well. All however

1 “(Natura) gradatim procedit; vegetabilia enim aliquid animae habent, cum in seipsis operentur, at multum materialiter, cum suis non fungatur officiis nisi per qualitates primas, et ad esse reale earum operationes terminatur. Deinde succedunt animalia solum tactum et gustum habentia et indeterminatam imaginationem; post quae sunt animalia quae ad tantam perfectionem perveniunt ut intellectum habere existimemus, nam multa mechanice operantur, ut construendo casas; multa civiliter ut apes; multa omnes fere virtutes morales, ut patet inspicienti libros De Historia Animalium in quibus miranda ponuntur quae referre nimis esset prolixum; imo infiniti fere homines minus videntur habere de intellectu quam multae bestiae.” De Imm. IX. p. 64.

2 “Istis autem omnibus gradibus cognoscitivis secundum Aristotelem et Platonem competit esse animas; quare saltem secundum Aristotelem quodlibet cognoscentis est actus corporis physici organici, verum aliter et aliter. Nam intelligentiae non sunt actus corporis qua intelligentiae sunt, quoniam in suo intelligere et desiderare nullo pacto indigent corpore, sed qua actuante et movente corpora coelestia, sic animae sunt....Anima autem sensitiva simpliciter est actus corporis physici organici, quia et indiget corpore tanquam subjecto, cum non fungatur suo officio nisi in organo, et indiget corpore tanquam objecto. Media vero quae est intellectus humanus in nullo suo opere totaliter absolvitur a corpore, neque totaliter immergitur; quare non indigebit corpore tanquam subjecto, sed tanquam objecto, et sic medio modo inter abstracta et non abstracta erit actus corporis organici. Nam intelligentiae qua intelligentiae non sunt animae, quia nullo modo ut sic dependent a corpore, sed qua movente corpora coelestia. At intellectus humanus in omni suo opere est actus corporis organici, cum semper dependeat a corpore tanquam objecto. Est et differentia inter intelligentiam et intellectum humanum in dependendo ab organo; quoniam humanus recipit et perficitur per objectum corporale, cum ab eo moveatur; at intelligentia nihil recipit a corpore coelesti sed tantum tribuit. A sensitiva autem virtute differt intellectus humanus in dependendo a corpore, quia sensitiva subjective et objective dependet, humanus autem intellectus objective tantum. Et sic medio modo humanus intellectus inter materialia et immaterialia est actus corporis organici.
might equally be regarded as "souls," though \textit{non uno modo, but aliter et aliter}.\footnote{1}

Corresponding to the three sorts of souls there were three ways of knowledge. The Divine and superior Intelligences were supposed to apprehend universal truth by an immediate intuition\footnote{2}. The sensitive powers, whether as in man or possessed by brute beasts, had also their proper mode of knowledge\footnote{3}; they were considered not to give general knowledge, but only knowledge of "singulars." Between these two extremes again came man, in whom mind was dependent upon the physical organisation for the objects of its apprehension, yet was not confined to the particularity proper to matter but grasped general relations; these general relations, however, being apprehended \textit{in the particular}, and the knowledge of them acquired only through particular experiences—a condition which was supposed to constitute a limitation upon human thought and to remove it from the rank of perfect knowledge\footnote{4}. Within human nature

\begin{quotation}
Quapropter \textit{non uno modo} corpora coelestia, homines, et bestiae animalia sunt, cum \textit{non uno modo} eorum animae sunt actus corporis physici organici; \textit{ut visum est}.\footnote{1} De \textit{Imm.} \textit{ix.} pp. 54, 55.

\footnote{1} "Sunt itaque in universum tres modi animalium, cumque omne animal cognoscit, sunt et tres modi cognoscendi: sunt enim animalia omnino aeterna, sunt et omnino mortalia, sunt et media inter haec; prima sunt corpora coelestia...alia vero sunt bestiae...intermedia vero sunt homines." Op. \textit{cit.} \textit{ix.} p. 71. "Universaliter enim corpora coelestia, homines, bestiae et plantae animata sunt, eorumque animae sub universali definitione animae continentur: verum \textit{non uno modo,}" Op. \textit{cit.} \textit{x.} p. 82.


\footnote{3} Cf. De \textit{Imm.} \textit{ix.} pp. 51, 53, where it is said that these powers of the soul, although bound up in matter ("indigent corpore et tanquam subjecto et tanquam objecto") are yet truly capable of knowledge ("spirituales"); "quendam modum immaterialitatis induunt"); for they are related to things not physically, but in the representative relation of knowledge ("non cognoscant per qualitates sensibiles, sed per earum species").

\footnote{4} "(\textit{Intellectus humanus}) non intelligit sine phantasmate, quanquam non sicut phantasia cognoscit; quoniam medius existens inter aeterna et bestias universale cognoscit, secundum quod cum aeternis convenit, et differt a bestiis: tamen universale in singulari spectatur, quod differt ab aeternis, et convenit quoquo modo cum bestiis. Bestiae autem ipsae in fine cognoscentium constitutae neque simpliciter universale neque universale in singulari, sed tantum singulare singulariter comprehendunt. Sunt itaque in universum tres modi animalium, cumque omne animal cognoscit, sunt et tres modi cognoscendi: sunt enim animalia omnino aeternae, sunt et omnino mortalia, sunt et media inter haec; prima corpora coelestia, et haec nullo modo in cognoscendo dependent a corpore; alia vero sunt bestiae, quae a corpore
itself, finally, there is the same hierarchy of powers. Man is the microcosm. The various grades of existence are reflected, are repeated, in man. He participates in immaterial intelligence. He partakes also of corporeal existence. Avoiding the fiction of separate souls, Pomponazzi lays it down that the human soul is vegetative, is sensitive, is intellectual. Thus is man the microcosm, embodying the grades of existence. The powers lower than the intellectual are themselves graduated. For example, the *vis cogitativa*, among the *vires sensitivae*, stands next to the intellect, as human intellect itself stands next to the superior Powers.

dependent ut subjecto et objecto, quare tantum singulare cognoscunt; intermedia vero sunt homines, non dependentes a corpore ut subjecto sed tantum ut objecto, quare neque universale simpliciter, ut aeterna, neque singulariter tantum, ut bestiae, sed universale in singulari contemplatur." *De Imm. ix.* pp. 70, 71.

"Quoniam (intellectus humanus) sensui conjunctus est, ex toto a materia et quantitate absolvi non potest, cum nunquam cognoscat sine phantasmate, dicente Aristotele 3. De Anima, 'nequaquam sine phantasmate intelligit anima.' Unde sic indigens corpore ut objecto, neque simpliciter universale cognoscere potest, sed semper universale in singulari speculatur, ut unusquisque in seipso experiri potest. In omni nunc quantumcunque abstracta cognitione idolum aliquod corporale sibi format, propter quod humanus intellectus primo et directe non intelligit se, componitique, et discurrat. Quare suum intelligere est cum continuo et tempore, cujus totum oppositum contigit in intelligentiis quae sunt penitus liberatae a materia. Ipse igitur intellectus sic medius existens inter immaterialia et materialia, neque ex toto est hic et nunc, neque ex toto ab hic et nunc absolutur, quapropter neque sua operatio ex toto est universalis, neque ex toto est particularis, neque ex toto subjectur temporis, neque ex toto a tempore remotur. Recte autem et ordinate sic processit natura, ut a primis ad extrema per media deveniat. Intellectoria enim cum simpliciter abstractae sint nullus modo intelligendo indigent corpore ut subjecto, vel ut objecto; quare simpliciter naturam cognoscunt, primo se intelligentes, et simplici intuunt; quapropter et a tempore et a continuo absolutae sunt. Virtutes autem sensitivae, cum immersae sint materiae, tantum singulariter cognoscunt, non reflectentes supra seipsas, neque discurrentes. At humanus intellectus sicut medius existit in esse, sic et in operari." *Op. cit.* ix. pp. 59, 60.


2 See e.g. *Comm. de An. f. 254 r.; Apol. i. iii. f. 58 d.

3 "Haec sunt omnes vires sensitivae, licet aliquae illarum sunt magis spiritualiores." *De Imm. ix.* p. 53.


Pomponazzi conceives man as the highest of all terrestrial and mortal things, the lowest, on the other hand, of beings having the immaterial and imperishable principle of thought (*intellectus*). Possessed of the very principle—namely the timeless element of thought—which is the secret of the imperishableness of the Divine Intelligence, the soul of man nevertheless, so far as we can see, has its existence bound up with its embodiment in matter; sharing the attribute of "immateriality," it is not (so far as reason and philosophy shew) in point of fact immortal.

In many passages marked by freshness and eloquence of thought and expression Pomponazzi describes the mixed characteristics and conditions of man; the diverse and almost contradictory qualities in his nature; the mingled elements in his lot of greatness and insignificance, glory and misery.

There is, in all these meditations, a uniform bias or tendency; it is to bring out the preponderance of the sensual over the intellectual of the earthly over what we may fairly call the supernatural element in human life. Yet this did not imply, practically, a low view of human life, any more than, philosophically, it meant materialism. The truth is, on the contrary, that Pomponazzi's conception of "intelligence" was so high that he needed to bring in some counterbalancing considerations in order to preserve the level of his general view of human nature. The power of thought was an element in the soul and life of


1 This intermediate position is frequently depicted in words like these: "Cum ipsa (anima humana) sit materialium nobilissima, in confinioque immaterialium, aliquid immaterialitatis odorat." *De Imm.* ix. p. 63.

man so high as to be almost supernatural. The possession of it almost raised man to an equality with God and the celestial Intelligences. In words, Pomponazzi constantly seems to labour to belittle man. But it is not a paradox to say that his sense of man's littleness was stimulated by his fundamental conviction of man's greatness. It was his belief in the transcendent worth of reason which led him to lay such stress on the irrational elements in human life and the limitations of intelligence in man. He was compelled to bring this side of the case into clear relief, in order to set man, as he believed, in his true position. Possessing such a power of thought, Pomponazzi seems to have reasoned, man must possess it subject to qualifications in its degree and hindrances to its full exercise, if he is to remain in that "middle place" which it is his nature to occupy.

We find accordingly in Pomponazzi a curious balancing of the higher against the lower attributes of human nature, and comparison of the spiritual with the sensual aspects of human life, in order to discover which bulks more largely or outweighs the other in the scale. He indulges in such considerations as that the transcendent and immaterial powers in man are few—intellect and will; the merely sensitive and animal attributes many. Comparing again the various races of men, we find that the savage outnumber the civilised, and that many of those which are described as civilised are so only in comparison with others utterly barbarous. Indeed in one place Pomponazzi suggests that many men are in intelligence below the level of the brutes. How small a part of time, again, is given to the cultivation of the intellect, in proportion to that which is devoted to the exercise of lower powers and satisfaction of lower needs! And how small a section of mankind is occupied with intellectual pursuits! Among many thousands you will find scarcely one thinking man. The light of reason, also, is in man so dim, the power of thought so weak, that his so-called knowledge rather deserves the name of ignorance, and his intelligence is not so much intelligence as its shadow and pale reflection.

1 "Cum in ista essentia sint quaedam quae dant ipsam esse mortalem, et quaedam immortalem, cum multo plura promoveant ad mortalitatem quam ad immortalitatem... magis pronuncianda est mortalis quam immortalis....Nam si in homine numerum po-
Elsewhere Pomponazzi dwells on the various burdens and ills of our mortal condition. Although man, he says, be superior by the participation of intelligence to all other mortal creatures, he is yet possessed of the feeblest of bodies and exposed to innumerable infirmities. Or, glancing at man's social state, he instances the evils of tyrannical misgovernment, and declares it an open question whether the tyrant or those over whom he tyrannises have the more miserable lot.  

He concludes, therefore, that while human life has its two sides, it looks more towards what is mortal and material than towards what is spiritual and enduring.

In particular the intellectual principle, by possession of which, certainly, man "partakes" of the nature of that which is abiding, is present in him in so imperfect and rudimentary a form that it cannot raise him after all above the sphere of the perishable. 

tentiarum considereremus, duas tantum invenimus quae attestantur super immortalitatem, scilicet intellectum et voluntatem, innumeris vero tum sensititium vegetatitum quae omnes attestantur super mortalitatem. Amplius si climata habitabilia conspexerimus, multo plures homines assimilantur feris quam hominibus; interque climata habitabilia perrarissimos invenies qui rationales sunt, inter quoque rationales si considerabimus hi simpliciter irrationales nuncupari possunt; verum appellati sunt rationales in comparatione ad alios maxime bestiales, sicut furtur de mulieribus quod nulla est sapiens nisi in comparatione ad alias maxime futuas. Amplius si ipsam intellectuonem inspexeris maximeeam quae de Diis est, quid de Diis? Imo de ipsis naturalibus et quae subjacent sensui, adeo obscura adeoque debilis est, ut verius utraque ignorantia, scilicet negationis et dispositionis, nuncupanda sit quam cognition. Adde quantum modicum temporis apponant circa intellectum, et quamplurimum circa alias potentias, quo sit ut vere bujusmodi essentia corporalis et corruptibilis sit, vixque sit umbra intellectus; haec etiam videtur esse causa cur ex tot mille hominibus vix unus studiosus reperiatur, et deditus intellectuali; causa quidem naturalis, nam semper sic fuit, licet secundum magis et minus; causa (inquam) est quia natura homo plus sensibilis quam immortalis existit." (De Imm. viii. pp. 36 ff.) "Virtutesque habet (anima) organicas et simpliciter materiales scilicet sensitivae et vegetativae, verum cum ipsa sit materialium nobilissima, in confinioque immaterialium, aliquid immaterialitas odorat; sed non simpliciter; unde habet intellectum et volunatem, in quibus cum Diis convenit, verum satis imperfecte et aequevoce, quandoquidem Dii ipsi totaliter abstrahunt a materia, ipsa vero semper cum materia, quoniam cum phantasmate, cum continuo, cum tempore, cum discursu, cum obscuritate cognoscit; quare in nobis intellectus et voluntas non sunt sincere immaterialia, sed secundum quid et diminuite, unde verius ratio quam intellectus appellari dicitur, non enim ut ita dixerim intellectus est, sed vestigium et umbra intellectus." (Op. cit. ix. p. 63.) "Infiniti fere homines minus videntur habere de intellectu quam multae bestiae." Op. cit. ix. p. 64. 

2 "Habet intellectum et voluntatem in quibus cum Diis convenit, verum satis
The human reason is definitely distinguished from the absolute reason, as acting by *discursus* and not by *simplex intuitus*. From this point of view it is not properly to be called *intellectus*. And this disadvantageous comparison of human thought with the supposed ideal of reason is summed up in words like these:—"If it be said that we have spoken much ill of the human intellect since we assert it to be scarcely the shadow of intellect, it is because it truly is a shadow in comparison with the Intelligences....It is not truly called 'intellectual' but only 'rational': for intellect grasps all things in a simple intuition; reasoning by means of discursive thought, synthesis, and a process in time, all of which are evidences of its imperfection and materiality; for these are the conditions of material existence. But if you compare human intellect with the rest of created and corruptible existences, it will obtain the highest rank of excellence."

To conclude, then, the human soul is participant in the Divine; but, that being granted, the precise mode of its participation remains to be determined. Participation in the Divine, for instance, does not necessarily imply imperishability. For all things in some sense partake of the Divine nature. Again all things that propagate their kind partake in a sense of imperfecte et aequivoce...quoniam cum phantasmate, cum continuo, cum tempore, cum discursu, cum obscuritate cognoscit; quare in nobis intellectus et voluntas non sunt sincere immaterialia, sed secundum quid et diminute, unde verius ratio quam intellectus appellari dicitur; non enim, ut iba dixerim, intellectus est, sed vestigium et umbra intellectus." (Op. cit. IX. p. 63.) Not only with regard to the highest realities but in its apprehension of earthly objects, is human thought thus inadequate. "Si ipsam intellectionem inspexeris maxime eam quae de Diis est, quid de Diis? imo de ipsis naturalibus, et quae subjacent sensui, adeo obscura adeoque debilis est, ut verius utraque ignorantia, scilicet negationis et dispositionis, nuncupanda sit quam cognitio." Op. cit. VIII. p. 37.

1 "Nam rationalis dicitur, et non vere intelligens. Quare cum discursu cognoscit et temporaliter." Apol. i. iii. f. 59 c.

2 "Si dicatur nos multum vilificare intellectum humanum, cum ipsum vix umbram intellectus affirmamus, hinc quidem dicitur, quod vere comparando ipsum intelligentis umbra est...Non enim vere appellatur intellectualis, sed rationalis: intellectus enim simplici intuitu omnia intuetur; at ratiocinatio discursu, compositione, et cum tempore, quae omnia attestantur super imperfectione et materialitate ejus; sunt enim hae conditiones materiae. Si vero ipsum humanum intellectum comparaveris ad cetera generabilia et corruptabilia primum gradum nobilitatis obtinebit." De Imm. XII. p. 90.

immortality. The sense, then, in which the soul of man partakes of the Divine nature, or of immortality, needs to be determined. It has at least a pre-eminent share in the Divine nature.

The most precise statement of Pomponazzi's conclusion upon this subject is that "however much man thus partakes of the material and of the immaterial, nevertheless strictly he is said to participate in the immaterial because he falls far short of immateriality, and is not strictly described as participating in the lower animals and in plants, but as including them."

(3) Mind and Body in Man.

It has been found that, for Pomponazzi, the "intellectual soul" of man possesses "intelligence" in the full sense of the term, which to him means something essentially immaterial in its nature. On the other hand Pomponazzi recognises the embodiment of the human soul, as a fact, and as, indeed, a necessary condition of its existence; without which it would not be what it is, without which it cannot (philosophically speaking) be imagined as existing.

I do not attempt here to penetrate more deeply into the conceptions of Thought and Matter as they presented themselves to a mind like Pomponazzi's. I only note that there was in his view nothing abhorrent in the notion of a corporeal being possessed of the power of thought. Various passages that have been quoted make this abundantly clear; I add only the full text of one from the De Nutritione, which as the latest of his writings may be taken to express the thoughts in which his mind finally came to rest. I may remark in passing that the clear recognition in this passage of the immateriality of thought

1 "Omne productivum sibi similis est sic immortalitatis particeps." De Imm. xii. p. 89.
effectually disposes of Fiorentino's attempt to make out in Pomponazzi's successive writings a progress towards materialism culminating in the *De Nutritione*.

"Quamquam id quod est anima intellectiva sit extensum—est enim sensitivum et nutritivum ut supponimus, quae sunt extensa—ut tamen intelligit et recipit species intelligibiles non utitur corpore neque ut sic afficitur quantitate (si enim virtus cogitativa quae est in parte sensitiva et organica...potest particulariter discurrere...et sequestrare substantiam a quantitate, quanto magis virtus intellectiva potest...facere operationes tales...) ...Intellectus... non utitur organo neque corpore ut subjecto.... Nam intellectus qua intelligit est immaterialis ad modum expressum: cum quo tamen stat quod et sit materialis: imo unaquaque anima est materialis et immaterialis, divisibilis et indivisibilis."  

Embodiment in a material body, he had always maintained, was not incompatible with the cognitive apprehension of material things, or with the power of abstract thought. Knowledge itself, however, at the same time, was not a physical relation, not *reals*, but *spiritualis*. If intelligence be in body it is not so in a physical sense: if it act there, the "principle" of its operation is nevertheless other than physical; if the physical conditions (dispositions) must be present, they do not cause or explain the intellectual process. Yet, once more, the characteristics of thought as human are determined by the embodied condition of human intelligence.

But I content myself with presenting Pomponazzi's own account of the relations between *anima intellectiva* and the body in which it exists.

1 *De Nutr.* 1. xxiii. f. 130 b.  
2 See Comm. de An. f. 128.

"Qua intellectus est non dependet a materia, neque a quantitate; quod si humanus intellectus ab ea dependet, hoc est ut sensui conjunctus est....Quoniam sensui conjunctus est, ex toto a materia et quantitate absolvì non potest, cum nunquam cognoscat sine phantasmate, dicente Aristotele 3. De Anima, 'nequaquam sine phantasmate intelligit anima.' Unde sic indigens corpore ut objecto, neque simpliciter universale cognoscere potest, sed semper universale in singulari speculatur, ut unusquisque in seipso experiri potest. In omni namque quantumcumque abstracta cognitione idolum aliquid corporale sibi format; propter quod humanus intellectus primo et directe non intelligit se, componitque, et discurrit. Quare suum intelligere est cum continuo et tempore, cujus totum oppositum contigit in intelligentis quae sunt penitus liberatae a materia. Ipse igitur intellectus sic medius existens inter immaterialia et materialia, neque ex toto est hic et nunc, neque ex toto ab hic et nunc absolvitur, quapropter neque sua operatio ex toto est universalis, neque ex toto est particularis; neque ex toto subjicitur temporis, neque ex toto a tempore removetur."

*De Infm.* ix. pp. 59, 60.
In the first place, as a matter of fact, the mind of man is in body. It is in permanent connection with a physical organisation which is the necessary condition of its action and without which, as Pomponazzi so frequently insists, it would no longer act as we know it to act, or be what we know it to be.

There are, further, two reasons why, according to Pomponazzi’s system of thought, the human mind is thus bound up with body. One is the law of human knowledge, accepted by Pomponazzi from the Aristotelian psychology, that all human knowledge is primarily derived from the senses, and hence presented by imagination to thought: so that thought in man has no contents (objecta), and the mind of man no objects of knowledge or intellectual consideration, which are not received from this source. The instrumentality of the body is thus necessary to thought as human. This is what Pomponazzi means by affirming the dependence of the human soul on the body tangquam de objecto.

But secondly the human soul is bound to the body because the intellectual soul is one with the sensitive and vegetative soul. It is the same soul under different aspects. And since in its lower aspects it is obviously inseparable from body, the soul as a whole must be so also. Intelligence in man may still have its true subjectum, its subsistence, in intelligence itself, and not in anything material; the soul as sensitive and vegetative subsists in matter simply. There is no reason to postulate any other substratum for the sensitive soul, no possible ground for supposing it separate from matter. And the “intellectual” soul, while having elsewhere the ground of its existence

1 See De Imm. IX. p. 58: “Dicimus intellectum non indigere corpore ut subjecto...non quia intellectio nullo modo sit in corpore, cum fieri nequit si intellectus est in corpore ut sua immannens operatio quoque modo non sit in eo...sed pro tanto intellectio dicitur non esse in organo et in corpore,” etc.: X. p. 77: “Intellectus humanus non potest intelligere nisi in materia sinit quale et quantum sensibile: cum non possit operari nisi ipse sit, ipseques esse non potest nisi cum dispositione convenienti; non tamen sequitur, quod per tales dispositiones intelligat,” etc.: Apol. I. iii. f. 59 b: “Dicimus...humanam intellectionem non esse in corpore, non quoniam non sit in materia, quandoquidem hoc fieri inimaginabile est...sed pro tanto dicitur,” etc.

2 “Cum nunquam cognoscat sine phantasmate, dicente Aristotele 3. De Anima, ‘nequaquam sine phantasmate intelligit anima.’...In omni namque quantumnque abstracta cognitione idolum aliquod corporale sibi format,” etc. De Imm. IX. p. 59.
INTELLIGENCE

(non indigere corpore ut subjecto), yet, as being one with that which subsists in matter and inseparable from it, is also itself actually inseparable from matter. This statement concentrates the pervading contradiction in Pomponazzi's metaphysics; but it is on these grounds that he affirms the soul of man, while "intellectual," and as intellectual independent of matter tanquam de subjecto, to be nevertheless actually inseparable from the body. 1

In so far as the body of man is the organ of his intellect—and that is as far as the objects of his thought are concerned—it is, in the opinion of Pomponazzi, the whole body that is so. There is, he says, no specific organ for thought as such: for if the action of thought were tied to a particular physical instrumentality, or the data of thought received only through a particular avenue, thought would lose its comprehensive power, its neutrality and universality. 2

1 "(Intellectus noster) quatenus intellectus, non eget corpore...Anima autem nostra secundum quod est intellectiva realis utitur in intelligendo organo corporeo... nec ex toto et omni modo in intelligendo eget organo corporeo, quia non eget eo ut subjecto....Anima autem nutritiva secundum quod realiter eadem est cum vegetativa et sensitiva, et sic in suis operationibus, quae sunt pertinentes ad vegetationem et sensationem, indiget corpore ut subjecto, quia omnes tales operationes sunt cum conditionibus materiae, quae sunt hic et nunc; ideo in talibus operationibus anima intellectiva, quatenus sensitiva aut vegetativa, indiget corpore ut subjecto; modo cum operatio eiusdem animae intellectivae, quatenus intellectiva est, quae est intelligere, fiat sine conditionibus materiae, quae sunt hic et nunc: ideo in ista sua operatione non eget corpore ut subjecto, sed bene ut objecto, quia quidquid intelligitur ab anima nostra intelligitur per aliquid corporeum." Comm. de Anima, ff. 253 v, 254 r.

Cf. De Nutritione, 1. xxiii. 130 b: "Quanquam id quod est anima intellectiva sit extensum—est enim sensitivum et nutritivum supponimus, quae sunt extensa—ut tamen intelligit et recipit species intelligibiles non utitur corpore, neque ut sic afficietur quantitate....Nam intellectus qua intelligit est immaterialis ad modum expressum: cum quo tamen stat quod et sit materialis."

2 "Non tamen in aliqua parte corporis ponitur ipsum intelligere, sed in toto categoriematice sumpto. Non enim in aliqua parte, quoniam sic esset organisus intellectus: et vel non omnia cognosceret, vel si omnia cognosceret ut cogitativa tantum singulariter et non universaliter cognosceret. Quare sicut intellectus est in toto, ita et intelligere. Non inconvenienter igitur Alexander posuit totum corpus esse instrumentum intellectus, quoniam intellectus omnes vires comprehendit, et non aliquam partem determinatam, quoniam sic non omnia cognosceret, sicut neque aliqua virtutum sensitivum. Quanquam autem sic totum corpus ponatur instrumentum intellectus quasi ut subjectum, non tamen vere est ut subjectum, quoniam intelligere non recipitur in eo modo corporali, ut prius dicitum est. Et si amplius quae ratur, an humanus intellectus indivisibiliter recipiat: dicitur quod qua intelligit indivisibiliter recipit: qua vero sentit, vel vegetat, divisibiliter." De Imm. x. p. 80.
It is to be particularly remarked that while allowing that the body is necessary to the human mind as its organ, he keeps himself as far as ever from a materialistic view of mind. He will not allow that thought is derivable from matter, or that a physical explanation can be given of the fact of intelligence in man. Body may be mind's organ; a condition it may be of the existence of the human soul as such; but matter can never be the *subjectum* of mind\(^1\).

But as dependent upon the bodily organisation for the materials of knowledge and thought (*tangquam de objecto*) human intelligence employs for its instrument in this sense the body as a whole. This is, so far as it goes, a position at once self-consistent and philosophically sound. From a physiological point of view the statement may be inadequate; since much remains to be said, as the result of physiological observation, with regard to the relation between various activities of thought and certain parts of the body—in particular, the brain. But if we distinguish the act of thought as such, and the relation in knowledge, as *sui generis* (*actio spiritualis*), and if then we enquire further as to the total physical concomitant or instrument of mental action, it is certainly true that it is the body as a whole which is to be so regarded.

Pomponazzi's view, then, of the relation of mind and body is an interesting one and not inconsistent with itself.

On the one hand he held, as the general principle of his conception of intelligence, that thought as such does not "subsist" in matter. Consequently it is not the product of some particular part of the body. Had thought been a function of matter, it must have had its proper bodily organ. Since it is not so, and although it is inseparably connected with the body, its connection is with the body as a whole. (And that the whole body is the instrument of knowledge is true, whatever be the particular offices in relation to knowledge of its several parts.) But the inseparable connection of human intelligence with body, and of human knowledge with bodily experiences, did not for

\(^1\) "*Quamquam autem sic totum corpus ponatur instrumentum intellectus quasi ut subjectum, non tamen vere est ut subjectum, quoniam intelligere non recipitur in eo modo corporali.*" *Ibid.*
Pomponazzi determine the question as to the real nature of thought.

On the other hand he did not contend for any activity of (human) intelligence that was unconnected with the bodily organisation. Where he speaks of human intelligence as "immaterial," he refers to the nature of thought as not physical or subsisting in matter. It is because he holds this view of thought that he is exempted from the necessity of establishing specific activities of thought in man that should be independent of the bodily frame. On the contrary, the human mind—thought as in man—is in all its operations conjoined to the body; first, as being in fact always connected with it, and secondly, as in its intrinsic nature and constitution depending on contact through a material instrument with a world of material objects.

**Note on the words "Subject" and "Object."**

Pomponazzi describes human thought as being dependent on the body *objective*, or *tanquam de objecto*; but not dependent on the body *subjective* or *tanquam de subjecto*.

If we accept the modern use of these terms, this would appear to mean that the mind is dependent on the body in reality ("objectively" speaking) but independent of it as regards the exercise of thought—if such a meaning could be supposed to be intelligible. What Pomponazzi actually means is of course the opposite—that the mind depends on the body in the act of knowledge, namely for the contents of knowledge; but that in its real nature—*per suam essentiam*, as he puts it elsewhere—it is not so dependent.

Hamilton and others have shewn clearly how in the mediaeval schools the terms "subject" and "object" were used in a sense almost exactly the opposite of that which they now bear.

There was indeed an early usage according to which "subject" had an alternative sense akin to its modern meaning of the thinking mind with its states and activities, τὰ ἑμῶν: a
distinction was drawn between subjectum occupationis, and subjectum inhaesionis or praedicationis. But the latter was the use that prevailed: and subjectum was employed to denote the ὑποκείμενων, the substratum of any given phenomenon, whether mental or physical. It is its use in the former alternative, as the ὑποκείμενων of mental states and acts, which has determined the modern meaning of the term. But subjectum thus, in its first meaning, belonged to τὰ φύσει.

The content (or, as we should say, the “subject”) of thought was called objectum, as that which is set before the mind. (“Qua- tenus objicitur intellectui”—Descartes. Cf. Pomponazzi, Comm. de Anima, f. 26 v.: “Objectum alicujus potentiae semper precedit operationem illius potentiae”; and the schoolmen passim. See also Prantl, Gesch. d. Logik, III. 208.) And any matter of knowledge was said to be objectum as present to a knowing mind, and to be “objectively” as it might appear to the mind. The objectum was the intentionale as opposed to the reale. Repraesentativum was the same as objectivum (see Descartes, Princ. I. xvii.).

Hamilton enumerates the following synonyms for objective and subjective respectively in the scholastic use: objectivum = intentionale, repraesentativum, vicarium, rationale, intellectuale, in intellectu, prout cognitum, ideale; subjectivum = reale, proprietum, formale, prout in se ipso. (Hamilton’s Reid, p. 806, note.) Again Gerson drew a distinction between esse essentiale, and esse objectale, seu repraesentativum in ordine ad intellectum creatum vel increatum (see Rousselot, Études, III. p. 321).

It is always to be remembered, at the same time, that there was also a subjectum of the mind. (Cf. Pomponazzi, Comm. de Anima, f. 86 v.: “Si species sensibilis sit in sensu depauperato spiritibus, tunc non est cognita, et hoc quia subjectum non est bene dispositum.”) Eucken (Geschichte der philosophischen Terminologie, p. 203, note 5) quotes from Leibnitz the words, subjectum; ou l’âme même, which present to us the point of transition from the old to the modern usage. According to the former, however, to repeat Hamilton’s illustrations, the imagination (say) was subjective in mind, its images objective; a horse was subjective out of the mind, objective in the mind.
Every notion had its \textit{esse subjectivum}, in the mind, as a psychological fact (we should say); and its \textit{esse objectivum}, as looking towards reality, and representative.

Thus understood Pomponazzi’s language is plain. The human intelligence, according to Aristotle’s doctrine of knowledge, derived all the contents of its thought, all its “representative ideas,” from the bodily senses, through the presentations of imagination—also, as was held, a bodily power: therefore it depended on the body \textit{objective}. But the ground of the being (\textit{subjectum}) of human intelligence was, according to Pomponazzi, simply intelligence as such: intelligence, not body, was the \textit{subjectum} of human thought—\textit{per essentiam suam}.

In the use by some later schoolmen of \textit{objectivus}, Hamilton notes a curious parallel with Locke’s double use of “idea,” for \textit{idea} or for \textit{ideatum}. These schoolmen distinguished \textit{conceptus formalis} (= representative notion) from \textit{conceptus objectivus}. Now if the latter was really distinguishable from the former it was not a \textit{conceptus} at all, but an object conceived. Here the new meaning of ‘object’ begins to shew itself, as possibly the occasion of the confusion.

During the 17th century the change gradually took place. But Descartes explicitly adheres to the older usage (\textit{Princ. I. xvii.}): “Totum enim artificium quod in idea illa objective tantum, sive tanquam in imaginatione continetur, debet in ejus causa...non tantum objective sive representaotive, saltem in prima et praecipua, sed re ipsa formaliter aut eminenter contineri” : and there could hardly be a more apt illustration of it than this from Berkeley: “Natural phaenomena are only natural appearances. They are, therefore, such as we see and perceive them. Their \textit{real} and \textit{objective} natures are, therefore, the same.” (\textit{Siris}, sect. 292.)
CHAPTER VII

SENSE

The great schoolmen, and especially Albert and St Thomas, had made an effort to relate Sense and Reason, arbitrarily sundered by Averroism. The Aristotelian doctrine of imagination in its relation to sense lent itself to this endeavour. So did the notion of a "cogitative faculty" (*virtus cogitativa*), by which the Arabians had sought to cover the nakedness of the non-rational soul.

Pomponazzi in his psychological enquiries had the same interest at heart. We shall find him on the one hand drawing as close as possible the relations of *sensus exterior* (i.e. sense proper) and *sensus interior* (imagination, memory, *cogitativa*); and on the other exalting the functions of the natural faculty of *cogitativa*, so as to bring it nearer to *intellectus*, which the Averroists separated from man and the Thomists detached from the body, but which he himself sought to see in an integral relation to both.

In his analysis of sense-perception Pomponazzi accepts with a certain hesitation the orthodox Aristotelian doctrine of the "passivity" or "receptivity" of the mind in sensation. At first sight it appears as if he adopted it *simpliciter*, as it was adopted by St Thomas. But at the close of each of two elaborate discussions we find him looking with favour upon the theory which assigned a certain contribution from the mind itself even to the simple sensation. As at the same time he does not deny the
passivity of sense, we may conclude that he was influenced by a regard to the wider psychological question raised by sense-perception—the question of the relations of sense and thought—but intended to hold a view of sensation in its cognitive aspect which did not involve the abandonment of the Aristotelian position with regard to sensation as such. And as a matter of fact we shall find him explaining, on each occasion, in his last word upon the doctrine of Albert, the place that was reserved in it for the passive reception of impressions.

He begins then, by expressly adhering to the authority of Aristotle. Sense “receives,” he says, the sensible impression (species sensibilis), which again is produced by the really existing object.¹

He seems at first clearly to distinguish the psychological from the physical aspect of sense. He does not deny to the sense-organ, he says, its own physical relations—what he calls its (physical) agency. The question is a different one: “Whether in perceiving it is passive and acted on.”²

This question, then, Pomponazzi discusses in two sections of his Commentary on the De Anima³ and also in a section of the Supplementa⁴. He defends the Aristotelian position doubtless in good faith, against various alternative hypotheses, which set up in one form or other the theory of an “activity” in sense. In the first Quaestio, whether sense is active, he is occupied with theories of a metaphysical or, as we should say, mythological character, professed in the Averroist schools; in the second, whether the sensible form and the sensation are identical⁵ in existence (“Utrum species sensibilis et sensatio sint idem realiter”), with psychological constructions, of which that of Albert is regarded as the most favourable example.

¹ “Dico quod (sensus) est passivus....Videndum est modo quid recipiant sensus ut puta oculus aut auris. Peripatetici antiqui dicunt quod recipit speciem sensibilem, quae est representativa objecti, de qua...dicit Aristoteles quod sensus est susceptivus specierum sine materia....Viso quod sensus recipiat speciem sensibilem, videndum est modo quid sit illud quod producit speciem sensibilen, et brevi dicendum est quod objecta sunt quae producunt species sensibiles.” Comm. de An. ff. 83 v., 84 r. Cf. ff. 88 v., 89 r.: “Sensus exterior non potest moveri nisi ab eo quod actu existit....Moveri est pati; omne antem quod patitur, patitur ab eo quod est in actu.” Cf. also f. 221 r.
³ Ff. 83—87.
⁴ Ff. 257, 258.
⁵ Or, “inseparable.”
The doctrine of the passivity of the soul in sensation presented great difficulties to the mediaeval mind. The essential correlativity, from the Aristotelian point of view, of *aiσθησις* and *aiσθητῶν* having been lost sight of, great difficulty was felt in relating the physical object, regarded as the occasion or cause of sensation, with the psychic fact of sensation itself. And especially was it repugnant to the ideas then in vogue, that a material cause—the sensible thing—should produce a “spiritual” effect, the sensation.1

This difficulty was increased by a confusion between the physical object of sense-perception and the physical cause of sensation, illustrated by the peculiar scholastic use of the term *species sensibilis* (sensible form or impression). The early interpreters of Aristotle had soon translated his doctrine of the impression of the forms of sensible things upon sensitive soul2 into a notion of a physical impression by the sensible thing on the physical organ of sense; and where the *species sensibilis* did not actually mean a certain quasi-physical something between the sensible thing and the sensitive soul, it was in most cases understood to stand for this physical impression on the sense-organ, corresponding to the sensible thing which “caused” the sensation.3 At a later period, after Averroes and St Thomas and their schools had recovered some apprehension of the logical intention of Aristotle’s original language, the phrase *species sensibilis* might be employed in both senses at once—to denote

1 Thus, f. 84 r.: “Tunc est dubitatio quae est mota ab Averroe...quomodo est possibile ut sensibile ad extra, quod habet esse in materia, producat speciem sensibilem, quae est perfectior objecto: cum tamen nihil producat aliquid perfectius se.” Again in f. 85 r.: “Quod sentit est perfectius eo quod non sentit....Si ergo sensus concurrat passive ad sensationem creandam, et objectum active, quum sit nobiliss concurrere active quam passive, tunc sensibile erit perfectius.”


3 Speaking generally of these *species intentionales* (whether sensibles or intelligibles) it may be said with Hamilton that they involved an hypothesis of representative perception in which “the immediate object was something different from the mind,” in contrast with the modern idea of representative perception “in which the vicarious object was held only for a modification of the mind itself” (Hamilton, *Reid*, pp. 951—960). The distinction, however, does not hold good for St Thomas and the later schoolmen generally, to whom the *species* was something in the mind itself.
a physical or a mental fact—with a somewhat confusing effect. We find this in Pomponazzi. Thus on the one hand, following Averroes, he asks:—"How is it possible that an external object of sense, which has a material existence, should produce a sensible form, which has a higher mode of existence than its object"? species sensibilis being thus regarded as a mental fact. But, again, in describing the case in which the object of sense is present to the sense-organ, and yet there is no sensation, he speaks of the species sensibilis as being then present. Now on Aristotelian principles where there is no sensation there is no species sensibilis, and can be none. But species sensibilis meant in this case the physical impression on the sense-organ. And we have the twofold interpretation of species sensibilis, almost in so many words, in the doctrine ascribed to Albert and adopted by Pomponazzi:—"Albert would seem to hold that every form, in so far as it is form, acts spiritually, but that in so far as it is in matter, it acts physically. This opinion, rightly understood, has truth, as, I think, the sensible form effects an alteration in the medium, and acts on the eye." The survival of the old misinterpretation in a physical sense of the species sensibilis explains the peculiar terms in which, in his second Quaestio, Pomponazzi states the question as to the passivity of sense: "Whether the sensible form and the sensation are identical in existence." This was really intended as a re-statement of the main question, whether the sensible thing be

1 "Quomodo est possibile ut sensibile ad extra, quod habet esse in materia, producat speciem sensibilem, quae est perfectior objecto." Comm. de An. f. 84 r.
2 "Aliquando in sensu est species sensibilis, non tamen tunc sentimus; aliquando enim delata sub oculis non videmus... nec tamen est credendum tunc speciem non esse in sensu, quum istae species agunt mere materialiter." Op. cit. f. 85 r. This indeed is not put forward as Pomponazi's own view; but in a subsequent criticism of the point, he says in his own name—"Si species sensibilis sit in sensu depauperato spiritibus, tunc non est cognitio." Op. cit. f. 86 v.
3 See De Anima, III. ii. 425 b 26: ἢ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἐνέργεια καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἢ αὐτῆ μὲν ὑπὲρ καὶ μᾶ, τὸ δ' εἶναι οὐ τωτὸ αὐτάς κ.τ.λ.
4 "Credendum tunc speciem esse in sensu, quum istae species agunt mere materialiter." Comm. de An. f. 85 r.
5 "Albertus videretur tenere quod omnis forma, ut forma est, agit spiritualiter; ut vero est in materia, realiter agit. Quae opinio bene intellecta habet veritatem quum, ego puto, species sensibilis alteret medium et agat in oculum." Op. cit. f. 84 v.
the "cause" of the sensation. Is the *species sensibilis*, he asks, a sufficient cause of the mental fact of sensation, or must some other cause also intervene? In these words he paraphrases his original question:—"The question is whether for sensation there is needed some other thing in addition to the organ and the form: and this is to ask whether the sensible form and the sensation are identical in existence."

That he intends in this new formula to ask the old question appears plainly when he treats the "causation" of sensation by *organum et species* as synonymous with its causation by *objectum* or *sensible*.

But it is evident that what he here means by *species sensibilis* is not the sensible thing in its relation to sensation as a mental fact—the sensible thing as object of sense-perception (*aisthētōn*)—but the physical impression of the thing on the organ of sense.

For on the other, the Aristotelian, understanding of *species sensibilis*, there could be no meaning in the question, "Whether for sensation there is needed some other thing in addition to the organ and the form*: the *species sensibilis* would imply sensation; and nothing further could conceivably be required in order that there should be sensation, if the *species sensibilis* were there. Nor, in that sense, could there be any question of the identity of *sensatio* and *species sensibilis*; for neither existed, in reality, apart from the other. Nor certainly in the case supposed, where there was no cognition, could the *species sensibilis* in the Aristotelian sense, the mental sense, be present as was alleged.  

1 "Quaeritur utrum ad talem sensationem requiratur aliquid alterum praeter organum et speciem; et hoc est quaerere utrum species sensibilis et sensatio sint idem realiter." Op. cit. f. 85 r.

2 "Si sola species cum sensu (i.e. in this connection, the organ of sense) essent sufficientes causae sensationis, tunc sensibile esset perfectius sensu....Si sensus concurrat passive ad sensationem creandam, et objectum active," etc. Ibid.

3 Cf. Arist. De Anima, II. v. 417 a 6: ὃδειν οὖν ὅτι τὸ αἰσθητικὸν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐνέργεια, ἀλλὰ δυνάμει μόνον.... 418 a 3: τὸ δ' αἰσθητικὸν δυνάμει ἔστιν οὖν τὸ αἰσθητικὸν ἢ ἐνεργεία, καθάπερ εἶρηται. πάραχει μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἰδίων δὲ, πεπουθός δ' ὠμολογεῖ καὶ ἕστω οὖν ἐκένω. III. ii. 425 b 26: ἦ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ ἐνέργεια καὶ τῆς αἰσθητικοῦ ἢ αὐτῇ μὲν ἐστι καὶ μία, τὸ δ' εἶναι οὐ παράδειγμα αὐταίς· λέγει δ' οὖν ψόφοι δ' κατ' ἐνέργειαν καὶ άκοής κατ' ἐνέργειαν· ἐστὶ γὰρ άκοῆ ἐχουσα μὴ άκοῆν, καὶ τὸ ἐχον ψόφον οὐκ δὲι ψοφεῖ. δὴν δ' ἐνεργῇ τὸ δυνάμευον ἀκούσιν καὶ φοφή τὸ δυνάμευον ψοφεῖν, τότε ἢ κατ' ἐνέργειαν άκοή ἀνήπνεσται καὶ δ' κατ' ἐνέργειαν ψόφοι, ὡν εἶπεν αν τις τὸ μὲν εἶναι άκούσιν τὸ δὲ ψοφεῖν.... 426 a 15: ἐπει δὲ μία μὲν ἐστιν ἢ ἐνέργεια
But it has already been shewn that when Pomponazzi speaks of *species sensibilis* in his second *Quaestio* he has in his mind the physical effect of the object first on the medium and then on the organ of sense. This meaning was implied in his assertion that formae act realiter as well as spiritualiter. It is necessarily understood in his talk of a *species sensibilis* present in sense where there is by hypothesis no cognition; and if he speaks of the *species sensibilis* at one time as that *in the thing* which affects the medium and the organ of sense¹, at another as the effect produced *in the organ*, the order of existence ascribed to it is the same: it is the physical nexus between the thing and the organ. Above all, the mere statement of the question:—

"Whether for sensation something is needed in addition to the organ and the form"—declares that the *species* in question is *not* the correlative of sensation as such, in the mental relation; and is of the order of *organum*, the physical order.

We shall see that Pomponazzi does something to distinguish the physical conditions of sensation from the object of sensation, the effect of the sensible thing as a physical cause from its apprehension through sensation in mind: and so to extricate the real problem of sensation as a mental fact.

Meanwhile, in spite of his employment of the Peripatetic terminology, he is so far only restating the mediaeval problem of the "causation" by a material thing, the object, of a psychical fact, the sensation. And it is curious to notice as a final illustration of the confusion that had come into the use of *species sensibilis*, that while *species sensibilis* is spoken of as the mental fact, the fact of sensation, which cannot be attributed to a physical cause², it is also the name given to that very physical agency (the effect, namely, in the sense organ) whose adequacy to the production of sensation is being denied³.

₁ "Species sensibilis alterat medium et agit in oculum." Comm. de An. f. 84 v.

² "Speciem esse in sensu"—i.e. in the organ (e.g."in sensu depauperato spiritibus").

³ "Est dubitatio quae est mota ab Averroë...quomodo est possibile ut sensibile ad extra, quod habet esse in materia, producat speciem sensibilem, quae est perfectior objecto." Op. cit. f. 84 r.

⁴ "Si solae species cum sensu essent sufficientes causae sensationis, tunc sensibile (scil. objectum) esset perfectius sensu." Op. cit. f. 85 r.
Doubtless, also, the perversion of the phrase *species sensibilis* from its true meaning did something to hinder the correct apprehension of sensation as a mental fact. The Aristotelian conception of the relation between sensation and the object of sense-perception being thus lost, the meaning of Aristotle's assertion of the passivity of sense was altogether misunderstood. What was intended as a psychological account of the mental fact—of the receptivity, or passivity, of sense in the perception of the sensible object—was read as an assertion of *physical causation*. Aristotle's description of the relation of sense to the sensible thing in cognition was similarly mis-read as affirming a *physical equivalence*, and in that sense denied. The truth of course was that this time-honoured and hackneyed phrase, "the identity of the perception and the thing perceived," had become meaningless on the lips of those who had missed the point of view of its original author. And certainly if the *species sensibilis* was the physical effect of an object on the organ of sense, or the qualities in the object causing that particular effect, *sensatio* and *species sensibilis* were not identical in existence. It was in this sense that the Aristotelian formula was denied by Albert and others, and a new "cause" required to account for sensation. But finally those who denied the sufficiency of the physical and organic nexus as an explanation of sensation as such, but yet moved within the physical circle of thought and failed to raise the psychological problem in psychological terms, introduced a really physical conception of the "agency" of the faculty of sense—of sense *acting*, in combination with the physical causality of the object and the effects on the medium and organ of sense, to produce the result, *sensation*.

It must be regarded as a considerable achievement, if Pomponazzi, out of so much confusion of thought, and such unconsidered blending of the physical and psychological points of view, emerges with something like a coherent physical history of the conditions of sensation on the one hand, and on the other a recognition of the distinctive peculiarity of the cognitive relation as such.

I have said that Pomponazzi examines in these two *Quaestiones* the alternatives to the Aristotelian doctrine of the passivity of sense in perception, and that in each he is occupied with a
distinct type of theory. There were two ways in which it might be asserted that sense is active. It might be done by postulating in the operations of sense some metaphysical power, some “agency” in the special meaning in which the term was then understood; or by devising a psychology, an account of the operation of the soul itself in sense, which introduced some specific agency of sense and contradicted its supposed purely passive and receptive character. The former alternative to the orthodox doctrine Pomponazzi dismisses in a few words; the latter he discusses more at length, giving special attention to the theory of Albert; and while he criticises adversely the arguments that had been employed in its favour, developing the while his own understanding of the Aristotelian position, he ends by the practical admission that there is more to be said on the subject, as a matter of psychology, than simply that sense is passive.

In view of the difficulty\(^1\) of attributing a mental fact like sensation to the agency of a material cause—the sensible thing—Averroes and his school postulated the action of a higher Intelligence. According to some this was the Deity who, in relation to the activity of intellect, was called intellectus agens, in relation to sense, sensus agens; others identified the sensus agens with some lower Intelligence postulated for this special purpose; others again attributed to the organ of sense a power to produce the sensible presentation—of which, says Pomponazzi, there is and can be no evidence\(^2\).

Pomponazzi, following Albert and St Thomas, dismisses these hypothetical intermediary powers, and explains the possibility of sensation, as caused by a sensible object, simply by reference to “spiritual action,” and to the proved nature and powers of the human mind. There is, he says, such a thing as “spiritual” action as well as physical; that is to say, there is a cognitive relation, between mind and its object, besides the physical rela-

1 “Quomodo est possibile ut sensibile ad extra, quod habet esse in materia, producat speciem sensibilem.” Comm. de An. f. 84r.

2 “Aliqui dixerunt propter dictum Averrois, quod quum objectum...producit speciem sensibilem, quod producit in virtute unius intelligentiae appropriatae ad hoc. ...Aliqui dixerunt esse Deum, qui est idem quod intellectus agens,...Aliqui teneuntur quod sit una virtus quae sit in organo, et per illud organum agat...Ego quaero, quae sit ista actio.” Ibid.
tion between one material thing and another. The production of sensation is an instance of such mental action—of a "spiritual" action of an object on the mind. The soul need not be the active member of this relation; nor need it on the other hand be argued that because the soul is passive in sensation there is therefore no activity in thought: for it is the distinguishing characteristic of soul in man to combine an active and a passive element.

It is true that Pomponazzi traces in the occurrence of this spiritual action, this sensation, the influence of the celestial powers. For him, as for the ordinary mind of his time, such influence accompanied and governed every action and every event. The point however is, that he dismisses the specific agency of sensus agens; and teaches that, subject to the cooperation of the higher powers, the object and the mind have a natural relation, and that in this relation, in the case of sense, the mind is passive. "Every form, in so far as it is form, acts spiritually....Objects act spiritually by virtue of the higher powers....It should not excite wonder that the object produces the form by virtue of the higher powers."

In the second Quaestio, "Whether the sensible form and sensation are identical in existence," Pomponazzi alludes again to the metaphysical explanations of an "agency" in sense, but he does no more than mention them, and devotes his attention now to theories of a different character. He refers here, and also in the Supplementa, to attempts that had been made on more psychological lines to ascribe an agency to sense, psychological constructions of sense-perception inconsistent with the passive

1 "Albertus videretur tenere quod omnis forma, ut forma est, agit spiritualiter; ut vero in materia, realiter agit....Sed tunc est dubitatio quum res imperfecta producit rem perfectiorum se; Thomas et Aegidius dicunt quod in virtute superiorum agunt spiritualiter; ut vero sunt entia realia agunt realiter....Quare non est mirandum objectum producere species in virtute superiorum." Comm. de An. f. 84 v.

2 "Si replicatur: Pariter non dabitur intellectus agens, quum ego dicam objectum in virtute superiorum producere species intelligibiles; respondeo quod ex perfectione hominis est ut activum sit conjunctum passivo." Ibid.

3 "In virtute superiorum agunt spiritualiter...non tamen nego quod in virtute corporum coelestium agant (res) actione reali." Ibid.

4 "Omnis forma, ut forma est, agit spiritualiter....In virtute superiorum agunt (objecta) spiritualiter....Non est mirandum objectum producere species in virtute superiorum." Ibid.


and receptive character assigned to sense by orthodox Aristotelianism. He distinguishes clearly himself, in the course of this discussion, between the two types of theory, which had this only in common that both denied the passivity of sense: “Some say that a sensus agens of this kind is the primary concurrent cause of sensation, whether it be God or some other Intelligence, or a power in sense. Others do not accept this view because it would not explain how sensation should be an immanent activity, if the mind is not a concurrent cause of sensation; so others give a different account (and among them is Albert) to the effect that sensation is produced by sense through the mediation of the sensible form.” Albert had already, in the previous section, been quoted in opposition to the metaphysical sensus agens; and is now named among those who had definitely rejected that hypothesis in favour of another sort of “agency” in sense. The ground on which he and those who thought with him rejected sensus agens, in the Averroist sense, is also clearly stated to have been that upon such an hypothesis sensation would be no longer an act of the soul itself at all. While holding still, that is to say, the necessity for an “agency” in sensation, they aimed at giving a psychological account of it; they required that it should be an agency of the soul itself. Albert accordingly suggested (and others propounded the same theory, in various modifications of it) that the sense itself as a power of the soul was, after a fashion which he tried to explain, the cause of its own sensations: “The sensation is produced by sense through the mediation of the sensible form, for the form is received in sense and the form thus received and the sense together cause sensation. And he holds this view in order to explain how the mind concurs as an efficient cause in its operations, and how sensation itself is an immanent activity.”

1 “Aliquid dicit...quod talis sensus agens principaliter concurrerit ad sensationem, sive modo illud sit Deus, aut aliqua alia intelligentia, aut una virtus in sensu. Aliis non placet hoc, quia tunc non solveretur, si anima non concurrerit ad sensationem, quomodo sensatio sit actus immanentem; ideo alii aliter dicunt, et (inter eos) est Albertus, quod sensatio producitur a sensu, medianti specie sensibili.” Comm. de An. f. 85 v.
3 “Sensatio producitur a sensu, medianti specie sensibili: in sensu enim
Such then was the theory of Albert, in which Pomponazzi found at least the strong suggestion of a truth. Albert had considered the standing question of the relation of sensation to the sensible thing. Not content with Aristotle’s psychological solution of the question in its psychological aspect, he turned aside into the enquiry as to the physical cause of sensation, and the physical relations of the sensation to its object. He then mixed the two aspects of the question, misled by the physical interpretation of *species sensibilis*. Failing to see that the physical history was one thing and the psychical fact another, and that the psychical fact was only to be accounted for by the analysis of the cognitive act as such, and of the relation of sensation to the sensible therein—he was yet unable to regard sensation as the result of a chain of physical causes. This was why in answer to the question, “Whether the sensible form and sensation are inseparable in existence,” which Pomponazzi paraphrases to mean, “Whether for sensation something is needed in addition to the organ and the form,” Albert answered that something more was required. The physical nexus, starting from the external object and proceeding (by the production of the *species sensibilis* as physically understood) through the medium and the organ of sense, was not a sufficient cause of sensation. Something more was required, which Albert declared to be the “action” of the *mental faculty* of sense itself concomitant with the effects of the object upon the organ of sense. In this way was avoided the incongruity of attributing the psychical fact to a material cause (“to explain how the mind concurs as an efficient cause in its operations”) while still sensation was essentially a psychical fact (an immanent activity).

Pomponazzi mentions two attempts to improve upon Albert’s theory—that of John of Jandun, who supposed “two powers” in

recipitur species, quae species recepta et sensus causant sensationem; et hoc dicit ut solvet quomodo anima concurrat effective ad operationes suas, et quomodo est actio immanens ipsa sensatio.” Comm. de An. f. 85 v.

1 Cf. *op. cit.* f. 87 v.: “Sensus ut nudus concurrit passive ad sensationem: ut informatus specie sensibili concurrit active”: and f. 258 v.: “Quod species sensibilis disponat animam sensitivam ut reducat se de potentia ad actum....Sensibile solummodo dispositive concurrit, sensus autem est principale efficiens.”
sense, one passive, to receive sensations, the other active, to cause them\(^1\), and that of a Thomist of his own day, who tried to distinguish the *species* as *species* from the *species* as *cognitio*, assigning the former to the causality of the sensible thing, but finding in the latter an activity of the mind itself\(^2\). The former suggestion Pomponazzi estimates at its true value and briefly dismisses. The second distinction he treats with more respect and criticises at some length; the substance of his criticism being that if the two "actions" specified are distinct, then either the mental action is the controlling element, and sensible things are under the control of the human senses, which is absurd: or the effect of the sensible thing governs the senses, which is the doctrine disputed; (besides that in sensation there are certainly not two successive acts of the kind supposed); while if the two are not distinct there is no difference between this new doctrine and the old position of Albert—"The *sensible form* modifies the sentient soul so that it *transforms* itself from potentiality to actuality\(^3\)."

Pomponazzi seems to have attached some weight to the suggestion of these theories, that there is more in sensation than mere passivity. At the same time he does not accept the arguments by which they are supported: nor is he prepared to abandon the essential point of the Aristotelian position.

The mediaeval mind did not, indeed, easily accept the idea of the passivity of the soul. One of its ruling conceptions was that of the "agency" of intelligence; and accordingly we find the advocates of an agency in sense appealing to the analogy of intelligence\(^4\), or again claiming the authority of Aristotle for the canon that the soul is the cause of all its own operations in the body. Specially did they lay stress on the consideration

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\(^1\) "Quod in omni sensu sunt duae potentiae, una passiva et altera activa, et quod per passivam recipit sensationem, et per activam eam causat." *Op. cit.* l. 86 r.

\(^2\) "Quod species, ut *species*, producitur effective a sensibili; ut autem ista *species* est *cognitio*, producitur ab anima: et sic objectum concurrit mere effective ad sensationem, anima vero active producendo cognitionem et passive recipiendo *speciem*.” *Op. cit.* l. 257 r.


\(^4\) "Ad creandam *intelleccionem* requiritur aliquid alterum praeter intellectum et speciem intelligibilem; ergo ita est in sensu.” *Op. cit.* l. 85 r.
that what feels is higher \((\textit{perfecti}us)\) than what does not feel; and therefore, they argued, the thing felt cannot “act upon” the feeling mind, cannot produce feeling\(^1\).

The other main argument against the passivity of sense was that the sensible object—the supposed cause of sensation—may be present to the sense organ, acting physically upon it (and producing there the \textit{species sensibilis}), while yet sensation does not take place. The inference was that in order to produce sensation there is needed some specific action of the power of sense, which in the case supposed has not come into play—hence the absence of sensation.

In answer to these arguments Pomponazzi first denies the analogy between sense and intelligence. He does so on the ground, characteristic of mediaeval thought, that sense has for its object a real thing, intellect only the presentation of a thing\(^2\); and whatever may be thought of this conception of intellect and of its relation to sense, the answer is to the point as regards sense-perception itself.

The case of an object present to the sense-organ without sensation is capable, Pomponazzi goes on, of explanation without recourse to the supposition of an intermittent “agency” in sense. The occurrence or non-occurrence of cognition by the senses is to be explained by the presence or absence of \textit{attention}\(^3\).

What is particularly interesting is that Pomponazzi proposes a physical explanation of this case, and of the facts of attention generally. We saw that Albert, following a physical line of

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\(^1\) \textit{Comm. de An.} f. 85 r.

\(^2\) “\textit{Alter potest dici negando similitudinem, et ratio est quia sensatio est cognition quae immediate terminatur ad rem; sed intellectio terminatur ad aliquid alterum ad re, scilicet ad speciem intelligibilem.}” \textit{Op. cit.} f. 86 r.

\(^3\) “\textit{Beatus Augustinus dicit hoc esse quia ad sentiendum oportet ut intentio sit copulata cum virtute; id est oportet ut anima advertat et velit sentire objectum.}” \textit{Ibid.} Pomponazzi offers the same explanation in the \textit{Supplementa}: “\textit{Item multoties est imaginatio in oculo, et tamen non est visio, scilicet cum non est intentio ad illud, sed ad aliquid aliud; cum vero advertis subito fit cognition et sensatio.”} The senses, he goes on, do not determine attention; nor, on the theory he is examining, do they alter the object as presented \((\textit{simulacrum})\); therefore the change from non-cognition is not due to an agency in sense: “\textit{Aut ergo aliquid est genitum de novo in imagine, vel intentio ipsius simulacri, vel aliquid aliud. Non intentionem imaginis nec aliquid aliud generat sensus in simulacro: quomodo ergo concurririt effective sensus ad sensationem, cum recepto simulacro nihil in eo generet?}” \textit{Op. cit.} f. 258 v.
enquiry into the relations of sensation and the sensible thing (illustrated by his reading of *species sensibilis* as an effect upon the medium and the organ of sense), inserted a non-physical cause (*sensus*) into the sequence in order to explain the fact of sensation. Pomponazzi offers a complete account in physical terms of the whole mental process, both of the occurrence and of the non-occurrence of sensation. When it is added that he immediately goes on to distinguish the physical from the cognitive relation, to disclaim the categories of *actio* and *passio* in reference to a mental fact as irrelevant, and in short to define the act of cognition as, in comparison with physical relations, something *sui generis*—we are in a position to estimate Pomponazzi's contribution to the problem of sense-perception.

Pomponazzi attempts a physical account of the phenomena of attention, and of the fact that cognition sometimes occurs and sometimes does not occur when the organ of sense is equally affected. He does so, it need hardly be said, in terms of the physiology of his own day, such as it was.

There is, he says, a limited amount of physical energy (for this is the nearest possible equivalent for what Pomponazzi meant by *spiritus*) upon which the various powers of the mind have to draw. In this way he explains the fact that when the attention of the mind is fixed in one direction it is removed from another, and when one faculty is in active operation others are at rest.

Thus when the attention of the mind is fixed elsewhere, the sensible object may be present to the senses, and yet sensation does not take place. Pomponazzi explains the presence or absence of sensation by the supply or deficiency of *spiritus* for the sensitive powers: "For if the sensible form is in sense when it is depleted of energy, there is no cognition, and this because the recipient is not in the right condition." It will be noticed

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1 "Omnes virtutes habent spiritus determinatos per quos operantur." *Comm. de An.* f. 86 v.
that he is still embarrassed by the physical conception of *species sensibilis*; for referring to the case where there is no *cognitio* (no *αἰσθητὸν*, and therefore in Aristotle’s sense *no aισθητοῦ*) he says—"The sensible form is in sense which is depleted of energy"; and speaks of the effect of the object upon the organ, unperceived, as a kind of *sentire*: "I say that the sensible form is not the same as sensation, *howsoever the sensible form may be felt."

But this only serves to emphasise the fact that he intends to follow out, more thoroughly than Albert, a physical view of the facts, and to give a complete physical history of the different processes in question, both where there is a mental *cognitio*, and where there is not.

We have also to notice, in striking contrast with this, and as complementary to it, Pomponazzi’s answer to the argument against the "action" of matter upon mind. He disarms this objection, in effect, by pointing out the peculiar and unique character of the cognitive relation. The categories of *actio* and *passio*, he says, are irrelevant to cognition; the relation of the mind to its object (thus clearly distinguished from the physical cause or condition of mental action) is not to be considered under those terms or under the physical ideas they represent. And if there be a sense in which cognition may be considered under the *analogy* of "passivity," and the material object called the "cause" of knowledge, *in this case what "receives" is the superior and what "acts" the inferior element.*

All this calls for little in the way of explanation or commentary. "We note that sensation, in the aspect in which it is cognition, does not mean activity or passivity; but it is an accident of sensation that it is accompanied by activity or passivity." This is Pomponazzi's true answer to all the questions about sensation. Knowledge as such, he explains, knowledge properly regarded, is neither action nor passion: it is knowledge.

f. 221 r.: "Sensatio nihil aliud est quam illud simulacrum existens in potentia sensitiva debite et sufficienter dispositum (? disposita) per sanguinem et per spiritus."

1 There are cases, i.e., where *species sensibilis sentitur*, and yet there is *no sensatio*—which is contrary to Aristotle and plainly implies that *species sensibilis* is physically conceived. See *Comm. de An.* f. 86 v.

2 "Notamus quod sensatio ex ea parte qua est cognitio non dicit actionem aut passionem; sed accidit cognitioni quod sit cum actione aut passione." *Ibid.*
He refers to the Divine knowledge as the perfection or type of knowledge. "The intellection of God is not accompanied by activity or passivity: nor is the intellection of God in its essential nature activity."

There is, it is true, an aspect of human knowledge in which it may be considered under the category of *actio* and *passio*; and from this point of view our knowledge is to be considered rather under the analogy of *passio*. "Granted that it is supposed that intellection and sensation are activities grammatically speaking, nevertheless philosophically speaking they are rather passivities; and this because what receives *sensation or intellection* is said to be 'sentient' or 'intelligent,' not what effects it." The soul, accordingly, if the cause of its own operations, is not the *efficient* cause of them and need not be. "Sensation is not activity, it is rather passivity than activity: *though in its essential nature it is neither*." If in this sense the mind is passive, it by no means follows that it is inferior to that which, in this sense, acts upon it; nor is there, in this view of sensation and of knowledge generally, any contradiction of the canon that "what feels is superior to what does not feel." Nay, as he had just said, in *cognition* that which "receives" sensation or thought is the "sentient" or "intelligent"; and not that which "causes" them. Accordingly he adopts the dictum of St Thomas: "Though the object of sense acts on sense, nevertheless it is not more perfect than it, for sense

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1 "*Intellectio Dei non est cum actione aut passione, nec intellectio Dei formaliter est actio.*" *Op. cit.* f. 86 v.

2 "Accidit cognitioni quod sit cum actione aut passione....In nobis qui de novo intellegimus, accidit quod nostra cognitio sit cum actione aut passione." *Ibid.*


4 "Stante ergo hoc, quod intellectio formaliter non dicat actionem vel passionem, dico quod reversa est ita quod anima non est causa effectiva omnium suarum operationum....Existimatur quod sit causa suarum operationum, non tamen est ita quod sit causa effectiva earum." *Ibid.*

5 "*Sensatio non est actio, imo potius est passio, quam actio; licet formaliter nullum horum sit.*" *Op. cit.* f. 87 v.
has a more perfect mode of operation than the object\(^1\): and adds a statement of his own which concludes and sums up his argument: "When it is said 'the object concurs actively to produce the sensation,' I reply that sensation, *qua* cognition, does not essentially mean activity or passivity: and granted that the object, in so far as it acts, is more perfect than sense, which is acted on, nevertheless it is *not* more perfect *without qualification*, because sense perceives, whereas the object does not: but what perceives is more perfect than what does not perceive\(^2\)."

This, then, was Pomponazzi’s final answer to the arguments against the "passivity" of the mind in sense-experience. He asks that the question should be treated not as physical, but as psychological\(^3\). But while the act of knowledge is essentially removed from the categories of "active" and "passive," or, as we should say, of cause and effect, there is a relative or analogical sense in which the human mind is passive in sensation; yet without prejudice to the characteristic superiority of consciousness to the unconscious.

We have still, however, to notice the fact that Pomponazzi refers favourably to Albert's theory of something in sensation

\(^1\) "Licet sensibile agat in sensum, non tamen est eo perfectius, quia (habet?) tam (?) perfectiorem operationem quam ipsum sensibile." Op. cit. f. 87 r.

\(^2\) "Quando dicitur 'objectum concurrit active ad sensationem' dico quod sensatio, prout est cognitio, non dicit formaliter actionem aut passionem; et licat objectum, in quantum agit, sit perfectius sensu, qui patitur, non tamen absolute est perfectius, quia sensus sentit, objectum autem non sentit; quod autem sentit est perfectius eo quo non sentit." It ought to be added, that Pomponazzi also supplements St Thomas by another argument not so convincing to the modern mind, but too characteristic of himself to be omitted. We shall see (below, Chapter xi.) how he was accustomed to invoke the celestial powers, much as a modern scientific thinker refers to the order or the laws of nature, on behalf of the data of experience; how by this sanction he defended the possibility of all things acting according to their own nature, and as they are actually found to do: and thus, in a curious chapter of the history of the human mind, what seemed to be an appeal beyond the court of reason altogether was in its real intention an appeal from *a priori* and dogmatic views of nature to the "nature of things"; and the most baseless superstition became a shelter of intellectual progress, and an excuse and argument for the scientific observation of facts. Here accordingly, in defence of an empirical psychology, Pomponazzi appeals in the language of astrology from a dogmatic prepossession to the illimitable possibilities of nature:

"Licet sensibile agat in sensum, non tamen est eo nobilius, quum non agit in sensum in virtute ejus; sed in virtute superiorum." Comm. de An. f. 87 r.

\(^3\) "Sensatio ex ca parte qua est cognitio non dicit actionem aut passionem." Op. cit. f. 86 v.
over and above passivity, even after he has seemed to dispose of the arguments on which that view was based: "The opinion of Albert is commonly held, and anyone who wishes to adopt it can easily reply to the objections brought forward." Again, at the close of the re-discussion in the Supplementa, he hints at the possibility of Aristotle's being in error.

Ferri interprets these expressions of Pomponazzi as implying "a concession to those who would make the mind sole author of its own operations," and recalls the names of "Leibnitz, Herbart, and Wolf." But this is an exaggeration, and Pomponazzi belongs, in the spirit of his theory, to quite another school.

To perceive this we have only to notice two points. One is the precise nature of that correction of Aristotle, the suggestion of which is the extreme limit of Pomponazzi's movement in this direction. Aristotle, he says, makes the sensible thing the primary cause of sensation. Albert, on the other hand, or the theory identified with his name, makes the mind's power of sense the primary, and the sensible thing the disposing cause. And, says Pomponazzi, Aristotle may here be in the wrong: "Nevertheless Aristotle had often erred in this way in attributing operation to an efficient disposing cause instead of to an efficient primary cause." We can thus measure exactly the extent of Pomponazzi's self-contradiction: in arguing for the passivity of sense he had defined the part of the mind in sensation in the words, "It is thought that the mind is the cause of its operations, but not in the sense that it is the efficient cause of them;" while here he leans so far to the more transcendental philosophy of Albert as to suggest that the mind may be the primary and the object the disposing cause of sensation. The object thus still remains a cause.

1 He refers, however, here only to the arguments brought against Albert by John of Jandun, and his attempted improvement of the theory. Op. cit. f. 87 r.
3 Introd. p. 28.
5 "Existimatur quod (anima) sit causa suarum actionum, non tamen est ita quod sit causa effectiva earum." Comm. de An. f. 86 v.
Secondly, Pomponazzi is careful to insist that on Albert’s theory, even if it were to be adopted, the mind is in a real sense passive in sensation. There is no need, he argues, for John’s invention of a passive and an active power in sense: “For sense as unmodified concurs passively in the production of sensation, as modified by the sensible form it concurs actively.” And again: “The form (i.e. in this case the object) concurs effectively not as a primary, but as a disposing, cause.

Thus on the one hand Pomponazzi keeps room, even on the more idealistic theory, for a passivity in sense (in so far, he stipulates, as “passivity” can be attributed to a cognitive act). On the other hand he is certainly inclined to find more in sense-perception than mere passivity, and hints, as above, at a mental factor in the constitution of sense-experience.

As so stated by him, Pomponazzi’s doctrine seems only the combination of two inconsistent positions, or even an attitude of indecision between them. It may, however, fairly be assumed that he had a purpose in taking up this two-sided position.

In leaning towards the theory of a “concurrency” and constitutive activity of the mind, he probably had an eye to the relation between sense and thought, and the part of thought in sense-perception. We have already seen how attention was, for Pomponazzi, a factor in the occurrence of the simplest sensation: “But when you attend, suddenly there arises cognition and sensation.” And if Pomponazzi did not distinguish “sensation” from “perception,” the words in which he states the theory of mental action almost correspond to that distinction, and at any rate express his final conclusion, as nearly as we can discover it, on the passivity of sensation and the part of the mind in sense-experience: “Sense as unmodified concurs passively in the production of sensation, as modified by the sensible form it concurs actively.”

“Sense as unmodified concurs passively”: this interpretation of Albert ought not to have been for him irreconcilable with

1 “Sensus enim, ut nudus, concurrit passive ad sensationem, ut informatus specie sensibili concurrit active.” Comm. de An. f. 87 v.
2 “Species concurrit effective non principaliter sed dispositive.” Op. cit. f. 87 r.
the Aristotelian, "Sense receives the sensible form," and we need not assume that Pomponazzi departed from his deliberate finding—that "sensation is not an activity, rather it is passivity; in its essential nature, it is neither."

Omitting what Pomponazzi, following Aristotle, had to say about the special senses, we may pass to his discussion of *communia sensibilia* (κοινὰ αἰσθητά).

In tracing the intellectual activity of the human soul from its foundations in sense, Pomponazzi dwells upon the "common sensibles"—those qualities, namely, which are perceived by the different senses and at the same time are not the direct object of any one of them—as the first objects which lie beyond the pure particularity of mere sensation. He quotes the Aristotelian enumeration of motion, rest, number, figure, and magnitude.

The first question which Pomponazzi asks about the "common sensibles" is: "How many, and which, are they?" Aristotle's enumeration of them is well known: was it to be accepted? Are all the *communia sensibilia* enumerated by him true *communia sensibilia*, in the sense that they are common to all the senses alike? By this mark—of being a common element in the sensation of *all* the senses—is the true *commune sensibile* to be determined. The question accordingly, Which are the common elements in sense-experience? is expressed by Pomponazzi by allusion to the enumeration of Aristotle, in this form: "Whether the common sensibles (i.e. Aristotle's) are apprehended by all the senses?"

In the section bearing this title, he discusses two questions. First, he seeks to vindicate the claim of two disputed items of Aristotle's list, viz. magnitude and figure, to rank as common sensibles; then, secondly, in the case of the other three (number, motion, rest) he raises the whole question of the nature of common sensibles as such, which he then follows out in the succeeding section.

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1 See Aristotle, *De Anima*, n. cap. vi.; iii. capp. i., ii.
2 "Utrum sensibilia communia comprehendantur ab omnibus sensibus." Comm. de An. ff. 87 r.—89 r.
3 *Op. cit.* ff. 89 r.—90 r.
The right of magnitude and figure to a place among common sensibles had been questioned. Averroes, says Pomponazzi, had found fault with the Aristotelian scheme in the reproduction of it by Themistius, on the ground that magnitude and figure are only apprehended by sight and touch. He proceeds to contest this point.

He enters therefore upon the question whether the "lower senses," hearing and smelling, have any apprehension of magnitude. He first weighs the argument from their apprehension of number: "It seems first that they do apprehend magnitude, because number is perceived by hearing, and number results from division of the continuous: therefore if hearing apprehends number, it seems that it apprehends the continuous, namely magnitude."

He finds, however, two objections against this argument. First: "Granted that number which is perceived by hearing results from the division of the continuous, nevertheless it does not result from the division of magnitude; for number which results from the division of the continuous that persists is not perceived by hearing, though certainly number which results from the division of the continuous which is successive, e.g. of

1 Prof. Ferri has here rather seriously misrepresented the position of the parties. By a curious blunder he has altogether overlooked the mention of Averroes, and assigns the Arabian's criticism to Themistius himself (Intro. pp. 30, 31), thus precisely reversing the historical situation. In support of the misinterpretation of Themistius he quotes (p. 30, note) a passage from the translation by Hermolans Barbarus as the probable source of Pomponazzi's information. But in that passage Themistius only says—"Magnitudo et figura visui et tactui praecipua sunt"; which is no more than Pomponazzi himself allows just below—"Aristoteles videtur appropiare comprehensionem figurae tactui et visui, non tamen ita, quod alii non comprehendant." (Comm. de An. f. 88 r.) It is really the divergence of Averroes from Aristotle and Themistius with which Pomponazzi sets himself to deal: "Averroes in commento sexagesimoquarto reprehendit Themistium dicentem ab omnibus sensibus comprehendendi, et dicit ipse quod tria eorum, motus, quies, et numerus, ab omnibus comprehenduntur, alia vero duo, scil. magnitudo et figura, a visu tantum et tactu" (f. 87 v.); and again: "Dicit Arist. quod omnia sensibilia communia sunt omnibus sensibus communia, ut bene dixit ibi Themistius" (f. 88 r.).

2 An analysis of taste is found in the Commentary on the Third Book, ff. 224 v.—229 r.

3 "Videtur primo quod sic, quia numerus percipitur ab auditu, et numerus causatur ex divisione continui; ergo, si auditus comprehendit numerum, videtur etiam quod comprehendat continuum scil. magnitudinem." Comm. de An. f. 87 r.
motion, is perceived by hearing\(^1\)." The second objection rests on the part played by memory, by "internal" as distinct from external sense, in the perception of number: to which he presently returns as affecting the general question of the nature of *communia sensibilia*: "If anyone perceives number which results from the division of the continuous, this is not to be credited to hearing, but is due to internal sense, namely the faculty of memory....But to this extent it is called a common sensible, because memory, through the mediation of hearing, apprehends number of this kind: *but then the question arises*, how number *as such* is perceived\(^3\)." So too in the case of smelling: "The question arises whether smell apprehends number. It seems that it does not. For if smell apprehends two odours in the same time it seems to apprehend them in combination, not as two: but if it apprehends them in different times, this does not seem to be the work of smell, but of memory which retains what is past\(^4\)."

Pomponazzi relies rather on the proof that by hearing and smell we can distinguish direction, implying the apprehension of space: "Hearing apprehends whether a sound comes from the right or the left, from before or behind, from above or below\(^5\)." And the additional remark is worthy of quotation: "And if it be said that in this it *deceives*, I concede the point: nevertheless it does not follow that it does not apprehend those distinctions\(^6\)." In general, position in space is a condition of all

1 "*Numerus qui sentitur ab auditu, licet causetur ex divisione continui, non tamen causatur ex divisione magnitudinis; numerus enim qui causatur ex divisione continui permanentis non sentitur ab auditu, sed bene numerus qui causatur ex divisione continuorum successivi, ut puta motus, sentitur ab auditu.*" *Op. cit.* f. 87 v.

2 "*Si quis sentit numerum qui est ex divisione continui hoc non est merito auditus, sed est propter sensum interiorem, scil. propter memorativam....* Sed pro tanto dicitur sensibile commune quia memorativa, mediante auditu, cognoscit talenm numerum; sed tune est dubitatio, quomodo numerus per se sentitur." *Ibid.*

3 "*Est dubitatio utrum olfactus cognoscat numerum: et videtur quod non; si enim olfactus cognoscat duos odores in eodem tempore videtur quod cognoscat eos ut unum non autem duo; si vero cognoscat eos in diversis temporibus, hoc non videtur officium olfactus sed memorativae, quae recordatur praeteritorum.*" *Ibid.*

4 "*Cognoscit utrum sonus veniat a dextris vel a sinistris, ab ante vel a retro, a sursum vel deorsum.*" *Ibid.*

5 "*Et si dicitur decipere circa hoc, concedo; non tamen sequitur ut non cognoscat istas differentias.*" *Ibid.*
sense-experience: “Sense perceives only under the conditions ‘here’ and ‘now’: but magnitude involves these conditions.”

So too for smelling: “A similar argument is made about smell, that the sense itself apprehends magnitude.”

Therefore, “In this view it seems necessary to say that all the senses apprehend magnitude: and therefore Aristotle says that all the common sensibles are common to all the senses, as Themistius has well said in this place.”

Yet only touch and sight apprehend magnitude perfectly: “But I think, as is said in the De Sensu et Sensato, that magnitude is completely apprehended by touch and by sight: for they apprehend with certainty what the magnitude is, and how great it is. The other senses have not this faculty: and therefore Aristotle seems to assign the apprehension of figure specially to touch and sight, but nevertheless not in the sense that the others do not apprehend it at all.”

Having disposed of the difficulty felt, in the case of the lower senses, about magnitude and figure, Pomponazzi turns to the three other common sensibles in Aristotle’s enumeration, namely number, motion, rest. Now even here, he says, there seems to be a difficulty in affirming that these are “apprehended by all the senses.” On the contrary, it might be maintained that none of them is apprehended by the senses at all. In regard to number, for example, he had already shewn in the case of hearing and smelling how it is only apprehended through the action of memory. As for motion: the senses only apprehend what is here and now, and cannot of their own power

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1 “Sensus non cognoscit nisi cum hic et nunc; magnitudo autem est cum hic et nunc.” Ibid.

2 “Similiter etiam arguitur de olfactu quod ipse cognoscit magnitudinem.” Ibid.

3 “In ista positione videtur esse necessarium dicere quod omnes sensus cognoscent magnitudinem; et ideo dicit Aristoteles quod omnia sensibilia communia sunt omnibus sensibus communia, ut bene dixit ibi Themistius.” Op. cit. f. 88 r.

4 “Sed puto, ut dicitur in De Sensu et Sensato, quod magnitudo perfecte cognoscitur a tactu et a visu; certitudinaliter enim comprehendant quae et quanta sit magnitudo; alii autem sensus non habent hoc: et ideo Aristoteles videtur appropriare comprehensionem figureae tactui et visui, non tamen alia quod alii non comprehendant.” Ibid.

5 “Non merito (sensus) exterioris sed propter sensum interiorem, scil. propter memorativam.” Op. cit. f. 87 v.
grasp the succession involved in motion. Lastly of rest he says: "A similar account may be given of rest, since rest is measured by time, but the time as a whole is not simultaneous."

But these difficulties raise the whole question as to the nature of the common sensibles. In what meaning of the word are they "sensible"? The argument against their being direct objects of perception by the senses is, says Pomponazzi, perfectly valid: they are not so: "The arguments prove the truth of the view that external sense in its essential and special nature cannot apprehend motion or rest."

Thus the result is that all sense-perceptions are accompanied by apprehensions which are not the work of sense. This is the outcome of the first step in the analysis of sense-experience.

He had noticed the fact in relation to hearing and the apprehension of number: memory was observed coming into play: "To that extent (number) is called a common sensible, because memory, by the mediation of hearing, apprehends number of this kind: but then the question arises how number per se is perceived." It is exactly the same with respect to motion and rest: "The fact that I see a man in this or that place, and then in another place, is apprehended by sense: but what compares being in this place with being in that is the inner faculty. Similarly in the case of rest: to know that this thing is at present not moved, belongs to external sense: to compare its previous state with its present belongs to the inner faculty."

1 "Motus est de numero successivorum; sed successiva non possunt a sensu comprehendi." For "sensus exterior non potest moveri nisi ab eo quod actu existit"; for "moveri est pati; omne autem quod patitur, patitur ab eo quod est in actu." But "successiva non actu existunt"; for "de ratione successivorum est quod pars sit praeterita, parsque futura sit; si ergo sic est, totum non poterit esse simul in actu; quare non poterit movere sensum." Op. cit. f. 88.

2 "Similiter etiam dicatur de quiete, quam quies mensuratur tempore, tempus autem non totum simul est." Ibid.

3 "Argumenta concludunt veritatem, quod sensus exterior formaliter et proprie non potest cognoscere motum aut quietem." Ibid.

4 "Pro tanto dicitur (numerus) sensibile commune, quia memorativa, mediante auditu, cognoscit talem numerum; sed tunc est dubitatio quomodo numerus per se sentitur." Op. cit. f. 87 v.

5 "Quod video hunc esse in tali vel tali loco, deinde in alio esse loco, comprehenditur a sensu; quod autem componit esse in hoc loco cum esse in alio loco,
All that Aristotle meant in calling magnitude, motion, rest, sensibilia per se, was that no sensible quality is perceptible apart from magnitude, motion, rest. They are in short the inseparable conditions of sense-perception, and belong to every sensible object. "When you say that Aristotle numbers them among things that are sensible per se, I reply that they are so in the sense that internal sense cannot apprehend what is sensible per se apart from motion and rest."

He describes in the case of number the psychological process by which the indeterminate data of sense are determined in the form of number (or, it might be, of magnitude or shape, or motion or rest): "A complete and perfect apprehension of number belongs to internal sense, but it originates in external sense. Hence boys and slow people who have bad memories perceive correctly the passage of the hours, but nevertheless cannot count them."

Thus the communia sensibilia are not real things, peculiar objects of sense-perception, impressing themselves by their own qualities on the senses.

Nor was it to be maintained, as by Alexander, and many mediaeval Aristotelians, that "common sense" was a faculty directly perceiving the "common sensibles," as the special senses perceive particular sensible qualities.

The relation of the common sensibles to particular objects of sense-perception depends on the answer to two questions: the first, whether the common sensibles have any way of impressing themselves directly upon sense; and the second, which is really the same in another form, whether there can be an apprehension est virtus interior. Similiter etiam et quies: cognoscere enim quod hoc nunc non moveatur, est sensus exterioris: componere autem prius cum posteriori pertinet ad virtutem interiorem."

1 "Cum dicis, Aristoteles numerat ea inter sensibilia per se, dico quod sunt per se ad hunc sensum, quia sensus interior non potest ea (scil. sensibilia per se) cognoscere sine motu et quiete." Ibid.

2 "Completa et perfecta comprehendio numeri est virtutis interioris, sed initiatice est in sensu exteriori: unde pueri et lethargici, qui non habent bonam memoriam, bene sentiunt horas, non tamen possunt eas numerare." Op. cit. f. 88 r.

3 "Utrum sensibilia communia comprehendantur per proprias species." Op. cit f. 89 r.
of magnitude, motion, etc., without the medium of particular sensible qualities.  

On the first question, which concerns the view of Alexander above referred to, "The common sensibles belong specially to common sense, just as the special sensibles belong specially to the separate senses," Pomponazzi adds nothing to the arguments of St Thomas or to his conclusion that the "common sensibles" are concerned with the mode and not with the contents of sense-perception—"Sensible qualities affect sense in a material and spatial way: hence they affect it in different ways according as they are in a larger or smaller body, and according to their different positions, namely at a distance or near, in the same or a different place"—except that he suggests a possible discrimination between magnitude and figure on the one hand, which are certainly in some sense simpler, and number, motion, and rest on the other, as more complex and more abstractly conceived.

The companion question introduces an investigation of certain alleged instances of the perception of magnitude or movement without specific sensations. In disposing of them Pomponazzi combats the notion that those general characteristics of sensible objects, which in an abstract analysis figure as magnitude, motion, number, are real independent objects of sense-perception. Thus if one grasps a hand at precisely the same temperature as his own he does not perceive heat or cold in the hand, yet he perceives magnitude. Again, if a man be cut with a sword he may not perceive the coldness or other qualities of the steel; yet "he perceives division of the continuous—which is number, and number is a common sensible." The answer of course is that some specific quality must be perceived before there can be perception of size or motion—as the consistency or hardness of

2 "Sensibilia communia sunt propria sensui communi, sicut sensibilia propria sunt propria singulis sensibus." St Thomas quoted by Ferri, Introduction, p. 32.
3 "Qualitates enim sensibiles movent sensum corporaliter et situaliter: unde aliter movent, secundum quod sunt in majori vel minori et secundum quod sunt in diverso situ, scil. vel propinquuo vel remoto, vel eodem vel diverso." Ibid.
4 "Iste sentit solutionem continui, quae est numerus; numerus autem est sensibile commune." Comm. de An. f. 89 v.
the hand or of the sword, or possibly the visible and palpable effects of the blow\(^1\).

In another place he refutes Averroes's idea that the impressions of weight and lightness are derived from an idea of motion, which would imply that the perception of motion in the abstract came before, and not in dependence on, the specific sense-impressions. Not so, says Pomponazzi; the impressions in question are preceded by a motion, it is true, in nature; but not by a perception of motion, in us\(^2\).

We have already seen in what sense alone Pomponazzi assigns to \textit{sensus communis} the apprehension of the common sensibles. He does so, but not in Alexander's sense that the common sensibles are apprehensible by interior sense as particular sensible qualities by exterior sense. He is aware that Aristotle had described them as perceptible in themselves by common sense (τῶν δὲ κοινῶν ἡδη ἔχομεν αἴσθησιν κοινὴν οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός), whereas the special senses only perceive them incidentally (κατὰ συμβεβηκός). But he regards the apprehension of the common sensibles as part of a general synthetic function (\textit{compositio}) which belongs to interior sense. Without pronouncing an opinion upon the vexed question of what precisely Aristotle meant by κοινὴ αἴσθησις, it may be said that the mediaeval thinkers had extended its signification.

Pomponazzi, in particular, assigns to this synthetic faculty a function which Aristotle had been content to assign to the particular senses—namely, that of distinguishing between the contrasts in each particular form of sensible quality, for example, in colour, sound, or tangible quality. It is with respect to touch that he makes this point, but he extends the view to the other senses as well. He has been anxious to prove that "touch" cannot be properly described as a single sense, since it perceives so many

\(^1\) "Cum dicitur 'non percipitur sensibile proprium' nego; imo percipitur durities quia est proprium sensibile a sensu tactus; ex eo enim quod percipio quod manus non cedit tangenti sentitur durities; et ex consequenti sentitur quantitas." (Ibid.) Again—"Non sentitur solutio continui nisi prius sentiamus duritiem et compressionem ensis" (op. cit. f. 90 v.)—which is, however, not quite accurate.

different qualities and different contrasts—as hot and cold, rough and smooth, wet and dry. But the answer was made that, if a sense can distinguish one contrast and remain a single faculty, it may equally well, as a single sense, distinguish among various contrasts. To which Pomponazzi replied that it is not the special sense, touch, which apprehends any contrast of tangible qualities, but the common sense acting on occasion of touch. "To this we may reply that it is not touch which declares the difference between the contrarieties of tangible things, nor is there any single tactual faculty which pronounces judgment on more than a single contrariety of tangible things, but it is common sense which judges all those objects. But we are deceived and think that what judges all those objects is the sense of touch, since tactual faculties concur as the initiating causes, though not as the primary causes, of this judgment. For since each faculty perceives its own contrariety, they act as the occasions on which common sense, comprehending all these contrarieties, pronounces judgment on them." He then applies this principle to the senses generally, though not without hesitation: "But again one of our disputants will object to my statement that it is not sight which judges those colours, but that it is common sense that makes the judgment, and declares the difference between the one colour and the other.... But according to the general opinion, it is sight that judges those colours, therefore also touch will judge...and thus we shall hold that it is a single faculty of touch which etc.... One could reply first by conceding that it is not sight which judges of colours, but common sense: sight only concurs as the initiatory condition of this judgment, as was said about touch. Or otherwise you may reply that...there is a difference between the case of sight and the case of touch: but do you reflect on this?"

1 "Ad hoc dicatur quod non est tactus qui ponit differentiam inter tangibilum contrarietates, neque est una aliqua potentia tactiva, quae afferat judicium de pluribus quam de una contrarietate tangibilium, sed sensus communis est qui de omnibus illis judicat. Decipimur autem nos et credimus quod sit sensus tactus (illud) quod de omnibus illis judicet, quum potentiae tactivae concurrent initiative, sed non principaliter, ad hoc judicium. Cum enim unaquaque potentia percipit nam contrarietatem, sunt occasiones sensui communi ut omnes illas contrarietates comprehendendis de illis judicat." Op. cit. f. 237 r.

2 "Sed rursus instabit quis nostrum, quando ita dicam quod visus non est qui judicat de istic coloribus, sed dicam quod est sensus communis qui afferit hoc judicium
Thus, developing the suggestion of the Aristotelian doctrine, Pomponazzi carries the synthetic function of *sensus communis* down to the simplest act of sensation.

The importance of the emphasis thus laid on *sensus communis*, and of the essential part assigned to it in the simplest sense-perception, appears when we consider all that was then included in *sensus interior*. Aristotle had explained the representative or reproductive powers, imagination and memory, as the sequel of sensation, and attributed them to the sensitive soul. And the mediaeval interpreters of Aristotle's doctrine of reason, having confined the name of reason to the formation of abstract notions, were compelled by this psychological scheme to assign all the other powers and activities of the mind to its sensuous part. Imagination, memory, and that *virtus cogitativa* to which was attributed a certain apprehension of universals, and (as we should say) a true though imperfect power of thought—all were ascribed to the sensitive soul and to *sensus interior*. "By the external senses we apprehend only the particular and that only when the sensible object is present—at least by the direct action of those senses; but by the internal senses we apprehend in some sort the universal; for though we cannot reach abstract universality by the internal senses, yet we can reach a certain indeterminate knowledge, intermediate as it were between particular and universal, which is called knowledge of the vague individual."

It will fall to us later to observe the relation between "indeterminate knowledge" and "universal knowledge," between *cogitativa* and *intellectus*. Meanwhile, in illustration of the suggestion that we may find in Pomponazzi a systematic psychology, and an endeavour to regard human mental life as

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1 *Apol. i. iii. f. 58 d*: "Per sensus exteriore cognoscimus tantum singulare et in praesentia sensibilis, saltem actione directa; per sensus vero interiores quoquo modo universale cognoscimus; nam licet ad universalitatem puram per sensus interiores devenire non possumus, ad quandam tamen indeterminatam cognitionem pervenimus, quasi mediam inter singulare et universale, quae individui vagi cognitio nuncupatur."
having a certain unity, we record his recognition of a synthetic power at the bottom of the mental scale, in the simplest unit of conscious life—the direct perception by the special sense of the sensible quality appropriate to it.

Pomponazzi's conception of a synthetic element in sensation, or (to come nearer to his own way of thinking) a synthetic power in sense, is further illustrated by the manner in which, following a suggestion of Aristotle's, he attributes to a "faculty of sense," namely sensus communis, the consciousness of sensation. It is, I think, doubtful whether Aristotle so far represented common sense as a "faculty" as to assign to it this function; he certainly did not do so with any distinctness in the De Anima (Book III. Ch. 2). He noticed however the fact of a consciousness of sensation, and ascribed it in some way to sense. "For certainly it is not with sight in the strict sense that the mind 'sees' that it sees...but with some organ common to all the sensoria." And Pomponazzi follows this language pretty closely, except that he identifies the "faculty of sense" expressly with sensus communis: "For the sensitive soul is conscious of itself, wherefore by one part it is conscious of another part, and by common sense is aware of the external senses."

Now in attributing this particular fact of the consciousness of sensation to sensus communis, Pomponazzi definitely implied that sensus communis was a power beyond and above mere sensation. For to sense as such (sensus exterior) he denies the possible capacity of such a consciousness—on the ground that it is not spiritualis. The power of self-reflection is outside of the nature of the physical: it is a power of thought. Consequently, in so far as it is possessed by sensus communis, that name must designate something spiritualis. "The characteristic of representing both itself and its object implies a high degree of spirituality...but sense (i.e. external), just because it is least spiritual and very imperfect, cannot be conscious of itself."

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1 Aristotle, De Somno, 455 a 17.
2 "Anima enim sensitiva cognoscit se ipsum, quare per unam partem cognoscit etiam aliam partem et per sensum communem exteriorem." Comm. de An. f. 120 v.
3 "Quod repraesentat se et suum objectum, hoc arguit magnam spiritualitatem...sed sensus (scil. exterior) eo quia est minime spiritualis et multum imperfectus, ideo non potest se ipsum cognoscere." Op. cit. f. 120 r.
Accordingly that "part" of the sensitive soul which gives the consciousness in question is more than a merely physical power. In *sensus communis* Pomponazzi arrives at the first of those stages by which in his psychology he bridges the distance between sense and "reason" in the strict meaning of abstraction. Already in the simplest act of sensation, in the consciousness which accompanies every *perception*, he discovers the first of the intermediate powers.
CHAPTER VIII

REASON

POMPONAZZI, like Aristotle, put unquestioning confidence in sense-experience. The senses may be deceived, they said, when the conditions of accurate sense-perception are not present; but that the impressions (species) made by outside realities upon the senses correspond with those realities, there need be no doubt whatever 1.

Of illusions of the senses, Pomponazzì gives a perfectly correct account. It may happen, he says, that the usual course of events whereby the sensible thing acts on the external sense and the external sense on the "interior" sense and imagination, is reversed; and the sense is affected by the imagination without the presence of a real sensible object 2. But all the senses are not deceived simultaneously; thus, for example, when we see a stick in water and it appears to be broken, the eye is deceived, but the other senses correct the false impression. Again, such

1 For Aristotle’s views on this point see Zeller’s Aristotle, Eng. trans., i. pp. 206—211, and notes; cf. Pomp., Comm. de Anima, f. 84 r.: “Viso quod sensus recipiat speciem sensiblem, videndum est modo quid sit illud quod producit speciem sensibilem; et brevi dicendum est quod objecta sunt, quae producunt species sensibiles”; p. 221 r.: “Hoc modo fit sensatio, scilicet, quod sensibile imprimit suum simulacrum in ipsum sensum,” etc.

2 "Natura primo sensibile agit in sensum exteriorem imprimendo in illum suum simulacrum, demum sensus exterior imprimit simulacrum quod in se habet in sensum communem, sensus vero communis eodem modo agit in imaginativam, et in imaginativa reservatur ipsa species et hoc fit in ordine recto. In ordine vero retrogrado fit modo contrario. Imaginativa enim quae sibi reservavit speciem sensibilem, eam imprimit in sensum exteriorem, et sic sensus exterior movetur iterum a specie sensibili, licet ipsum sensibile actu non existat, et non sit praesens.” Comm. de An. f. 221 v.
illusions do not affect a number of persons together, and the individual aberration is rectified by the experience of others.

But now the question arises, how the mind forms the notion of an individual being, regarded as a substance or "subject" in which sensible qualities inhere.

If the common conditions of sense-perception had been investigated before Kant by Aristotle, the notion of substance had been examined before Locke, and with much greater success than attended his efforts in this direction. And in analysing the nature of the sensibile per accidens (κατὰ συμβεβηκός), the follower of Aristotle was discovering the true nature of knowledge and the part taken by the mind in the perceptions of sense.

Pomponazzi's account of the rôle of sensus interior—imagination, memory, cogitativa—in passing from the sensibile per se to the sensibile per accidens, and arriving at the notion of substance, is a characteristic part of his psychology. His cue is to deny that substance is sensibile per se, and to affirm that it is sensibile per accidens—that is, properly, not an object of sense-perception at all, but a notion arrived at by the mind through a process of discursus or ratiocinatio. Thus in the course of this discussion he carries a stage further his theory of the mind's activity in sense-perception.

The sections of the Commentary on the De Anima dealing with substance and the sensibile per accidens² shew that the

1 "Quod unus sensus decipiatur est possibile, sicut oculus in visione baculi existentis in aqua, quia judicat ipsum esse fractum et in rei veritate non est fractus; sed quod omnes aut plures sensus decipiantur circa idem objectum non contingit, quia (unus) certificat alterum sicut tactus certificat nos de baculo quod non sit fractus, quum per visum judicatus est esse fractus....Remus videtur nobis fractus et non dicimus quod est fractus, et sic verum est quod nihil vere sentitur nisi illud sit existens praeens." Op. cit. ff. 222 v., 223 v. Cf. ff. 90, 91.

2 (1) "Utrum accidens ducat in cognitionem substantiae," ff. 33—35;
(2) A section only partly transcribed in Ferri's edition, ff. 91—93;
(3) "Utrum substantia materialis intelligatur per propriam speciem," ff. 187—189;
(5) "Utrum substantia producat speciem substantiae in phantasia, an aliud," f. 190 r.;
(6) "Utrum cogitativa denudit speciem substantiae a sensibilibus propriis et communibus," ff. 223, 224;
(7) "Utrum grave et leve sint substantiae," ff. 229—231.
whole subject was in Pomponazzi's day much perplexed by forgotten controversies; and it is not very easy to extricate his own thought of it, which was really sufficiently clear, and in its way interesting.

We find Pomponazzi occupied as usual with various controversies. Against Averroes he denies that there is a power in sense to approach and apprehend substance directly. This negation broadens into a general denial of any sort of intuition or immediate apprehension of substance. Presently these contradictions appear as the negative aspect of his own thesis, that the conception of substance is formed—or, as he would say (realistically), the apprehension of substance is reached—by an act or process of discursive thought.

These discussions were of course carried on under the influence of scholastic hypostasising of abstract substance. The notion of the logical correlativity of substance and attribute, had it been clear to any of the controversialists or to Pomponazzi himself, would have greatly simplified the issue and proved a safe guide in the psychological analysis. Those who believed that the substance, as substance, could be approached by a specific act of the mind and apprehended *per speciem propriam*, supposed so because they believed the substance somehow existed in itself as apart from its attributes. The attributes, then, made their "impression" on the mind; the substance, by an equal right, could make its own.

It would not be easy to determine exactly how far Pomponazzi was emancipated from this fallacious mode of thought, or comprehended the true conception of Aristotle.

The truth is that he was not occupied with substance as concrete, in the modern meaning of that distinction; nor even, directly, with substance existing as a reality outside the mind. It never occurred to him to question that real existence. The question before him, suggested by the Aristotelian analysis, was the psychological question how the idea of that substance (which might be supposed to exist) came into the mind.

That substance existed, he never doubted, any more than any other schoolman. Whether he imagined it as existing outside of its attributes, is not an easy question: the fact of his
holding that it could be *known* only in its attributes may suggest that he did not. The point of interest, certainly, in the history of thought is that according to him the substance or *subjectum* was not to be apprehended by any mental act appropriated to it as a separate entity, but through induction from the knowledge of the attributes: “Substance is known through an act of discursive thought, from a mutual comparison of a number of attributes.”

Every schoolman was a “realist” in the modern sense—albeit a “representative realist”: to the thinker of that age the correspondence of thought and reality was not so much a postulate as an unquestioned and unconscious assumption. By the time of Pomponazzi every schoolman was also something of a psychologist. The only question was whether he should be a realist in the way of “common-sense”—that is, broadly, in the “scientific” way—or a realist in his own special and technical sense of hypostasising logical *abstracts*: the question was whether he should be a serious or a fantastic psychologist.

To the essentially psychological question which he set before him, Pomponazzi gave an unambiguous answer. In his polemic against the Averroist and quasi-Averroist theories of a direct intuition of substance he exploded a venerable psychological superstition. He assigned the abstract idea of substance—the matter before him—to a process of discursive thought, by induction from the knowledge of the attributes. Finally, we hear him affirm that neither can the attributes be known without the substance nor the substance without the attributes.

One limitation of his view and of the scope of his psychological enquiries, was characteristic of his time and his environment. The subject which he set before him was simply the abstract idea of substance; how, he asked, and by what stages, does the mind arrive at this conception of substance in the abstract? He did not enquire into substance as an objective category of thought constituting experience, but into the single phenomenon in consciousness of the subjective idea—substance. He did not distinguish correctly—as it was not given to that

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1 “Substantia cognoscitur per discursum ex collatione plurium accidentium ad invicem.” *Op. cit.* f. 189r.
day to distinguish—between the idea of substance considered merely as an abstract conception, and substance regarded as concrete in particular sensible qualities. Yet his acute observation, as we shall see, did not fail to notice the deeper question; and he treated it with the respect it deserves.

First of all, then, he denies the intuitive perception of a substance as such by sense. This seems to us an altogether inconceivable supposition; but it was not by any means so inconceivable to those who imagined the substance as a somewhat existing separately beneath its attributes.

He presses the language of Averroes closely to convict him of this monstrous doctrine. But he is eventually obliged to admit that this is rather to force Averroes's meaning.

Two explanations were given of what Averroes meant by “sense” in this connection. One was that he referred to “interior sense,” which as we know included imagination and even cogitativa; and that the perceptions of exterior sense (sense proper) were only the occasion on which the interior sense proceeded to the apprehension of substance. Once more it was even said on behalf of Averroes that he intended to include a possible action of intellect, and that in ascribing to sensus a perception of substance he meant not sensus ut sensus est, but ut est sensus animalis intelligentis.

Pomponazzi is not disposed to admit that these suggestions harmonise with the language actually used by Averroes. In his later reference however he concedes to Scotus another interpretation of that language which is more feasible, and in which it cannot lightly be dismissed: Sense (so this interpretation ran) in so far “apprehends substance” as substance is inextricably bound up with its own sensible qualities. Pomponazzi attaches great weight to this aspect of the matter, and suggests that it may be reconciled with his own view.

7 “Sed ejus sententiam veram esse ita concedit Scotus, quod sensus quomodo et involute cum ipsis sensibilibus cognoscit substantiam.” Ibid.
8 “Forte quod isti possent simul conciliari.” Ibid.
I shall return to this point presently. Meanwhile, with respect to the other explanations of the action of sensus interior or even intellect on the data of sense to produce the conception of substance, Pomponazzi justly claims that they surrender the whole position. For as apprehended by sensus interior, or by “sense as the sense of a thinking being,” substance is no longer sensibile per se—no longer an object of sense properly speaking at all. On this shewing, the apprehension of substance, so far from being possible to external sense, involves a certain process of the mind. This is implied in its being, as thus admitted, sensibile per accidens. For this is, says Pomponazzi, the whole point. If that be what Averroes meant, in short, by attributing the apprehension to sense, then the conception of substance is present in sense, but tacitly and as it were unconsciously there; and only comes to apprehension in imagination. According to others, the species substantiae is in no way present to sense at all, but is apprehended by imagination. They hold “that substance is thought by means of its special form...but as to how imagination apprehends substance, and not the external senses, different views are held. Some say that the sensible object produces its form, and that with its form the form of substance is involved, and that it first produces it in external sense, then in common sense, lastly in imagination: and they say that though the form of substance is present in special and common sense, yet sense itself does not apprehend it, but that of all the faculties imagination alone apprehends it...There are others however who say that the form of substance is not in sense, either special or common, yet that it is in imagination...They say that from the external senses the form of substance is produced in imagination. Those people therefore hold that substance is apprehended by imagination by means of its special form, whether the manner of

1 “Et ita est sensibile per accidens, quia per sensibile proprium sensus interior devenit in ejus notitiam; non tamen ita est quod sensus exterior cognoscat substantiam...Si enim ex cognitione coloris vel figure cognoscatur substantia ut substantia est, hoc non est sensus ut sensus est sed ut est sensus animalis intelligentis.” Op. cit. f. 91 v.

2 “Totum ergo stat in hoc, quod si dicat sensum exteriorem cognoscere substantiam, debet intelligi per accidentes.” Ibid.
its apprehension is according to the first opinion or to the second: and they hold that there is a special image of each material substance.

Pomponazzi in reply, while denying that substance is apprehended per propriam speciem, recognises the part of imagination in the formation of the idea of substance. "I say that it is the special function of imagination to receive the form of substance, provided that it is properly predisposed, and receives the special attributes of the substance. For instance, if I wish to apprehend 'endive,' it is not only necessary to apprehend it by sense, but also to connect together a number of sensible qualities, for instance that it possesses a certain smell, taste, colour, multiplicity, substance, mode of action, and the like; and this seems to be what Aristotle expresses in the first book of the De Anima...when he says that, when we know a number of the special attributes, we can then apprehend something of the ultimate specific nature of the substance...This view necessarily admits that substance is apprehended through an act of discursive thought, from a mutual comparison of a number of attributes, special namely and common."

1 "Putant substantiam intelligi per propriam speciem...Quomodo autem phantasia cognoscat substantiam et non sensus exteriore, de hoc sunt diversae opiniones. Aliqui dicunt quod sensibile producit speciem suam et cum sua specie est immixta species substantiae et primo producit eam in sensu exterior, deinde in commun, demum in phantasia; et dicunt quod species substantiae licet sit in sensu particulari et commun, ipse tamen non cognoscit eam, sed sola phantasia inter omnes virtutes eam cognoscit....Alii vero sunt dicentes speciem substantiae non esse in sensu proprio aut commun tamen esse in phantasia...dicunt quod ex sensibus exterioribus creator species substantiae in phantasia. Iste ergo tenent substantiam cognosci per propriam speciem et phantasia, sive modo sit secundum primam opinionem, sive secundum secundam; et tenent uniuscujusque substantiae materialis esse proprium phantasma." Op. cit. ff. 187 v., 188 r.

2 "Dico quod proprium est phantasiae recipere speciem substantiae dummodo ipsa sit bene disposita et recipiat accidentia propria istius substantiae. V. gr. si volo cognoscere endiviam, non oportet tamen cognoscere eam per sensum, sed oportet multa sensibilia congregare ad invicem, ut quod sit talis odoris, saporis, coloris, numeri, substantiae, operationis, et similis; et ista videtur esse expressa mens Philosophi primo hujus, testu commenti undecimi, quando dicit quod quando cognoverimus multa accidentia propria, tune de substantia habeimus aliquid ultimae differentiae....Isti tandem necessario confertur quod substantia cognoscatur per discursum ex collatione plurium accidentium ad invicem, propriorum scilicet et communium." Op. cit. ff. 188 v., 189 r.
In another discussion he appears to have in view certain incomplete theories of the action of *intellectus* in this connection. He describes a theory which assigns the apprehension of substance to *intellectus* in somewhat vague and general terms: "Attribute leads to the knowledge of substance....Our intellect from a perceived form *elicits* the unperceived form of substance.... No sense rises to the conception of substance, but *it is the intellect which apprehends it, after its attributes have first been apprehended by sense*...." He accepts this as so far satisfactory. He regards it however as insufficient, and in reviewing it along with the other explanations here quoted, says that none of them is a correct interpretation of Aristotle. At the same time on stating the theory he adds, "But I do not wish to accept the criticism that John makes here."

With the same provisional acceptance he seems to quote the further, or alternative, doctrine that *intellectus* creates the conception of substance when "predisposed" by the conceptions of the accidents. This is indeed in general accord with his own view as already quoted: "The special function of imagination is to receive the form of substance, provided the imagination is properly predisposed and receives the special attributes of the substance." But the question still remains, *how* the idea of substance comes into thought—whether by a process of discursive thought, or by some immediate intuition of, and impression by, a *species substantiae* as distinct from the accidents. "Though many agree in this view" (i.e. as above in assigning the apprehension of substance to intellect), "nevertheless they differ as to the *mode of production* of the form in intellect."".

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2 "Accidens ducit in cognitionem substantiae....Intellectus noster ex specie sensata accidentis elicit speciem insensatam substantiae....Nullus sensus profundat se ad substantiam, sed intellectus est qui eam cognoscit cognitis primis accidentibus per sensum...." *Op. cit.* f. 33 r.
Here then is the last point which Pomponazzi, following Scotus, desires to make good—namely that the idea of substance is the result of a process of discursive reasoning. He quotes under the name of John (Philoponus? or Gandavensis?) a theory satisfactory on all but this one point; “John supposes that the forms of the substance and the attribute are present simultaneously in the faculty of imagination, and that the intellect cannot receive the form of substance unless it has first received the form of the attribute which predisposes and prepares for the reception of the form of substance: yet even in this view the form of the substance produces knowledge of the substance, though through the mediation of the attribute!.” This possible hypothesis of a direct action of a distinct (and abstract) *species substantiae* on intellect—of an immediate intuition (as it would practically come to be) by intellect of substance as distinct from attributes—this was what Pomponazzi wished finally to guard against. As leaving this point undetermined, the general assignment of the idea of substance to *intellectus*, and the general admission of a predisposition through the conception of the attributes, were not sufficient; nor could those statements be accepted as the full doctrine of Aristotle. Every form of “intuition,” even on the part of *intellectus* itself, must be excluded. “None of these is a correct interpretation of Aristotle, because...he does not speak of an intuitive knowledge without discursive thought, but of knowledge accompanied by discursive thought.”

Every doctrine of “intuition of substance” is rejected in the most formal manner. Pomponazzi also notices in passing the contradiction which such a notion would imply of the accepted doctrine of “representative perception.” “This kind of knowledge of substance, John, Caietanus and Apollinaris call intuitive, but most improperly and wrongly, because intuitive knowledge is in

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1 “Joannes imaginatur quod in virtute phantastica sit simul species substantiae et accidentis, et quod intellectus non potest recipere speciem substantiae nisi prius recipiat speciem accidentis disponentem et preparantem pro receptione speciei substantiae; tamen cum hoc etiam species substantiae generat notitiam substantiae, mediante tamen specie accidentis.” *Ibid.*

2 “Nullus istorum est ad mentem Philosophi, quia...non loquitur de ista cognitione intuitiva sine discursu, sed loquitur de cognitione cum discursu.” *Op. cit.* f. 34r.
direct relation with reality. We have no such knowledge in this world, but we shall have it in heaven!"

The doctrine of Pomponazzi himself on this subject has already appeared in various statements. A word or two may be added by way of summary.

(a) He fully recognises the function of sense as supplying the particulars on which the mind proceeds to the idea of substantial unity. He formally accepts the modification of the Averroist theory according to which the apprehension of substance was assigned, not to "sense in so far as it is sense," but to "sense in so far as it is the sense of an intelligent animal"; remarking that, on this or a similar view, "by means of external sense, internal sense arrives at the idea of substance." And finally, in leaving the subject, he adopts the concession of Scotus to Averroes: "In a way and as bound up with the sensible qualities themselves, sense apprehends substance." The significance of this admission, which in words seems like the abandonment of his own position, will be pointed out below.

(b) Secondly, phantasia plays its part. "It is the special function of imagination to receive the form of substance in so far as it is properly predisposed and receives the attributes peculiar to that substance."

(c) With regard to cogitativa, it was defined as the function of cogitativa to receive the form of substance apart from quantitative determinations—to conceive of substance, that is to say, in a partial, but not an absolute, abstraction from sensible attributes.

(d) One account of the act of thought in the apprehension of the idea of substance is summed up in the words "Substantia cognoscitur per discursum, ex collatione plurium accidentium." The ideas of substance and accident are discussed somewhat fully, in their logical relation, on ff. 34 and 35. Not only, it is there said, do we pass from the knowledge

1 "Talem cognitionem substantiae Joannes, Caietanus, et Apollinaris appellant intuitivam, sed valde improprie et male, quia notitia intuitiva terminatur ad rem: nullam autem talem habemus in hoc mundo, sed habebimus in patria." Op. cit. t. 33 v. The sentence that follows, however, serves to remind us that the scholastic representationalism was dogmatic and not sceptical, a "realism" and not "sensationalism": "Quod si in hac vita cognitio terminatur ad rem, quia phantasma formaliter terminatur ad rem, non propter hoc est intuitiva." Ibid.
of accidents to the knowledge of substance, but conversely a
perfect knowledge of substance conveys the knowledge of the
accidents as well. A "perfect" knowledge of an accident is
only given through a perfect knowledge of the substance, and
that means, as above, of the other accidents as well. Thus
Pomponazzi develops the psychological history of the idea of
substance. The passage, however, quoted above, in which
he seems almost to abandon his characteristic doctrine of the
relation of sense to the idea of substance, is too significant
of the limitations of this whole mode of thought to be passed
over without more particular notice. The passage is as follows:
"But Scotus admits the truth of Averroes's view in so far as it
maintains that, in some way and as bound up with the sensible
qualities themselves, sense apprehends substance. For by its
apprehension of a kind of aggregate resulting from a number of
attributes, it apprehends also substance itself, just as there are
rustics who know lettuce and other herbs by the simultaneous
presence of a number of attributes."

The case which he has in view is evidently the case in which
the abstract idea of substance has not been formed in thought,
but in which the logical notion "substance" is practically and
implicitly though unconsciously present. This is what is implied
in the reference to rustics—unreflecting persons, or persons in-
capable of abstract ideas.

The significant thing is his seeming to allow that in such a

f. 34 v.) "Non solum accidentis ducit in cognitionem substantiae, sed etiam e con-
verso." (Op. cit. f. 34 r.) "Dicit Averroes quod definitiones et declarationes quae
non declarant accidentia sunt vanae; quod eodem modo contingit quum accidentia
declarantia ipsam substantiam sunt maxime propria; quae vero non sic, non sunt
propria saltem eodem modo. Sic enim perfectissima definitio declarat omnia acci-
dentia." (Op. cit. f. 35 v.) "Substantia ducit in cognitionem accidentis et e contra via
discursiva et demonstrativa." (Op. cit. f. 35 r.) "Non enim per speciem substantiae

2 "Perfecta enim cognitioni accidentis non potest haberi nisi post cognitionem

3 "Sed ejus sententiam veram esse ita concedit Scotus, quod sensus aliquo modo
et involute cum ipsis sensibilibus cognoscit substantiam. Cognoscendo enim aliquid
aggregatum ex multis accidentibus, et ipsam substantiam cognoscit: sicut sunt rustici
qui cognoscunt lactucam et alias herbas ex aggregatione multorum accidentium simul." 
case Averroes was right in seeing no action of thought at all. Yet he says, there is an apprehension of substance, obscure, but real.1

We have already seen that in his enquiry into the conception of substance Pomponazzi has before his mind the abstract idea of substance. He is concerned simply to trace the emergence of that idea, and to shew the psychological process by which it is reached. In the passage before us, he stands in the presence of another order of facts, and on the threshold of a different enquiry, into which however he does not enter.

The fact which he here describes—"that in a way, and as bound up with the sensible attributes themselves, sense apprehends substance"—is the characteristic fact of human experience. Psychologically, it is correctly observed by Pomponazzi. He stumbles, however, in his attempted explanation of it—that is, in referring it simpliciter (if we are to take the literal meaning of his words) to sense.

This explanation may be viewed in two ways. Critically regarded, it must be considered a self-contradiction on Pomponazzi's part; revealing the inadequacy of his method of thought, and incidentally of every merely psychological explanation of the fact of knowledge. Pomponazzi had of course no notion of the distinction between the logical prius, or prius de jure, and the psychological prius, or prius de facto. For want of this distinction he was at a loss.

In his oscillation between the two poles—sense or reason, reason or sense—and his falling back in the critical instance, on account of the absence of the explicit abstract notion of substance, upon sense as the alternative, we are forcibly reminded of the course of subsequent controversy. We are in presence of the issue which came to be discussed between the Intuitionist and the Sense Empiricist. The advocates of a rational element in human experience set up an hypothesis of Ideas and Principles of Reason present to consciousness and explicitly recognised. These, however, had to be verified by psychological observation as facts. The opposite school, failing to discover rational principles in such an explicit and abstract form, and dismissing

1 "Ipsam substantiam cognoscit." Ibid.
them as, psychologically speaking, fictions, referred all knowledge to the data furnished by sense.

The language of Pomponazzi, however, may also be interpreted in a more sympathetic spirit. He may be said to have stated the problem with insight and sincerity, even though in stating it he contradicted his own formal theory. *He perceives that there is an apprehension of substance without the express and explicit idea of substance.* He admits the part of sense in that apprehension, without withdrawing his repeated contention that sense is not by itself adequate to the task. With a broader and more comprehensive psychological observation than that of his age, he turns from the analysis of the ideas of the philosopher to the explanation of the experience of the plain man. At the same time he at least describes in words—even if unconscious of the problem his words raise—those facts which an accurate psychology can indicate, but which the observation of them does nothing to explain. In such phrases as, "Sense in so far as it is the sense of an intelligent animal," and "Substance the knowledge of which is implied in its sensible qualities," we may imagine a prophetic anticipation of the problem of modern philosophy.

In developing this theory of the formation of the idea of substance, Pomponazzi definitely broke with the mechanical explanation of mental action. That explanation was that there must be something in the mind as it were physically correspondent to the outward thing which produces an impression on the mind. Pomponazzi escapes from the bondage of this conception by a distinction, firmly grasped and applied, between *actio realis* and *actio spiritualis*.

(a) When, for example, the mechanical conception was invoked in favour of an immediate action of substance on the mind, as a real entity making its correspondent impression there, Pomponazzi replied by means of that distinction.

We notice this in that early discussion "Whether accident leads to the knowledge of substance" and "Whether the form of substance produces the knowledge of substance" of which an account has already been given. One of the modes of reasoning which Pomponazzi has constantly in view there is that "spiritual
activity ought to correspond to material activity,” and “as it is in real and material action so is it in spiritual.”

Now substance, in the sphere of reality, according to the scholastic mind, exists apart from, and prior to, its accidents: therefore, the argument was supposed to run, the conception of substance should be prior to, and separate from, that of the accident. To this analogy Pomponazzi answers: “The principle that ‘the relation of the thing to the physical action holds also in the spiritual sphere’ is not universally true... The exact opposite is the case in spiritual activity, as has been said. In material things substance is prior to modification; in the spiritual sphere in many cases the exact opposite is true, as when the substance is unknown to us, while the modification is known: and in this way it is true of imperfect knowledge.”

Still more generally does he express himself, to the same effect, in his last utterance on the subject. The Averroist argument was: “The stone is not in the mind, but its form... the intellect receives all forms,” therefore the mind is impressed by the “form” of substance as such. Pomponazzi, in denying this immediate effect or impression of substance on the mind, distinguished the effect in question as a logical one (conceptus), the logical notion of the substance stone, the “action” that is, not as realis, but as spiritualis. “When it is said ‘the stone is not in the mind’ and ‘intellect is potentially all forms,’ I reply that though substance of this kind has no special form, yet it has a special conception that in a way represents the thing, by means of which conception the intellect arrives at knowledge of the substance.”

3 “Ille modus dicendi non est universaliter verus, ‘Sicut res se habet ad actionem realem ita ad spiritualem.’... Stat autem totum oppositum in actione spirituali, ut dictum est. In materialibus prius est substantia quam passio; in spiritualibus multoties est totum oppositum, ut quando substantia esset nobis ignota, passione existente nota; et hoc modo est verum de imperfecta notitia.” Op. cit. f. 35 r.
6 “Cum dicitur, ‘lapis non est in anima’; et ‘intellectus est in potentia ad omnes formas,’ dico quod etsi talis (substantia) non habeat propriam speciem, habet tamen...
(b) But the mediaeval theory of mental action also met Pomponazzi in another form—namely in the highly characteristic difficulty about *accidents* producing the idea of *substance*. Those who denied the separate and immediate "action" of substance found themselves in a fresh difficulty. "Substance," they reasoned, "does not act directly." But "how can accident produce the form of the substance?" Hence the perplexity of some whom Pomponazzi calls *aliqui Thomistarum*, and the futile expedient to which they had resort. They could not allow that "substance produces the form of substance". Yet neither could they understand, on their theory of the action of reality on the mind, accident "producing" anything but the *species* corresponding to itself, that namely of accident; or the *species* of substance being "produced" by anything but substance itself. So they had taken refuge in the exquisitely illusory explanation, a typical verbalism—"the form of the special attribute produces in the intellect the form of each, and produces the form of substance by virtue of substance."  

It is interesting to notice that Pomponazzi escapes from this characteristic scholastic puzzle by the distinction between mental and physical "action." In the act of knowledge, he says, there *is a direct relation* between the mind and substance; though a physical or mechanical impression of the mind by substance is what he has all through denied. "The proposition 'substance does not act directly' can be interpreted as holding only as regards physical action: but the action in question is purely spiritual."  

The *intellectus agens* of St Thomas or of Pomponazzi bore no relation to the common Intelligence of Averroes, or the *proprium conceptum qui quoquo modo reputat rem, quo conceptu intellectus devenit in notitiam substantiae.*  

1 The view which Pomponazzi again refers to here is that of Joannes (Philo-ponus?)—"Aliqui putant quod, praeparato intellectu per speciem accidentis proprii, introducatur species substantiae ab ipsa substantia; et hoc tenet Joannes; et concedit ipse substantiam immediate agere." *Op. cit.* f. 190 r. Cf. f. 33: "Species substantiae generat notitiam substantiae, mediante tamen specie accidentis."  

2 "Species accidentis proprii producat in intellectu speciem utriusque, sed producit speciem substantiae in virtute substantiae."  

Divine Reason of Alexander influencing the human soul from without. The distinction of “active” and “passive” intellect they understood to be an abstract and logical distinction, and “active intellect” to be a part of the human soul. Averroes had indeed recognised the identity of active and passive intellect, and in his case that meant that he did not allow the latter any more than the former to belong to the nature of the soul of man.

By *intellectus agens* St Thomas and his followers understood the independence in which intelligence “begets in itself” by abstraction the logical notions of things. To trace the “action” of *intellectus agens*, then, was to discover the contribution of thought itself to the conceptions of things in knowledge. It is probable that we should still speak, if we used ordinary popular language, of the constitutive “action” of thought.

Pomponazzi was mainly concerned with two interests. On the one hand, like every mediaeval writer, he must maintain the “activity” of thought. The form in which this necessity presented itself to him was that of maintaining a distinction between *intellectio*, as the act of thought, and *species intelligibilis*, which was supposed to be produced and presented to thought by the intermediate powers (*sensus interior*) “preserving” and “composing” the data of sense (*exterior*).

The other interest with which Pomponazzi was concerned was the psychological interest, the scientific interest of tracing and distinguishing the operations of these various powers.


4 The principal sections dealing with the nature of thought (ff. 158—170) have not been transcribed in Ferri’s edition. Of one important part of the discussion, however, to which reference will presently be made (“Utrum intellectio et species intelligibilis sint idem realiter,” ff. 172—174), the text is given. The titles of the omitted sections are these: “Utrum intellectus agens et potentialis sint duae res realiter distinctae et quid sint”; “Utrum sit necessarium ponere intellectum agentem et quomodo”; “Utrum sit necesse ponere intellectum agentem propter intellectionem causandam stante priori necessitate.”
It must always be remembered that *intellectio* was the act of *abstract* thought, of forming an abstract idea. In distinguishing (say) the *virtus cogitativa* from *intelllectus*, it was the act of pure abstraction that was denied to the former.

For the most part, Pomponazzi is hampered by the traditional separation of the intellectual from the sensitive powers. We shall find him, however, gradually and by a dialectical process arriving at the conception that there is no real difference between the *intellectio* and the *species intelligibilis*; that what intellect, by its agency, *adds* to the material presented by the lower powers is not a *nova species* but the *intellectio* itself as such—the fact of intellectual apprehension. And this conception of the relation between intelligence in its characteristic exercise and the lower powers opens the way to a tentative conception of these as in some sense stages in the development of intelligence.

Besides the apprehension by sense of sensible qualities, objects are determined in general relations. But the two forms of apprehension are by no means on one footing. For the sensible qualities really exist previous to their apprehension. But this is exactly what we cannot say of that which thought apprehends, namely general relations and universal notions.

How then do they begin to be? The significant feature of Pomponazzi’s reasoning is that for him the alternative to an “agency” of intellect itself was the real existence and agency of the general conceptions of intellect—*universalia ante rem*. The analogy of sense was always before him. The objects of intelligence are different from the objects of sense: the data of sense were not sufficient, he felt, to call the conceptions of the mind into being. Was then the mind to be considered after the analogy of sense? Sense was purely passive, purely receptive: it was brought from potentiality to realisation by the action on it of its real objects outside itself. Was the actualisation of intelligence (this was the question) to be accounted for in the same way? If intelligence was purely receptive—if it had no “agency” of its own—its actualisation was explained by its objects, considered as real existences, acting on it.

But this was not the nature of the objects of thought. Such a supposition would restore the baseless, the exploded fiction
of \textit{universalia ante rem}. For the objects of thought were "universals."

Such then was the ground on which Pomponazzi demanded an "agency" in thought as such. For if that hypothesis of \textit{universalia realia} were dismissed, and it were also assumed, as Pomponazzi professed to prove, that the faculties lower than \textit{intellectus} are inadequate to the production of truly abstract and universal ideas, the conclusion followed that the actual exercise of \textit{intellectus} is due to the "agency" of \textit{intellectus} itself—i.e. to \textit{intellectus agens}.

This was the argument of Pomponazzi: it indicates in a cumbrous manner and in obsolete language the difference between sense and thought. The affirmation on the one hand of a contribution of thought itself to the actuality and by consequence to the objects of thought; the denial on the other of the absolute existence, as independently real, of the terms of thought, of what thought attributes to its objects (of \textit{universalia ante rem})—amount to a designation in scholastic language of the peculiar relation between thought and its objects.

I do not dwell on the abstract and unreal psychological presuppositions which run through this argument. \textit{Intellectus} is considered as in absolute psychological isolation; and the verbal cogency of the argument depends upon an artificial distinction between \textit{intellectus} on the one hand and imagination, memory, \textit{vis cogitativa}, on the other. The inadequacy of "lower powers," as they are called, to the production of the contents of thought (universals) is constantly affirmed. We shall return to this point immediately.

In a parallel course of reasoning\footnote{\textit{Op. cit.} ff. 166—169; Ferri, Introduction, p. 53.} Pomponazzi enquires what is the productive cause of the intermittent action of intelligence—of its reduction, in the Peripatetic phraseology, from possibility to actuality. It cannot be, he says, following the same logic as we have just analysed, \textit{intellectus} itself as \textit{possibilis}; for \textit{intellectus possibilis} is by its very definition inadequate to actual intelligence, since it is the mere expression of the potentiality of thought, and logically nothing but a passivity, a receptivity: thought potential, but essentially not actual. Nor, he goes on, can the cause of
intelle\textit{ctio} be the bare form (\textit{species nuda}). What does he intend to deny here? The action of intelligence, he seems to say, cannot be produced by the object acting through lower powers which are not thought itself: the object presented to those lower powers is not the same as the object of thought and their action is not thought’s action, nor capable by itself of producing the action of thought. This is what Pomponazzi means by denying the production of thought to \textit{species nuda}, or (what is the same thing) to \textit{vis cogitativa} and imagination. For the \textit{species nuda} is the object of knowledge as it presents itself to \textit{vis cogitativa}, a faculty lower than \textit{intellectus}. \textit{Vis cogitativa}, it appears, was not capable of apprehending universals. \textit{Species} accordingly, as present to \textit{cogitativa}, was, in Prof. Ferri’s words, “l’ obbietto ideato, senza l’ universalità.” Something more than \textit{species} in that sense—some other “agent” as they said then—was required before there should be thought proper.

Pomponazzi denies the sufficiency of \textit{species} to cause \textit{intelle\textit{ctio}} on two grounds, (1) because \textit{species} as apprehended by \textit{cogitativa} is less \textit{perfect} than \textit{intelle\textit{ctio}}, and (2) because in so far as \textit{intelligen\textit{bilis}} it is the object of \textit{intellectio}, and therefore, in this respect, only itself comes into existence with the actualisation of \textit{intellectio}.

\textit{Species} being thus excluded, \textit{phantasma} is dismissed by an argument \textit{a fortiori}—for it is the sole office of \textit{phantasia} to present such \textit{species}, and “if it is not present in the more likely case, it is not present in the less likely.” Once more, then, an essential link in the argument for the “action” of \textit{intellectus} as such is the absolute separation of \textit{intellectus} from the other powers of the mind. This unpsychological division of powers led to a highly artificial treatment of mental action. It was partly imposed on Pomponazzi by the metaphysical interest in \textit{intellectus agens}, and largely confirmed by the exigencies of the reasoning which has been described, in favour of the agency of intelligence (as abstractly understood) in its own processes. That reasoning, as we have seen, did not proceed by the analysis of the facts of mental action, which would have revealed the

1 Ferri, \textit{ibid.}

2 “De quo magis videtur inesse et non est, ergo nec de quo minus.” \textit{Comm. de An.} p. 168 r. (Ferri, \textit{ibid.})
unity of the whole mental process. The object was to discover the agency of *intellectus* as such; an abstract view of *intellectus* was implied in the whole method of enquiry; and intellect being once defined or considered as essentially distinct from imagination, *cogitativa*, etc., these must be consistently excluded from that "intellectual" action in which it was sought to trace "intellectual" agency. Thus the abstract and artificial psychology, which gave its peculiar form to the theory of intelligence, was itself stereotyped and confirmed in the course of arguments which were essentially abstract and verbal in their character.

This difference in kind between universal thought and all other activities of the mind is accordingly maintained by Pomponazzi, though not with perfect consistency. He expresses it by the formula that the *species nuda*—which as the product of *phantasia* and *vis cogitativa* is the highest product of mental action short of *intellectio*—"concurs in the cognition of the intelligible form, not as an efficient but as a predisposing cause". Ferri seems to find indications of wavering from this rigid distinction, which if they were real would mean a tendency towards a truer because a less abstract psychology: "Another account can be given, namely that image and active intellect *both concur as efficient causes* of the production of the form as if they were a single complete agent": and again: "I hold that there is no incongruity in supposing that the same thing concurs *both as an efficient and as a predisposing cause". How far Pomponazzi really moved in this direction, it is not easy to say: it is probable that he was carried a little way by an unconscious logic, without actually facing an alternative which would have meant the revision of his whole theory and the abandonment of his presuppositions. His conclusion at any rate is thus given: "The whole necessity for supposing an active intellect is to produce the intelligible form—which is the view of Alexander":

1 "Concurrit ad speciem intelligendam non effective sed dispositive." Ferri, *ibid.*
The same elements appear, as the factors in Pomponazzi's theory of intellectio, in the discussion of the Quaestio, "Whether intellect and the intelligible form are identical in existence." The section is a piece of dialectic, very characteristic of Pomponazzi; of its details, however, the interest is for us completely extinct. Its plain drift is towards the establishment of an "agency" in intellectus as before. Species intelligibilis is evidently, as before, the work of phantasia, memorativa, and cogitativa. It is "received" in intellectus; it is the object of intellectus. But there is something added to species intelligibilis in actual intellectio. "Intellection is received in the intellect as modified by the form."

We must not overlook the significance of the designation species intelligibilis. The regular name for the object of thought here takes the place of the negative designation above noted, species nuda. The latter was intended to indicate a difference between species as the work of cogitativa, etc., and intellectio. The title, species intelligibilis, marks the relation between species and intellectio, of which species is the content.

While Pomponazzi intends to distinguish by means of "species" and "intellectio" between the work of lower powers and that of intellectus proper, he yet considers species as intelligibilis. It is, in short, a "representation" by imagination and vis cogitativa—retained also in memory—of the contents (objectum) of a notion. Therefore it is intelligibilis. It is in one aspect a stage in the formation of the notion; in another, it supplies thought with its object. Both aspects are included in the reference of St Thomas's dictum, which Pomponazzi

2 E.g. "Dormiens non habet intellectionem et tamen habet speciem; aliter enim si species non remaneret in intellectu hominis (docti?) non esset rememoratio." Op. cit. f. 173 r.
5 "Ita se habet intellectus ad intelligibile sicut sensus ad sensibile, quia utraque cognitio terminatur ad objectum proprium...Intellectio...terminatur ad speciem intelligibilum." Op. cit. f. 173 r.
follows: "The cognition of the thing results from the form and the faculty."

It is of course to be remembered, as the essential character of the species, that it was "representative." It was representative of the object—that is, in the case of species intelligibilis, of the object of which thought was the apprehension. The species sensibilis represented the objectum proprium sensus; the species intelligibilis the objectum proprium intellectus. The word objectum did not, of course, imply real existence ("objective" existence in the modern meaning of the word), except in a psychological reference, as the real existence of the notion with its contents. This is clearly illustrated in the course of the discussion under review, where Pomponazzi expressly argues for species intelligibilis as the true correlate (terminus) of intellectio, on the ground that the objectum may have no real existence. "I can have intellection of things that exist and of things that do not exist and cannot exist. What then I ask is the correlate of the intellection of the non-existent? Not the object, because the object neither exists nor can exist... Therefore the intelligible form."

At the same time it is always to be borne in mind that the mediaeval thinker never questioned the validity of knowledge. The species, while representative, certainly conveyed the knowledge of reality. This unquestioning confidence of scholasticism in the human mind, and the absence of all suspicion of the relativity of knowledge, does more even than the errors of its logic to shake its title to the name of philosophy. Subjective in the highest degree in its theory of knowledge, it was yet perfectly innocent of scepticism; and we might take as a concise formula of mediaeval representative realism the words, "The cognition of the thing results from the form and the faculty."

The ruling idea, meanwhile, of intellectus agens finds a new expression in the theory of a difference between intellectio and

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1 "Ex specie et potentia fit cognitioni rei." Ibid.
2 "Nulli est dubium quod different (species et intellectio) ratione, quom species representet tantum ipsum objectum, non autem intellectio." Op. cit. f. 172 r.
3 "Possum intelligere existentia et non existentia, nec possibilia existere. Tunc quaero ad quod terminatur ista intellectio non-entis: non ad objectum quia objectum nec est nec potest esse... ergo ad speciem intelligibilem." Op. cit. f. 173 r.
species intelligibilis—of something added, as before, on the part of intellectus to bring the species intelligibilis to actual intellectio: “Intellect would add to the form either something independent or something relative.”

Pomponazzi quotes first the arguments against this view; mention of these may be deferred until we come to give his answers to them.

Then follow the arguments in its favour, stated by Pomponazzi with his usual baffling impartiality, which makes it difficult to say how far he commits himself to them.

The first reason for affirming something “additional” in intellectio, plus the species intelligibilis, is that the species continues to exist even while there is no activity of intelligence; therefore, it is argued, where there is actual intellectio, some further agency must be at work. This permanent existence of the species (scil. species nuda) was implied in the received psychological theory that species resided somehow in the lower powers—in memory and the virtus cogitativa (or comprehensiva)—before the action of intellectus and in the intervals of its activity.

The second argument is that the species is the efficient cause of intellectio; the third, that it is its object (using the word in the modern sense: terminus, ad quod terminatur). On both grounds, Pomponazzi argues, the two must be distinguished.

An opinion of Avicenna which he quotes as bearing on the first or psychological argument might have pointed him towards a truer psychology. “Avicenna held that the intelligible form and intellection are entirely the same and that when intellection


2 “Ilia non sunt eadem realiter quorum, uno non existente, alterum remanet. Sed species et intellectio tali modo se habent inter se quod unum remanet altero non existente...Dormiens non habet intellectiones et tamen habet speciem; aliter enim si species non remaneret in intellectu hominis (docti?) non esset rememoratio.” Op. cit. f. 173 r.

3 “Ilia non sunt eadem quorum unum ab altero efficitur, sed species et intellectio hoc modo se habent...Est dictum Angelici quod ex specie et potentia fit cognitio rel.” (Ibid.) “Item quia ita se habet intellectus ad intelligibile sicut sensus ad sensibile, quia utraque cognitio terminatur ad objectum proprium...Necessario dabitur species intelligibilis ad quam cum terminetur intellectio erit ab ea distincta sicut species sensibilis est distincta a sensatione.” Ibid.
stops, the intelligible form also ceases to exist, since he could not see how it could be in the cogitative faculty while there was no cognition of the thing." These words might have suggested the fictitious character, psychologically, of both the species intelligibilis and virtus comprehensiva as distinguished from intellectus; and indeed the concrete unity of mental action generally. Pomponazzi does not seem, however, to have accepted this view.

It does not appear likely that Pomponazzi, who elsewhere shews some comprehension of Peripatetic principles, accepted as his own the second and third arguments savouring so strongly as they do of scholastic "Realism"; and it is doubtless with reference to them that he quotes and, I imagine, adopts the finding of the later and better schoolmen: "The forms and the acts of intellection are not separable in existence."

To the question, then, "whether intellection and form are inseparable in existence" (idem realiter), he seems to return a qualified answer. He follows a middle course, maintaining on the one hand a difference between species and intellectio, so as to allow for the agency of intellectus, but defining the difference on the other hand as not a difference realiter. "Almost all the Latin writers held that the forms and the acts of intellection are not separable in existence: but, if they differ, it is not clear what the intellection adds to the form." And as to this last point, characteristically, he takes in the end an attitude of indecision—leaving the question open, as we shall see, between a modification of a view held by Scotus and another formula hesitatingly ascribed to St Thomas.

Practically, Pomponazzi seems to adopt the view of Scotus, in a sense which he proceeds to explain. He certainly holds

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1 "Avicenna tenuit quod species intelligibilis et intellectio sint penitus idem, et quod cessante intellectione cesset species intelligibilis, quum ipse non potuit videre qualiter sit in virtute comprehensiva et non sit cognitio rei." Ibid.

2 "Species et intelleciones non distingui realiter." Op. cit. f. 173 v. We are not able at present to reproduce Pomponazzi's criticisms on these last two arguments, which would have been instructive, on account of a gap in Ferri's edition at this point; and for the same reason it is only by the use of a little conjecture that we arrive at the commentator's own mind on the subject.

3 "Omnes fere Latini posuerunt species et intelleciones non distingui realiter; sed dubium est, si differunt, quid superaddat intellectio speciei." Ibid.
firmly that *species* and *intellectio* differ—*intellectus* adding something to mere *species*: “But if they differ it is not clear what intellec
tion adds to the form.” He lays it down, with Scotus, as we have already seen, that *intellectio* is “more complete” (*perfectior*) than *species*, and that *intellectio*, as *agens*, while receiving *species*, adds something to it.

But now we come to the most characteristic part of the theory of Pomponazzi, that part of it which is personal to him-
self. It is introduced in the form of a modification of the doctrine of Scotus. He proposes to correct that doctrine in two points. These points are related to each other; and the modification which Pomponazzi proposes with reference to them, and which constitutes his independent contribution to the subject, is another stage in emancipation from scholastic fictions and a great stride towards a more rational psychology.

The two objectionable features of which Pomponazzi desires to rid the Scotist doctrine are (1) the proposition, “Intellection adds to the form something that is not relative,” and (2) the consequence, “Intellection is another form that is clearer and more lucid than the original form.” In explicit correction of the former he says: “Since it adds either something independent or something relative, it is said that intellection in itself is independent; yet I say, and it is agreed, that it is relative”: and with manifest reference to the second: “When there is talk of an independent addition to the form, I say that that is intel-
lection itself.”

What Pomponazzi thus denies is the abstract scholastic

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1 "Tenet Scotus quod species et intellectio non sint una et eadem res formaliter, sed tenet quod species sit imperflctor intellectione, lta quod intellectio sit altera species multo clarior et lucidior ipsa specie prima...Si dicatur quod est necessitas ponendi species intelligibiles, dicunt quod intellectio terminatur ad speciem sicut supra diximus. Ulterius cum dicitur unde causatur illa diversitas speciei ab intellectione, dicunt pro-


5 "'Cum dicitur quod istud absolutum superadditum speciei, dico quod est ipsa intellectio.' *Op. cit.* f. 174 r.
fiction of the intellectual power possessing, and bringing to the
formation of the notion, specific content of its own, apart from
that which is furnished to it by experience, from sense primarily
and subsequently by the operation of memory, imagination, and
rudimentary thought. He denies that intellectio adds anything
absolutum, independent, de novo (so to speak), holding instead
that it invests with a universal meaning contents already
furnished in experience. And he puts the same thing in
another way when he denies that intellectio is or introduces a
new species (species intelligibilis perfectior); instead, he con-
sistently maintains that species intelligibilis as such—the pro-
duct, be it observed, of mental activity below the level (as
he would have said) of thought—is the object and contents
of thought.

If we recall the arguments cited against the special agency
of intellectus¹, we shall see the meaning, and the reason to
Pomponazzi’s mind, of the concession which he makes later.
He divides these counter arguments into two classes—(a) those
against the “addition” by intellectus to species of aliquid ab-
solutum; and (b) those (of Scotus) against the addition of aliquid
relativum. It is obvious that neither set of objections alone will
be conclusive against the agency of intellectus, if the other can
be got over. Accordingly, when accepting later Scotus’s doctrine
of intellectio, he quietly ignores his objections to aliquid relativum.
And when he introduces his correction of the Scotist position,
the grounds of his rejection of absolutum are precisely those
which he had begun by setting out. He concedes then the
objections to absolutum; and in allowing the addition by intel-
lectus declares for relativum.

We quote therefore his own reasonings against the absolute
interference of intellectus. “If intellection added something in-
dependent, a new act of intellection would not result from the
form unless something independent were acquired de novo.”² The
contents supplied by experience, that is, would not be sufficient;
a specific new experience would be required. Now, he goes on,

¹ At the beginning of the section, op. cit. f. 172 v,
² “Si intellectio adderet aliquid absolutum, per speciem non acquireretur nova
it would be impossible to imagine the form such an experience should take; because it would be contrary to all the conditions of experience as we have it. “Only it is impossible to conjecture the nature of an absolute addition of this kind which intellection should make to the form. Also it does not seem to be the case that intellection is something absolute...because intellection as intellection is intellection of something.”

In the sentence that follows we see the significance he attached to the second point on which he corrected Scotus, and its connection with the first. “Also it would be well to see that if intellection is something independent it will be simply a more complete intelligible form.” Under this phraseology he exposes the absurdity of supposing that intellectio, abstractly considered, introduces fresh content into thought in giving it universal form. This new species must be either the same as the species intelligibilis, or not. If it be the same, one or other is superfluous. If the two be different, under which presentation is the object to be thought? It is impossible to see what the difference between the two could be: “It is impossible to see in what respect they differ, since they are of the same substance and content, as e.g. the thought of an ass and the form of an ass.” But in truth species intelligibilis and intellectio are correlatives in the act of knowledge, and a new species (as supposed by Scotus) in the actual intellectio is of all things most superfluous. “One of them would be useless, either the form or the intellection, since the form is that by which the thing is known and the intellection is that by which the thing is thought. It has therefore been proved that intellection does not add anything independent over and above the form itself.”

It is in the light of this discussion, then, that we are to

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1 “Modo non est fingere tale absolutum quod intellectio superaddat ipsi speciei. Item non videtur quod intellectio sit aliquid absolutum...quia intellectio, ut intellectio, est alijus intellectio.” Ibid.

2 “Item pulchrum esset videre quod si intellectio est quid absolutum, non erit alius nisi species intelligibilis perfectior.” Ibid.

3 “Non est videre penes quod distinguantur, cum sint ejusdem substantiae et objecti, sicut intellectio asini et species asini.” Ibid.

4 “In vanum esset unum istorum vel species vel intellectio, quum species est illa per quam res cognoscitur, et intellectio est etiam per quam res intelligitur. Probatum est ergo quod intellectio non addat aliquid absolutum super ipsam speciem.” Ibid.
understand the words of Pomponazzi when he says, referring directly to these objections, that what intellectio adds is ipsa intellectio: ipsa intellectio, not nova species.

We may now understand the intention with which Pomponazzi, just before leaving the matter, goes back to those counter arguments: it is to introduce, by a concession to them, his profound modification of the Scotist doctrine of intellectio. "Then in reply to the counter arguments: to the first, which says that intellection in itself is independent, since it adds either something absolute or something relative, I reply, and this is agreed, that it is relative: to the second, which speaks of an independent addition, I reply that that is intellection itself."" In the sense thus explained, Pomponazzi maintains his doctrine of an agency in intellectus; and, in this sense only, the difference between species intelligibilis and intellectio. "Intellection is essentially more complete than the form...When it is said, what is the cause of the difference? I reply that it is caused by what is active and by the passive factor which is better disposed....When it is said that one of those (i.e. form and intellection) is a useless assumption, the reply is No, for the form alone cannot effect what intellection effects, since the form is less complete than the intellection." Intellectus agens is thus plainly affirmed. At the same time place is left for the operation of the various factors in mental life, in the allowance for passive mind that is melius dispositus.

Finally, there is yet another modification of the theory of intellectual action, which if it is only suggested is yet strongly

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2 "Tunc ad rationes in oppositum dicitur: ad primam, cum vel addit aliquid absolutum vel relativum, dicitur quod intellectio in se est absolutum; dico tamen, et constat, relativum. Ad aliam, cum dicitur quod istud absolutum superadditum speciei, dico quod est ipsa intellectio." Ibid.

3 "Intellection est essentialiter perfectior speciei....Cum dicitur, unde causatur ista diversitas (dico) hoc quod causatur ab agente et melius disposito....Cum dicitur in vanum poneretur una istorum (scil. species et intellecto) dicitur quod non, quia species sola non potest facere istud quod facit intellectio quum species sit imperfectior intellectione." Ibid.

indicative of the direction in which, in a mind like Pomponazzi’s, thought was moving.

Just at the end of the same *Quaestio* he mentions another theory of this *actio intellectus*, this *additio super speciem*, besides that of Scotus which he had been engaged in expounding and amending. The characteristic of this theory, which he doubtfully ascribes to St Thomas\(^1\), was a somewhat different view of *species*, bringing it nearer to *intellectio*, and making the action of *intellectus* upon it a matter easier of explanation. “Form,” it was said, on this view (form as the product of memory and *cogitativa*), “is a kind of incomplete intellection.” “They differ as the more and the less complete.” Or again even more strongly: “And it is called form in so far as it represents an external object, but it is called intellection in so far as the object by means of it is thought in the mind....This view differs from the first, since the first does not assume that the form is the same in quality as the intellection\(^2\)” Here then was the basis for a different theory of the *additio intellectus*. “Almost all the Latin writers,” Pomponazzi had said, “held that the form and the act of intellection are not separate in existence, but if they differ it is not clear what the intellection adds to the form\(^3\).” If, now, we take *species* to be *quaedam intellectio, eadem qualitate cum intellectione*, the *additio* is simply the change from the “less perfect” to the “more perfect” in *intellectio*; “So it seems that there is a certain addition, involving a change not to another *form*, but from one *mode of existence* to another\(^4\).” The difficulties, that is to say, about the “action” of *intellectus*—that it seemed to add specific contents while forming the notion, and to import a new *species*\(^5\)—on this view disappear, and with

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2 “Differunt (species et intellectio) ut magis perfectum et minus perfectum. Species enim est quaedam intellectio imperfecta,...Et dicitur species pro quanto repraesentat objectum ad extra, dicitur vero intellectio pro quanto per eam ad intra intelligitur. Differt autem haec opinio a prima, quam prima non ponit speciem esse eadem qualitate cum intellectione.” *Ibid.*
3 See note 3, p. 194.
4 “Ita videtur esse quaedam additio non in alteram speciem sed in unum ab alio esse.” *Ibid.*
them the objections to the action of intellectus on species as now understood. For so far from intellectio introducing new content (altera species), intellectio and species are on this view absolutely correlative: "It is called form in so far as it represents an external object, but it is called intellection in so far as by that form an object is thought in the mind. So it seems that there is a certain addition, involving a change not to another form, but from one mode of existence to another."

We may resent the tantalising indecisiveness with which Pomponazzi simply states this theory alongside of the other, without pronouncing for either. Or we may welcome this fresh example of the suggestive and dialectical method of his thinking, so faithfully revealing the movement of thought in his time. From this point of view we may regard this suggested alternative, along with his dissent from the "absolute" intellectio of Scotus, as indicating a tendency towards a truer because a more concrete psychology. The intellectual power, he had already stipulated (against Scotus), must receive the contents of its notions from experience, and through the other powers of the mind. He began to seek unity in mental action and a partial loosening of the shackles in which a system of abstractions and logical fictions had bound psychology. And the suggestion that "form is in a sense intellection, and is called form in so far as it represents an external object...intellection in so far as by that form the object is thought in the mind"—this suggestion in so far as Pomponazzi contemplated it led him one step nearer to the realities of mental history, and prepared the way still further for the breaking down of the artificial partitions of Averroist psychology.

For if species, the product of sensus interior and cogitativa, be quaedam intellectio imperfecta, then there is no longer a difference in kind between thought and the lower powers. And that the notion of really relating them, and reducing cogitativa and intellectus to a common denominator as stages in a single development, had definitely entered Pomponazzi's mind, appears plainly from his words in another place: "I say that from the intelligent soul and body modified by the cogitative faculty there results an essential unity, because the cogitative faculty is not
the complete essence of a man. And if it be said...that it is impossible for the same thing to have two forms of being, I reply that that is true only in the case of two forms of being that are ultimate and equally perfect."

A question is raised by Ferri which is not so much a psychological as a metaphysical question—namely how far, according to Pomponazzi, thought is immanently constitutive of the human intelligence. As it is doubtful whether this question presented itself to Pomponazzi, and since, if it did, the passages bearing on it have not been transcribed for us, I content myself with quoting Prof. Ferri's words on the point: "Quanto all' esercizio dell'intelletto agente il Pomponazzi o il suo Commento non si spiega molto chiaramente sul punto delicato di sapere se si debba ammettere in esso un atto immanente oltre i suoi modi transitorii; ma dell' insieme di questa parte della trattazione e delle altre ancora di tutta questa dottrina sembra risultare sicuramente che 'l atto immanente dell'intelletto umano non differisca da un atto costitutivo della sua materia e della sua forma o funzione, potenza e atto che per se stessi son tutto e non son nulla, in quanto 'l una per ricevere e 'l altro per fare 'l intellazione determinata, abbisognano del lavoro delle funzioni inferiori, della cogitativa, della fantasia, della memoria, e dei sensi."

1 "Dico quod ex anima intellectiva et corpore informato per cogitativam fit per se unum, quia cogitativa non est hominis essentia per se complens....Et si dicitur... impossibile est idem habere duo esse, dico quod est verum de duobus esse ultimatis, et aeque perfectis." Op. cit. f. 142 r.

2 Ferri, Introduction, p. 54.
CHAPTER IX

KNOWLEDGE

There were, according to the received psychology of Pomponazzi's day, three powers (virtutes) which lay between external sense and reason (intellectus), namely imagination, memory, and a certain power of comprehension which was called vis or virtus cogitativa or sometimes comprehensiva. These powers were all included under sensus interior.

We have already seen what great stress Pomponazzi lays on the element of imaginative presentation in human knowledge, making it the distinctive mark of intelligence as human that it should operate always and only through imagination. It is the necessity for a presentation of sense-data through imagination which stamps the human mind as a receptive and not a creative intelligence—"moved," as they said then, and not self-moving. The superior Intelligences, whose thought is self-moving, and not suggested from without, do not, according to him, employ phantasia; "Since in the third book of the De Anima imagination is defined as a change produced by sense in operation." It is otherwise with human intelligence: "But the intellect of man...cannot be freed from images, since it thinks only when it undergoes modification: for thinking consists in a kind of passivity: but it is the image that affects the intellect, as is proved in the third book of the De Anima: wherefore it does not think without an image, though the kind of knowledge it has is not identical

1 "Cum sint tres virtutes interiores, imaginativa, cogitativa, et memorativa." Comm. de An. f. 191 v.
2 See Apologia, 1. iii. f. 58 d.
3 "Quum tertio De Anima phantasia sit motus factus a sensu secundum actum." De Imm. ix. p. 70.
with imagination." These then are the elements of Pomponazzi’s doctrine of *phantasia*, in which he claims to follow Aristotle: (1) “Imagination is a change produced by sense,” (2) “the image moves the imagination,” (3) “the intellect of man thinks only when it undergoes modification: it does not think without images, though the kind of knowledge it has is not identical with imagination.”

We have already, in defining the function of *memorativa* in the apprehension of common sensibles, noted the language in which memory is spoken of as *sensus interior*.

*Imaginativa* and *memorativa* are co-ordinate powers, composing from the data of sense the material on which thought shall act—i.e. the *species intelligibilis*. It is as the products of imagination, with or without the aid of memory, that the objects of human thought are described as presentations or *species* (*intelligibiles*). Imagination “preserves” and presents to thought the immediate data of sense; memory, itself working through imagination, preserves those presentations whose sense-equivalents are no longer in existence.

But these two were not of themselves sufficient to bridge the gulf between exterior sense and thought. It was the act of thought that had to be accounted for, by the array of hypothetical “powers” and “actions.” It was the intelligible form that was to be brought into being, for *intellectus* to act upon. Something

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1 “At humanus intellectus...non potest absolvii a phantasmate, quum non intelligit nisi motus; nam intelligere in quodam pati consistit; movens autem intellectum est phantasma, ut probatur tertio De Anima; quare non intelligit sine phantasmate, quanquam non sicut phantasia cognoscit.” *De Imm. ix. p. 70 and passim.*

2 “Si quis sentit numerum, qui est ex divisione continui, hoc non est merito auditus, sed est propter sensum interiorem scilicet propter memorativam,...Memorativa mediante auditu, cognoscit talem numerum.” So for motion and rest: “Ex eo enim quod video hunc esse in tali vel tali loco deinde in alio esse in tali loco, comprehenditur (motus) a sensu; quod autem componit esse in hoc loco cum esse in alio loco, est virtus interior. Similiter eiam et quies: cognoscere enim quod hoc nunc non moveatur, est sensus exterioris; componere autem prius cum posteriori pertinet ad virtutem interiorem.” *Comm. de An. ff. 87 v., 88 v.*

must be produced that should be as near thought as possible (such was the implied logic of these theoretical constructions), without being itself the product of thought; then at last the action of thought could come in. Some such unconscious logic produced those crowning fictions of an abstract and a priori psychology—creations in which the ineradicable contradiction, the dualism of the original false abstraction, became almost a contradiction in terms—the species intelligibilis which was not intellectio, and the virtus comprehensiva which was in no sense intellectus.

It was not thought that was gradually realising itself from stage to stage of the process of knowledge; since in the ultimate act of thought (intellectio) no lower power could have a part. But meanwhile the data of sense must be duly prepared for the agency of thought upon them; and for every stage in the process there must be a “power.” The last and highest of the preparatory powers must be all but thought—virtus cogitativa. To it was assigned the crucial and determining part in the production of the species nuda, the species intelligibilis

The place which vis cogitativa occupied in the human mind, and the order of mental powers generally, are illustrated by the account given of the successive grades of living beings and their respective powers. The analogy between the hierarchy of Nature generally and the ascending scale of powers and faculties in the nature of man, was of course a characteristic mediaeval thought. The macrocosm Nature was supposed to repeat itself, with the successive powers, in the order of their rank, within the microcosm Man. It is therefore instructive to notice the place occupied by cogitativa in the scale of life; and still more instructive to observe

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1 “Tenet Joannes quod...illud quod immediate ministrat intellectui, quoad causandas species intelligibiles, est virtus imaginativa aut memorativa...et quia hoc non videtur sufficere pro intellectione causanda ideo pro hoc ponit alium actum specialiorem actu imaginativae aut memorativae, qui actus est sicut dispositio necessario acquisita ad intellutiones, et quod istum actum immediate dependet a cogitativa.” Op. cit. f. 192 r. Or Pomponazzi’s own alternative explanation: “Vel aliter quod cogitativa sit immediate serviens intellectui...Dico quod conservari, species pendent ab imaginativa aut memorativa: quo vero ad produci pendent a cogitativa, nunquam enim intellectus posset intelligere aliquid quod sit in memorativa aut imaginativa, nisi cogitativa prius illud cogitaret.” Op. cit. f. 192 v.
some uncertainty and vacillation on Pomponazzi’s part upon this point.

A leading passage in which Pomponazzi sets forth his view of the gradation of living beings with reference to the various mental powers, and in analogy with the human mind—what one may by an anachronism call his “Comparative Psychology”—is the following: “Nature...advances gradually....Plants have a psychical element though of a very material kind....Then follow animals that have only touch and taste and vague imagination. After these there are animals that reach such perfection that we regard them as having intelligence....A cogitative faculty too is reckoned among the perceptive powers....Many distinguished men have thought that it is intellect. If we proceed a little higher we shall reach the intellect of man, just above the cogitative faculty and below purely spiritual being, participating in both1.”

The conception of vis cogitativa was attended by the difficulties which always beset such intermediating devices. When two terms are set over against one another by a vicious abstraction, the intermediary which is intended to link them together only contains within itself the contradiction it was devised to reconcile. Either it must be identified with one or other of the supposed opposites, or it must inconsistently partake of the nature of both. In the former case, the false logic which is being followed will go on to the creation of a new intermediary between the first and that term of the original dualism from which it has been removed; and so on ad infinitum.

The gulf which mediaeval logic set between thought and sense was not to be bridged by an intermediate term like vis cogitativa. That power would now be regarded as a mode of thought, and now as a power akin to sense; and where the former view prevailed, a new intermediary was invented to form

1 “Natura...gradatim procedit....Vegetabilia enim aliquid animae habent...at multum materialiter....Deinde succedunt animalia solum tactum et gustum habentia et indeterminatam imaginationem. Post quae sunt animalia quae ad tantam perfectionem perveniant ut intellectum habere existimemus....Ponitur et cogitativa inter vires sensitivas....Multi excellentes viri ipsam esse intellectum existimaverunt; quod si parum ascendamus, humanum intellectum ponemus immediate supra cogitativam et infra immaterialia, de utroque participatem.” De Imm. IX. p. 64.
a link with sense and complete (as was supposed) the chain of
powers. Thus in the passage last quoted cogitativa is ranged on
the side of sense. The cogitative faculty is reckoned among the
sensitive powers; cogitativa is expressly said not to be of the
nature of intellect, and the possession of it is consequently
ascribed to the animals lower than man. With cogitativa there-
fore we are still, be it noted, on the lower side of the imaginary
dividing line: the line that separates the sensuous from the
intellectual powers is in effect still uncrossed, the gulf unbridged.
And yet cogitativa must help to bridge the gulf, since this is the
very purpose for which, really, it has been called into being, the
whole motive of the conception of such a virtus. Accordingly
we have only to turn to another part of Pomponazzi's own
writings for a description of cogitativa in the opposite terms:
"The cogitative faculty...is peculiar to man as man; for by this
power man differs from the other animals, since they are without
the cogitative faculty, though they have memory and imagina-
tion." The contradiction is direct and explicit, and illustrates
the impossibility of escaping from an artificial dualism by the
imagination of an intermediary which merely embodies the
original gratuitous contradiction. And the illustration of this
sort of speculation is completed when Pomponazzi adduces a
new intermediary, to stand between cogitativa and the powers of
sense. In so far as cogitativa leaned towards intellectus, or was
regarded as a characteristically human faculty, a new distinction
was drawn between cogitativa and existimativa, and a new faculty
devised—vis existimativa—which should serve animals in the
place of the cogitative faculty.

The artificial nature of the virtus cogitativa as a faculty
intermediate between sense and thought appears also in the
difficulty which was experienced in giving any account of its
actual operation in the process of knowledge. In so far as the
action of cogitativa was likened to intellectio its special action
seemed to disappear (so to speak) in one direction; in so far as
it was placed on a par with imagination and memory, its action

1 "Cogitativa...est propria hominis in quantum homo; per eam enim virtutem
homo differt ab alis animalibus, cum ipsa careant cogitativa, licet memorativam et
imaginativam habeant." Comm. de An. f. 191 r.
again seemed to become superfluous, since intelligence appeared able to act directly upon the data of imagination and memory.

Pomponazzi notices the former difficulty in the course of his attempt to make out a special "action" of intellectus upon the material presented by imagination, memory, and cogitativa (i.e. the species intelligibilis). The point has already been referred to as illustrating the abstract and psychologically unreal conception of the action of thought.

It was the special office of cogitativa, it will be remembered, to produce the species intelligibilis, on which intellectus should act. But in what sense (Pomponazzi attributes the question to Avicenna) could the species intelligibilis be said to exist without the action of intellectus? How (to turn the same question round) could there be any apprehension of a species intelligibilis (i.e., as supposed, by cogitativa) which was not actual knowledge? If this question had been pressed, the action of vis cogitativa in forming a species intelligibilis would have run into intellectio proper; and the distinction of intellectus and cogitativa in reference to species intelligibilis, and, with that, the whole distinctive office of cogitativa, would have disappeared. Pomponazzi, however, does not yield to the force of this argument; he has his own account to give, as we shall see, of the difference between cogitatio and intellectio; and the virtus cogitativa, preparing the species intelligibilis previous to intellectio, remains a leading idea of his psychology, as of that of his predecessors.

He has more trouble in finding a rôle for cogitativa in the presentation to thought of material, over and above that of imagination and memory. Imagination, memory, and cogitativa (the theory was) presented the data of sense to intellectus, wrought into the fitting shape of species intelligibilis. But it almost seemed (Pomponazzi states the objection very pointedly) as if thought might act directly upon the data of imagination on the one hand or of memory on the other. "It seems that cogitativa is not the faculty that is the immediate instrument of the operation of intellect, for it does not preserve images, but that that faculty

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lies between imagination, which preserves forms that are perceived, and memory, which preserves forms that are not perceived. ...It seems that we must say that the faculty instrumental to intellect is memory with reference to unperceived forms or imagination with reference to perceived forms."

It would not be worth while to follow closely the reasonings of Pomponazzi on this point. He proceeds throughout upon his own psychological assumptions, in particular upon the assumption of the three powers preparatory to thought. "It is known that the operation of intellect depends on those powers?" Cogitativa remains an unquestioned item in his scheme. But it is interesting to observe his difficulty in fitting cogitativa (so to speak) into the account of the mental process; in inserting it, as it were, between sense, as mediated by imagination and memory, and thought as such; and to see in the solutions proposed by him how small and nominal is the part which in the end he is able, with the best will in the world, to reserve for it as a faculty distinct from thought.

He proposes two solutions of the difficulty. Not only is the difference between the two only verbal; but both are in fact merely verbal solutions. In both he admits in effect that imagination and memory, acting on the data of sense, supply the material to thought; the consequence of which should be that those two, plus the action of intellectus, are sufficient to bring about true knowledge. The necessity of finding some function for cogitativa is met in one answer by the naively scholastic assumption of a dispositio: a "disposition" to thought, it is said, is needed before thought can act, which disposition is provided by the action of cogitativa. The second answer amounts to no more than the dogmatic assertion that cogitativa is necessary to the production of the species intelligibilis; that

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1 "Videtur quod cogitativa non sit illa quae immediate serviat intellectuali operatiioni, quia cogitativa non servat phantasmata, sed est in medio imaginativae, quae servat species sensatas, et memorativae, quae conservat species insensatas....Videtur dicendum quod virtus serviens intellectui sit memorativa respectu specierum insensatarum, aut imaginativa respectu specierum sensatarum." Op. cit. f. 191 v.

2 "Notum est operationem intellectus dependere ab istis virtutibus." Ibid.

3 "Dispositio necessario acquisita ad intellectiones"; again, "dispositio necessario requisita ad creandam intellectionem." Op. cit. f. 192 r.
while imagination preserves the presentations as given in sense, and memory the same from the past, *cogitativa* is necessary *quoad produci speciem*.

The first solution Pomponazzi does not, it is true, put forward on his own authority, but on that of "Joannes" (Philoponus? or Gandavensis?). However, he attaches weight to it, and lets it stand as an alternative solution: "John...seems rather ingeniously to hold that for the production of intellection, not only is the intelligible form necessary, but also an operation of the cogitative faculty: for its operation is as it were the pre-disposition necessary for the production of intellection. But that operation is not necessary for producing this *intelligible form*, namely as a direct condition for the form that depends on the faculty of memory....John holds that, *for the production of the intelligible form* in the intellect, that operation of the cogitative faculty is not required: at least it effects nothing towards this: but the immediate instrument of intellect in producing intelligible forms is the faculty of imagination or of memory...and because this seems insufficient to produce *intellection*, therefore *for this purpose* he postulates another operation more specific than that of imagination or memory, which is as it were the disposition necessary for acts of intellection: and *with respect to that operation there is a direct dependence on the cogitative faculty, and when its action ceases, actual intellection too comes to an end. Thus he would say that, with respect to what remains in the intellect, there is dependence on memory, and *with respect to the acts of intellect, on the cogitative faculty*".

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1 "Joannes...satis ingeniose videtur dicere quod ad creandam intellectionem non solum requiritur species intelligibilis sed etiam actus virtutis cogitativa; quia actus est sicut dispositio necessario requisita ad creandam intellectionem. Sed ad hanc speciem intelligibilenum non requiritur iste actus, scilicet immediate quantum ad speciem pendentem (?) a virtute memorativa....Tenet Joannes quod ad causandam speciem intelligibilum in intellectu non requiritur iste actus virtutis cogitativa; imo nihil facit ad hoc; sed illud quod immediate ministrat intellectui, quoad causandas species intelligibilum, est virtus imaginativa aut memorativa....Et quia hoc non videtur sufficiere pro intellectione causanda ideo pro hoc ponit alium actum specialiorem actu imaginativa aut memorativa, qui actus est sicut dispositio necessario acquisita ad intellectiones; et quoad istum actum immediate dependet a cogitativa, et cessante ista actione cogitativa cessat actualis intellectio. Et ita vult quod quoad ea quae remanent in intellectu dependeat a memorativa, et quoad intellectiones a cogitativa." *Comm. de An. f. 197 r.*
This of course is pure scholasticism: the theoretical agent (cogitativa), the theoretical necessity for its action: the assumption of a dispositio previous to what actually takes place, and the ascription of that hypothetical state of matters to an agency of whose presence there is no other evidence.

The alternative theory of the action of cogitativa is no better. "We must either explain the matter as John does, or otherwise by saying that the cogitative faculty is the immediate instrument of intellect......As to their conservation, the forms depend on imagination or memory: but as to their production, on the cogitative faculty, for the intellect can never think anything that is in memory or imagination, unless the cogitative faculty first apprehends it."

Such were the difficulties occasioned by this established psychological fiction of the virtus cogitativa mediating between sense and thought. The conception formed of it oscillates between that of a vis sensitiva, common to man and the higher animals, and that of a part of the proper endowment of man as man. On the one hand it is difficult to maintain a distinction between the action of cogitativa and the action of thought as such; on the other hand, when we analyse the presentation of the data of sense for the action of thought upon them, it seems a superfluous addition to imagination and memory. No better justification of its existence can be found than an arbitrary assertion of its necessity to the provision of the data on which thought shall act, and which are already provided by imagination and memory; or than the assumption of a dispositio ad intellectu- tionem—the necessity for which prior "disposition" is supposed, after all, solely in order to bring cogitativa into play. Thus the part so far assigned to vis cogitativa is an extremely small one. What is more, it is a merely nominal part: its part, in short, is made for it.

It is as well to see the logic of abstractions and faculties at work. I may remark, by way of excuse for seeming to take

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1 "Vel dicatur ut dicit Joannes, vel aliter quod cogitativa sit immediate serviens intellectui....Quoad conservari, species pendent ab imaginativa seu memorativa; quo vero ad produci, pendent a cogitativa, nunquam enim intellectus posset intelligere aliquid quod sit in memorativa aut imaginativa, nisi cogitativa prius illud cogitaret." Op. cit. f. 192 v.
these speculations so seriously, that we perceive by the verbal logic of such arguments how psychological fiction was not to be expelled by reasoning. Only when a more concrete psychology, giving another account of the whole mental process, was able to do without it, would it disappear. It was not so much disproved, eventually, as dispensed with. The faculties, the innate ideas, and other abstractions, the creations of a speculative psychology, do not admit of disproof: they are ignored, rather, by truer methods of observation; they drop out and are forgotten.

And what we observe with interest in the statements of Pomponazzi is that *cogitativa*, which had played so prominent a part in the psychology of three centuries, has already become superfluous in its character of a distinct faculty. Such verbal *tours de force* as we have noticed indicate that the need for a faculty intermediate between sense and reason is no longer felt. It is almost driven out, because it is almost superseded by a fresh analysis of mental life.

Ignoring, however, as we may well do, the details of these scholastic constructions, we may find underlying them a certain residuum of psychological observation. And there is a passage in which Pomponazzi improves upon the word-splitting explanations last quoted, and relates the notion of *cogitativa* to a real basis of psychological fact.

A pure abstract general notion is one thing, say in the form of a definition; the apprehension of an actual individual in a general relation is another. Now, by an extreme application of their doctrine of intelligence, the schoolmen denied to the latter act the name of intelligence. They did not recognise as the true general notion, proper to intelligence, the general notion as concrete in the individual instance, but only the explicit abstract idea. Yet obviously, when an individual was regarded not in its particular sensible qualities but as an individual possessed of the attributes of a certain genus, here was an act of generalisation; even though there was not present to the mind the formal idea of the genus as such in abstraction from all attributes.

Here then was an actual psychological fact. And this particular act of generalisation, or as they said, "comprehension,"
was referred to the *virtus cogitativa* or *comprehensiva*. Certainly, to our minds, there is no antithesis between this distinctive moment of thought, and thought in pure abstractness; between thought as referring directly to an individual object, and thought in the particular function of abstracting from all individuals the pure abstract idea. Still less do we see any ground for postulating a specific faculty to account for the act in question. But there is a fact here of which psychology takes notice, as well as logic, and of which, we may say, the formula of *vis cogitativa* was the natural expression in the mediaeval mind.

This at least is the doctrine formulated by Pomponazzi: "You may say that though the cogitative faculty apprehends the form apart from quantity and position, yet it does not follow that it has a general conception, because its apprehension is of a particular unit, though apart from quantitative character; if it is asked how that form is a unit, I reply that it is a unit through its own nature and not through quantity." It was an accepted canon that "the cogitative faculty abstracts the substantial form from its sensible qualities both special and common." Fastening, then, upon the apprehension of an individual, divested of its character as a particular individual in time and space, yet not apprehended in full generality under an abstract general idea, Pomponazzi assigns such an apprehension to *vis cogitativa* as distinct from thought.

The *distinction* from *intellectio* is the thing which in this place he labours to maintain. He quotes the objection, "If the cogitative faculty abstracted the substantial form from the common and special sensible, it would apprehend the substantial form apart from quantity and space and likewise time and would then have a general conception...and thus would be intellect." And to

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1 "Dicatis quod licet cogitativa apprehendat speciem substantiae sine quantitate et situ, non tamen sequitur quod cogitativa cegnoscat universaliter, quia illa intentio est una et singularis licet sit sine quantitate; quod si quaseritis per quod talis species sit una, dico quod est una per se ipsam et non per ipsum quantitatem." *Op. cit.* f. 224 r.


3 "Si cogitativa denudaret speciem substantiae a sensibili communi et proprio, tunc cognosceret speciem substantiae sine quantitate et loco, et similiter tempore, et tunc cogitativa cognosceret universaliter...et sic esset intellectus." *Ibid.*
this he answers as above by distinguishing *cogitativa*, with its *intentio una et singularis*, from *intellectus*: “Granted that the cogitative faculty apprehends the substantial form apart from quantity and position, *yet it does not follow* that it has a general conception, because its apprehension is of a particular unit, though apart from quantity.”

We may not accept the distinction, thus defined. We may consider that the intermediary *cogitativa*, as thus interpreted, has already by an immanent logic passed over into identification with one of the terms it was intended to link together, namely, *thought*; and that Pomponazzi’s distinction is no answer to the objection of Avicenna “He held that when the intellection ceases to exist so also does the intelligible form...he could not see how the intelligible form should be in the comprehensive faculty, while there was no knowledge of the thing.” We may hold that the distinction between the apprehension of an individual in its general character and the apprehension of an abstract general idea is not a distinction between thought and something else which is not thought, but between one act of thought and another; that thought is present in the whole process; and in particular that the apprehension which Pomponazzi thus assigns to *cogitativa*, as its peculiar and distinguishing function, is essentially an act of thought.

But we may also note that Pomponazzi observes a real aspect of generalisation as a mental process, and signalises it in his own way. The manner in which he expresses it is determined on the one hand by a psychology of “powers” and “faculties,” on the other by the narrow identification of “thought” with abstraction.

The doctrine of *vis cogitativa*, which had so firm a hold upon his mind, was his inheritance—part of the doctrine of his school, and of his mental environment; but it was his own work to relate that doctrine to an original psychological observation; and if perhaps the result was only to leave confusion worse confounded, yet the more that *cogitativa* was permitted to discharge the function of thought, the thinner did the partition become

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1 See p. 194, note 1.
that divided it from thought, and the nearer drew the time when cogitativa as a power different from thought should disappear.

Pomponazzi raises a question about cogitativa as a faculty of the sensitive and material nature of man, which brings up the general question of thought and matter and prepares us for the conception elsewhere developed by him of an embodied intelligence.

There was no reason, said Pomponazzi, why cogitativa, although a power really physical in its nature, should not apprehend an object in the quasi-intellectual way in which it was supposed to do so.  

A difficulty, however, stood in the way of this admission. There was a canon of the schools, the application of which to knowledge exemplified the mechanical mode of conceiving mental "action": "Whatever is received is received in accordance with the nature of the recipient." This seemed to prohibit the function which was assigned to vis cogitativa.

For cogitativa, it must be remembered, had been defined and introduced as essentially a faculty of sense. In virtue of this character it was to discharge its function of mediating the data of sense to thought. So it was classed among the vires sensitivae; it was ascribed, though not with absolute consistency, to others of the higher animals as well as to man. And in the passage under notice it is plainly said: "The cogitative faculty implies what is quantitative, since it is a faculty that is material and extended." The question then arose how, in accordance with the maxim, "Whatever is received, etc.," it could act as it was supposed to do. For Pomponazzi, following Averroes and the received psychology, ascribed to cogitativa the power of apprehending objects in abstraction from all the forms of sense—apart from both special sensible qualities and the common sensibles (he specifies quantitas, numerus, motus, situs), in short,
from space and time\textsuperscript{1}. Was this then consistent with its being a faculty of the physical nature of man and the higher animals \textit{(vis sensitiva, virtus materialis et extensa)}?

Pomponazzi accordingly states this question: “What causes a difficulty is that whatever is received is received in accordance with the nature of the recipient; but the cogitative faculty involves quantity, since it is a faculty that is material and extended; therefore the substantial form will be received in it according to its quantitative nature\textsuperscript{2}.”

The answer which he proceeds to suggest has twofold merit. In the first place he dismisses the scholastic doctrine of “natures” in favour of a more empirical mode of thought; in the second place he shews an apprehension of the peculiar nature of the act of knowledge.

The passage may be quoted in its entirety: “\textit{We shall say that though the substantial form is received in the cogitative faculty through a modification of quantity and extension, yet it is not necessary that we should think the object as extended and quantified. Otherwise we could say, with Thomas and others, that all the souls of the higher animals are indivisible, and they reply to the argument brought forward against them ‘whatever is received is received in accordance with the nature of the recipient, but matter is quantitative and extended, therefore the soul which is received in it is extended and divisible’— they reply by denying the unqualified truth of the major premise; for in their view, if anything is received in extended matter, it is not necessary that it should be extended and divisible. But they say that the principle in question that is current in philosophy ought to be understood with the addition ‘according to capacity.’ Thus therefore I say, in the present problem, that it is not necessary that the substantial form should be received as quantified, though it is received by a faculty that is material...}”


\textsuperscript{2} “Quod facit difficultatem est quia omne receptum recipitur secundum naturam recipientis: sed cogitativa est cum quantitate, cum sit virtus materialis et extensa; ergo species substantiae recipietur in ea secundum quantitatem.” \textit{Op. cit. f. 223 v.}
and extended, and to the proposition, ‘whatever is received, etc.,’ (I add) ‘according to capacity’.”

He borrows his formula from the Thomists, who, in maintaining the possibility of an immaterial and “unextended” soul in extended matter, laid it down that matter “received” such an immaterial soul secundum capacitatem. So, says Pomponazzi, a physical faculty (cogitativa) receives an unquantified conception of substance secundum capacitatem.

This might seem at first sight but the substituting of one scholastic verbalism for another. But it is really a step towards a more experiential and observational mode of thought. Instead of speculative reasonings from “natures” conceived and defined a priori, as to what is or what is not possible to them, we are to go by the actual capacities of things as they are. The word capacitas may not be very promising: it is a thoroughly scholastic word, invested with misleading associations, with misleading suggestions of immanent potencies, substantiated “powers”; but the point is that the capacitas is to be determined from actual facts. Whereas natura was a datum a priori from which possible phenomena, possible combinations, were to be deduced, by which the unsuitable were to be excluded; capacitas is to be reckoned by the phenomena actually observed, the conjunctions actually occurring. Once more, then, the shell of scholastic thought is being broken, or its bonds stretched at least to the breaking point.

This appears when we look at the case in point—the case of cognitive apprehension by a material “power.” “It is not necessary that the substantial form should be received as

1 “Dicemus quod, licet species substantiae sit recepta in cogitativa per modum quantitatis et extensionis, non tamen oportet quod extense et per modum quantitatis reputemus. Aliter possemus dicere, sicut Thomas et alii, quod omnes animae animalium perfectorum sunt indivisibles; et dicunt ad illud argumentum quod fit contra eos ‘omne receptum recipitur secundum naturam recipientis, sed materia est quanta et extensa, ergo anima quae in ea recipitur est extensa et divisibilis’—dicunt isti negando anteriorem illam secundum quod sic absolute profertur; quia secundum eos non oportet si aliquid recipitur in materia extensa, ut illud receptum sit extensum et divisibile. Sed dicunt quod illa anterior curren per ora philosophorum debet intelligi secundum capacitem. Sic dico ergo ego in proposito quod non oportet ut species substantiae recipiatur cum quantitate, licet recipiatur in virtute materiali et extensa, et ad illam propositionem ‘omne receptum etc.’...secundum capacitatem.” Op. cit. f. 224 r.
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quantified, though it is received in a faculty that is material and extended.” “Granted that the substantial form is received in the cogitative faculty through a modification of quantity and extension, it is not necessary that we should think it as extended and quantified.”

The conception thus arrived at of the action of cogitativa, in so far as it proceeds by abstraction to transmute the data of sense, is, I suggest, substantially a true conception of the act of knowledge in its relation on the one hand to the object, on the other to the organ of knowledge.

The analogy of cogitativa ("virtus materialis et extensa," which nevertheless "apprehendit speciem substantiae sine quantitate et situ") is elsewhere used by Pomponazzi to justify the conception of an intellectus also, capable of intellectual apprehension in the full sense and of truly abstract thought, yet dependent on a bodily organ).

In his account of the mind's knowledge of itself and of its operations, of the thought, that is, of thought, Pomponazzi denies that it is immediate or intuitive, and traces in it an act of discursus.

The point occurs in the course of the argument of the De Immortalitate. He names as the characteristic of reason in man, "Not to know itself by means of its special form, but by that of other things," contrasting it in this with the superior Intelligences—with reason, we might say, as ideally perfect, ideally possible. In support of his position that the soul of man, in itself "material," participates in "immateriality," he adduces this conception of the mind's knowledge of itself in the case of man. It was the accepted canon that the power supra

1 E.g. Apologia, 1, iii. f. 59 c, d: "Cogitativa virtus extensa est, quam omnes affirmant ipsum esse virtutem sensitivam, ipsaque potest sequestrare substantiam a quantitate, quamvis sit in quantitate; quid igitur obstat et ipsum intellectum existentem materialem et extensum, secundum quandam altiorem gradum quam sit cogitativa ipsa, infra tamen limites materiae, et universaliter cognoscere, et universaliter syllogizare? non discedendo tamen penitus a materia, quam in omni tali cognitione dependet a phantasmate. Puto itaque quod qui tenet cogitativam esse talem ut dicimus multum probabiliter habet tenere et de intellectu."

2 "Non cognoscere se per speciem propriam sed aliorum." De Imm. x. p. 76.

seipsum reflectere belonged to the “immaterial” and not to the “material” being; he therefore carefully defines the degree and mode in which this power is possessed by the human soul, in illustration and defence of his doctrine of man as an intermediate being, and of man’s soul as “material,” while participant in “immateriality.” Thus:—“As to what participates in immateriality, granted that it does not know itself by means of its special form, but by that of other things, as is said in the third book of the De Anima, yet in accordance with its nature it can in a way reflect on itself and know its own operations, though not directly or so perfectly as the Intelligences can.”

He seeks in the commentary on the De Anima to base this view of the mind’s knowledge of itself on psychological grounds; and it is another instance of the way in which his general doctrine of man’s place in nature leads him towards a correct psychology. What he is concerned to deny is the Averroist theory of an immediate intuition of abstract thought by itself apart from particular experiences.

The passage referred to discusses the Quaestiones, “Whether the intellect thinks itself by means of itself or by means of another,” and, “Whether the intellect thinks its own operations.” Pomponazzi finds in the first place that thought does think itself: “About the fact itself there is no doubt, because we have experience of it in our own case: but there is doubt as to the means by which intellect thinks itself.” But he says that it does so not by a presentation of thought as such, but on the occasion of the presentation of some other object of thought. In answer to the question whether intellect thinks itself by means of itself or by means of another—the doubt as to the means by which intellect thinks itself—Pomponazzi rejects the doctrine of Averroes: “It is certainly not by means of its own essence, and

1 “Quantum ad id quod de immaterialitate participat, licet non cognoscat se per speciem proprium sed aliorum, ut dicitur tertio De Anima, secundum tamen illud esse potest quoquo modo supra seipsum reflectere et cognoscere actus suos, licet non primo et ita perfecte sicut intelligentiae.” De Imm. x. p. 76.
2 Comm. de An. f. 150, 151.
3 “Utrum intellectus intelligat se per se an per alid.”
4 “Numquid intellectus suam operationem intelligat.”
5 “De re in se non est dubitatio, quia in nobis met experimur hoc; sed est dubitatio per quod intellectus intelligat se.” Op. cit. f. 150 r.
without having a conception distinct from itself, as Averroes says. The argument he uses is that, if there were such an immediate intuition of thought by itself, there would be no reason why it should not be permanently in operation, which it is not: "If this were the case it would always think itself, which is false—it must always first think some other thing." In point of fact, he says, any and every presentation affords the occasion for the apprehension of itself by thought. "We must see therefore whether one determinate form is needed rather than another, one form or any form whatever enabling it to think itself: and, as it seems to me, we must say that it can think itself through any form whatever indifferently: and experience shews this." Pomponazzi, therefore, analyses the apprehension by thought of itself and asks, What precisely is the act of thought in which it apprehends itself as thought? He puts this question definitely, in the following form. "But a doubt remains. If it is possible for intellect to think itself by means of any form whatsoever, how is it possible that a single form, e.g. of an ass, should bring the intellect to have knowledge both of an ass and of the intellect itself?"

He discusses first the theory that every presentation of an object gives immediately to thought the knowledge both of the object and of itself as thought. Two considerations were adduced in favour of this account of self-consciousness as an immediate act. The first was that presentations represent not only their objects, but the subjects (thinking minds) in which

1 "Certum est quod non per sui essentiam, non habendo conceptum distinctum a se, ut habet Commentator." Op. cit. f. 150 r. Cf. De Imm. x. p. 76: "Licet non cognoscat se per speciem propriam sed aliorum."

2 "Si sic, semper intelligeret se, quod est falsum nisi prius alia intellexerit." Comm. de An. f. 150 r.

3 "Videndum est ergo an requiratur una species determinata magis quam alia, sic quod solum per unam speciem vel per quamcunque possit se intelligere; et quoad mihi videtur, dicendum quod per quamcunque speciem indifferentem possit se ipsum cognoscere; et hoc docet experientia." Ibid.

4 "Sed stat tamen dubitatio: si per quamcunque speciem potest se intelligere, quomodo est possibile quod una species, ut asini, ducat intellectum in cognitionem asini et ipsius intellectus?" Ibid.

5 "Quod per speciem solam intellectus potest devenire in sui cognitionem quia species habet duo repraesentare: primum illud a quo deciditur...secundario, subjectum illius." Ibid.
they occur. We have here an illustration of the manner in which the modern usage of "subject" is based on the original mediaeval meaning of subjectum: subjectum or substrate might of course be mental as well as material\(^1\). The other argument for the immediacy of thought's knowledge of itself was the naive one that since, according to Aristotle, thought is identical with the object thought, therefore, in thinking the object, thought thinks itself. "Averroes says that in thinking an ass the mind in a way becomes an ass\(^2\)."

Pomponazzi does not make the criticisms which we should naturally make upon these arguments; but he is fully conscious of their irrelevancy to the matter in hand, which he proceeds himself to treat as a matter of psychological fact. He might have pointed out that although the presentation implies a subject, it does not therefore involve the explicit apprehension of the subject, which is the point in question; that in short to assume that the species "ought not to be unknown by its subject," is to beg the question, to abandon the analysis of the fact of consciousness, and, besides, to go against experience. Again he might have quoted Aristotle's language to shew that it was only in the case of pure abstract thought that in his view intellectus and intelligibile were actually identical; that is, ultimately, in thought's apprehension of itself, which was the very act of which they were seeking the psychological history: the fact to be explained was the emergence of this consciousness on occasion of concrete presentations\(^3\) of which it was the very characteristic, according to Aristotle, that the identity of thought and its object was only potential and not actual. Thus such presentations were no explanation of thought thinking of itself, and (as was obvious) contributed nothing to the specific analysis of that mental fact\(^4\).

\(^1\) "Species habet duo repraesentare: primum, illud a quo deciditur, et hoc per se (patet?), secundario, subjectum illius, cum non debeat esse ignota suo subjecto. Sic ergo per quamcunque speciem duo intelliguntur, subjectum et objectum." Op. cit. f. 150 r.


\(^3\) "Quomodo est possibile quod una species, ut asini, ducat intellectum in cognitionem asini et ipsius intellectus?" Op. cit. f. 150 r.

\(^4\) Aristotle, De Anima, 430 a 2—7. καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ (scil. νοῦς) νοητὸς ἕστων ὀφειρ
Pomponazzi does not enter upon the analysis of the difference between thought *simpliciter* and thought *plus* the consciousness of thought; but he is clearly aware that the proposed explanation contained nothing to account for the specific fact of thought's consciousness of itself. He shews this by an argument parallel to that which he had employed against the Averroist absolute intuition of thought. If, he had said, the apprehension of thought were not occasioned by some particular exercise of thought, then it would be always in activity; for it is impossible to see what should call it into action. So now he says, if the consciousness of thought be thus immediately given with the presentation of an object to thought, it must be always given. This was a way of saying that the analysis in question had failed to explain the peculiar features of the particular case in point or the reasons of its occurrence. And in fact it is not true that consciousness of thought always accompanies thought.

Taking the question, then, on the ground of experience and fact, he develops and amplifies this argument.

"If the intellect thinks itself by means of a form, this will be either a voluntary act or purely natural: it is not voluntary because we cannot always do it...If it is natural...then rustics when they think of an ass would also by means of the form of 'ass' think their own intellect, and we whenever we think should always think our intellect. Secondly...the intellect would apprehend itself and 'ass' either by a single cognition or by two; if by one, then always when it thinks one cognition it would also think another, etc." So in the next *Quaestio*. "The question is raised as to how intellect thinks its own operations. About the fact there is no doubt, but about the mode there is...Two ways are possible: one, in which I should think the operations of

1 See p. 220, n. 3.

2 "Si per speciem se intelligat, vel hoc est voluntarium, vel naturale: non voluntarium quia non semper hoc possumus...si naturale...rustici intelligentes asinum per speciem asini etiam suum intellectum intelligerent, et nos quando aliquando intelligeremus semper nostrum intellectum intelligeremus. Secundo...vel per unam cognitionem intellectus cognosceret se et asinum, vel per duas: si per unam semper quando unam intelligeret, aliud etiam intelligeret, etc." *Comm. de An.* f. 150 v.
thought by means of the same intellect by which I think the object...But this I believe is untenable: because that operation is either one or more than one; if the first, when I think anything, I should always think that I think, which is false; but if the operations are different, how do these operations differ from each other?"

Pomponazzi's own conclusion is that thought's consciousness of thought, on occasion of particular activities of thought, is the result of a discursive process and takes the form not of a species but of a conceptus. Neither does thought apprehend itself by an absolute or immediate act, apart from any particular presentation of another object, nor is the apprehension given simpliciter in the particular presentation. Thought frames, he says, not a presentation (species) of itself, but a conceptus—a new and special conceptus, formed by thought through a certain process (discursus), and on occasion of the presentation of an object not itself (species aliena): "The form concurs as an efficient instrumental cause to the production of the concept...Ass and intellect are thought by means of two different conceptions....In virtue of its being modified by the form, the intellect acts on itself by causing an intellection of itself, different from the first intellection....Note the difference between a concept and a form:—Of abstract things we have a concept and not a form: of material things we have a form and not a concept, for we have images of them?"

In the discussion, "Whether a particular thing is known by the intellect and how," to which this examination of thought's

1 "Quaeritur quomodo intellectus suam operationem intelligat. De re non est dubitatio, sed de modo....Duo sunt dicendi modi: unus, quo, per eandem intellectionem per quam intelligo objectum, intelligam etiam intellectiones....Sed credo hoc esse falsum: quia vel ista actio est una, vel plures: si primum, cum aliquid intelligam, semper intelligam me intelligere: quod est falsum; si vero ita quod sint diversae, quomodo differunt istae actiones inter se?" Op. cit. f. 151 r.

2 "Ad (conceptum) causandum concurrunt species ut efficiens instrumentale...duobus conceptibus distinctis intelligitur asinus et intellectus....Ex eo quod intellectus est informatus specie, agit in se ipsum, causando intellectionem sui aliam a prima. Nota quod est differentia inter conceptum et speciem, quia de abstractis habemus conceptum et non speciem; de materialibus speciem et non conceptum, quia habemus de eis phantasmata." Op. cit. ff. 150 v., 151 r.

self-knowledge leads, Pomponazzi really investigates the nature of predication. He describes and examines two views, which are at once theories of knowledge and doctrines of the nature of individuality, and which have this in common, that they set the general conception and the individual object of knowledge, the "common nature" and the individual being, in logical opposition to each other—that which makes all knowledge rest on the knowledge of particulars, as such, and as opposed to "universals," "the view of the Nominalists which seems also to be that of Alexander"¹, and that which confines the name of knowledge to general conceptions, and holds that the individual as such is to be known only indirectly and by inference, "the view...which Albert, Thomas and Scotus follow."²

The discussion is a characteristic example of Pomponazzi's dialectical method. He first states the arguments usually employed on behalf of the nominalist view. Next, after stating the counter-arguments for the opposite view, he examines nominalism from the standpoint which they suggest and makes various corrections and modifications of the argument for nominalism, thus carrying the question on a stage. Finally, he criticises the case against nominalism—partly admitting, partly rejecting it—and suggests a combination of the two standpoints. Such a combination, fully carried out, would of course have given the true solution of the problem; but Pomponazzi again, characteristically, while avoiding the two extremes, does not attempt to define the middle line closely or follow its course in detail; so that the solution is not stated, but only foreshadowed.

First he states the case of those who derive all knowledge from the knowledge of particulars, defining the particular as the opposite of the universal. The abstract logical idea of the particular which was here in question appears in the very first words, "The particular is known by its special form."³ The force of this distinction may be gathered from the terms in which Pomponazzi subsequently states the alternative view:

¹ "Opinio...Nominalium, quae etiam videtur Alexandri." Op. cit. f. 152 r.
² "Opinio...quam imitantur Albertus, Thomas, Scotus." Op. cit. f. 153 r.
"What is received in the intellect is not received as a particular, but under a general conception!" What was meant, then, by the particular's being known per propriam speciem, was that the mind had a conception of it distinct from, and not included among, the general conceptions of its relations. Accordingly the argument proceeds: "The first consideration is that the singular is known by its special form, because the intellect posits a distinct difference between the universal and the particular; but this could not take place unless it had a distinct knowledge of them, and this could not happen except through the conception of the particular."

Another phase of this mode of reasoning, from the logical hypostasis of the abstract "particular" as such, was the argument that the general notion, just because general, could give no determinate knowledge of the individual being. To know individuals, it was said, in communi, was to know them only in confuso. "Either the particular is known by its special form or by the form of the universal. If the first, the point is proved: if the second, since that form brings us to a knowledge of all the particulars as a whole or as blended together, I shall not be able to have knowledge of a single determinate individual, e.g. of Socrates or of Plato."

To this, which may be called a logical, if spurious, argument, Pomponazzi adds a psychological argument from the nature of human knowledge as dependent upon sense and imagination, which deal with particulars. "Our intelligence depends on images....Imagination is knowledge of the particular." Further: "The primary object of intellect is the primary object of

1 "Illud quod in intellectu recipitur non singulariter recipitur, sed sub conceptu universalis recipitur." Op. cit. f. 153 r.
2 "Prima consideratio est quod singulare cognoscitur per propriam speciem, quia intellectus ponit distinctam differentiam inter universale et particulare; hoc autem non potest esse nisi habeat distinctam cognitionem de illis, et hoc non potest fieri nisi per ejus conceptum." Op. cit. f. 152 r.
3 "Vel cognoscitur (singulare) per propriam speciem, vel per speciem universalis. Si primum, habeo intentum; si secundum, cum ista species ducat nos in cognitionem omnium singularium in communi vel in confuso non potero habere notitiam unius determinati individui ut Socratis ant Platonis." Ibid.
4 "Intelligere nostrum dependet a phantasmatibus:....phantasia est singularis." Ibid.
imagination: the particular is that; therefore it is the primary object of intellect."

He refers in corroboration to the fact that all general knowledge of matters of fact is derived from particular experiences. "The complex singular is known before the complex universal... for thus I know that rhubarb purges cholera...therefore this holds also in the case of what is not complex"; and he quotes the Aristotelian doctrine of the place of sense in knowledge: "When sense is wanting, there is wanting also scientific knowledge of the sensible which is known by that sense."

The characteristic argument is added, that, since all general knowledge is by abstraction from particulars, and there can only be abstraction from what is known, therefore the particulars must be first given in knowledge.

The third main argument on this side is that all general notions are gained by a comparison of individuals. This in itself seems undeniable; but we gather from the exposition of Pomponazzi the sense in which this principle was understood. It was interpreted to mean that particulars are knowable and known, in the first instance, as unrelated, and without any general conception of them, while it was understood further to imply that the mind formed a conception of the particular as such prior to, and distinct from, every conception of its relations, of the "common nature" in it.

1 "Illud primo intelligitur quod primo phantasiatur: singulare autem primo phantasiatur, ergo primo intelligitur." Ibid.
2 "Singulare complexum prius cognoscitur quam universale complexum...quia sic cognosco quod reubarbarum purgat coleram....Ergo et ita est de incomplexo." Op. cit. f. 152 r.
4 "Item est tertia ratio quod universale non cognoscitur nisi abstrahendo a particularibus, sed abstractio non fit nisi a noto, ergo singulare prius fuit cognitum ab intellectu." Ibid.
5 "Particulariter ab intellectu cognoscitur." Ibid.
6 "Tertia consideratio est quod universale non cognoscitur nisi ex comprehensione multorum singularium, et ex similitudine reperta in singulari causatur universale: sicut accipiendo Socratem et Platonem, ita maxima eorum similitudine, causant conceptum specificum; et videndo hominem et asinum ambos habere virtutem sensitivam, causatur alius conceptus, ut puta genericus, quia non habet tantam similitudinem quanta est in Socrate et Platone. Non ergo universale primo et
The second theory with which Pomponazzi had to deal claimed to be the logical application of the principle that knowledge is the apprehension of general conceptions—of relations. This implied that there could be no specific apprehension of an unrelated individual, by means of its special form; but it was supposed to involve two further consequences—(1) that the individual is known not directly in the general conception of it, but indirectly, by inference from the general conception of it, and (2) that the general conception is not acquired in, and through, the knowledge of the particular (as, in short, the true knowledge of it), but by some specific apprehension directed towards the "universal" as such, and as distinct from the particular. We see, then, that we have here to do with another one-sided abstraction; with a theory of intellectual action psychologically unfounded; and with an artificial abstraction of the "general" from the "particular" aspect of thought and being, an artificial hypostasis of the "common natures." This second doctrine Pomponazzi also sums up in three arguments. The first is a negative to the first position of the nominalists: "The particular is not known by its special form." This is argued from the fact that it is the very nature of thought to think general conceptions.

"Intellect in this differs from sense, for intellect receives universals, sense particulars; therefore what is received in the intellect is not received as a particular, but under a general conception." There is no function for thought, it is said, except this. "If the particular

simpliciter fit, sed ex collatione multorum individuorum....Dicunt ergo (Alexander, Themistius, Averroes) quod particulariter ab intellectu cognoscitur, et ratio est quod nulla alia res videtur posse causare universale, et ista fuit opinio Buridani, etc....quod scilicet cognoscatur singulare intellectu per propriam speciem; istam tamen speciem habet a sensu, non enim potest intelligere singulare nisi prius id senserit sensus, et quod conceptus communis sit posterior conceptu particularium." Op. cit. f. 152 v.

1 "Intellectus non intelligit primo singulare...intelligit reflexe, ergo non directe....Singulare per accidens intelligitur....Universale per speciem universalis primo cognoscitur, et singulare secundario cognoscitur." Op. cit. f. 153 r., v.


3 "Intellectus in hoc differt a sensu, quia intellectus universaliter, sensus singulariter recipit. Ergo illud quod in intellectu recipitur non singulariter recipitur, sed sub conceptu universali recipitur." Ibid.
is received in intellect, for what purpose should an activity of intellect be postulated?¹"

Pomponazzi quotes also the following argument:—If thought, it was argued, had an immediate apprehension of individual beings, as individuals, and apart from all elements of a “common nature” in them², then we should be able to distinguish between two individuals between which there was no known specific difference³: we should be able, that is, to distinguish between two precisely similar objects presented to us at different times. But we are not able to do so. The example is given of two eggs. If one egg is shewn to me at one time, another at another, I cannot say whether it is the same egg or not. But I should be able to do so, had I a direct apprehension of each egg as an individual thing, and apart from specific characteristics and specific differences⁴. Therefore there is no such apprehension; but things are known, so far as they are known at all, only in their specific characters⁵.

In the second place Pomponazzi expounds the manner in which according to this theory the individual does come into apprehension—that is, indirectly, by reflection, and through the general conceptions. The consequence of this is that the individual in itself is not apprehended (as indeed the isolated and abstract “individual” is not): which is expressed in scholastic language by saying that it is known, not per se, but per accidens⁶.

¹ “Si singulare recipitur in intellectu, ad quid esset ponendus intellectus agens?”  
Ibid.  
² “Si intellectus haberet conceptus singulares ipsorum singularium.”  
Ibid.  
³ “Secret ponere differentiam inter duo individua ejusdem speciei.”  
Ibid.  
⁴ “Per proprium speciem,” “sub conceptu singulari.”  
Ibid.  
⁵ “Si intellectus haberet conceptus singulares ipsorum singularium, sciret ponere differentiam inter duo individua ejusdem speciei, et cognoscere differentiam quae est inter talia individua: hoc autem est falsum de duobus representatis, quorum unum sit representatum in una hora, aliud in alia. Verbi gratia ponam hic unum ovum. Vel habeo proprium conceptum hujus vel non. Si non, habeo intentum; si sic, volo quod alium ponatur; tu credis quod illud est idem ovum, ergo non scias ponere differentiam.”  
Ibid.  
⁶ “Secunda consideratio est quod intellectus non intelligit primo singulare, quod declaratur quia intelligit reflexe, ergo non directe....Universale per se, singulare per accidens intelligitur ab intellectu. Item quod est primum objectum prius intelligitur; universale est primum objectum intellectus, ergo prius cognoscitur ab intellectu.”  
Ibid.  
“Quaeram, si particulariter non cognoscitur ab intellectu per speciem

15—2
In the third place, it was denied that universals are formed by a collection and comparison of particulars. For, it is argued, if the collection of particulars be the same as a universal conception, then the supposed process implies that a universal conception must exist before a universal conception can be formed (which is absurd); and if the two be not the same, then the universal conception remains to be accounted for, namely by a specific apprehension of the universal as such. And this last is in fact required so long as the general is conceived of as the opposite of the particular; and until it is understood that the general is given in the knowledge of the particular, and the particular truly known just when known, and as known, in general relations.

We now come to the interesting passage in which Pomponazzi examines and criticises these reasonings. After his usual profession of uncertainty, he pronounces for the nominalist view; but he proceeds to correct the customary arguments in its behalf, and in so doing to modify the theory itself in his own way. He takes it up first for criticism, in order to develop his own position, and, by clearing away a fallacious structure of argument, to base it on a firm foundation; and also as naturally continuing his statement of all that could be said for the other view.

To begin with, although he intends to conclude that thought apprehends singulars, he flatly denies that there is any apprehension of them qua singulars—in abstraction, that is, from general determination, or apart from their relations.

It had been argued that because we distinguish between the


1 "Tertia consideratio est quam isti in sua tertia consideratione sibi condicunt, quia singulari prius intelligitur, et universale non intelligitur nisi per comprehensionem multorum singulum, et collectio singularum non est nisi universale. Ergo universale cognosciatur ante universale; quod est inconveniens. Restat ergo dicere quod universale per speciem universalis primo cognosciatur, et singulare secundario cognoscitur." Ibid.

2 "Utraque harum partium potest teneri, et Deus de hoc scit veritatem, ego autem nescio." Ibid.

3 "Dico tamen quod prima opinio mihi magis placet. Quia tamen sua argumenta non concludunt, ad illa respondebimus." Ibid.
universal and the particular, therefore there must be an apprehension of the particular as distinct from the universal; the particular must be known by a definite act of thought directed to it as such, this being supposed to be the beginning of all knowledge. Pomponazzi denies that there is any apprehension of the particular in this sense; denies, in effect, any knowledge of an unrelated particular.

What, then, is the distinction that we draw between particular and universal? It is certainly not, replies Pomponazzi, a distinction in respect of specific content; for the particular, in the abstract sense in which it is here spoken of, is that which has no specific content. Nor do we know such a particular at all, except in abstract reflection; for knowledge is only of relations.

The explicitness with which he lays it down that only in general conceptions is there knowledge at all, is worthy of attention, since Pomponazzi also maintains that thought apprehends individuals. Pledged to the apprehension of individuals, he yet holds that knowledge is only of universals.

He does not hesitate to draw the conclusion that there is no distinction between particular and universal, in the sense in which it had been asserted. Of a particular, as abstracted from all specific content, there can be no intellectio. And referring to the act of reflection which he had admitted as giving, in an abstract sense, the knowledge of the particular as such and of its distinction from the universal, he points out that this in no way implies such distinction as had been suggested, or the possibility of a “merely particular” object of thought.

1 "'Conceptus singularis per proprium speciem...per speciem particulararem distinctam a specie universalis.' Ibid.

2 "'Ad primum, quod intellectus ponat distinctionem inter universale et particulare, hoc argumentum non est facile; dico tamen quod ponit differentiam inter ea, non per speciem particulararem distinctam a specie universalis, quia non potest habere speciem singularis.' Ibid.

3 "'Sed dices, unde est quod ponit differentiam inter ea? Dico quod in prima operatione, quando directe intelligit universale, tantum universale cognoscit. Sic in secunda, quando revertitur ad phantasmata (i.e. in reflection upon the presentations), ponit differentiam inter universale et particulare.' Ibid.

4 "'In prima operatione...tantum universale cognoscit....cum tamen unum cognoscat, scilicet universale, quia ejus solius habet speciem.' Ibid.

5 "'In secunda, quando revertitur ad phantasmata, ponit differentiam inter universale et particulare. Sed haec responsio non multum valet; quia si non est
In answer to the second argument under this head, he admits that the general concept does not as such give the apprehension of the determinate individual; but he says that, as caused by this or that determinate individual, it gives (per accidens) knowledge of it and of no other.

To the argument that what is first in sense-presentation must be first in thought (namely the particular), he answers that this reasoning begs the question by ignoring the possible difference in this respect between thought and sense-presentation. He also questions the analogy between the general notion (universale incomplexum) and general knowledge of a matter of fact (universale complexum). The universale complexum appears to mean a general truth in nature, an empirical observation, what we should call a law of nature or generalisation from experience. Such a generalisation rests on particular experiences; so therefore, it was argued, must every general notion (universale incomplexum). But Pomponazzi first raises the question whether every general conception of matter of fact is based on particular experience; instancing first the general conceptions of geometry, and secondly (by a transparent fallacy) the case of second-hand information, by means of which we form a general conception of (say) certain animals, without personal sense-experience or even acquaintance with particular details. He then asks further whether the diversitas specierum, ergo nec intellectum, cum duae intellectiones non proveniant ab eadem specie; quare si non habebit speciem singularis non poterit inter ea differentiam ponere; cum tamen unum cognoscat, sicut universale, quia ejus solius habet speciem.” *Op. cit.* f. 153 v.

1 “Ad secundum, quod species universalis causat confusam cognitionem particularum, dicatur quod species universalis, quantum est de natura sua, non causat distinctam cognitionem particularum; per accidens autem, in quantum causatur ab hoc vel ab hoc particulari determinato, dicit in cognitionem alicujus particularis et non alterius, et ita per accidens causat distinctam cognitionem particularum.” *Ibid.*


3 The example given is “reubarbarum purgat coleram.”

4 The dictum of Aristotle which had been appealed to referred only to particular sense experience: “Quod autem dicitur de Aristotle, dico quod illud est verum in principiis quae habent orsum a sensu, non de principiis sicut accidit in geometria, ubi aliquando habemus conceptum universalem alicujus considerationis, absque hoc quod habeamus conceptum singularem suorum singularium.” *Op. cit.* f. 154 r.

universale incomplexum is to be considered after the analogy of
the universale complexum. The one is purely a logical notion
(repraesentatur natura communis), the other affirms a matter of
fact (repraesentatur suppositum). The feature of the former is its
universality, its absolute validity so far as it goes; and when we
are investigating the source of that absolute character, it is not
relevant to bring a merely empirical rule into comparison. The
empirical rule, no doubt, such as, “All rhubarb purges cholera,”
may be invested with logical universality, by being introduced
into a definition; but in so far, its empirical character as a simple
generalisation from experience is altered. Such appears to be
the drift of a condensed and rather obscure statement of this
point. The distinction thus suggested, between the generalisation
as derived from experience and the same in its logical character,
looks towards the metaphysical question of the nature of
thought as such; while it still remains true that, in tracing the
psychological history of every general conception, a method of
analysis must be employed, and the analogy of experience is the
only safe guide. We shall see, too, that Pomponazzi does not
really decline that method, or that analogy.

Another piece of verbal logic by which it had been sought
to establish the apprehension of an individual as particular, and
apart from general conceptions of it, had been that since the
general conception is reached by “abstraction” from the
particular—and there can be abstraction only from what is
known—therefore the particular must first be known, in itself.
Pomponazzi replies by distinguishing the “abstraction” which
is involved in forming a general conception of an object from an
explicit or formal act of abstraction. In the general conception
of a particular object there does not take place an abstraction,

1 "Aliter potest dici negando assumptum et similitudinem illam: et ratio est quia
quando comprehenditur universale incomplexum repraesentatur natura communis, sed
comprehendendo universale complexum repraesentatur suppositum ratione de limita-
tione 'omnis'; quod si adjungitur, licet stet primo pro natura in communi, ut dicendo
omne reubarbarum purgat coleram, ratione de limitatione 'omnis' repraesentatur
suppositum; licet enim stet pro natura communi, inter tamen naturalia habet exer-
ceri in suis suppositis: et ita non valet similitudo." Ibid.
2 "Ut stet pro natura in communi." Ibid.
3 "Abstraction non fit nisi a noto." Ibid.
4 "Notum a noto." Ibid.
in the latter sense, of the general from the particular—the particular, on the contrary, being conceived precisely *in its general aspect*; and so far from the particular being "known" previous to the general conception of it, it is only in that general conception that it comes to knowledge\(^1\).

So far Pomponazzi goes, in correction of the argument for particular apprehensions. But he does not deny that general notions come by comparison of particulars. Coming now to the third argument, he abandons the attitude of antagonism, and we see that he is preparing to draw the true distinction in this matter.

His attitude at this point is a favourable example of his thinking. We have already seen that he does not accept that account of induction from particulars which he began by describing. He does not admit the specific apprehension of a particular as such\(^3\). From his account of conception also, in connection with the point last discussed, it is plain that he does not suppose it to start from an explicit recognition of the separate particular and proceed thence to generalisation\(^3\). Yet he does not on these grounds deny the inductive formation of general conceptions. While rejecting those abstract and unreal interpretations of the inductive process, he does not deny the fact.

This is the more noticeable, since he quotes an attempt which had been made to explain it away, and find room for a direct intuition of universals, by a distinction which he almost seems himself, for a moment, to be on the verge of accepting. It was proposed to admit the induction from particulars\(^4\) for the universal which is *secunda intentio*, but to deny its necessity for the universal that is *prima intentio*. The distinction between *prima* and *secunda intentio* is elsewhere explained by Pomponazzi himself to be the distinction between a general notion as held in

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1 "Ad alium: universale abstrahitur, et ista abstractio non fit ab ignoto; dico quod est aequivalentio de abstractione; non enim abstrahitur eo modo quo argumentum concludit, ut quando notum a noto abstrahitur. Sed est abstractio ad hunc sensum, quia singularis quod est in potentia intellectus(m?) fit actu intellectus(m?)." *Op. cit.* f. 154 r.
abstraction in the mind and the same as a determination of particular things, considered in their species and genera. It was suggested, then, that the language of Alexander, Themistius, and other authorities as to the formation of general notions ex collatione individuorum might be applied to the conception in this second meaning of concrete determination; while in the case of the abstract or "indifferent" notion there might be room for some direct apprehension of it by thought without the mediation of particulars. Pomponazzi states the suggestion with his usual impartial air; but proceeds to dismiss it as contrary to the real intention of the authorities, and to the truth. The simplest general conception, he concludes, depends upon comparison.

In rejecting this last scholastic subtlety, Pomponazzi definitely decides for the apprehension of the particular. So he repeats here what he had said already in commencing his revision of the proof of that position. But he has now partly explained the sense in which he holds this. He does not countenance the idea that the particular is known apart from general conceptions or that the apprehension of the particular through which the general conception is formed is an apprehension of an unrelated particular; still less, that it is an abstract idea of particulars that must come first. He argues against mis-statement of his own position, and by means of an impartial criticism succeeds in rectifying his foundations in a passage which is a triumph of dialectical

1 "Universale causatum ab intellectu duplex est, unum quod dicitur indifferentem, quod sumitur pro quadem natura communi indifferentere se habente ad omnia sua singularia. Alio modo sumitur universale pro quanto non intelligitur illa natura communis indifferentem, sed ultra hoc attribuitur huic naturae communi intentio. Utrumque enim istorum fit per opus intellectus; primum enim fit per intellectum agentem, quando verbi gratia intelligo hominem indifferentem se habentem...et communiter tale universale dicitur prima intentio. Secundum universale fit per comparationem suorum singularum inter se, et collationem similitudinis inter sua individua. Unde maxima similitudo ex comparatione individuorum inter se per opus intellectus electa causat speciem specialissimam; non ita magna causat genus respectu illius speciei; et ideo minima similitudo causat genus generalissimum." Op. cit. f. 28 r.

2 See f. 154 v.

3 "Ista responsio non est ad intentionem Alexandri, quia Alexander ibi dicit de albo et albo; et ita non valet." Op. cit. f. 154 v.

4 "Quod intellectus intelligat singularem...mihi videtur esse tenendum." Ibid.

dexterity; while the accuracy with which at this last point he stops in time and turns, just when he seems to be committing himself to a false position, reveals the real qualities of his mind. By a seemingly hostile argument he has cleared the doctrine he desires to maintain from the fallacies that had surrounded it; accepting the element of truth in an opposite theory, he refuses to be led into a snare; and while arriving by a method of concession at the ground he is to occupy, the two-sided position he is to hold, he preserves the essential point in the empirical theory, finding exactly the right place at which to draw the line. A case like this leads us to believe that the openness of Pomponazzi's mind was not a mere feeble eclecticism, and that his weighing of alternatives did not mean simple inability to decide.

Finally it was incumbent on him from his corrected standpoint to deal with the arguments for an unmediated apprehension of abstract universals.

He gives most attention to the argument which carries the least possible weight for us, but which bulked so largely in the thought of his time—the a priori argument from the nature of intelligence: "Intellect receives universals, sense particulars." To us such an argument seems merely to beg the question; but we have only to glance over these pages to see how deeply the absolute idea of intelligence had rooted itself in the general mind; and how seriously the preconceptions suggested by that idea, and the fictitious difficulties it created, complicated every psychological enquiry and vitiated every result. It was this notion of the absoluteness of intelligence, with the consequent dualism of thought and matter, general concept and particular fact, which made it so difficult for a thinker of Pomponazzi's time to give a psychological account of knowledge. It is not without interest, however, to observe the scientific spirit emerging, the scientific method partially extricating itself from mythological shackles; even although in the end we get no more than suggestions of true solutions, because the questions had never been formulated in scientific terms, and the answers remain imprisoned in dualistic forms of expression.

Meeting on its own ground, then, the argument from the

nature of intelligence, Pomponazzi proposes once more his characteristic conception of the nature of intelligence as in man. Man, he repeats, is an intermediate being; his nature has a double aspect. *Intellectus*, as in man, is on the one hand *abstractus, qua intellectus*; on the other hand, it is *formae materiae*, and as such apprehends particulars, through sense. Human reason is *intelligentia*, but it is "the lowest of the intelligences."

The distinction between sense and intellect (as in man) is accordingly not so absolute as had been supposed. "Sense receives only particulars, intellect both particulars and universals."

It need not be said that Pomponazzi's own account of human intelligence, and indeed his every thought upon the subject, is deeply coloured by the absolute theory of intelligence. The dualism of that theory runs as a flaw through the thoughts of every thinker of his time. He is really here in effect rejecting it—rejecting it, that is, so far as the case in point is concerned, the case of real interest, the case of intelligence as in man; and yet he can only find expression for his own doctrine in the terms of dualism: "Intellect receives both universals and particulars, but it thinks universals in so far as it is separate from material conditions, particulars in so far as its activity depends on material conditions."

He makes his customary concession to the absolute theory, that it is true of the higher Intelligences, while not true of man (or if true of man *qua intellectus*, not true of him *qua humanus*).

It is not the superstitions of Pomponazzi, however, that are interesting, but the drift and tendency of his thought—and a sort of unconscious logic in it. His formula is that thought in man knows the singular and the universal. By means of this formula he meets the objection that, if there were a knowledge


3 "Intellectus (recipit) universale et singulare, sed intelligit universale pro quarto est abstractus a materia, singulare vero in quantum a materia dependet in operari." *Ibid.*

4 "Quod intellectus intelligat singulare...accidit intellectui ut humanus est, non tamen accidet ei ut intellectus est, quia ut humanus potest intelligere singularia, non ut intellectus est." *Op. cit.* f. 155 r.
of the particular, there would be no occasion for the agency of intellect. "If it apprehended only particulars, there would be no necessity to postulate an active intellect: but because, in addition to those, it apprehends also universals... an active intellect is postulated."

Sense has its part in the apprehension of the particular object; but thought as such operates in it as well. "In addition to these particulars, intellect apprehends also universals, and this function is more appropriate to it than to apprehend particulars; ...if you ask by what means it has cognition of particulars, I reply, by sense."

The illustration of the two eggs (noticed above) as an argument against the apprehension of particulars, proves too much. For the same case would prove that there is no apprehension of particulars by the senses. The senses cannot distinguish between two seemingly identical objects presented to them at different times. Yet if there had been any difference in the original sensations, memory would have preserved it. In such a case, then, two objects individually different produce exactly the same impression upon the senses. Are we to infer that the senses have no apprehension of particulars? Such an inference would have been contrary to the axioms of the received psychology, to Aristotle, and to the definition of sense.

Pomponazzi considers this sufficient as an argumentum ad hominem. He might have gone on from this case of illusion to shew that the knowledge of its relations is indispensable to any knowledge of the individual, even as an individual. This is the

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1 See op. cit. f. 153 r. Cf. "Si solum singulare intelligeret, non esset necesse ponere ipsum (intelluctum agentem); sed quia ultra hoc et universale cognoscit... ideo ponitur intellectus agens." Op. cit. f. 155 r.
2 "Intelluctus ultra hoc (singulare) et universale cognoscit et hoc est magis proprium ei quam singulare intelligere... si dices a quo habet cognitionem singularis, dico quod habet a sensu." Ibid.
3 "Virtus cogitativa nescit ponere differentiam inter ea." Ibid.
4 "Species potuerunt in memoria conservari." Ibid.
5 "Ad quartum de duabus ovis, dico quod si hoc argumentum concluderet, etiam de sensu concluderet, quia non cognosceret sensus singulare; quia virtus cogitativa nescit ponere differentiam inter ea; et tamen species potuerunt in memoria conservari. Et ideo ad praesens aliter non dico." Ibid.
6 "Ad praesens aliter non dico." Ibid.
reason why different individuals, apart from the knowledge of any distinguishing features (i.e. in relation to things outside themselves), are not distinguishable—either by judgment or (as Pomponazzi here acutely remarks) by sense. Rightly interpreted, this instance might have led him on towards that true conception of what an individual is, to which by more abstract methods he was working his way. Meanwhile all he has definitely asserted is that thought knows both the individual and the universal—whether in one act of thought or not he does not decide.

Referring next to the accepted formula—"the particular is thought mediately"—Pomponazzi adopts it in his own sense: this sense, however, as he briefly declares here, and as we can see for ourselves from a fuller explanation in the De Immortalitate, was essentially different from that in which the phrase was intended in the orthodox Thomist school. In the absence of a clear distinction between the direct or primary apprehension of an individual being—that is, in its relations, and in its specific and generic character—and the abstract, secondary conception of the particular as such, it had been laid down that the individual was apprehended by "reflection"; and this reflection had been interpreted as an act of discursive thought. Pomponazzi, however, is definitely and consciously applying himself to the primary apprehension of the individual as concrete. And here also, he says, there is in a sense a process of "reflection." It consists in the two-fold (while simultaneous) action of sense and thought: "We say that reflection is different from what our Latin writers have imagined; the intellect apprehends the particular by reflection, because, as a reflected line is double, so is knowledge of the particular, because it is effected by sense and intellect." That is to say, there is, besides the immediate activity of sense, an action

1 The reasoning of this passage affords an interesting illustration of Pomponazzi's working theory of sense. The relation, practically so close, between sense on the one hand, and memory and virtus cogitativa on the other, had evidently the effect in concrete psychological reasoning of really bridging the gulf between sense and thought; and gave to the powers of sense, practically, a wider scope than was allowed to them by the formal psychology of the school.


3 "Dicimus quod illa reflexio non est sicuti imaginati sunt nostri Latini; sed cognoscit singulare reflexe, quia sicut linea reflexa est gemina, ita est cognitio singularis, quia est per sensum et intellectum." Ibid.
of thought mediated through the sense-data; and in that way there takes place a *reflexio*. That this is the correct interpretation of a very difficult passage will appear from a comparison with the latter part of the twelfth chapter of the *De Immortalitate*¹. Such a comparison will further establish three points: (1) that Pomponazzi has clearly set before him the problem of the apprehension of the individual as universally determined, and, by consequence, of the universal in the particular⁴, (2) that for him the apprehension of the particular is not *prior in time to* the general conception, nor the general conception prior to the apprehension of the particular³, (3) that the action of thought in thus apprehending the universal in the particular, or forming a general conception of a particular object, is something perfectly distinct from the act of ratiocination which the schoolmen postulated for the intellectual apprehension of the particular⁴.

The argument that it was impossible from particulars to form a universal conception without the previous existence of that conception (that is, the immediate apprehension of an abstract universal), Pomponazzi meets with the very same consideration on account of which he had denied the necessity of a previous apprehension of the abstract and unrelated particular—namely, by the distinction between the potential and the realised

¹ "Cumque dicebatur quod singulare non cognoscitur nisi reflexe...dicimus vere et proprie talem intellectionem esse reflectionem et conversionem ad phantasmata.... Definit (D. Thomas) motum reflexum cum esse qui in idem terminatur a quo incepit; verum quum anima humana per cogitationem comprehendit singulare primo, deinde eadem per intellectum universale comprehendat, quod tamen in eodem singulari speculatur quod per phantasiem cognitum est, vere reditum facit, et per consequens conversionem, quoniam ex singulari per phantasiem cognito eadem anima per intellectum ad idem redit. Neque satis video quomodo syllogismus vel argumentatio reflexio vel conversio commode nuncupari possunt, cum non ex eodem in idem, verum ex diverso in diversum procedant. Eademque specie utrumque (scil. singulare et universale) comprehenditur, licet non aequo primo." *De Inm.* xii. pp. 94, 95, and *passim*.

² "(Universale) in eodem singulari speculatur (per intellectum) quod per phantasiem cognitum est." "Ex singulari per phantasiem cognito...anima per intellectum ad idem redit." "Eademque specie utrumque (singulare et universale) comprehenditur, licet non aequo primo." *Op. cit.* xii. p. 95.


universal conception. On the empirical side it had been argued that, before a universal conception could be formed of a particular, that particular must as such be "known"; and Pomponazzi had answered that the mental act of forming a conception was something different from *abstrahere notum a noto*, and that before the conception there is no apprehension of the individual; the particular as such is only potentially, and not really, conceived in thought. In the same spirit it was urged by those who believed in an *a priori* apprehension of universal conceptions ("the universal is primarily known by the form of the universal, and the particular secondarily") that a collection of particulars in thought, if it was to be competent to give rise to the general notion, must itself be that general notion. Pomponazzi once more replies that the particulars as such are not the general conception, but are its materials, are that general conception in potentiality; therefore there is no "universal before a universal," and no reason to postulate an *a priori* universal conception ("a priori, that is, as was argued, in consciousness") in order to explain the possibility of an empirical generalisation.

The views of Pomponazzi on this subject may be thus summarised:—"Intellect apprehends universals and particulars." The manner in which it does so is as follows:

1. Negatively speaking, he denies that either the universal or the particular is apprehended in separation. Abstractly he admits that the two are distinguishable. But it is the great merit of Pomponazzi's investigation of this point that he does not fall into the common scholastic confusion of two distinct

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1. "Singulare quod est in potentia intellectus(m?) fit actu intellectus(m?)." *Comm. de An.* f. 154 r.
5. "Per speciem propriam."
intellectual processes—namely, the secondary or reflective consideration of the general and particular aspects of an object of knowledge on the one hand, and on the other the direct and primary apprehension of a particular object in general relations, or general conceptions of the object. He clearly conceives and investigates the problem presented by this latter act of thought. And, in it, he denies that the general and the particular are separately apprehended. He denies that they are specifically distinguishable at all.1

(2) But that individuals are the real objects of knowledge he expressly affirms.2 On the other hand, in his deliberate revision of the arguments for his own position, he affirms that knowledge only takes place through general conceptions.3 Denying as he does that there can be any specific difference between an individual and the general conceptions of it, he says plainly—“The object of knowledge is a unity, namely the universal!” This can mean nothing else but that the general conception is realised in the individual, and the individual known only in a general conception of it.

(3) Pomponazzi holds with the “empirical” school that general conceptions are derived from particular experiences, but in a sense which he himself explains.4

(4) At the same time he adopts from the opposite school the doctrine of an act of thought in conception, and accepts their description of it as reflexio.5

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1 See passages cited above, p. 229, notes 2, 3, 4, 5. “Ponit differentiam inter ea, non per speciem particularèm distinctam specie universalis, quia non potest habere speciem singularis....In prima operatione quando directe intelligit universale, tantum universale cognoscit....In secunda quando revertitur ad phantasmata, ponit differentiam inter universale et particularè. Sed...si non habebit speciem singularis, non poterit inter ea differentiam ponere, etc.” Op. cit. f. 153 v. Cf. De Imm. XII. p. 95. “Eadem specie utrumque comprehenditur, licet non aequo primo.”


4 “Unum cognoscit scilicet universale.” Ibid.

5 De Imm. XII. p. 94. Cf. “Particularia quamvis habeant causare conceptum communem non sunt universale nisi in materiali.” Comm. de An. f. 155 v.

(5) This act of conception is the crux of the whole question. Now while Pomponazzi nowhere undertakes formally to describe it, at least in its logical character, yet from various indications, and especially from the passage already cited on the psychological history of it, in the *De Immortalitate*, we gather how nearly he had arrived at a true, because a concrete, notion of this act of thought.

Thus while deriving the general notion (by a psychological process to be explained below) from particular experiences, he admits no knowledge of the particular previous to and apart from the general conception itself. We recall also in this connection the distinction drawn by him between a general conception as such and an empirical generalisation upon matter of fact, which leads to a more fundamental distinction between the nature of a conception in its logical character and the history of its derivation.

On the other hand, the act of thought does not imply the apprehension of a universal previous to the apprehension of the individual. There is no universale ante universale. In particular, the history of a conception is not that the induction of instances makes one mental unity (a universal), to which thought adds a second; but the general conception of particulars is the action of thought. Pomponazzi meets the opposite fictions of an *a priori* universal and of an unrelated individual with the same illuminating suggestion that the abstract particular is potentially the universal.

The act of conception is imagined in accordance with these views of the universal and the particular. On the other hand, that act is regarded, on the suggestion of the empirical school, as receiving its material from particular experiences through the senses; but the distinction is drawn that the general conception

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2 "Singularia, quamvis possint causare conceptum communem et universalem, non tamen sequitur quod sit universale in actu; et ita non cognoscitur universale ante universale." *Ibid.*
of those particulars is not an act of reason, an act of abstraction in the ordinary sense. On the other hand the act of thought which finds the universal in the particular, and conceives the particular as an instance of the universal, is named according to the received terminology of those who held that the universal is apprehended a priori, and the particular reached by thought through a deductive process: it is called reflexio. But this reflexio is described as something quite different from a process of ratiocination; and it is expressly denied that there are separate intellectiones of the universal and the particular.

The act of conception being so understood, there is no question of temporal priority between the apprehension of the universal and the apprehension of the particular. The universal cannot be prior to the particular apprehension, because there is no general conception which does not find its material in a particular experience. The particular cannot be prior to the universal, because there is no apprehension of a particular object which is not a general conception of it—an apprehension of it, as we should say, in some relation. And so we find Pomponazzi saying—"It is said that the intellect apprehends simultaneously the universal and the particular."

(6) Pomponazzi's idea of the act of conception will be made finally clear by an examination of his account of the mental process through which it comes to pass. The Quaestio of the Comm. de Anima contains suggestions of his view of this

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1 "Non enim abstrahitur eo modo...ut notum a noto abstrahitur. Sed est abstractio ad hunc sensum, quia singulare quod est in potentia intellectus(m?) fit actu intellectus(m?)." Op. cit. f. 154 r.

2 "Neque satis video quomodo syllogismus vel argumentatio reflexio vel conversio commode nuncupari possunt." De Imm. XII. p. 95, and cap. XII. passim. "Illa reflexio non est sicuti imaginati sunt nostri Latinis...cognitio singularis...est per sensum et intellectum." Comm. de An. f. 155 r.


4 "Dicitur quod simul tempore cognoscit (intellectus) universale et singularis." De Imm. XII. p. 44. Cf. Comm. de An. f. 155 v. "Sicut linea reflexa est gemina illa est cognitio singularis...per sensum et intellectum." An apparent expression in the contrary sense (f. 29 v.) doubtless refers to the abstract idea of the particular as secondary to that of the universal: "Dicimus hominem esse priorem Socrate ex parte modi intelligendi...quum res primo concipitur modo universali quam modo particulari."
psychological aspect of the subject; but it is fully worked out in the *De Immortalitate*.

While it is laid down that there is no knowledge of the particular save in the general conception, the particular is described as the "cause" of the general conception.

This causation takes place through the senses.

The action of thought upon the presentations of sense, forming a general conception of the particular, is thus described: "When it was said that a particular is not known except by reflection...we hold that truly and strictly intellection of this kind is a reflection and turning towards the images...St Thomas defines reflex motion as that which terminates at the point where it began; but since the human mind in the first place apprehends the particular by means of the cogitative faculty, and then the same mind apprehends the universal by means of the intellect, a universal which it grasps in the same particular as was known by imagination, it really makes a return and consequently a turning, since the same mind from a particular known by imagination returns by means of intellect to the same. Nor do I clearly see how a syllogism or argument can accurately be called a 'reflection' or 'conversion,' since they proceed not from and to the same point, but from one point to another. And both are comprehended by the same form, though not equally primarily. Nor is there any difficulty in more objects than one being thought at the same time, if they are thought under one form."

1 Thus after concluding—"Unum (cognoscit) scilicet universale, quia ejus solius habet speciem," he goes on—"Ad secundum quod species universalis causat confusam cognitionem particularium, dicitur quod species universalis, quantum est de natura sua, non causat distinctam cognitionem particularium; per accidens autem, in quantum causatur ab hoc vel ab hoc particuliari determinato, ducit in cognitionem alicujus particularis et non alterius." (Comm. de An. l. 155 v.) Again—"Ista particularia quamvis habeant causare conceptum communem, etc....sicut sensus cognoscit duo alba quae possunt causare conceptum communem, et tamen non sequitur quod sensus cognoscat universale." Op. cit. l. 155 v. Cf. De Imm. cap. XII.


3 "Cumque dicebatis quod singularis non cognoscitur nisi refexe...dicimus vere et proprie talem intellectionem esse reflectionem et conversiouem ad phantasmata.... Definit (D. Thomas) motum reflexum cum esse qui in idem terminatur a quo incepit;"
The words that follow explain the difference between the general conception as such, and the particular as given in sense, while generally conceived: "But the mind apprehends this particular rather than that, because it has an image of this, not of that. Though from looking at this lion I have the thought of 'lion' and of 'this lion,' yet I do not have the thought of 'lion' more from this lion than from that lion in the wilds: though if I were to see him, I should no less have the thought of 'lion.' But I have the thought of 'this lion,' and not of 'the lion in the wilds,' because I have an image of the one and not of the other."

I do not enter further into Pomponazzi's theory of knowledge and reality, partly because it would not in any case be possible to give an exhaustive account of his Commentary on the De Anima, and partly because an important section of it dealing with the various theories of general ideas and reality, and proposing a reconciliation of nominalism, realism, and the doctrines of Scotus and Averroes, has not yet been published for us.

It may be sufficient to say that he discusses scholastic realism with patience and care, especially in the reconstruction of it by Scotus and his followers, and rejects every hypothesis of universalia ante rem. He expresses his own conclusion in a formula which indicates conceptualism with a leaning to nominalism: "The universal is a mode of thinking which in

verum cum anima humana per cogitativam comprehendit singulare primo, deinde eadem per intellectum universale comprehendat quod tamen in eodem singulari speculatur quod per phantasiem cognitum est, vere reditum facit et per consequens conversionem; quoniam ex singulari per phantasiem cognito, eadem anima per intellectum ad idem redit. Neque satis video quomodo syllogismus vel argumentatio reflexio vel conversio commode nuncupari possunt; cum non ex eodem in idem verum ex diverso in diversum procedant; eademque specie utrumque comprehenditur, licet non aequo primo; neque inconvenient plurar simul intelligi dum per unam speciem intelligentur." De Imm. XII. pp. 94, 95.

1 "Magis autem hoc quam illud singulare comprehendit, quoniam huius est phantasma non illius. Etenim ex huius leonis inspectione leonem et hunc leonem intelligo, non tamen magis leonem ex hoc quam ex illo qui moratur in sylvis; etenim si illum inspicerem non minus leonem intelligerem, verum hunc intelligo et non eum qui in sylvis, quia huius et non illius phantasma habeo." Op. cit. XII. p. 95. Cf. Comm. de An. l. 155 r., "Cognoscit singulare reflexe, quia sicut linea reflexa est gemina, ita est cognitio singularis, quia est per sensum et intellectum."


its essential nature is in the intellect, but refers to the thing thought of 1.

At the same time, his doctrine of the general conception of individual things, above described, is far removed from nominalism. And even conceptualism, he appears to have felt 2, is a solution only of one side of the problem, namely its psychological side. The fact remains that there are resemblances among (real) individual things, and that—concretely—the principle of individuality, whatever it be, is united with the common nature. His recognition of this datum of common sense, which after all is the real problem, was probably what led Pomponazzi to regard with some degree of favour the Scotist notion of *haecceitas*; for this, although it is the expression of a false abstraction of singular and general, and when subjected to analysis a purely negative description of the individual (seeing it excludes all specific differences), is yet an attempt to regard the individual in a general aspect.

In the last resort, Pomponazzi stood with scholasticism generally upon the ground of common sense. Failing a true criticism of the meaning of Thought and Reality, his belief in their correspondence was dogmatic. He lays it down, then, finally, that there are two kinds of truth; the correspondence of things to the ideas in the Divine Mind, and the correspondence of our thought to things. In the former sense thought is the measure and reality the thing measured, in the latter reality is the measure to which thought must conform in order to be true.

“Truth is a kind of ‘correspondence’ or ‘measuring’ of the object with the mind or of the mind with the object... If an object is compared with the practical reason, such an object is true, in so far as it is referred to that kind of reason; and in the same way all things are true in so far as they are referred to the Divine Mind: for in so far as everything is an effect of God, whether in the way of efficient or of final causation, all things will have their idea in the Divine Mind, and objects

1 "Universale est modus considerandi qui formaliter est in intellectu sed denominative in re considerata." *Op. cit.* f. 33 r.

are true in so far as they agree with their ideas, and the more like their ideas they are, the more they are true....

"I have explained then how truth consists in the correspondence of an object with the mind: I must proceed to explain how in some way truth consists in the correspondence of the mind with the object. I maintain that this is so most of all in our case. For our thoughts are true when they correspond to an external object....In the first kind of truth, the object is measured and the mind is the measure; in the second, the object is the measure, while the mind is measured. Yet we must note here that the objects are not said to be true or false without qualification in themselves, when referred to our intellect, for otherwise one and the same object would be both true and false, if one man thought of it in one way and another man in another....But objects are said to be 'true' without qualification, when referred to the Divine Mind, which is completely true. And thus the definition of truth becomes plain, how it is the correspondence of the object with the mind or of the mind with the object. But if it is asked whether God is true, I reply that truth in every sense is present in God, as Themistius says at this point with reference to the active intellect, that it is true, not with reference to other things, but simply by reference to itself, which is true intellect. How more completely then will God in this way be one and true in the highest degree, when He is true through Himself and not through something external to Him, as in the case of human truth! He is not only true, but true in every way, since in God there is both correspondence of object with mind and of mind with object. For His thought is in proportion to His nature, and His nature to His thought, nor can He in any way be deceived about Himself."

1 "Veritas est quaedam adaequatio vel commensuratio rei ad intellectum, vel intellectus ad res....Si res comparatur ad intellectum practicum, talis est vera pro quanto comparatur ad talem intellectum, et sic omnia sunt vera pro quanto comparatur ad intellectum divinum: ex quanto enim omnis res est effectus Dei, vel in genere causae efficientis, vel finalis, omnia habebunt ideam suam in mente divina, et res, secundum quod habent similitudinem ideae suae, sunt verae, et quanto magis assimilabuntur suae ideae, tanto magis erunt verae....Dictum est igitur qualiter sit veritas in adaequatione rei ad intellectum; dicendum est modo qualiter in aliquo veritas consistat in adaequatione intellectus ad rem. Dico quod illud verificatur maxime quoad nos. Nostrae enim intelliones sunt verae quando conformantur rei ad extra...In
prima veritate res est mensurata, intellectus mensura, in secunda vero res est mensura, intellectus autem mensuratum. Notamus tamen hic quod scilicet res non absolute dicantur verae aut falsae in ordine ad nostrum intellectum; aliter enim una et eadem res esset vera et falsa, quam unus homo opinatur uno modo et alius alio modo....Sed res absolute dicuntur verae in ordine ad intellectum divinum, qui maxime verus est, et sic patet definitio veritatis, qualiter est adaequatio rei ad intellectum et intellectus ad ipsam rem. Si autem quaeratur utrum Deus sit verus, dico quod in Deo omnibus modis est veritas, sicut dicit hic Themistius de agente quod est verus, non quoad alia, sed quoad se tantum qui verus est intellectus. Quanto magis ergo Deus hoc modo unus erit et maxime verus, quum ex se ipso verus est, et non ex alio extrinseco sicut nostra veritas! Est etiam verus omnibus modis, quum in Deo est adaequatio rei ad intellectum et intellectus ad rem: tanta enim est sua essentia quanta est sua intellectio, et tanta est sua intellectio quanta est sua essentia, nec aliquo modo de se ipso potest facere aliquam deceptionem." Comm. de An. ff. 174, 175.
CHAPTER X

THE NATURE OF VIRTUE

POMPONAZZI always shews a marked anxiety about the ethical effect of his theories. It is characteristic of him that he constantly desires to shew his philosophical conclusions to be consistent with the highest views of moral life, and with the binding obligation of moral duties. In particular he labours to prove that his doctrine of the soul's mortality not only does not deprive morality of any sanction, but even establishes morality upon a better basis. The ground on which he rests this latter claim for his doctrine is that it makes morality independent of every consideration of rewards and punishments, and so places it upon its true foundation.

But first he was obliged to meet a number of arguments by which it was sought to prove his conclusion hostile to morality. It was argued that to deny the future life was to deprive virtue of its motives and sanctions: for how could men be induced to prefer death to dishonour, or to die for duty, if death ended all? Or would it be reasonable to ask them to do so? Again, if the Divine Government were represented only by its operation in the present life, it seemed impossible to trace in it any principle of justice, or to maintain the existence of a moral order at all. Finally there was the most profound and fundamental objection of all, that in this life man does not, and cannot, attain his End: but a being for ever precluded from attaining its natural end is an impossibility: therefore, it was argued, since
for the attainment of the end of man a further existence is required, that extension of existence must be given.

Pomponazzi accepts the issues thus offered to him. He admits that his doctrine must be tried by these tests. He proposes, on his own principles, *salvare rationem virtutis*. He will not for a moment allow that his view of human life leads to immoral conclusions, or lessens the sanctions and destroys the motives for moral action. If it were to follow from the soul's mortality that men should prefer dishonour to death, or fail to persist in duty even to the point of death, that certainly would be something *contra naturam*, but by his determination of goodness as a thing desirable for its own sake, he proposes to shew that this does not follow. Similarly he vindicates Divine Justice and the reality of a moral order, as something independent of rewards and punishments in a future state.

But he deals most fully with the argument against him in the most general form—namely as concerning the possibility of man's attaining in this life the end of his being. He proposes such a view of the nature and end of man, and of the possibilities (however limited) of the present life, as shall permit man on earth to reach a certain relative perfection—that perfection, Pomponazzi would say, which is appropriate to his condition and place in the universe—and to attain a measure of real happiness.

This is the question which Pomponazzi takes up first, in the fourteenth chapter of the *De Immortalitate*.

He raises first the question, whether it be possible for man in this life to attain the *end of his being*. And he admits that if we suppose that "end" to be intellectual contemplation, it can in no sense be attained within the bounds of mortality. How few men have in this life ability, time, or opportunity for philosophic thought! How utterly imperfect and rudimentary is the highest earthly knowledge—so that it is rather to be called ignorance than knowledge, a guess rather than a certainty! Again, the more one knows, one still desires to know the more. Then there are so many arts, so many sciences, and life is all too short to master even one. And how many obstructions there are, and how many accidents may befall, to hinder the pursuit of

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1 *De Imm.* xiii. p. 99; cf. xiv. p. 117.
truth; how difficult is the struggle; how uncertain the outcome; how suddenly all may come to an end!

This is the negative case against the sufficiency of the present life. But the positive argument, on which the thinkers of that time depended to prove the immortality of the soul, was that the soul of man desires and demands infinity. It is true that the beasts also desire the prolongation of life, and have an instinct of self-preservation; but they do not desire this like men appetitu cognosctivo, while "we know the eternal and desire that we too should become eternal and immortal." This appetite belongs, it was said, to the very constitution of our nature. It is in all men: "but if it is in all, it will be natural."

Similarly, quoting Augustine, Pomponazzi weighs in one place the argument from the religious instinct in man. The soul finds its happiness in the knowledge and love of God; but if it knew that that knowledge and love were to cease, its happiness would be at an end. Hence the expectation of immortal life is necessary to the felicity of man.

Pomponazzi boldly meets here this issue, as to the end of man's being. The true end of any particular being, he says, is that which is appropriate to itself. It does not do to say—such or such a condition is the highest, or the best conceivable: therefore it must be the final end of such or such a being. But each being has an end appropriate to itself. For example, sentiency is in an absolute sense "better" than insentiency; yet is a stone not sentient—"for if it were, it would cease to be a stone." So we are not justified in attributing dogmatically to man what are really Divine attributes.

1 De Imm. xiii. pp. 96 ff. and xiv. pp. 104 ff.
2 "Cognito aeterno cupidum et nos aeternos fieri et immortales." "Appetitus iste...esta voluntate nostra intrinsecus." "Si utem est in omni, erit naturalis." Comm. de An. f. 131 v.
4 "Unaquaque res saltem perfecta habet aliquem finem...Non tamen quod est magis bonum debet unicique rei pro fine assignari, sed solum secundum quod convenit illi naturae et ci proportionatur." De Imm. xiv. p. 104.
5 "Eti si sentire melius est quam non sentire, non tamen convenit lapidi sentire, neque esset bonum lapidi, sic enim non amplius esset lapis." "Quare assignando finem homini si talem quem Deo et intelligentiis assignaremus non conveniens foret assignatio, quandoquidem sic non esset homo." Ibid.
As for the appetite or desire for immortality, he has simply to say that it is an unreasonable desire. To the argument that it is "natural," and therefore not to be disappointed, he had already answered that such necessity may hold in the case of unconscious instincts; but where, as in this case, argument is involved, there is always room for an incorrect process of reasoning to creep in. No doubt, if Divine conditions of being are set before us, our will desires them: whether it is justified in so doing, is another question. If our desires are not to be disappointed, they must be regulated by sound reason.

It is true that in intelligence man partakes of the eternal principle. But a mole has eyes, yet does not see (although Aristotle compares human intelligence rather to an owl than to a mole, for an owl sees a little). At any rate in considering man's end he is to be rated as an intermediate being.

It does not become the mortal, says Pomponazzi in the same strain, towards the end of his book, to desire immortal felicity; and a wise man will not set his heart upon what is impossible. It is not then the part of a man who has learned to control himself and moderate his desires (homo temperatus) to yearn for

1 "In quod fertur voluntas sine cognitione, frustrari non potest: at si per cognitionem, frustrari potest nisi sit recta ratio." Op. cit. x. p. 81.

2 "Ad illud vero de experimento, in primis mirere quomodo Divus Thomas illud adduxerit, cum Aristoteles 3 Ethic. dicit voluntatem esse impossibilium, veluti in appetendo immortalitatem: unde si voluntas nostra non est nisi in anima intellectiva, si appetendo immortalitatem per Aristotelem appetit impossibile; non ergo anima humana potest esse immortalis. Quare dicitur ad argumentum non esse evidens signum illud, quoniam ut ibi dicit philosophus, voluntas naturafer est impossibilitum cum in impossibili possit salvari ratio boni. Et quod ulterior dicebatur appetitum naturalem non frustrari; verum est sumendo naturale ut distinguatur ab intellectivo, nam illud est opus intelligentiae non errantis; unde in quod fertur voluntas sine cognitione, frustrari non potest: at si per cognitionem, frustrari potest nisi sit recta ratio. Praequentato enim summum bono etiam Diis competente, voluntas fertur in illud esse impossibile; quare ne frustretur oportet voluntatem esse regulatam per rationem rectam." Op. cit. x. pp. 80, 81.

3 "Et talpa oculos habens non videt, sed in animali non frustrantur ut habetur (in) lib. De Hist. Anim. Quare et humanus animus desiderat immortalitatem quam consequit non potest absolute, sed sufficit quod separata simpliciter consequatur; quare Aristoteles 2 Metaphys. comparavit humanum intellectum noctuae et non talpae, noctua enim aliquam erat videt, talpa autem nihil, unde et 9 Metaph. tex. ult. dixit intellectum humanum in cognoscoendo abstracta non esse caecum, sed caecutientem; quapropter aeternitatem affectat, sed non perfecto appetitu desiderat." Op. cit. x. p. 82.
immortality. “Nor ought what is mortal to seek immortal happiness, since the immortal is not congruous with the mortal...which is why at the beginning we laid down that to each thing is assigned an end appropriate to it; for if a man be moderate he will not seek the impossible, nor will it be suitable to him: for to have such happiness belongs to the Gods, who are independent in every way of matter and mutation—the opposite of which is the case of the human race, which holds an intermediate position between mortal and immortal beings.”

It is not true then, Pomponazzi maintains, that men miss their end in this life. He meets the allegation by two suggestions which are perhaps the most original ideas to which his mind gave birth. He offers a twofold correction of the accepted ideas about a man’s end. In the first place, he suggests the conception of the human race as an organism, in which the different parts combine to promote a common end. Individual men may come to little, or do little in this world; yet they may fill each a place in the common life and do each a part in the common work of the whole human race. He institutes an elaborate comparison with the body², and employs also the analogy of a symphony of voices rendering different parts³. But for the order produced, he says, by the variety of individual men and individual fortunes, the individual himself could not exist; as it is each contributes to the other, and to the whole⁴. The passage is a lively and interesting one; but the special point at which Pomponazzi aims in it has, I think, been generally overlooked. It is a part of his answer to the argument that the ends of

¹ “Neque mortalis immortalis felicitatem appetere debet, quoniam immortalae mortalitatem non convenit...quæ primo supposuimus quod unicuique rei proportionatus finis assignetur; si enim homo sit temperatus non impossibilia appetet, neque sibi conveniunt; tamam enim habere felicitatem est proprium Deorum, qui nullo modo a materia et transmutatione dependent: cuius oppositum contingit in humano genere quod est medium inter mortalitatem et immortalitatem.” De Imm. xiv. p. 114.


³ “Sic commensurata diversitas inter homines perfectum, pulchrum, decorum, et delectabile generat.” Ibid.

⁴ “Individuum minime constare posset...Unumque tribuit alteri, et ab eodem cui tribuit recipit, reciprocaque habent opera.” Ibid.
human beings are not attained in the present life, and that life so far as this earth is concerned is meaningless and vain. He proposes a point of view other than that of the individual mode of reckoning, other than that which counts the gains of individual fortunes, taken in isolation. This is the use which he makes of the conception of a real and living unity of the human race. The design of this thought in his mind is, in measuring the attainments of man's mortal state, to substitute for the review of the mingled and often disappointing experiences of individuals a contemplation of a large and harmonious development in the race; and thus to turn the point of the objection, that in this life the ends of humanity are not attained\(^1\).

But in the second place, with reference to man's attaining the ends of his being in this life, Pomponazzi raises the question of what is the essential end of man, taken even as an individual. He prepares to dispute the conventional belief, that the end of man is intellectual attainment, intellectual contemplation.

He proceeds accordingly to examine the nature and the powers of man, to ascertain in the exercise of which of them he is to find his end.

The fact to which he has just referred, that all men work together to a common end, implies the existence of a common nature in men. This common nature he finds to consist in three rational powers (intellectus)—the "speculative" or theoretical, the "practical" or moral, and the "factive" or mechanical. For there is no man, he says, of full age and in possession of all his faculties, who does not share to a greater or less extent in each of these three rational powers\(^2\).

In an interesting passage he traces the rudiments of the theoretical understanding in all men, on the principle that the "common sense" and ordinary perceptions of men are in essence the same activities which in their full development make the various sciences and arts. Thus even the axioms of metaphysics are part of the common stock of mankind (for example, the

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axiom of non-contradiction), and its objects matters of universal apprehension (God, Being, the One, the True, the Good). Similarly, in the case of the various branches of science, all men possess and exercise the elements of mathematics and astronomy, of perspective and music, of rhetoric and dialectic. It is even more evident that all men exercise the practical reason, and have some aptitude for moral, civic, and domestic life. A certain degree of mechanical skill again is necessary for the very preservation of life.

The question is, then, in the exercise of which of these powers does man attain his true end as man; in which does he realise the specific and characteristic attributes of humanity and thus fulfil his proper destiny? Pomponazzi prepares to answer that it is in the exercise of the practical or moral reason.

First by a negative criticism he shews that the end of man is not to be found in the exercise of either of the other powers he has distinguished. In each case he adduces two arguments—a general argument from the analogy of nature or the fitness of things, and an empirical argument drawn from the facts and necessities of actual life. Thus with regard to theoretical speculation he points out, first, that even in so far as it is vouchsafed to men, it is rather a Divine gift than an endowment properly belonging to the nature of man; and secondly, that in its full development it is not, and cannot be, the possession of more than a very small proportion of mankind, and the part of the human race which gives itself wholly to intellectual pursuits as the end of life, even allowing for all the variety of these pursuits, bears the same proportion to the whole as the heart does to the body. It is certainly quite different in this respect with the mechanical arts; for the greater part of mankind is wholly given over to these, and the whole female sex occupied with almost nothing.

3 "Speculativus intellectus non est hominis, sed deorum...maximum donum deorum est philosophia." *Ibid.*
else. Yet still there are two reasons why the end of life cannot be sought in these. In the first place, in correspondence with his argument that speculative knowledge is more Divine than human, is the argument that mechanical art cannot be the attribute which marks out man in the system of nature, or that which is distinctively human, since it is shared by man with the lower animals. Secondly he refers to the impossibility, as a fact in life, that one man should cultivate all the mechanical arts; each of these competes with and excludes the others, so that it is laid down by all sound social thinkers, and proved in experience, that he who attempts to excel in more than one shall not excel in any.1

Proceeding then positively to establish his point, he makes much of the fact that in common speech a man is called “good” or “bad” absolutely, only in respect of moral qualities.2

Hence it is that a man does not take it amiss to be told that he is no metaphysician, or physicist, or artisan; but when he is called a thief, or intemperate, or unjust, or imprudent, he feels that he is being accused of not being what he ought to be, and blamed for something that is within his power. “But to be a philosopher, or to be a house-builder, is not within our power, nor are such things absolutely incumbent upon man.”

Nay, he can go further, and say that to require of every man the cultivation either of the theoretical understanding or of the mechanical arts would be inconsistent with the general well-being of the human race. For the common good of humanity exactly requires that in these respects there should be differences among men—that speculation, and mechanical labours, and the various sub-divisions or departments of each of these, should be attended to by different individuals. Returning to his conception of a common life in humanity and a common end which all the members of the race variously serve, he lays down, first, that all men are one in the possession, to some extent, of the “three

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2 "Secundum namque virtutes et vitia homo dicitur bonus homo, et malus homo; at bonus metaphysicus non bonus homo dicitur, sed bonus metaphysicus: bonusque domificator non bonus absolute, sed bonus domificator nuncupatur." Ibid.
rational powers\(^1\): secondly, that moral virtue is absolutely necessary to the fulfilment by each individual of his several office, and to the well-being and indeed the very preservation of the whole\(^2\); whereas, thirdly, this is so far from being the case with the several vocations of men, whether speculative or practical in their character, that on the contrary neither human society at large nor the particular human being could stand, or even continue to exist, but for the variety of tasks and functions among men; all are necessary, while no one human being could possibly overtake them all\(^3\).

The moral vocation of man, then, “qui proprie hominis est,” is alone “fit to be law universal.” It, and it alone, is binding on every man and always\(^4\). Pomponazzi examines the faculties of human nature in order to discover in the exercise of which of them that nature is to find its end; and he concludes that a man’s true end is to be found in the exercise of moral reason and in the moral conduct of life. His other powers a man is to cultivate in part, and in various proportions according to his nature and his place in life; but this with all his might and to perfection; absolutely and without limitation he is to be, in this sense, a “good man\(^5\).” And this view is verified by the criterion which Pomponazzi had set up of a common aim of the race, which its individual members are to serve: “For the universe would be completely preserved, if all men were zealous and highly moral, but not if they were all philosophers or smiths or builders\(^6\).”

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2 "Quantum ad intellectum practicam qui proprie hominis est, quilibet homo perfecte debet habere; ad hoc enim ut genus humanum recte conservetur, quilibet homo debet esse virtuosus moraliter et quantum possibile est carere vitio." Ibid.

3 "Non enim constaret mundus si quilibet esset speculativus, imo neque ipse, cum impossible sit unum genus hominum, utpote physic(or)um, sibi esse sufficiens; neque esse tantum domicoratorum genus, vel aliquid hujusmodi: neque fieri potest ut unus perfecte exerceat opera alterius, nedum omnium, sicut contingit in membris." Op. cit. xiv. p. 112.

4 "In quounque statu reperiatur, sive egenus, sive pauper, sive dives, sive mediocris, sive opulentus." Ibid.

5 "Quare universalis finis generis humani est, secundum quid de speculativo et factivo participare, perfecte autem de practico." Ibid.

6 "Universum enim perfectissime conservaretur si omnes homines essent studiosi et optimi, sed non si omnes essent philosophi vel fabri, vel domicicatores." Ibid.
This discrimination of the moral law as the one universal rule in human life is the first point in Pomponazzi's ethical doctrine which deserves the description of it by Ad. Franck\textsuperscript{1} as a "foreshadowing of the Critique of Practical Reason, for which the world was still to wait 300 years."

Again, whereas it had been remarked that the various intellectual and practical pursuits in which men may engage impede one another, and compete with one another, so that a man has to choose among them and cannot possibly cultivate all to perfection or even more than one, it is not so with the moral virtues; for moral life is a unity; and the cultivation or attainment of one virtue, so far from hindering the pursuit of another, puts us on the way to it: indeed the attainment in perfection of one virtue would imply really the attainment of all. This harmony in moral life, unique in human experience, fits it to be the essential and all-incumbent life of man\textsuperscript{2}.

Pomponazzi proceeds accordingly to draw his conclusion as to man's attainment of his true end and excellence within the limits of mortality\textsuperscript{3}.

The ground on which he holds this is once more defined to be that moral excellence is the only truly essential excellence of man. Admitting that the intellectual part of mankind is in a sense the highest part, he does not infer that every man should attain to the excellence of that part, any more than that in the body every member should exercise the functions of those which are considered to be the highest parts of the body, such as the heart or the eye\textsuperscript{4}.

Nor, although a man comes short—as many a man will—of perfection in the highest (intellectual) pursuits and of the peculiar

\textsuperscript{1} In the \textit{Journal des Savants} for 1869 (p. 407).

\textsuperscript{2} "Ut dicetur in Ethicis, virtutes morales sunt connexae, et qui perfecte habet unam habet omnes; quare omnes debent esse studiosi et boni." \textit{De Imm.} \textit{XIV.} p. 112.

\textsuperscript{3} "Quapropter ad rationem dicetur quod si homo mortalis est, quilibet homo potest habere finem qui universaliter convenit homini." \textit{Op. cit.} \textit{XIV.} p. 113.

\textsuperscript{4} "Ad rationem dicetur quod si homo mortalis est, quilibet homo potest habere finem qui universaliter convenit homini. Qui tamen competit parti perfectissimae non potest, neque convenit; sicut non quodlibet membrum potest habere perfectionem cordis et oculi, imo non constaret animal; sic si in quolibet homo esset speculativus, non constaret communitas humana:...felicitas igitur non stat in habitu speculativo per demonstrationem tanquam conveniens universaliter generi humano, sed tanquam primae parti principali ejus." \textit{Ibid.}
"felicity" that belongs to them, need he be said to have missed his end or his felicity; for although poorly endowed in intellectual, or alternatively in "mechanical" powers, he may be rich in moral attainment and moral worth, which are sufficient to make him happy. Nay, only in these does true happiness or success (felicitas) consist. For while a man may be called "happy" on other grounds, such as mechanical success, or a high degree of speculative attainment, he is only truly and properly felix in so far as he is morally good. For this is that which is within the power of all men.¹

It is in the light then of this revised conception of the end of man and of the most valuable elements in human life, that the question of the sufficiency of the present life is to be asked and answered. In this light Pomponazzi reconsiders the charge against earthly life, that it is meagre and unsatisfying; and he claims to prove that it is enough to satisfy the needs of man's nature, and does permit him, if he will, to realise his destiny.

The restriction, for example, and incompleteness of human knowledge, of which so much is made by those who depreciate earthly life, wear a different aspect from the changed point of view. If intellectual contemplation were the very end of man's existence, it could not be supposed to be so frustrated as it is here; and a future life would evidently be necessary to supply the deficiencies, and carry on the poor beginnings, of this. But as it is, the position of man with regard to knowledge may be considered altogether appropriate to his condition; for it may fairly be maintained that in this life each man possesses knowledge enough, and sufficient intellectual light, to enable him to fulfil his moral vocation as a man. In relation to absolute truth, and those matters which are the objects of the higher Intelligences, his light may in comparison be dim and his sight feeble, while at the same time he may have sufficient knowledge for the conduct of life; and indeed it may well be that the degree of knowledge vouchsafed to man is exactly that which is most appropriate to the working out of his moral task.² In that case

² "Inter res morales nihil excellentius haberi potest." Ibid.
his position is suitable to his nature, and to his fulfilment of his true end.

The reference to those beings who enjoy a perfect exercise of intelligence recalls the general consideration which Pomponazzi had already brought forward earlier in the book, that the end of man must be appropriate to his nature and to his position as a being of intermediate rank in the hierarchy of things.

It is remarkable that, while thus escaping the argument from the necessity of intellectual perfection, by the substitution of a moral for an intellectual ideal of life, Pomponazzi did not consider the argument which many would think the strongest argument for immortality—the argument, namely, from the necessity of moral perfection or at least of a higher degree of moral progress than is here attained or attainable by man. His was not the age or country for an enthusiastic moral idealism of that kind; and Pomponazzi's own moral feelings lacked the zeal and intensity which should give wings to such aspirations. Ethically, as a writer and a man, he was rather sober and serious than fervent or enthusiastic. He would probably have met this argument by another reminder of the natural limitations of man, and by enjoining moderation and deprecating unattainable ideals. He would have distinguished as usual between the human and the superhuman. You ought not to attempt, he would have said, to force human nature beyond its scope, or pitch the standard of human virtue too high. And on a modest and moderate view of what is in any case possible to a man, this life might be considered sufficient for its attainment—by those who make a reasonable effort, who do their best.

Meanwhile his belief is that man may find on earth a suitable, an appropriate destiny, which it is his duty to accept as sufficient. In a former argument, in answer to the claim that the desire for immortality implied its actual attainment, he had urged that

1 "Quod ulterius addebitur, quoniam talis speculatio non videtur posse facere hominem felicem cum sit valde debilis et obscura; huic dicitur quod tametsi in ordine ad aeternam hujusmodi sit, et ad eam quae intelligentiarum, tamen inter res morales nihil excellenterius haberi potest, sicut Plato in Timaeo dixit." Ibid.

every “appetite” needs to be corrected by “right reason.” Here he bases the same contention on moral grounds; the acceptance of the limitations of our state is treated as a matter of moral obligation; “for if a man is moderate, he will not desire what is impossible, nor is that fitting to his nature.” It is not a question of what we should like, but of what befits us.

He goes on, then, in justification of what he has suggested as the true end of man—an end attainable within the limits of this life—to show that peace and happiness are possible to man on earth.

Certainly in fulfilling his true end a man ought to find peace (“finis debet quietare”). But it might be argued with a show of reason that man cannot find peace or happiness if his existence and his hopes are confined to the present life. It does not quite appear, from a somewhat obscure passage, what the precise difficulty is. Probably it is that this life is such a scene of change and trouble. Or the suggestion may be, that earth is not sufficient to satisfy the large desires of man, or bring his mind to rest. Or it might be held, as Pomponazzi observes elsewhere, that the fear of death poisons life and makes happiness, or at least rest, impossible.

Pomponazzi replies characteristically by defining the measure and kind of the “peace” enjoyed by man. He quotes Aristotle’s teaching that human happiness is not inconsistent with many changes, and many lesser misfortunes. He does not, of course, forget how Aristotle finds in goodness the essence of happiness, and in the permanency of moral attainments its true stability; so that the peace or security of the good man can survive even great outward misfortunes, borne with a high spirit. This was Pomponazzi’s own conception of the security (stabilitas) of man. But at present he is concerned with that suggestion of Aristotle’s doctrine, that human happiness can be real without being perfect, “stable,” yet not without disturbance: and that indeed an unbroken rest and unmingled happiness do not belong to the human lot.


He compares man to a tree, whose leaves are always being shaken, but which is not at every blast plucked up by the roots. While always exposed to change and always in some degree of trouble, he would say, man has nevertheless his deep-rooted peace. If not a perfect happiness on earth, he has yet a real happiness. While always in fear of death, again he might have said, he does not every moment die. But if his happiness were not a vexed and mingled happiness, his peace a "disturbed stability," he would not be a man.

Reverting to the matter of knowledge, he uses the happy illustration of the different degrees of knowledge appropriate to different times of life. The child has only a child's mind; yet he is happy. He does not possess the knowledge of a grown man; but he does not therefore make himself miserable nor complain that he is harshly and unreasonably restricted. His contentment arises from the fact that he has that which is proper to his age: it is sufficient for his happiness. So may man be content with that which is appropriate to his nature; nor need he complain. A man may not know all that is to be known, nor so clearly but that his knowledge might be clearer; but this need not deprive him, as it was argued, of his peace of mind, if he has all that is appropriate to his condition.

In answer to the suggestion that all man's happiness is poisoned by the fear of change and the certainty of ultimate loss, which (it is said) make his condition one of misery rather than of felicity, Pomponazzi says very finely—"Illiberalis

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1 "Cum ulterius dicebatur quia finis debet quietare, hoc autem hominis intellectum et voluntatem non quietare, huius dicitur quod Aristoteles in fine Ethic. non ponit felicitatem humanam tanquam perfecte quietantem; imo ponit quod quantum-cumque homo sit felix non tamen tam stabilis est quin multa perturbent ipsum; non enim esset homo; verum non removent a felicitate, sicut non quis vis ventus evellet arborem, licet moveat folia. Quare in humana felicitate sufficit stabilitas non removibilis, licet aliqualiter conturbabilis." De Imm. xiv. p. 115.

2 "In juvenili enim si exactam non habet cognitionem, quae in virili congruit, dummodo habeat juvenili congruentem contentus est pro illa aetate, neque amplius appetit quam sibi conveniat." Ibid.

3 "Quare neque angustiabitur ut dicebatur." Ibid.

4 "Cum ulterius procedebatur quod nunquam tanta certa quanta scire potest, nec tam clare quin clarius; dico quod hoc non tollit felicitatem eius, dummodo tantum habeat quantum sibi pro illo statu convenit, et ex parte sui non deficiat." Ibid.
hominis est non velle restituere quod gratis acceptit." For indeed mortality is man's appointed condition. Even the ancients teach us that, holding life as we do only on condition of paying the debt to nature at the last, we ought to give it up with thanks to God and nature. To fear that which is inevitable is folly.

Nor is human life upon these terms, as it has been made out, "worse than the life of the brutes." For, in virtue of that moral worth which it may possess, it is far, even at the worst, from being the miserable condition it is said to be; and in any case it is infinitely preferable to a merely animal existence. Mere duration is not the test of a satisfying existence: "Who would prefer the long life of a stone or of a stag to that of a man however mean?" In the worst bodily condition a thinking man can possess a quiet mind. Nay, every wise man would prefer to endure the worst hardships and tribulations rather than in an opposite condition to be foolish, base, or vicious. For—so far from its being true, that in view of the difficulty and unsatisfactoriness of higher aims in this life (the labour, say, of the pursuit of knowledge, the renunciation of bodily enjoyments, and the dim knowledge which at the best we gain, with the prospect of losing all we have acquired) reason would counsel us, if this life were all, to decline upon bodily indulgence and excess—the mere truth is that the smallest share in knowledge and virtue is to be preferred to the total sum of bodily delights. So he prepares the way for his answer to the next argument.

It has been argued that, if death ended all, no man could ever for any reason willingly seek death. In this way it was sought to prove that the doctrine of mortality was inconsistent with the obligation of duty and the necessities of moral life. For, death being altogether evil, no man would then ever be

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2 "Cum ea lege receperit ut sciat naturae concessurum." _Ibid._
3 _Ibid._
4 "Quis mallet esse lapidem vel cervum longae vitae quam hominem quantum-cunque vilem?" _Ibid._
willing to die for duty. He would rather commit any baseness than meet death; nor would he die for his friend, his country, or the public good. But such a conclusion is "against nature" and repugnant to the universal feelings of mankind.

Pomponazzi met this argument, and deprived it of all its force, by the fundamental consideration that virtue is in itself desirable and vice hateful—virtue in itself preferable to all things, and vice of all things the most to be feared and shunned. Now, as Aristotle had said, of two evils we must choose the less. And to die for others, or in order to escape an act of baseness, is a gain to the individual—a gain in virtue, which is the most precious of all things; and it is a gain to the race, because it harmonises with and confirms its right instincts. But a crime injures the community, of which the criminal is also a part; and, still more, injures the criminal himself. A soul marred by baseness is a diseased soul; and by it a man does injury to his own humanity. Even if by wrong a soul could escape death for ever, sin would still be misery. But the soul cannot live for ever; death follows at last in any case; and for him who seeks by crime to escape death there is no immortality except "an immortality of shame and contempt." By doing right, again, true happiness is secured; which is something, however short its duration may be.

1 "Cum igitur in eligendo mortem pro patria, pro amicis, pro vitio evitando, maxima virtus acquiratur, alisque multum prosit, cum naturaliter homines hujusmodi actum laudant nihilque pretiosius et felicissima ipsa virtute, ideo hoc maxime eligendum est. At scelus perpetrandum communitati maxime nocet, quare et sibi, cum ipse pars communitatis sit, vitiumque incurrit quo nihil infelicius, cum desinet esse homo, ut Plato pluribus locis in De Republica dicit." Op. cit. xiv. p. 117.


3 "Desinit esse homo." See note 1 above.


Pomponazzi meets ingeniously the logical quibble of the schools, that no man could willingly choose death, if death were the end of all, for death would then be annihilation, and the will cannot choose "nothing" but must always move towards some "good." "Neque per se in tali casu mors eligitur, cum nihil sit; verum actus Studiosus, licet ad eum sequatur mors: sicut non committendo vitium, non renuitur vita, cum in se sit bona, sed vitium renuitur, ad cujus perpetrationem sequitur vita." Op. cit. xiv. p. 118.
Pomponazzi does not deny that most men, if they thought death were the end, would prefer even dishonour to death; wherefore wise legislators restrain the masses of mankind from crime and incite them to courage by threats and promises for the future life; but those who need such influences are only they who do not know the true nature of vice and virtue.

By the same consideration, of the essential gain of goodness and the loss inseparable from evil-doing, does Pomponazzi seek to remove the difficulty that might be felt about the Divine Government in view of the inequality of rewards and punishments in this life. Rewards and punishments, it was argued, fall in this life so irregularly; so many crimes go undetected, so many more unpunished, and so many good actions fail of their reward; that if this life were all, it would be impossible to believe in a righteous government of the universe: we should be obliged to conclude either that God does not govern, is not omnipotent (in which case he would be no longer God), or else that he is unjust—either supposition being abhorrent and inadmissible. Wherefore, it was said, there must be another life in which good and evil fortune shall be exactly proportioned to desert.

Pomponazzi answers all this in the bold way which is characteristic of him. He frankly admits the alleged inequalities in the distribution of outward rewards and punishments. Nevertheless he affirms that no good action goes unrewarded and no evil action unpunished, in this life. He does so on the simple ground that virtue is its own reward and vice its own sufficient punishment.

We must distinguish, he says, between the "essential" and the "accidental" reward or punishment. He also expresses

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Pomponazzi supports his argument by instances of irrational creatures dying for one another and to preserve the species: they have no life after death, and yet it must be worth while thus to die, for in so doing they are guided by instinct, which is infallible: "Natura dirigitur ab intelligentia non errante; non ergo et in homine hoc est contra rationem." Op. cit. XIV. p. 120.


3 "Sciendum est quod præmium, et poena, duplex est, quoddam essentiale et inseparabile, quoddam vero accidentale et separabile." Op. cit. XIV. p. 120.
this in the case of punishment as the distinction between the inward guilt (poena culpae) and the outward loss (poena damni).

It is in respect of its "essential" consequences that conduct never goes unrequited. Nothing better than goodness itself can possibly be possessed by human nature\(^1\): this is the best that can befall; and therefore in being good a man infallibly has his reward. It is in this that the security and stability consist which Aristotle ascribes to the good man\(^2\). On the other hand, wickedness of itself implies unhappiness; for first of all, baseness itself is of all things the most miserable\(^3\), while, further, all sorts of outward dispece attend it as well\(^4\).

Wherefore, he says, Aristotle, asking the question why prizes are given in all other contests, but not in the efforts after virtue and knowledge, answers that it is because a prize, to be a prize, must be of more value than the game; but nothing is of more value than virtue or knowledge; and therefore there is nothing fit to be the reward of those efforts except the virtue and the knowledge themselves.

The "separable" recompense of action is admittedly variable and irregular. The reason of this he does not here enquire into\(^5\): the fact is undoubted, but that does not affect the essential connection between virtue and well-being, vice and calamity\(^6\). The

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\(^1\) "Nihil enim majus natura humana habere potest ipsa virtute." *Ibid.*

\(^2\) See Arist. *Nic. Eth.* Bk I. Chap. xi. "Praemium essentiale virtutis est ipsamet virtus quae hominem felicem facit. Nihil enim majus natura humana habere potest ipsa virtute, quandoqnidem ipsa sola hominem securum facit et remotum ab omni perturbatione: omnia namque in studiose consonant: nihil timens, nihil sperans, sed in prosperis et adversis uniformiter se habens, sicut dicitur in fine I Ethic. et Plato in Critone dixit, viro bono neque vivo neque defuncto potest aliud malum contingere." *De Imm.* XIV. p. 120.

\(^3\) "Poena namque vitiosi est ipsum vitium, quo nihil miserius, nihil infelicius, esse potest." *Ibid.*


irregularity of the outward ("accidental") reward or punishment matters the less since the intrinsic or "essential" consequence is in itself incomparably greater.

Finally Pomponazzi goes one step further. The inward gain or loss, he says, by virtue or vice respectively, is in each case greater where there is no outward recompense, than where there is such recompense. The outward reward (at any rate so far as it was in view when the good action was done) actually diminishes the real gain of the good action; the suffering of outward punishment lessens the inward loss by sin. This is put crudely—that the incidence of the outward consequence positively interferes with the development of the intrinsic consequence, whether of gain or loss—in order by the paradox to emphasise the main position, that the absence of external reward makes absolutely no difference to a man's reaping the fruit of his goodness; that in escaping outward punishment a man is still left to bear the utmost consequences of wrong-doing. So far from the absolute gain or loss—whichever it be—being diminished by the absence of material profit or detriment, he will assert that it is positively increased.

He explains his meaning. It then appears that he did not precisely intend that the happy outward consequences of goodness diminish its real gains; but only that if they are considered as an inducement, if a man sets them before him as his end, he is so much the less a good man, and makes so much the less of the real gains of goodness. The man who does right without hope of reward has a higher virtue than the man who has an eye to that reward. He has more of that inward and intrinsic reward which virtue itself is.

The application of the idea in the converse case is somewhat different. In proportion as a man suffers outwardly through

1 "Accidentale praemium longe minus est essentiali praemio, poena namque accidentalis...longe minor est poena essentiali...culpae poena longe deterrior est poena danni." Op. cit. XIV, pp. 121, 122.

his fault, it is suggested, his inward loss thereby (poena culpae) is lessened. It does not appear whether this diminution is due to a remedial power in the punishment, lessening sinfulness; or whether the idea is that, forensically speaking, his guilt is reduced by expiation. So far, the argument is clear that if the poena culpae (the inward and intrinsic loss through sin) be thus diminished through the endurance of the poena damni (outward loss), the absolute loss is lessened, and, speaking absolutely, the man is a gainer. The ultimate standard of gain and loss is the inward one, the standard of character, of more or less actual goodness. As always, Pomponazzi maintains again that any outward loss or suffering is well borne which makes the man a better man; while, on the other hand, the man who remains "unpunished" is yet the loser by his sin, and perhaps loses more, really because he has not suffered.

Thus, once more, whatever be the history of outward rewards and punishments, human action, Pomponazzi concludes, never goes really unrequited.

These applications of the idea of Virtue as an end in itself, reminiscent as they are of the doctrines of Kant, find no counterpart in Pomponazzi's immediate predecessors among the schoolmen, or in the Arabians, or in the Renaissance Platonists.

Two other difficulties in the way of his doctrine, and Pomponazzi's manner of dealing with them, may be briefly mentioned.

It was urged that if the soul be not immortal, almost all mankind, believing in its immortality, has been deceived. Pomponazzi replied that this is not necessarily an inconceivable supposition; for in any case, since there are "three religions,"

1 "Eodem quoque modo qui vitiose operatur, et accidentaliter punitur, minus videtur puniri eo qui accidentaliter non punitur. Nam poena culpae major et deterior est poena damni. Et cum poena damni adjungitur culpae diminuit culpam. Quare non punitus accidentaliter magis punitur essentialiter eo qui accidentaliter punitur." Ibid.

2 "Dicitur nullum malum esse essentialiter impunitum, neque bonum essentialiter irremerentatum esse....Omnis virtuosus virtute sua et felicitate praemiatur....At contrarium de yitio contingit, ideo nullus vitiosus impunitus relinquitur." Op. cit. XIV. pp. 120, 121.
either all mankind or a majority of men have held erroneous creeds.  

Here also we find the most deliberate statement of Pomponazzi's frequently expressed opinion, of the right of prudent legislators to impose upon their subjects useful and restraining beliefs, although known by themselves to be untrue. Truth is not the concern of the legislator, but good living only; and men have to be influenced, he says, according to their nature, some by higher, some by lower considerations. "The legislator, knowing that men's lives are prone to evil, and aiming at the common weal, has sanctioned the belief that the soul is immortal, not caring about the truth of the belief, but about its moral value." He is justified, it is argued, in so doing on the very same grounds on which a nurse is permitted to limit the knowledge of a child, or a physician to deceive a sick person or one of unsound mind.

The last objection on moral grounds to his conclusion with which Pomponazzi deals, is the allegation that the immortality of the soul is the belief of all good men, and its mortality is held only by those who desire to lead immoral and sensual lives. He first denies the fact: "Nam manifeste videmus multos pravos homines credere, verum passionibus seduci; multos etiam viros sanctos et justos scimus mortalitatem animarum posuisse," and so forth; and he enumerates the names of the virtuous heathen. Besides, he says, it must be taken into account that there have been many who have known the soul to be mortal, but have dissembled their belief, by way of reserve or as a moral precaution ("sicut medicus ad aegrum, et nutrix ad puerum"). But, secondly, even if the case were so, it need not be; for all the duties of morality and religion ("Deum colere, divina honorare, preces ad Deum fundere, sacrificia facere") are on the theory of the soul's mortality fully binding: being right


2 "Politicus est medicus animorum; propositumque politici est facere hominem magis studiosum quam scientem." Ibid.


in themselves¹ they are to be sought and practised. And finally, he repeats that all these things are even performed with a more perfect, because a more disinterested, virtue by those who have no hope of a future life and its rewards, and are not actuated by fear of future punishment; and so he concludes, "quare perfectius asserentes animam mortalem melius videntur salvare rationem virtutis quam asserentes ipsam immortalem²."
CHAPTER XI

NATURAL LAW IN HUMAN LIFE AND RELIGION

POMPONAZZI had formed a distinct idea of an order of nature—of nature as a system, governed by pervading and uniform principles. His work De Incantationibus is a deliberate attempt to extend the conception of that order to all phenomena without exception, by bringing all the marvellous events and powers observed in experience or recorded in history within the scope of principles common to all nature. He seeks to trace analogies between the extraordinary and the familiar, and to interpret what is most exceptional in terms of nature’s common operations. Hypothetically at least he includes all things within the natural order as he understands it, and what we should call the reign of law; and he endeavours also as far as possible to discover the actual causation of each event.

His avowed design is, salvare experimenta, to account for facts. Those marvellous phenomena, in nature and history, for whose actual occurrence there appears to be sufficient evidence, he includes among experimenta. And for these exceptional parts of experience, as for its most usual elements, he desires to find the simplest explanation, and an explanation infra limites naturales. It is expressly on this ground that he rejects the attempt to account for omens, portents, and wonders generally, through the agency of angels and demons. If a natural

1 "In rebus difficilibus et occultis, responsiones magis ab inconvenientibus remotae ac magis sensatis et rationibus consonae, sunt magis recipiendae quam oppositae rationes....His modo sic suppositis, tentandum est sine daemonibus et angelis ad objecta respondere." De Nat. Eff. p. 131. Similarly in the De Immortalitate: "Evidenti ratione naturali hoc (i.e. the agency of spirits) videre meo monstrari non potest; quare non stabimus infra limites naturales quod tamen polliciti sumus a principio.” De Imm. xiv. p. 118.
explanation can be found, he says, we are exempted from the necessity of seeking a supernatural one. His intention to discover a natural explanation of everything, even of that which is most exceptional in experience, is sufficiently obvious.

His point of view is clearly illustrated by the title of the book usually called the *De Incantationibus*. This is only a secondary title; the full title of the book is *De Naturalium Effectuum Admirandorum Causis, sive de Incantationibus*. The book certainly deals with magic, as it deals with all exceptional and surprising effects in nature: with dreams, apparitions, omens, portents; spells, and charms; necromancy, chiromancy; miracles (so-called) both within and outside of Scripture History; miraculous answers to prayer and the like; in short, *de rebus difficilibus et occultis*. But the point is that the enquiry about these things is *de naturalium effectuum causis*; and that such are the contents of a book bearing this title.

Of course, in the case of Pomponazzi, his idea of nature's order and his attempts at natural explanation were governed by his astrological presuppositions. It is impossible here to trace the influences through which the conception of the spheres and the celestial powers came so to pervade the mediaeval mind as it did. In this respect Pomponazzi shared the ideas of his time; in proportion as he was deeply read in the Arabians and in Albert, must this whole side of things have bulked more largely in his thoughts and occupied his imagination; while in Aristotle, as he read Aristotle, he would find nothing to correct him, since it was from certain passages of Aristotle that the whole astrological scheme took its rise. In all natural and historical events, at any rate, it was supposed that astral influences were at work—not superseding ordinary physical and psychical causes, but operating in and through all their sequences. Practically, although not theoretically, this superior system of causes stood for what we might call the universal complex of causes. Just as we know that, along with a particular cause which we may single out in its connection with a particular effect, there is

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working an infinite number of other factors, making in their combination a universal system; so for Pomponazzi there stood behind each particular cause the general causation of the celestial powers; or rather, behind each “sequence” of events (for this was his notion of causality) stood those powers determining that this should follow that, and events fall out so and not otherwise: standing thus behind, and working through, every particular instance of sequence or causality. The two ideas are very different, and indeed not strictly comparable, expressing as they do two entirely different notions of nature; but they may be compared in so far that when Pomponazzi, besides pointing out a particular sequence of events in nature, referred the effect at the same time to the heavenly powers, he meant much the same as we do when we refer a fact to the order of nature: he meant to establish the fact in a connected system, to place it under an order uniformly working.

All events, all phenomena, were included within the sway of the astral influences. The astral order was the other side of nature.

It was therefore, to say the least, nothing inconsistent with his astrology, if Pomponazzi sought to bring all events, even the most exceptional, within the order of nature. But we may go further and say that, for him, to refer wonders and miracles to the astral powers was precisely to include them in the natural order and refer them to the analogy of nature. This was what the reference meant, to his own thought; this was the very motive and significance of the astrological explanation, from his point of view.

He expressly brings forward the astrological as a natural explanation, contrasting it in this respect with the theory of spiritual agency. He brackets “nature and the heavenly powers” together as the “efficient cause” of phenomena, or, by

1 “Infra limites naturales stabimus,” he says; and again, “Si sine illa multiplicatione daemonum et geniorum salvare possimus, supervacuum videtur illa ponere... corpora ergo coelestia secundum suas virtutes haec miranda producunt.” De Imm. XIV. p. 130.

a variation of the thought, combines with the celestial causation a physical "disposing cause."

The great reason why Pomponazzi brings wonders and magic within the scope of the astral influences is just that universal nature is subject to those influences. Thus the whole motive and implication of this reference in the case of the marvellous is that those exceptional phenomena are to be viewed according to the analogy of nature generally. If, his argument is, the celestial powers uphold and direct the whole frame of nature, why should they not likewise be supposed to govern these particular events? Unusual these events may be; it may lie beyond our power to trace their causes in detail; but why remove them from the scope of those powers that govern all other sublunary things, many of them also mysterious and inexplicable, though in a less degree? Considering the great and innumerable concerns included in the realm of nature and governed by the heavenly powers, why should we place beyond their capability "effects" which are few in number after all, and intrinsically small and unimportant, when compared with the vastness and variety of universal nature?

His attribution of marvels to the celestial powers, then, did not mean that he made them exceptions to the order of nature,


but the very contrary. It was his way of affirming that they were included in that order. The conception of an all-embracing order was indeed the fundamental postulate of astrology.

Meanwhile Pomponazzi makes a laborious attempt to find, for all the marvels which are to be accepted as worthy of belief, parallels and analogies in nature which, if they do not explain them, at least suggest conceivable explanations.

The sequences and conjunctions which seem magical and supernatural are after all on the same footing as other observed sequences and conjunctions in nature. We are not able to explain, says Pomponazzi, why one phenomenon in nature follows or accompanies another; we simply observe the fact that it is so. He thus compares the supposed sequence of an omen and its fulfilment with any other observed sequence in nature; in particular with a case in which one event is the recognised and authentic sign of another without being its cause, as the rainbow for example is a sign of the end of rain. Or if, again, we are to believe that one day is lucky, another unlucky, it is a strange conjunction, an inexplicable repugnancy; but not more inexplicable, intrinsically, he suggests, than the attractions or repulsions observed by the chemist. The transformations and 'metamorphoses' ascribed to magic or to supernatural power are similarly parallel with the more remarkable and surprising natural alterations, such as the formation of fossils, the petrifaction of wood and other objects in mineral springs, or the metamorphosis of the caterpillar into the butterfly.

The miracles that attend the beginnings of new religions, the gifts of prophets and diviners, and the like, are brought in the same way within the normal operations of nature and the heavenly powers; or it is suggested that they could be so brought. The answers to prayer, seemingly miraculous, are traced (in so far as they cannot be physically explained) to the operation of a law, according to which acceptable prayers precede the accomplishment of Divine purposes; and thus even the prayers themselves, and the religions out of which they arise, are subject to a Divine government, and form parts and stages of a cosmic purpose.
We have here, then, the outline of a philosophy of nature and of religion.

This whole mode of explanation of the marvellous in nature and history is constantly pitted against the orthodox theory which attributed magic and miracles to the agency of angels or demons⁴. The book *De Naturalium Effectuum Causis* is a uniform polemic against that theory, as essentially a vulgar superstition. It is the tendency of the vulgar mind, he says, always to ascribe to diabolic or angelic agency events whose causes it does not understand².

While he thus seeks to refer all things to "natural" causes, Pomponazzi is fully prepared to recognise many strange effects in nature. His point of view is that there are many surprising and even to us inexplicable things in nature, but all doubtless capable of a natural explanation, had we sufficient knowledge of nature and the heavenly powers. On the one hand he insists that the ordinary sequences of nature are ulti-


² Thus with regard to the fluctuation of the prophetic *afflatus*, of which he had been suggesting the astral and the physical conditions: "Et vulgares attribuunt hoc numinibus iratis, cum veram causam ignorant. Sed haec est consuetudo vulgi, ascribere daemonibus vel angelis quorum causas non cognoscunt." *Op. cit.* p. 230. Or in the case of answers to prayer: "Cum ignavum vulgus ista ignorant, cum succedunt vota, dicunt Deos vel Sanctos fuisse sibi propitious, et orationes sibi fuisse gratis: cum vero non succedunt, Deos et Sanctos esse iratos: quandoquidem haec talia habeat causam quam diximus." *Op. cit.* p. 240. In the case of magic, the superstitious belief may be imposed upon the credulous by interested pretenders; or again the stigma of diabolic agency may be placed upon the magic to guard against its abuse; just as in the case of miracles and omens the vulgar are indulged in a favourite superstition by those who know better than to believe it themselves:

"Fortassis quoniam harum scientiarum magis est abusus quam usus, hinc forte dictae sunt esse daemoniacae, et ab eis daemonibus inventae, ut non desiderentur, et abominaliles fiant; velut legitar de Mahumeto in Alcorano, qui dum vino et maxime rubro vellet gentibus sui interdicere, finxit in quolibet uvae rubeeae grano habitare unum diabolum. Potuit et hoc fingi, ut habentes eas artes essent in majori pretio, et haberentur ut dii. Fortassis et isti daemones sive angelii introducti sunt, quoniam cum talia quae retulimus multiotiens visa sunt, veluti de oraculis, de omnibus in aere apparentibus, et de reliquis recitatis, et rude vulgus veras causas non potest capere; nam homines isti non philosophi, qui revera sunt veluti bestiae, non possunt capere Deum, Coelos, et Naturam hocasse operatori, creduntque ita esse de intelligentiis, veluti de hominibus (non enim nisi corporalicia capere possunt); ideo propter vulgares introducti sunt angeli et daemones, quanquam introductentes minime posse esse illos sciebant." *Op. cit.* pp. 200, 201.
mately inexplicable; they are simply given, imposed upon experience, and are intrinsically incapable, or all but incapable, of explanation; there is an analogy of nature, a proportion and a propriety in it; but we are hardly able to discover what it is. On the other hand he holds to the belief that a process of causation and an intelligible sequence (of a "sign," as he says, and a "thing signified") are to be found even in the case of that which is most exceptional and therefore most surprising to us.

His idea of what is possible in nature was of course in some directions too wide, just as in other directions it would be found too narrow; because it was inexact. The astrological view, in particular, of the order of nature was in a very high degree vague and indefinite. It left room, no doubt, for marvellous and unexplained phenomena, because it left room for the absurd and the impossible. It is possible to know much more of the analogy of nature than Pomponazzi thought possible; much more than he knew. Had he known more, he would at once have dismissed much that he accepted as at least possible. Of many things which he supposed to be vouched for by experience, he would have been suspicious to the point of incredulity; and a sterner examination of the evidence would have disproved them. But the things which we are now apt to feel instinctively to be outside of the possibilities of nature and beyond the analogy of nature altogether, he did not feel to be so. For him, not only miracles, both within and without Christianity, but magic as well, came within at least the conceivable and credible possibilities of nature.

We are perhaps learning even at the present moment to extend our view of the possibilities of nature. It is quite certain that these can never be arbitrarily limited, and that the sixteenth century astrologer attained more nearly to the scientific spirit than many a professed scientist of a later day, hidebound by prejudice and dogmatism. In its two essentials, in short, he

1 "Proprietatem et proportionem...nobis intelligere aut difficilimum aut impossibile est....Sed stamus experimentis." De Nat. Eff. p. 171.
2 "Non sunt miracula quia sint totaliter contra naturam et praeter ordinem corporum coelestium; sed pro tanto dicuntur miracula (i.e. things marvellous or surprising), quia insueta et rarissime facta, et non secundum communem naturae cursum, sed in longissimis periodis." Op. cit. p. 294.
possessed the scientific spirit—in an open mind, that is, to the boundless and often unexpected possibilities of nature, and in a dependence on experience ("stamus experimentis").

I should not like to imply, however, that Pomponazzi was altogether unsuspicious in the matter of evidence. On the contrary, he was, for his time, noticeably cautious and sceptical. While accepting too much, he rejects many fables; and much that he seems to treat too seriously he has only accepted hypothetically, for a non-committal and provisional examination.

This spirit is illustrated in many details.

Pomponazzi for example constantly distinguishes, among the marvellous stories that are current, those that are true from those that are false. We must discriminate, he insists, among the various marvels that are reported—the wonders alleged by priests or others and the miraculous events related in Scripture or by the poets. Some of these events and phenomena, though strange, are doubtless real; and of those that are so, he endeavours to find or to imagine a possible natural explanation. But many of the stories that are told are as indubitably false, and are the product either of fraud or of delusion; and he is prepared to call in this explanation in the case of alleged events altogether beyond the possibility of natural explanation.

Those who accept all such stories without examination and those who will believe in nothing that seems strange or mysterious are, he says, equally in the wrong; and indeed fall into the same error, of a refusal to discriminate.

In the first place he cannot agree with those who dismiss all such stories as fraudulent inventions. They are, he says, in many cases too well authenticated, and by too good authorities. We must endeavour rather to separate the true from the false; and in the case of facts which appear to be well established, we must attempt to find the most feasible and the most natural explanation.

1 "Mihi autem non videtur tutum neque sine verecundia dictum, quod a plerisque dici solet haec experimenta negantibus, haec scilicet esse ab hominibus conficta, velut Aesopi apologi, ad plebis instructionem: vel quod sunt sacerdotum aucupia ad subripiedas pecunias, et ut in honorem habeantur, quod si aliquid in his operibus appareat perfecte, sunt praestigationes et illusiones, veluti continue videmus in istis
In many cases, however, he is prepared to accept the hypothesis of fraudulent or well-intentioned fiction. Thus many alleged miracles are the inventions of priests for purposes of gain\(^1\). Other marvellous narratives are of the nature of instructive fables, invented by lawgivers or philosophers for an ignorant and sensuous multitude only capable of learning by sensible images and concrete representations; and are imposed on them for their moral benefit\(^2\). The anthropomorphic narratives of the Old Testament are expressly brought within the scope of this explanation.

In the same way the fancies of the poets are explained—e.g. the "metamorphoses"—either as imaginative representations of natural facts (e.g., the "birds of Diomede") or as consciously intended to set forth moral truth in symbolic form (the transformation of men into animals, e.g., representing a moral condition or a moral change)\(^3\).

In the case of Scripture narratives, this admission of a method of accommodation and figurative representation has the consequence of a spiritual and secret sense in Scripture\(^4\).

\(^1\) See e.g. De Imm. xiv. p. 126; De Nat. Eff. p. 146.

\(^2\) See op. cit. pp. 114; 201, 202; 269, etc.


\(^4\) "In veteri lege multa feruntur quae vere non possunt intelligi ut litera sonat... sed sunt sensus mystici et dioti propter ignavum vulgus quo corporalia capere non potest. Sermo enim legum, ut inquit Averroes in sua poesi, est similis sermoni poetarum, nam quanquam poetae fingunt quae ut verba sonant non sunt possibles, intus tamen veritatem continent...nam illa fingunt ut in veritatem veniamus, et rude vulgus instramus quod inducere oportet ad bonum et a malo retrahere, ut pueri inducuntur et retrahuntur, scilicet, spe praemii et timore poenae; et per haec corporalia ducere in cognitionem incorporalium, veluti de cibo teneriori in cibus solidiorem ducimus infantes." Op. cit. pp. 201, 202.
We are not, however, entitled, merely because an alleged occurrence is strange and inexplicable, to dismiss it as impossible and fictitious. For, as Pomponazzi constantly repeats, there are many things in nature which are marvellous and surprising, and which are exceptions to ordinary rules.

Where we have reason to believe that the unusual event did take place, our aim must be to find the simplest explanation of it, and that which is most in accordance with the other operations of nature. The question that presents itself is how to account for the facts (salvare experimenta)\(^1\).

It is characteristic of his sceptical and dialectical manner of thought, and perhaps also of the vacillation and uncertainty in his mind, that in very many cases Pomponazzi offers alternative explanations: and suggests that either the marvellous story or magical doctrine is untrue, or else, if it be true, that analogies can be discovered in nature which make it not altogether inconceivable, and bring it within the compass of the regular powers of nature and the astral influences\(^2\).

Thus, for example, he proposes to trace the natural history of apparitions\(^3\). He begins by setting aside many popular fables and priestly inventions. Next, he speaks of cases in which the apparition is a matter of pure illusion due to physical causes: the air, in places where there are many graves, is supposed to be thick and cloudy\(^4\), and the appearances it presents are mistaken by the ignorant and superstitious for ghostly apparitions—the delusion being aided by imagination, and terror, and accepted belief\(^5\). But certain facts remain as at least probably authentic, when these causes are allowed for\(^6\). Of this residuum of fact Pomponazzi offers his characteristic explanation. Refusing to admit a real appariation of departed spirits, declining also to refer the appearances to angelic or

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2 E.g. op. cit. pp. 146, 174, 191, 273—278.

3 Cf. a parallel passage in the De Immortalitate, xiv. p. 125.

4 "In locis sepulchorum, ut in pluribus, aëris est valde crassus, tum ex evaporatione cadaverum, tum ex frigiditate lapidum, ex multisque aliis, quae aēris spissitudinem inducunt." Ibid. "Bless me! what damps are here! how stiff an air!" (Henry Vaughan: The Charmel House).


diabolic agency, he puts them down to certain powers in nature, exercised of course by the astral agencies. As has already been pointed out, for him the astral is the "natural" explanation. In the De Naturalium Effectuum Causis he analyses somewhat more minutely than in the De Immortalitate the manner in which, on occasion of an apparition, the human mind is affected. In the first place he refers to the analogy of dreams: if the higher powers work on the mind in sleep (as was then universally believed), why not in the waking state also? Coming to the waking state, he names first the condition most akin to sleep, that namely of trance or ecstasy, in which men believe that they converse with spirits or with the dead, and through which, he doubts not, divination may be given. Of apparitions in the ordinary sense three explanations may be supposed. There may in the first place be a purely subjective illusion: or, secondly, there may be an objectively real operation—of astral origin; and, in the latter case, either an abnormal affection of the organ of sense or an effect upon the external air. In the first place what he supposes to happen is that the thoughts and fancies of the mind affect the senses, producing an illusory impression there; which is the reverse of the normal process. But he also admits the possibility of the physical senses being directly affected by the secret agency of the heavenly powers: the most interesting point in the development of this idea is his illustration of it by natural analogies, and by comparison of the mystic intuitions of prophets with the presentiments of animals and the weather-wisdom of sailors and husbandmen. Finally, he

4 "Tertio, idem potest contingere in vigilia (et hoc raro) per simulachra genita in sensibus exterioribus a corporibus coelestibus." Ibid.
6 "Nautae et agricolae periti certius...judicant quam astrologi scientifici." Ibid.
supposes that a secret power may act directly on the air, causing in it an unusual perturbation and producing an unusual appearance\(^1\). Such are the four causes of apparitions\(^2\).

All this may doubtless appear to us fantastic and absurd in the highest degree—an attempt to explain by imaginary causes supposed facts which have no existence: yet it represents a real movement, in an essentially mediaeval mind, towards a consistent view of the universe, and an attempt to bring all known or imagined facts within the scope of the powers of Nature in a wide sense of the words.

That there are any real apparitions of the dead, Pomponazzi altogether denies. We have in his theory a curiosity of the history of superstition, namely, the belief in ghosts without a belief in an existence after death. Necromancy in the strict sense he declares impossible\(^3\), while allowing that, if we could believe in the immortality of the soul, there would be no absolute reason to deny the possibility of raising the dead. But real apparitions of the sorts above described he holds to be possible; nor is there conclusive reason to doubt the possibility of their being produced by human ingenuity, by those who should gain sufficient knowledge of the conditions which regulate their occurrence\(^4\).

Towards the belief in portents and omens the attitude of Pomponazzi is much the same. Allowing for a large element of invention in the stories that are told, he is yet not able to

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\(^2\) Enumerated in op. cit. pp. 163, 164.


\(^4\) "Si necromantia intelligatur per similitudinem, scilicet aliquid simile mortuo... apud Aristotelem est concedenda, et hoc fieri vi superum; et fortassis quod ex artificio, sive hominum ingenio, fieri potest per virtutes herbarum, lapidum, vel harum consimilium: hoc tamen non affirmo, multa enim sunt possibilia, quae quoniam nobis nota non sunt ea negamus; talia enim non mihi impossibilita videntur." Op. cit. pp. 161, 162.
disbelieve them altogether; while at the same time he labours to bring marvels of this kind also within the regular working of nature and the heavenly powers. With regard to portents in nature, and indeed to oracles, prophecies, and marvellous events generally, he remarks that their occurrence is recorded in connection with great events in history, such as the rise and fall of nations or dynasties, the changes of religions, the birth and death of remarkable personages, and the like—appropriate occasions, he suggests, for the special activity of the heavenly influences; he quotes, for example, the wonders which are said to have accompanied the birth of Augustus, of Alexander, of the Saviour of the world. For the belief in omens and auguries also he considers that there is a probable foundation, and he invokes for it the respectable authority of Plato. He is chiefly concerned, however, to bring the connection of omens with their fulfilment into analogy with the ordinary sequences of events in nature. Omens are signs; but so also are all events signs of those that follow them; and all natural objects signs of the properties which are observed to belong to them. Even in the most ordinary instances we cannot understand why one thing should thus be linked to another: we can only observe that it is so. The sequence of omens with their fulfilments is simply another case of the same kind—established, as Pomponazzi supposes, by experience, but in itself neither more nor less comprehensible than any other established sequence.

He goes so far in this interpretation of nature as a language of signs as to compare nature's sequences with the arbitrary symbolism of human invention, as, for example, when a red flag is taken to mean war and a white flag peace. There is no doubt a certain natural appropriateness in all such emblems (the red flag, e.g., being of the colour of blood, and the white suggesting spotlessness and quiet), but this would not of itself be sufficient

to declare their meaning. We gather their meaning by experience. Now herein, he says, "art follows nature" ("ars imitatur naturam"). In nature, as in the case of an artificial emblem, we learn by experience to infer from the sign the thing signified. If then, as he holds to be established by experience, a certain omen is constantly followed by a certain event, happy or unfortunate, the connection between the two is the same as between any other two related events in nature.

This is not to say that the one is the *cause* of the other. And here he adds the just and the relevant distinction that two events may be constantly connected in experience, and consequently suggest or "signify" each other, neither of which is either cause or effect of the other, but which are both effects of the same cause; and so, when that cause comes into play, both appear together. He takes the example of the connection which we see to exist between a rainbow and fair weather: we do not say that the rainbow is the cause of the fair weather, but the rainbow appears because the cloud grows thin, and the clearing of the cloud causes the rain to cease. There is here, he remarks, a double process of inference—from effect to cause and from cause again to another effect: from the rainbow we may infer the thinning of the cloud, and from that the cessation of the rain. Of this sort, he says, must be the connection between an omen and its fulfilment.


3 "Utpote quoniam iris et serenitas aëris ab eadem causa procedunt, ideo per irim judicamus serenitatem futuram, sunt enim ibi quasi duo processus: primus est ab effectu ad causam, cum ab iride procedamus supra nubis victoriam. Et quoniam victoria super nubem est causa serenitatis aëris ideo ex tali nubis victoria procedimus ad aëris serenitatem, tamquam ex causa super effectum: quod autem ex iride inferatur victoria super nubem, et ex victoria super nubem inferatur serenitas, sumitur nunc tamquam notum quomodocunque illud fuerit notum. Quare in proposito dici potest, per garritum corvi cognoscitur malum futurum, quoniam utrumque ab eadem causa procedit: quo fit, ut per unum, alterum cognosci possit." *Op. cit.* pp. 171, 172.
The application of this to the omen is less interesting to us than its application to the rainbow; the argument than the illustration. The point to which I wish to call attention is Pomponazzi's way of approaching the subject. He is wrong in his facts, but right in his mode of reasoning. What he supposed to be established in experience, we know to be a fancy altogether remote from experience and fact. But the appeal to experience is the main thing. "Stamus experimentis" said Pomponazzi, and "hoc scimus ex multis experimentis."

He was right also in his view of the way in which nature's "signs" are to be interpreted. We cannot learn nature's sequences, which constitute her language of signs, by an a priori perception of their necessity, but by an observation of them a posteriori. True, for us the action of a medicine has a previous probability, which does not belong to the connection between a crow and a calamity. But this anticipation of a probability rests altogether on our larger acquaintance with nature's language. A priori, or previous to all observation, one sequence is as likely as another. And Pomponazzi's position was that of one who, from a standpoint of most imperfect observation, suggested the true canon for the interpretation of nature.

Palmistry (chiromantia) he accepts only in so far as it is possible to set it on a rational basis. He treats it as a branch of physiognomy. If it is to be taken as a fact that there are lucky and unlucky days, it is a conjunction of which we do not know the cause; but there are other repugnances and concurrences in nature which we have to observe and accept as facts without being able to trace the reason of them. The rule is thus once more appealed to, that we must accept the data of experience, many of which will be to us strange and inexplicable.


3 Thus for example in chemistry, "medici ponunt...aliaqua simplicia esse invicem componibilia, et aliqua non, quorum causas ignoramus: sed tantum in eis dicimus..."
Love-philtres and charms he is more than inclined to doubt altogether, although he remarks, with probably unconscious humour, that they are not more unreasonable or improbable than the causes which actually do produce the amorous passion. And if the question be whether “words” can conjure up love—“verba,” a charm—in this sense “words” do so. If, at any rate, magic of this sort is to be admitted, it must be explained, says Pomponazzi, “insequendo viam naturae, et absque daemonibus.” He accordingly goes on to suggest possible analogies, and physical modes of explanation, for the action of spells and charms.

Pomponazzi occupies himself a good deal with the legendary transformations or “metamorphoses” of men into beasts—the turning of the companions of Diomede into birds, of the companions of Ulysses into swine or of certain Arcadians into wolves, as related by the poets. If these are not to be considered as mere fiction, he first suggests explanations which are in the technical sense “rationalistic.” Thus he quotes Pliny’s story about the gulls or water-fowl called the birds of Diomede, which cared for the shrine of Diomede on the island off Apulia, and were alleged to be friendly towards Greeks and hostile to men of other nations: improving upon it by an anecdote about the dogs of Rhodes which fawn upon natives of the island but bite strangers, and adducing the case of his own little dog which could not abide rustic and poorly clad persons. Similarly he supposes the stories about the swine and wolves to have arisen from metaphorical descriptions of a moral change and deterioration: men might become like wolves or swine in nature; and, he adds, by a characteristic refinement, a physical change might also attend the moral, and the men become wolfish or swinish in quoniam talia: quare etiam sic existimo de talibus diebus esse dicendum, aliqua enim dies conventi uni, quae alteri disconvenit.” Op. cit. p. 174.

4 Ibid.
countenance. He brings the case of Nebuchadnezzar under this rationalising explanation.

It is probable that even these suggestions are not more than half serious, and that he was quite aware that he was dealing here with fables. It was characteristic of his intellectual curiosity and dialectical habits, that he still could not resist the temptation to bring forward natural analogies to these metamorphoses. There are transformations in nature, he says, little less marvellous. Plants and trees are turned into stone; for this, he says, is undoubtedly the origin of the stone called "coral"; and he quotes a story from Albert and Avicenna of a tree which fell into the water and was metamorphosed, even a nest in it being turned to stone, birds and all! He instances the power of mineral springs to petrify objects laid in them, and goes the length of saying that drops of the water itself become small stones. Again, petrified animals are found (fossils). A caterpillar becomes a butterfly by a change than which hardly any could be imagined greater—a worm becoming a flying thing.

Coming now to phenomena more properly connected with religion, we find Pomponazzi maintaining the same attitude of mind. The miraculous pretensions of priests of his own day he places on a level of incredibility with such frauds in every

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The miracles related in Scripture he brings within the scope of the same explanations by which he proposes to account for similar portents in various times and lands. Let us take for example his enquiry into the nature of prophecy, in the sense of the power of divination and miraculous prediction. This gift was actually ascribed to the action of a good or evil spirit. The argument of St Thomas was this. All men have not the gift of prophecy: therefore a special cause must be assigned for the gift where it occurs. From the same causes arise only the same effects; and of each specific effect a new and specific cause must be found, in this case the demoniacal possession. Again, the gift of prophecy was supposed to fluctuate, and now to be in exercise and again not; the variation had to be accounted for, and was attributed to the arbitrary power of the demon, giving or withholding the gift according as he was pleased or displeased.

Pomponazzi met the demand for a causal explanation of these phenomena, but proposed to refer them to natural causes. A "natural" explanation for him meant an explanation partly physical and partly astrological, or rather one that was both simultaneously, in different aspects. Certain persons, he suggested, possess a disposition towards prophecy—a disposition of course created by the universal powers of nature which he called the "heavenly powers," and dependent for its exercise upon these influences. Upon these lines he gave a natural history of the prophetic gift. The gift thus implanted is at first only potential. Besides that original and potential disposition, there must also be an "immediate disposition," before the gift comes into actual exercise. Of this actual exercise of the gift he names two causes—one is that universal causality of nature which was

1 De Imm. xiv. p. 126; De Nat. Eff. p. 146, etc.
2 Op. cit. pp. 169; 276, 277; and esp. 293.
3 True oracles were assigned to angelic aid; the false oracles of the heathen were the work of devils; "In oraculis homines non loquuntur neque aliquid faciunt, verum daemones talia operantur ex idololatria commissa a cupidentibus scire quod petunt." Op. cit. p. 232.
5 "Satis remote et quasi in potentia." Ibid.
conceived by him as the "heavenly powers," and to refer any matter to which meant (as we should say) to refer it to natural causes. The other is some immediate incitement calling the innate power into exercise: such, for example, as the influence of music upon Elisha, who, although endowed with the prophetic gift, could not prophesy until the minstrel played\(^1\). Thus instead of the accepted theory of demoniacal possession Pomponazzi offers at once a natural and an astrological explanation\(^2\). For he held that a gift could come into play only on occasion of a certain celestial conjunction\(^3\).

It is true that all men have not the gift, and that, in those who possess it, it is of variable exercise: human oracles, for example, are not always true. But these variations are to be accounted for, without reference to the agency of spirits, by the variable operation of the causes named—that is, on the one hand, of the proximate cause which is the particular incitement (acting on the original endowment or \textit{dispositio in potentia} and producing the \textit{dispositio propinqua} or \textit{ultima}, the actual exercise of the gift); and, on the other hand, of the remote or ultimate causality of the heavenly powers\(^4\). He dwells particularly on the former, which we should call the "natural" causation of the prophetic state\(^5\).

\(^1\) "Rogatus a rege vaticinari non potuit nisi prius manu imposita super psalterium, ut deveniret ad ultimam dispositionem; quamvis enim Elisaeeus ex natura esset vates, non deducebatur tamen ad actum illum nisi ex illa imediata dispositione." \textit{Op. cit.} p. 226.

\(^2\) "Cum quieritur per quam dispositionem hujusmodi vaticinia operentur, in genere causae materialis, dicendum est illam remotam et illam propinquam esse (i.e. the original endowment and the particular incitement), de quibus diximus; quantum vero ad formalem et effectivam, est cognitione et simulitudo rerum habita a corporibus coelestibus." \textit{Op. cit.} pp. 226, 227.


\(^4\) Thus, he says, we read of the Sibyl in Virgil that she could not give her oracle without the divine \textit{afflatus}: "Hoc autem erat ex illa dispositione propinqua per quam habilitantur ad susciptendum divinos afflatus...et inde provenit ut non semper tales vates varicinentur, cum non semper sint dispositi, et aliquando magis, aliquando minus, secundum meliorem passi dispositionem, vel corporum coelestium: diversitas namque situum, utpotque conjunctionum vel oppositionum in ejusmodi effectibus, multum diversificat effectus." \textit{Op. cit.} pp. 225, 226.

\(^5\) "Cumque ulterior quae rerum sit in sic vaticinantium potestate sic disponi et vaticinari, haec dicitur quod non simpliciter: est enim deorum munus et corporum coelestium. Dico tamen...sicut natura adjuvat artem, sic et ars naturam; quare multa consuetudo et horum solicitudo et reliqua hujusmodi generis multum adjuvant
There is thus no question, as St Thomas had implied, of the same causes producing different effects—of the natural causes, as he supposed, remaining unchanged while the new facts of the prophetic state occur or its manifestations vary. On this ground St Thomas had invoked spiritual agency. But, says Pomponazzi, the natural causes do not remain unchanged: on the contrary it is their variation which accounts for the facts¹. He accordingly dismisses the spirit theory as a vulgar superstition². Combined, then, with an astrological explanation, we have a natural history of the prophetic afflatus. Its first condition is an original endowment of nature. The gift may take different forms, but it has its basis in a certain temperament common to all who possess it³. The melancholic was the poetic temperament; and we notice that Pomponazzi treats the endowment of the diviner as practically identical with that of the poet. Each was to him equally natural or equally supernatural⁴. Pomponazzi specifies the varieties of the prophetic gift: some seers, he says, have uttered oracles without understanding them, even like birds and beasts that give omens; others have had the power of interpreting their own dreams and oracles; others again, like Joseph and Daniel, without themselves seeing visions or pronouncing


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oracles, have interpreted those of others. Next, the gift is capable of being stirred up and the power brought into exercise by an external excitement, as Elisha's was by music. And, speaking generally, the gift, although of Divine communication, and not under the control of him who receives it, admits nevertheless of cultivation by art and practice. He does not enter into detailed illustration of this fact, he says, but leaves that to the enquirer; he lays down clearly, however, a general law.

A gift of nature, to Pomponazzi, does not necessarily mean a congenital gift. Some poets and prophets display their power from their birth. Others give evidence at least of its possession only after a time, and in some sense seem to acquire it: here Pomponazzi perhaps contradicts himself a little, having previously spoken of an original, though only "potential," disposition. Now he says, "multi efficiuntur vates post ortum, ubi prius erant ad hoc vale disimpositi," and instances some who had learned to be poets. He goes the length of saying that such persons change their nature, and from sanguinei become melancholici. It is interesting to note that this extension of the conception of "gift of nature" largely relieves it of its artificial and misleading character. For Pomponazzi the poetic or prophetic endowment still remained a gift of nature, not to be voluntarily controlled or acquired by study.

For, finally, it is to him the outstanding characteristic of the prophetic gift that it is not under the control of its possessor. As a gift of nature, it is not to be acquired. It is likewise largely incalculable in its action, a fact which Pomponazzi explains at once by its own nature and by its dependence on celestial combinations; and probably in Pomponazzi's mind these were not thought of as two different explanations.

In the same place Pomponazzi discusses the subject of

relics of the saints possessed (as was believed) of healing power. In this case St Thomas had used the same argument for angelic intervention as in the case of the gift of prophecy—the argument namely from the necessity of finding a sufficient cause of the varying effects produced through this means. If virtue resided, said St Thomas, in the bones, etc., themselves, then all such objects would possess the healing power; and they would exercise it upon all persons alike: neither of which consequences is in fact true. Therefore, he concluded, an angelic visitation is the cause of each act of healing. Pomponazzi denied the inference and offered a natural explanation of the facts. His explanation is twofold. First, he says, much may be assigned to the power of imagination and belief\(^1\); and this will explain why some are healed and not others\(^2\). Secondly, he accounts for the variation observed in phenomena of this class by a purely physiological explanation: persons differ in physical constitution; and so, he suggests, their bodies may have different effects, in relation, say, to various diseases, or to the diseases of various persons. This he says is a sufficient explanation, without resort to angelic agency, of the supposed fact of the relics of some persons and not of others possessing a healing property; and of their healing one person and not another\(^3\).

Pomponazzi next devotes a considerable space to the subject of answers to prayer, and endeavours to discover a possible explanation of the fact, which he is not prepared to dispute, that prayers are answered.

The instance he selects is one recorded by Valerius Maximus, of the inhabitants of Aquila whose prayers against long-continued rain were followed by the cessation of the rain, and also by an apparition of their patron saint, Celestinus. He also compares with this case that of the Bolognesi to whom appeared their patron saint, Petronius. He thus examines simultaneously

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the question of the efficacy of prayer and that of visions of the saints.

A direct causality in the act of prayer is of course out of the question. He also considers and dismisses the hypothesis of chance coincidence. He then suggests two possible explanations of the phenomena, the second in two slightly different forms.

The first natural explanation suggested is a highly strained theory of the power of the human mind over matter ascribed to Avicenna.

Although he does not himself accept this theory, Pomponazzi develops it in his usual impartial way. In nature, he says, there are material objects, such as certain herbs, trees, stones, etc., which have an influence upon the weather: then why not also the "animal spirits" in men, especially in a large number of men gathered together and desiring the same thing? Thus the human thought and wish should produce their own objects, not by way of mere illusion, but in physical reality. The effects thus produced by the mind in nature will be proportionate to

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the force and intensity of the mind's desires, and this will be the reason why the most earnest and heartfelt prayers are said to be the most effectual.

St Thomas had pressed the question why St Celestinus should appear in the abbey dedicated to his name and St Petronius in Bologna; and he had argued from this discrimination the really supernatural (i.e. angelic) character of the apparitions. But Pomponazzi shows how this can be accounted for on the physical theory; since, if the appearances in the air were due to physical influences proceeding from the onlookers, the result would naturally be in the case of those who looked to St Celestinus a vision of that saint, but a vision of St Petronius to those who held him as their patron. Accordingly Pomponazzi contrasts such a natural mode of explanation, just as he had done in the case of the gift of prophecy, with the theory of spiritual agencies; and he stigmatises the latter as a vulgar superstition.

Pomponazzi suggests further that this notion of the real connection between prayers and their fulfilment can be supported on astrological grounds. The bells, for example, rung by the Aquilani, if made of certain metals or under certain constellations, might have the same power over the weather which through the same influences resided in certain natural

1 "Hujusmodi autem effectus non semper succedunt, quoniam vel agens non est aeque potens, vel natura est magis rebellis, et multo validiora sunt promoventia ad unam partem quam ad contrarium. Unde si preces Aquilanorum non fuissent aeque potentes ut tunc fuerunt, et si non provenissent ab imo corde, fortassim tam cito imbens non fuissent expulsi. Quare dici consuevit, ut preces valeant, ab imo corde debent provenire, et esse ferventes: quoniam sic spiritus melius afficiuntur, et supra materiam sunt validiores; non ut flectant intelligentias (quoniam omnino sunt immutabiles) sed ut magis afficiantur." *Op. cit.* pp. 238, 239.


3 "Cum ignavum vulgus ista ignoraret, cum succedunt vota, dicunt Deos vel Sanctosuisse sibi propitios et orationes sibi fuisse gratas; cum vero non succedunt Deos et Sanctos esse iratos; quandoquidem haec talia habeant causam quam diximus." *Ibid.*
objects. And similar power might reside in men ("ex dono coeli"), just as certain men have the power of healing those that are possessed\(^1\). This is offered as an enlargement or modification of Avicenna's physical theory.

Eventually, however, he dismisses this whole explanation as far-fetched and inapplicable to the facts in question\(^2\).

His own theory of the connection between prayers and their fulfilment is a different one. It is that the prayers are included with the fulfilment in one Divine purpose, as a stage in it or incident of it—not indeed, in one sense, necessary to its accomplishment, but ordained in the course of its execution "for the good of men." It is not correct to say that prayers change God's purpose ("preces nihil novi induxerunt in Deum"), still less that the prayers cause their fulfilment ("neque preces induxerunt serenitatem"). It would be equally untrue to say that the prayers are worthless, seeing they are part of the Divine ordinance\(^3\). *Media* they are, but not causes of the fulfilment; an appointed step towards the execution of the Divine purpose\(^4\).

He lays stress on the idea that, while our prayers are *media*, they are not necessary to the fulfilment of the Divine purpose.


\(^3\) "Nec tamen dicemus preces fuisses vanæ neque non ordinatas ad finem...quoniam sunt media a Deo ordinata ut serenitatem consequantur." *Op. cit.* p. 244.

\(^4\) "Preces nihil novi induxerunt in Deum, ut manifestum est: neque preces induxerunt serenitatem, quando ex supposito solus Deus operatus est, cui cuncta ad natum parent. Nec tamen dicemus preces fuisses vanæ neque non ordinatas ad finem. Hoc igitur in hoc casu dicendum est, quod si quis recte consideraverit, videbit tamen preces operatas fuisses, id scilicet, quoniam sunt media a Deo ordinata ut serenitatem consequantur, nihil inducendo in Deo neque aliquid in aere, sive movendo localiter, sive alterando, neque realiter neque spiritualiter. Aquilani itaque tantum executi sunt voluntatem et ordinem Dei, qui vult talem effectum producere ipsis Aquilanis sic precentibus: et tunc dicitur Aquilanos fuisses exstantibus, quoniam quod petebant habuerunt, cum tamen nihil in Deo causarint neque effective concurrerint ad talem effectum." *Op. cit.* pp. 244, 245.
This determines his whole view of prayer, to which I shall refer presently\(^1\). In this way he answers an objection which he imagines might reasonably be brought forward—namely, that the fulfilment of the prayer, as for example a change in the weather, is a matter of necessity and due to necessary causes; whereas the offering of the prayer is contingent on the human will. The answer is that the appointed connection, in the Divine will, between the prayers and their fulfilment is not a causal connection. The result is not produced by our prayers and may be without our prayers; as, on the other hand, the prayers may be offered without being followed by a fulfilment. For indeed, he goes so far as to say, the prayers do not exist, are not offered, for the sake of the fulfilment. The true end and object of prayer, his point is to affirm, is not the fulfilment, but something else\(^2\).

This brings us to the very interesting theory which Pomponazzi develops, of the nature and use of prayer. Prayer does not secure its fulfilment by a necessary causation; conversely the obtaining of the fulfilment is not necessary to the utility and benefit of prayer, for, as Pomponazzi puts it, the prayer does not exist for the sake of that result. Prayers often go unfulfilled; yet they are not therefore useless (\textit{vanae}). He distinguishes two ends (\textit{fines}) of prayer: a “separable” and an “inseparable” end. The former is “\textit{ad obtinendum votum, utpote sanitatem}”; “\textit{et hic finis est secundarius, et multotiens frustratur}.” The latter is “\textit{pietas et in Deum religio}”; and “\textit{nunquam frustrari potest, si ardentì mentì sit}.” Whether therefore we obtain the things we ask or not, we ought still to pray; for indeed it may be better for us to be refused than to be heard. This may be so in two ways. In the first place, the refusal may exalt our piety to a higher level; and in an argument that reminds us of the \textit{De Immortalitate}, Pomponazzi claims that it is a higher virtue to


\(^{2}\) “\textit{Pro hominum bono ordinavit tale medium.”} Cf. \textit{op. cit.} p. 248, “\textit{Imbres possunt fugari absque precibus nostris; et nostrae preces possunt esse non sequentibus propulsionibus imbrìum, ut manifestum est; neque sequitur preces ordinari ad talia, esseque causales.”}
pray disinterestedly than to insist upon our desires. Again, it may be better for us that our prayers should remain unanswered, when we have asked for something that would do us harm. It is in this sense that Plato and other philosophers have commanded us to pray; we are not, according to Plato, to say, "O God, give us this," but in the words of the poet cited by him we are to say—"Give, O God, both to those who pray and to all men all that is good; and avert all evil from them that seek of Thee."

In this sense prayers are a good thing and never useless or vain. They always fulfil their end where they are sincere ("si ardentia mente sint"). But they are in a sense an end to themselves as constituting in men piety and virtue.

Pomponazzi takes the opportunity of vindicating the philosophers from the charge of impiety. On this view of prayer, he


says, true prayer is never in vain. It is the common view, on the other hand, which makes all those prayers vain that do not obtain their request. As always, Pomponazzi is concerned to claim the highest ethical worth and sanction for the view which he believes to be the more scientific. And he finds in the tendency to measure prayer by its visible results and identify the efficacy of prayer with material fulfilments, only a fresh instance of the earthly and materialistic habit of the vulgar mind, which sees worth only in bodily satisfactions. It deems that the inward and spiritual exist for the sake of the material, while the truth is the exact contrary of this.

Pomponazzi adds a further explanation of fulfilled prayers, which he introduces as a third theory but treats as practically a modification (which it is) of the theory just described. It is that a certain state of mind, represented by devout prayer, constitutes a condition or "disposition" upon which God can give his gifts in answer. In this sense the prayer has a real part in its own fulfilment.

This idea of prayer, and of religiousness in general, as a *dispositio* which, without changing God or the heavenly powers, yet introduces a condition on which an intended gift can be given, brings religion itself more expressly within the operation of the Divine purposes.

This turn of his thought accordingly gives Pomponazzi the first opportunity of introducing his characteristic conception of the several religions as Divinely ordained and favoured by the celestial influences. Each of them in its time and place might constitute such a "recta et ordinata dispositio" as might afford the occasion for a Divine response to prayers duly offered. He

1 "Ex his sequitur, falso philosophos criminari de impietate, et quod secundum philosophos non debent Dii orari, quandoquidem non sint flexibles, neque nostras audiant preces: patet autem secundum philosophos Deos esse orandos, neque unquam preces esse vanas, quandoquidem finis per se est inseparabilis qui longe praestantior est fine per accidens. Verum, secundum vulgares, preces videntur esse vanae, si quod petitur non impetratur. Exsistant enim felicitatem consistere in bonis corporalibus: creduntque virtutes et spiritualia ordinari in corporalia, quoniam tantum illa percipiunt. Non vera religio tenet hoc sed vulgus prophanum: et revera qui de philosophia non participat, bestia est." Op. cit. pp. 250, 251.


3 "Intendens namque finem, intendit ea quae sunt ad finem." Ibid.
instances marvellous events occurring under the Christian, the Hebrew, the Roman religions.

In this connection (leaving the line of thought he had just been following with regard to prayers unfulfilled, and returning to the topic of portents and other recognised answers to prayer) he reverts to the combined astrological and natural explanations which we have already examined. In dreams, he says, the form of Divine communication, the subject of the vision, differs according to the particular religious belief of the time and country: why not also in other communications? These differences of peoples and religions are of course referred to astral influences. Simultaneously he relapses into the thoroughly sceptical and rationalising supposition that the phenomena witnessed by the Aquilani and the Bolognesi might be physically identical, although those affected by them interpreted them according to their respective religious prepossessions.

This last explanation, then, by the place each religion occupies in the designs of the heavenly powers—“recta et ordinata dispositio”—has the advantage of explaining not answers to prayer only, but all the (so-called) supernatural or abnormal phenomena connected with the religions.

The view thus suggested, of the various religions of history, was further developed by Pomponazzi in answer to another question.

The question was asked—Why did the heathen oracles cease at the coming of the Saviour? And this raised the previous question—By what power were the oracles and miracles of pre-Christian religion produced? The accepted answer was that heathen oracles and wonders were the work of demons, and that at Christ’s coming the devil was deprived of his power—“cast out” and “bound.”

3 “Uterque tamen modus stare potest; et iste secundus modus dictus, est multum conformis his quae visa sunt in aere...et reliquis quae facta fuerunt non intercedentibus precibus.” Ibid.
This view of the matter naturally did not commend itself to Pomponazzi. He sought instead to bring the history of religions, with all other facts in experience, under the general laws of nature. Ultimately of course for him this meant to refer the facts in question to the Divine Will, working through the celestial powers; and, incidentally, he states with unusual clearness that the "celestial" agencies were really the instruments of the Divine causality. But besides this general assertion of the Divine causality in them, he brings the whole phenomena of religious history—the changes of religious belief, and the phases of thaumaturgic power—under certain universal laws of nature. Of these facts as of all others, he suggests, there is a natural and a rational explanation; in them the powers that are at work in all nature are still operative; and they are subject to the laws and conditions that govern nature generally—the laws of change, of development, of growth and decay, and transformation in decay.

Accordingly, in undertaking to explain the cessation of the heathen oracles, he sets out from some highly general considerations about the law of change in mortal things. Whatever has begun, he says, must cease to be: its duration is limited, and it has its appointed stages of growth and decay. Once more, every mortal thing, when it passes away, generates in its decline something different from itself.

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1 "Quod igitur ex aliquibus verbis vel signis factisque in alicuius Dei existimati reverentia aliquando prosint, aliquando vero non prosint, non ex toto est extra rationem. Secundum enim communiter nunc opinantes hoc provenit ex arte daemonum vel angelorum: verum verisimilior videntur haec fieri ex corpore coelestium dispositione, in virtute tamen principali Dei et intelligentiarum moventium talia corpora coelestia." (Op. cit. pp. 288, 289.)

With great deliberation he applies the law of origin, growth, and decline to religions. Changes, then, in religion are appointed by the heavenly powers, and accomplished according to the universal law of natural mutation. We see the Divine Hand in the rise and fall of empires, for instance Rome and Persia: why not then in the succession of religious systems, which are both greater and more enduring than earthly kingdoms?

It is a consequence of this conception that the thaumaturgic powers, which according to Pomponazzi depend upon certain natural causes and certain astral influences, are transferred at each epoch of change to that system of religious belief and practice which holds the pre-eminence.

Here, also, as we have previously seen, we find the explanation of accepted and successful prayer. That prayer has power with God which is offered according to the forms and in the spirit of the religion which is in the ascendant at any particular period of time—of the religion, I think we may say, interpreting the spirit and intention of Pomponazzi's thought, although perhaps going beyond the letter, which is the highest that the world has reached at each stage of its history.

The same principle accounts for the validity of charms and


3 "Nam veluti nunc orationes factae valent ad multa, sic tempore illorum deorum hymni dicti in eorum laudem proficiebant tunc: proficiebant autem quoniam tunc sidera illis favebant diis; nunc vero non favebant, quoniam propitia sunt istis qui nunc sunt." Op. cit. p. 288.
exorcisms, and for the invalidity of the same things at other times\(^1\). He applies this idea of a relative and temporary efficacy to the crucifix of the Christian, as well as to the sacred symbols of other faiths\(^2\).

It is a leading idea with Pomponazzi that the thaumaturgic powers resident (under celestial influence) in man and in nature have their most marked activity on occasion of the initiation of a new religion. At such times men present themselves gifted with unusual powers. And in this he sees a peculiar fitness and Divine intention, seeing that the change from one religion to another is so momentous in itself and so difficult to effect\(^3\).

He describes the powers possessed by such men, whom, he says, we may justly call "sons of God." They reveal mysteries, they predict the future; they heal the sick, and have power even over the winds and seas, and the elements of nature. Without these powers, the great task of planting a new religion could not be accomplished\(^4\). At the same time he sees in such powers only what is natural—only a particular manifestation of forces and potentialities permanently resident in different degrees in various beings in nature\(^5\).

He lays stress on the vocation of the founders of religions. But through the operation of the same powers by which they exercise their office, such persons are predicted beforehand, and followed afterwards by others who share their peculiar endowment. These successors, at least for a time, wield the same

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1 See note 1, p. 299.


Divine power (*deitatem*)—either deriving it from their founder as iron touched by a magnet becomes a magnet itself, or obtaining it directly from the same source as the founder.

Exceptional powers of this sort are not, in the belief of Pomponazzi, confined to one religion; but the like miracles as are recorded of the beginning of the Christian religion attended the foundation of the Mosaic and Pagan and Mohammedan religions. And it is in this connection that Pomponazzi explains that what he means by a miracle is not anything contrary to nature or to the orderly working of the heavenly powers, but only an operation very rare and infrequent, and out of the usual course of nature.

Besides a natural origin and growth, religions have also their decay. The time comes to each to decline and give way to another. Religious systems may stand so long that this truth has become obscured: the law of change seems not to apply to them, and it looks as if they had always been and were to endure for ever. But it is not really so.

Finally, Pomponazzi applies this law of change and necessity of decline to Christianity itself. It had its origin with signs and portents, and marvellous powers persisting for a time; but now, he says, it is evident that these powers have declined, and a chill and lethargy as of death are falling once more upon a religion

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1 "Non solum unus talis primus est sed sunt etiam multi qui vel eandem deitatem ab eodem primo recipiunt vel eam recipiunt a consimili influxu intendente dictam legem perficerent.... Unde videmus tales legum conditores per multa vaticinia et multos prophetas certitudinaliter praedici per multa secula ante: videmus in eorum ortu magna prodigia, in eorum vita suspensiora: et si lex illa debet multum propagari, ille legifer multos habet sequaces, qui vel deitatem ab illo recipiunt, sicut aliquod ferrum, ex virtute quam recipit a magnete, ferrum aliud potest trahere, vel ab eadem influentia, quae est pro illo legifero." *Op. cit.* p. 284.


that has passed its prime and is moving towards the end of its appointed period.  

A further idea, more obscurely indicated, is that of a *returning cycle* of religious forms. Albert had spoken of a periodicity in the gifts of heaven: Aristotle had remarked how philosophy repeats itself and the same ideas recur. So the forms of religion, while perpetually succeeding one another, and, as individuals, of a possibly infinite number, are not infinite "secundum species." They come "per circulum et vicissitudines." With regard to religious forms it holds true that "nihil est quod simile non fuerit, et consimile non erit: nihil erit quod non fuit, nihil fuit quod non erit." Although he does not illustrate these remarks by examples, they show that Pomponazzi had observed the common features and parallelisms of different religions. But it is true at the same time that no individual perishable thing can either last for ever or return identically the same a second time; no earthly existence or institution can escape the law of change. Thus, he says, it is proved by reason as well as by history, that religions are subject to a natural law of growth and decline.


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